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Abstract 
One-Sentence Summary 
This study assesses agonism's practical possibilities for constructive, rather than destructive, 
outcomes arising from state-society strife, by drawing on the case of the Johannesburg city 
administration. 
 
 
250-Word Summary 
Increasing citizen protest against the state in recent years seem to point to the 'failure' of the 
state and democracy globally. Particularly in South Africa, the 'miracle' of the transition from 
apartheid highlights the apparent shortcomings of the new democracy in serving all its citizens, 
especially low-income communities, but also middle-class ones.  
The story behind protest is complex, with many forms of state-society strife unfolding in the 
public realm – not only those staged in the streets. In a world largely based on consensus-
seeking western democratic governance practices, the state makes every effort to implement 
participation processes targeting citizen agreement for plans, policies and projects.  
Using agonism as a prism to view state-society strife, conflict is shown to be not necessarily a 
destructive force but an inevitable and sometimes constructive agent for democratic change. 
The main question asks what the practical possibilities are of applying concepts of agonism to 
the state-society relationship in cases of conflict, from the perspective of those working within 
the state. 
Stories of city strife about urban governance issues in Johannesburg are told through a case 
study based on documentary analysis and interviews with state-affiliated respondents. The 
investigation into these conflicts, through the previously unapplied lens of agonism provides 
fresh insights into protest, potentially contributing to a new narrative showing that actualising 
agonism has real possibilities for considering conflict as a constructive force for change. 
Further, this has implications for both the national South African and global democratic 
discourse on the intersection between governance practices and protest. 
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Chapter 1 | Strife and the State: The Research Agenda 
1 Introduction 
Scenes of frequently aggressive and sometimes violent protest in the streets by citizens 
worldwide, but particularly in South Africa in the form of 'service delivery' protests (as in Box 
1.1 below), seem to be on the increase. Many in recent years believe, arguably, that such 
protest symbolises the 'failure' of the state and of democracy, with citizens at loggerheads 
with the state for not matching its practices of governance with their expectations of 
democracy. In South Africa, the hard-won 'miracle' of the unexpectedly peaceful nature of the 
country's transition from apartheid regime to democracy has lost valuable ground to 
burgeoning dissension. 
The story behind 'service delivery protest' (defined in Table 1.1 on page 3) in South Africa is a 
far more nuanced one than it seems on the surface, with public protest by low-income and 
middle-class communities taking place daily on streets and in boardrooms of the state. In a 
world where democracies support the right to protests but are largely consensus-seeking, the 
state undertakes numerous participation measures that aim to obtain agreement of citizens 
for its policies, plans and projects. In the lexicon of the state and democracy, state-society 
strife is largely seen as undesirable and not congruent with democratic principles. 
However, the notion of 'agonism', developed by Mouffe (2000b), seems to offer a different 
view of the state's engagement in processes of 'strife'. Here, conflict is not necessarily 
destructive but 'agonistic', inevitable, and can sometimes be a creative and constructive force 
for democratic change (see brief definition of 'agonism' and other new terms in Table 1.1 on 
page 3). 
Box 1.1: Scene of Violent Street Protest 
 
"Violent service protests erupted… where police and… residents clashed in street battles.  
Neither side would accept responsibility for the clashes and violence which left 19 people, 
including a policeman, injured. Police arrested 13 demonstrators for public violence. 
The violence began when police opened fire on protesters after they refused to disperse when law enforcement officers from the 
Joburg metro police… told them their march was illegal. 
Taunting police with protest songs, chanting demonstrators, who demanded that they hand over their memorandum to President 
Jacob Zuma, repeatedly clashed with officers throughout the day, blocking roads with large metal rubbish bins, rubble, refuse and 
burning tyres.  
Police, on foot and in armoured vehicles, repeatedly chased residents off the streets as they tried to enforce a 'curfew' in the area 
in an effort to contain the violence. 
The violence spread throughout the township, with plumes of black smoke signalling the burning tyre roadblocks set up by the 
protesters. 
…Those who refused to obey police orders to remain indoors were shot at with rubber bullets.  
Many business owners and residents claimed they were forced to shut their shops and join the protest by instigators…" 
 
Source: Extract from article on service delivery protest in the Diepsloot informal settlement: "Cops open fire as residents run amok" 
(ioL News Online 2009a) 
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Table 1.1: New Terms in Brief 
Term  Meaning 
agonism (noun) A form of conflict between two opponents in the sense of Mouffeian 
(2000b) agonism, based on the theoretical notion that this conflict is a vital and 
necessary facet of democracy and is a positive force for change; the opponents 
recognise the legitimacy of each other's view; the state embraces conflict and 
keeps the space continuously open for expressions of dissensus, rather than 
seeking consensus. 
agonistic (adjective) Derived from 'agonism'; describes any attribute of democracy and the 
state and its institutions; its principles, ethos, practices, processes, behaviour, 
governance, conflict management and responses; and any state-society 
interactions or engagements, in line with the tenets of agonism. Likewise, the 
adverb form, 'agonistically', is used to describe any of the above. 
consensus (noun) In a consensus, individuals agree to support a decision made by the group – 
they give their consent – even if they do not all necessarily agree with it. 
service delivery (noun) The institution of government, its resources, personnel and relevant 
processes that are involved in the provision of any essential or other service, as 
well as the service itself, to the public, such as the supply of water and electricity, 
refuse removal, street cleaning, public transport, infrastructure investment, health 
services, housing, parks, street trading stalls, social amenities, billing, parking, and 
the like. Taken in the broader context it has come to mean, in South Africa, as 
encompassing less tangible improvements to benefit citizens, and as part of the 
reshaping of the notion of democracy. 
service delivery 
protest 
(noun) Any form of protest by citizens against perceived shortcomings of services 
delivered by the state; the protest is typically in the public eye by means of media 
coverage or highly visible street protest; service delivery protest staged by low-
income or middle-class citizens usually targets local government's unacceptable 
service delivery whether real or perceived. See ‘service delivery’ and ‘street 
protest’. 
street protest  (noun) Any protest, whether peaceful or violent, motivated by any cause, taking 
place in a street or public place where citizens gather to register an objection to 
any issue (noun).See also 'protest'. 
strife (noun) Any processes of conflictual interactions over issue under contention 
between the state and society (or city and citizen in the case study). 
Source: Own formulation; see more terms and details in Appendix 1 (Glossary) on page 304 
This leads to the broad question asked in this research: what are the practical possibilities of 
applying the concepts of agonism to the state-society relationship, in cases of open conflict, to 
governance practices of the state, considering the view of those working within the state? 
Issues of governance in the case of the state-society strife related to service delivery in the city 
of Johannesburg are studied through the prism of agonism to determine if any elements of 
agonistic principles could be identified in the state's efforts at conflict management and 
resolution. This research aims to offer a fresh narrative about conflict and protest based on the 
agonistic notion that conflict is a normal and potentially constructive force in any democratic 
forum. This research agenda has far-reaching implications for both the national South African 
and global discourse on democratic governance. Furthermore, state practitioners might gain 
valuable alternative insights on state-society strife (see Figure 1.1 on page 4 for overview of 
research agenda). 
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Figure 1.1: Overview of Research Agenda 
Significance of the Research
Different way to assess
combination of new and
established material about
conflict, and stimulate de-
bate on views of governance,
protest and state-society
link; further, the research:
• Contributes to global
debates about demo-
cracy
• Explores the notion of
agonism
• Provides new views on
protest
• Uses a local lens to view
the larger questions of
protest, state-society
relationships, service de-
livery and conflict in
governance
Broad Research Question
Based on an understanding of dissensus in democracy and governance,
and on protests and responses thereto in post-1994 Johannesburg,
what are the practical possibilities of applying agonistic principles to
future state-society strife, drawing from cases of open conflict,
considering the view of those working within the state of its
governance practices?
Argument
The state has the potential to see conflict in new ways to improve
state-society strife; to recognise the centrality of conflict; and to adopt
an ethos of agonism in governance, but many constraints limit this
potential.
Aim
To explore the nature of protest against the state in post-apartheid
Johannesburg and the state’s response thereto, using agonism as a
prism to enquire about the potential for agonistic state-society
practices within processes of conflict about service delivery; and the
nature of the dissensus from the perspective of those working within
the state especially where conflict is incorporated as a constructive
rather than destructive force.
 
Source: Own formulation 
2 Problem Statement and Study Rationale 
The increase in street protest and other related processes of city strife in metropolitan areas 
globally in recent years is perplexing to the democratic state, which largely views conflict as an 
undesirable aspect of democracy and to some extent as a 'failure', or at least a breakdown, of 
the state-society relationship, if not of the principles of democracy itself. This dilemma is set 
within the context of citizens' perceptions about what democracy ought to be and ought to 
deliver and whether democracy and the state are indeed failing to meet citizen expectations, 
as detailed further in Chapter 2, and Chapter 4 on page 77 (Meyer, D. & Tarrow 1998; Scott, J. 
1998; Diamond 2005a; Little 2008; Kagwanja & Kondlo 2009; Alexander 2010; Gaon 2010; 
Roefs & Atkinson 2010; Heller & Evans 2011; Marinova 2011; Moreno 2011) 
The nature of the state-society relationship, the influences on the state's engagement in 
processes of conflict, the negativity associated with street protest and the myriad processes of 
all sorts of public strife between the state and its citizens has become a challenge globally. The 
challenge is compounded by the state's perceptions of the impact of street-based and other 
conflict on state governance and the environment as a seemingly negative one. 
The study responds to this apparent impasse in democratic governance through the case of 
city strife in Johannesburg. Although the study considers many types of protest by citizens and 
not just those in the streets, it is the street protests that are thought to be able to topple South 
Africa's "fragile stability" (Beall, Gelb et al. 2005). Street protests are seen as a threat to the 
credibility of the state and the social order of the country especially in the face of the 
significant scale of "social problems, which were apartheid's legacy" (ibid., p. 681), and so 
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receive greater attention in the literature than other types of protest. Other democratic 
countries also seem to be experiencing this kind of challenge, albeit in somewhat different 
guises.  
As problematising protest in this way does not seem very useful so far, the rationale of the 
study is to find a different way of understanding and articulating the state's actions in strife; to 
provide new knowledge and insight about this deep social impasse being encountered; and 
enquire about the potential of agonistic practices to deal with conflict constructively. The 
study considers the issues from the perspective of those working within the state, and is 
motivated by the interest of the author of this thesis as a professional formerly within the 
state. Although the perspective of protesting groups in society has been well considered in 
others' research, that of the state has been only minimally addressed so far. 
Most forms of democratic governance worldwide generally implicitly emphasise the 
attainment and maintenance of the principles of consensus and agreement, as shown in 
Chapter 2. Currently most states operate on the understanding that although conflict is not 
necessarily regarded as a sign of a weak or 'failed' state, or democracy per se (Scott, J. 1998; 
Diamond 2005b), it is generally regarded as negative, as a threat to the state's legitimacy and 
as something needing speedy resolution through rational argument to secure and maintain 
peace. What most states fail to recognise adequately is that a healthy democracy needs 
conflict to serve as checks and balances to ensure that the government is consistently and 
truly democratic and that the interests of all parties are seriously taken into account in 
decision-making. 
In South Africa, implicit in the democratic discourse is the notion that the 1994 elections 
marked the end of the extremely divisive apartheid era and symbolically ended the deep 
conflicts within its society. Despite a seemingly 'miraculous' transition to a fledgling democracy 
(Southall 2001, p. 1), based on the then-new social compact embedded in the Constitution 
(Republic of South Africa [RSA] 1996a) and numerous reconciliation and peace-building 
measures, the intervening years have offered up an increasingly different picture. South 
African citizens have vociferously demonstrated "the need for greater urgency in broadening… 
service delivery interventions… [and] a worrisome reversal in trust in virtually all major public 
institutions" (Roberts, B., wa Kivilu et al. 2010, p. 5). Despite major strides in service delivery 
(Roefs & Atkinson 2010, p. 58), anti-local-government sentiment is high according to recent 
attitude surveys by the state (Pillay, Roberts et al. 2006; COJ, 2010g; Roberts, B. et al. 2010; 
Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2013). 
This citizen dissatisfaction directed at perceived and real shortcomings of the state seem to 
materialise increasingly as street protests. In setting the scene for this research, the 
developmental ideology of the South African state emphasises service delivery over concepts 
of real transformation (Picard 2005). As is true of most other democracies worldwide, the 
nature of the relationship of the South African state with its citizens is a largely 'customer-
centric' one. However, citizens' expectations have been created by, and are embodied in, the 
state's diverse initiatives within various policies, legislation and programmes. The modus 
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operandi of the state seems constructed in a way that the majority of citizens feel they have 
only limited effective ways of interaction with the state; hence, they embark on street-based 
protest to attract the attention of the state to their concerns (Booysen 2007; von Holdt, Langa 
et al. 2011).  
Indeed, the very concept of 'service delivery' means so much more than the mere delivery of 
services. 'Service delivery' is burdened with complexities of meanings about the quality of life 
as well as being interwoven with politics and the shaping of democracy, as Chapter 4 
elaborates. For state administrators, 'service delivery' protests are but one component of a far 
broader range of conflicts playing out between the state and its citizens. Behind the visible 
street protests lie countless other untold processes of less visible strife between the city 
administration and citizens that might or might not play out in the streets or in boardrooms. In 
a world founded on consensus-seeking democracy, protest against the state's plans can be 
frustrating for the state, especially when it has gone to great lengths to design and implement 
initiatives that facilitate citizens' participation in decision-making.  
This state-society contestation seems at odds with the principle of co-operation underpinning 
democracy. However, the dissensus-centred 'agonistic democracy' seems to offer an 
alternative view of conflict as integral to the state-society relationship and as a constructive 
force to attain the ideals of democracy. Certainly, the current public discourse centred on 
conflict as destructive is only partly helpful in unravelling the full story of the role of conflict in 
democracy. 
In Mouffe's (2000b) agonism, conflict is understood as an essential and permanent component 
of everyday democracy, something to be brought out into the open and to be transformed by 
the state, from negative antagonism to positive agonism. Peace and consensus are regarded as 
impossible ideals due to the varying and competing needs of multiple interest groups, many of 
whom are not equal, with agreement not the end game of agonistic engagement. Indeed, the 
follower of agonistic principles, although these are few as agonism has been somewhat 
untested in practice, accepts that any agreement is short-lived and that the agonistic state 
emphasises keeping the democratic state open for future contestation.  
Could a possible starting point for a different, more productive and constructive engagement 
between the state and its citizens in South Africa lie in the application of agonistic principles? 
Such an approach seems to resonate with the vision for the empowerment of all citizens to 
participate fully in these processes of democratic governance (RSA 2011c, pp. 411-430). This 
thesis offers new insights into practices of governance in state-society strife by reviewing 
agonism as the object of the research, and as the prism for the research process, in the context 
of the case of city strife and governance in Johannesburg post-1994. This sort of empirical 
study, of the relationship between protests and state action and the resulting changes is 
minimal, worldwide (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995, p. 3). 
In terms of the puzzle driving this thesis, issues about state-society conflict in service delivery 
have pre-occupied the author for some time. As reflected on in this thesis – and in her own 
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experiences more directly as an official in government – these issues seem to remain 
perpetually side-lined and unresolved, and corrosive. This thesis allowed the author to 
interrogate a possibly misplaced expectation as a former official that these issues should be 
resolved. Perhaps, taking Mouffeian agonism on board, one cannot expect them ever to be 
resolved. At best, one can keep the space open for ongoing deliberation, dialogue and even 
dissensus about the unresolved issues and one should expect them then to be never-ending 
issues. Or, from a more liberal perspective, these issues could have reached some point of 
resolution but seem to fail to do so. Do they? If so, why? If so, Chapter 3, on methods, 
discusses the author's positionality in more detail (on page 41). 
3 Research Questions and Aim 
The research explores the nature of public protest against the state in post-apartheid 
Johannesburg and the state's response to that protest using agonism as a prism to enquire 
about the potential for agonistic state-society interactions within existing processes of conflict 
about service delivery in Johannesburg. Related to this, the research identifies the 
opportunities and limitations of the translation of the notion of agonism into governance 
practices by the state. Furthermore, the research casts light on the nature of state-society 
conflict about service delivery from the perspective of those working within the state, 
especially in those interactions that result in the incorporation of conflict as a productive and 
constructive force for deeper democratic governance and outcomes. Thus the overarching 
question driving the research agenda is: 
What are the practical possibilities of applying concepts of agonism to the state's governance 
practices in future state-society strife, drawing from cases of open conflict, in considering the 
perspective of those working within the state? 
This topical question leads to two lines of questioning, the first being about agonism, and the 
second about strife. These parallel lines of questioning then converge to address the 
overarching question as outlined in Figure 1.2 on page 8. The research draws on both 
traditions of realism and idealism, combining inductive and deductive approaches in the 
assessment of the notion of agonism and processes of city strife. Notwithstanding state-
society strife and the state's apparent negative stance on conflict, the research asks to what 
extent agonistic processes, as opposed to antagonistic ones, have unfolded that have drawn 
on conflict for productive outcomes. Such outcomes might include the deepening of 
democracy, the betterment of the quality of life for all citizens, and other more tangible 
outcomes related to the improvement of service delivery.  
In consideration of the first, and theoretical-conceptual, line of questioning about agonism, the 
interrogation turns to the application of the tenets of agonism, not only understanding how 
the concept of agonism is translated into practice, but how it is used as an analytical tool in the 
study of conflict, leading to further theoretical queries about the use of agonism. Thus, 
drawing on the academic literature on agonism and other works on conflict and democracy, 
the first sub-question raised is: 
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1) What does the literature say about dissensus in democracy and governance, and what is 
agonism's appeal and how does it feature in the discourse on dissensus; how have writers 
translated agonism into practice at the institutional level; and how have they applied 
agonism as a research tool? 
Next, in consideration of the second, and descriptive-analytical, line of questioning about 
state-society strife, the research turns to the second two-part inquiry about the nature of the 
protests over time, asking to what extent agonism featured in the state's responses and what 
outcomes resulted from these processes of strife. Given the scope and scale of the complexity 
of state-society strife, the next two inductive sub-questions are asked, in the context of the 
city administration of Johannesburg:  
2) In considering the case of local government, what types of protests characterised post-
apartheid Johannesburg; how did the service delivery strife unfold over time; and how did 
the city administration respond to the protests? 
3) To what extent are the city administration's practices agonistic; do these practices result in 
outcomes beneficial for citizens; and what are the constraints to agonistic practices of 
governance? 
4) These questions are answered by means of an empirically grounded descriptive-analytical 
assessment of city strife in Johannesburg over time, since the first national democratic 
elections in 1994, using data derived from document reviewing and interviewing 
strategies, and data analysis through the techniques of document analysis and case study 
formulation. 
Figure 1.2: Diagram of Research Questions 
OVERARCHING QUESTION 
What are the practical possibilities of applying concepts of agonism to the state's governance practices in future state-society 
strife, drawing from cases of open conflict, in considering the perspective of those working within the state? 
 
             theoretical-conceptual                                                                                                                                                               descriptive-analytical 
 ❶ 
What does the literature say about dissensus in 
democracy and governance, and what is 
agonism's appeal and how does it feature in the 
discourse on dissensus; how have writers 
translated the notion of agonism into practice at 
the institutional level; and how have they applied 
agonism as a research tool? 
  ❷ 
In considering the case of local government, what 
types of protests characterised post-apartheid 
Johannesburg; how did the service delivery strife 
unfold over time; and how did the city 
administration respond to the protests? 
 
 ❸ 
To what extent were the city administration's 
practices agonistic; did these practices result in 
outcomes beneficial for citizens; and what were 
the constraints to agonistic practices of 
governance? 
 
 
Source: Own formulation 
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Armed then with a deep understanding of the actually-existing practices in stories of strife 
post-apartheid, speculation about the future practical application of agonistic principles and 
about the value of the tool of agonism in studying processes of conflict, and what the city 
administration could try differently in the future, seems possible. The two lines of iterative 
query are then drawn together to close the loop on the theoretical-conceptual and descriptive-
analytical questioning, and return to the overarching question. The insights gained from the 
case study of Johannesburg can also inform thinking about future city strife further afield 
locally and internationally. Hence, insights emphasising the state's view and handling of strife 
enable conclusions that could contribute to governance processes yielding improved outcomes 
in terms of deepening democracy and providing a better quality of life.  
4 Significance of Research 
This research demonstrates not only a different way of assessing the combination of new 
material with material already well researched, but also stimulates debate on views of 
practices of governance, protest and the state-society link. Further, the significance of the 
study is its contribution to the field in the four areas detailed next. 
Firstly, global debates about the meaning of conflict in democracy abound, as dissension seems 
to be on the rise internationally with movements such as the Arab Spring and the Occupy 
movement taking front stage in recent years. The South African case is a powerful democratic 
narrative with insights for academics and practitioners of other democracies, although it is not 
a unique case if one considers the recent conflicts in also the United Kingdom, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Greece, Russia, former communist states of Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America, and 
other countries that have also experienced rapid change. South Africa is evocative as a 
democratic archetype that exists in extremis – with rapid transitions from oppression to 
liberation and from exhilaration to despondency – all transpiring over a relatively short period 
of less than two decades. The findings of the study could inform international contexts as well, 
but cognisance must be paid to the specific circumstances of their individual democratic 
accounts. 
Secondly, although the topic of governance has been researched in a number of ways, the 
exploration of the notion of agonism brings to light hitherto overlooked insights into 
democratic governance practices by the state in the case study. Agonism has already been 
discussed at the politico-philosophical and theoretical level in the literature. However, there is 
a paucity of works connecting practices of governance to the debate on the notion of agonism 
in democracy, and the stories of strife at the local level, where the objectives of democracy are 
chiefly realised, have remained largely untold by researchers and, and vice versa. The few 
writings available on agonistic governance practices are limited to mainly stable democratic 
contexts such as the United Kingdom and Northern Europe, Australia, some Scandinavian 
countries and a few isolated instances elsewhere, such as the work on South Africa by Pieterse 
(2006a, b, 2008). This thesis narrows the gap between the notion of agonistic democracy and 
its practical application in local-level governance through the stories of city strife in 
Johannesburg.  
Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 10 
Thirdly, clearly there is a social and political democratic challenge in South Africa, one that 
needs to be thought about differently if the country is to make progress. The primary impact of 
the study is to provide new views on protest about service delivery through the application of 
the different perspective of agonism to stories of city strife, in both its highly visible and less 
visible forms. 
Lastly, Johannesburg is used as a local lens to view the larger questions of protest, state-society 
relationships, service delivery, and the meaning of conflict for practices of governance. 
Johannesburg's experience is not unique. Although the case study findings are Johannesburg-
specific thus having limitations in respect of generalisability, they nonetheless, provide 
opportunities for practitioners within state structures in South Africa, and internationally, to 
make comparisons and gain practical insights into how the agonistic management of conflict 
might support democratic objectives.  
5 Scope of Study 
Firstly, the scope of the research agenda is geographically limited to South Africa with an 
emphasis on the city of Johannesburg. However, it draws also on international literature and 
insights from other democratic contexts globally to highlight specific issues as appropriate. A 
comprehensive comparison of Johannesburg to other South African and international cases 
was not attempted as the Johannesburg case alone is complex. However, the empirical work, 
while locally focused on conflict and agonism in Johannesburg, can be applied within the larger 
context of South Africa. Further, Johannesburg as the largest city in South Africa is supposedly 
a useful exemplar of worldwide urbanisation trends (McIlwaine 1997), and thus could cast light 
on other issues elsewhere globally.  
Secondly, the research focuses mainly on texts and data from the post-apartheid period after 
the 1994 elections up until mainly 2013, whilst also incorporating some pre-1994 material 
deemed significant in understanding how the foundations of the South African democratic 
state-society and city governance were laid, impacting on current-day governance. 
Thirdly, the research agenda focuses on the state's actions and understandings of the 
processes of strife, but from the perspective of those working within the state. Although 
agonism potentially impacts all of society and emphasises the importance of relationships, it is 
almost impossible to explore agonism and strife in all their multi-dimensional aspects as each 
set of adversaries and contexts is enormously varied and complex, even across the structures 
of the state and society in one country. Hence, the study focuses only on one set of state role-
players, namely those appointed and elected officials of the local government of Johannesburg 
mainly that interact with citizens about governance matters, with the society's perspective on 
state-society strife being beyond the scope of the is study. Further, the author's professional 
experience within local government and familiarity with the topics is seen as helpful for the 
research process.  
Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 11 
Finally, the topic is limited to considerations related to the broader concept of 'service 
delivery' that has come to dominate the discourse in South Africa. 'Service delivery' means not 
only the delivery of tangible services such as, for instance, the supply of water or electricity 
services, the management and development of street traders, or the regeneration of the inner 
city, and the practices of city governance in the delivery of those services, as well as other 
intangible aspects related to expectations that citizens have of the state to improve their 
quality of life (discussed on page 77).  
6 Preview of Thesis 
To implement the research agenda, this thesis is constructed in three main parts, with a case 
study nested within the thesis. The three parts are Part A, which sets the scene, Part B, which 
deals with the case study, and Part C, which presents the conclusions of the research.  
Part A: Setting the Scene (Chapters 1-3) 
Chapter 1 remarks on the increase in protest worldwide, evident in South Africa as 'service 
delivery' protests, symbolising a lack of confidence in democracy and the state. The state sees 
conflict as negative, as a threat to democracy and a 'failure' of state and governance, in the 
context of consensus-seeking democracy. However, 'agonism', an alternative model of 
democracy centred on contestation rather than co-operation, seems to offer an alternative 
way of considering protest and forms the rationale for the study. The overarching question 
asks what the practical possibilities are of applying concepts of agonism to state-society strife 
to the state's actions, from the perspective of those working within the state. The line of 
questioning then diverges into a range of queries about the state's view and handling of strife, 
and the prospects and value of agonism as an alternative way to consider strife given its 
relatively limited translation into practice, before it closes the loop and returns to the 
overarching question. The inquiry is grounded in the case of Johannesburg specifically. 
Chapter 2 explains why Mouffe's (2000b) agonism may be an appropriate line of questioning 
by contextualising it within conceptions of contestation and co-operation in democracy and 
governance, the relationship between the state and society and the expression of dissensus as 
protest, including 'violent' protest, in key academic literature. The innovative aspects of 
agonism are presented, namely its centrality in democracy; its potential as an agent of change; 
the need to transform antagonism to agonism and to keep the space of conflict open. 
Limitations are also presented, in the form of the need for some 'consensus'; the discounting 
of antagonism and the possibility of the fetishisation of conflict. Then, the translation of 
agonism into practice in limited applied cases highlights implications for the implementation 
and institutionalisation of agonism. A broad approach and principles of agonistic practices of 
governance are identified, enabling the use of agonism as a prism for the research process, 
inter alia. 
Chapter 3 outlines the approach to the study and research methodology. The nature and 
complexity of the questions can only be addressed effectively with a qualitative method, 
namely thorough the exploration, description and clarification made possible in the case study 
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approach. The case study serves in this research process as both method and output. Agonism 
is used as a prism to collate and analyse multiple data – including academic literature, grey 
sources, media articles, reports, government documents and interviews with key state 
informants – into themes and five-year time periods. Within the case study, three detailed 
narratives are then selected according to defined criteria.  
Part B: The Johannesburg Case Study (Chapters 4-8) 
Part B provides the case study of the city administration of Johannesburg starting with the 
backdrop of public conflict in general, globally and in South Africa, in Chapter 4 before 
narrowing down to the phenomenon of 'service delivery' protest post-1994 in South Africa. 
Drawing on academic contributions, an expanded definition of 'service delivery' links service 
delivery protests with citizens' disillusion with 'developmental local government', which has 
not met their expectations. This Chapter narrows down further to the case of strife in 
Johannesburg. Drawing on the study of the 453 low-income and middle-class service delivery 
protests identified, the dimensions of protests that inform the state's responses are 
considered, which include the reasons stated for the protests, the income level of the 
protestors, the frequency of protests, the types of service being contested, the level of 
physical intensity of the protests and their size, location and duration. Service delivery protests 
are then clustered in four broad and overlapping types. As the spatial dimension of protests is 
important, this dimension is explored further, elaborating on the low-income areas, priority 
areas and middle-class suburbs making up Johannesburg. The role of the state in providing 
channels for protest, and the different mechanisms of protest, are described with different 
groups generally favouring different channels to protest. 
Chapter 5 provides a timeline of city strife, showing the intersection of the responses of the 
city administration to types of protest, in five-year periods correlating broadly with the 
mayoral terms of office. The timeline briefly covers the 'pre-liberation' period (pre-1991) and 
the 'negotiation' period (1991-1995). It continues from the first local government elections 
with the 'transition' period (1996-2000), through to the 'consolidation' (2001-2005), 
'maturation' (2006-2010), and current (post-2010) periods. Primary data augmented by other 
researchers' observations on the topics reveals the city administration's inconsistent stance 
towards service delivery protests, its swings between agonistic and antagonistic practices of 
governance during the study period, its largely anti-protest mind-set and the varied outcomes 
of its management of processes of conflict. These cross-cutting themes are then explored in 
the following chapters to provide a much finer-grained assessment of the state's view and its 
handling of conflict. 
This trio of narratives, selected because of the different parts of the state responding to the 
protest and issues under contention, the different groups, income profiles and spatial areas, 
details the specific story of strife within each study area. Chapter 6, "Dissent in the Deep 
South: Water Wars of Orange Farm", tells the tale of conflict related to initially the state's 
provision of water services and later other basic services and housing in the low-income area 
of Orange Farm in the south of Johannesburg since its establishment in the late 1980s. Chapter 
Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 13 
7, "Struggle Streets: Informal Trading and the Inner City", tells the tale of the struggle between 
the city administration and street vendors over the management and development of markets 
and the enforcement of by-laws. Chapter 8, "Middle-Class Malcontents: Billing Backlash", tells 
the tale of dissensus between the selected middle-class suburbs and the city administration 
over the problematic billing system. Unique findings, particular to each tale, are described and 
analysed.  
Part C: Wrap Up (Chapter 9) 
Chapter 9 wraps up the research, summarising the overarching findings and points to the 
potential application of agonism in governance practice. However, the findings are complex 
and not definitive. Broadly, the state's view and handling of conflict is generally negative but 
fluctuates according to various factors. There is evidence of limited agonistic practices, and a 
greater number of constructive responses, albeit inconsistently and sometimes limited, by the 
city administration in the concessions and changes made. The city administration prefers 
formal channels for protest and mostly handles conflict antagonistically in the short-term 
towards protest events. In the longer-term, however, it appears that the city administration 
responds more agonistically or at least constructively to protestors' demands, and to the 
effects of the issues under contention and their root causes. Outcomes of conflictual 
interactions between the city administration and citizens include institutional modifications, 
policy and programmatic shifts and operational changes, but many constraints to the extent of 
agonistic governance are evident. The understandings derived from, the infrequently agonistic, 
conflict management considered in the case study highlight the state's partial recognition of 
the centrality of conflict and the adoption of an ethos of agonism in its governance practices, 
even if unknowingly. Lastly, the main possibilities of agonism seem to lie in its potential for the 
state to see conflict management practices agonistically to improve state-society interactions 
and find new solutions, although its limitations are recognised. 
Appendices  
Appendices contain information important to the thesis chapters but which is too detailed and 
cumbersome to incorporate into the thesis without disrupting the flow of the argument. 
Additional relevant data and research outputs are also provided in the form of Annexures, 
which are available in a digital format only (list on page 408). 
7 In Closing 
This chapter provides the research agenda including the problem statement and rationale, the 
questions and the significance of the research, the scope of the study and the preview of the 
thesis. It also touches on the notion of agonism. Given agonism's relatively untested status, 
and the substantial focus of this research on the topic of agonism, the next chapter turns to 
the assessment of academic contributions to the school of 'agonism', both theoretical and 
applied, relative to the research agenda.  
  
Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 14 
Chapter 2 | Agonism as Prism: From Theory into Practice 
1 Why Agonism? 
Before 1989, less than 25 of 192 countries were democracies; now a little over three-quarters 
or 143 of all countries are fully or partly democratised (Freedom House 2005; Weale 2007, p. 
250; Piano, Puddington et al. 2011). However, disappointment at the unmet promise of 
democracy, in South Africa as well as in other emerging and established democracies, is rising 
(Scott, J. 1998; Little 2008; Kagwanja & Kondlo 2009; Heller & Evans 2011; Marinova 2011). 
Democratic states, their institutions and cities seem increasingly unable to deal with ongoing 
and seemingly unresolvable conflicts arising from the demands of society to address 
inequality, exclusion, poverty, the absence of trust and ineffective governance (Diamond 
2005a; Jas & Skelcher 2005; Diamond 2008; Gaon 2010; Swyngedouw 2011, 2015).  
Conceptions of the 'liberal democracy' may be many; but the prevailing one globally generally 
makes commitments to representation, political equality, protection of rights, deliberation and 
participation in varying degrees (Cunningham 2002a, b). It is typically 'consensus'-seeking – 
trying to ensure individuals will agree to accept a decision made by the group even if they do 
not all necessarily agree with it (Prothro & Grigg 1960). Although conflict over the 
interpretation of democratic commitments is a given, the contemporary scope and scale of the 
conflict seems to be at odds with the principles and promise of liberal democracy (Diamond 
1990; Benhabib 1996; Held 2006; Little 2007; Wenman 2014). 
Chantal Mouffe’s (2000b) work on 'agonistic pluralism' arguably offers a way of rethinking the 
role of conflict in democratic societies. She argues that the formal requirements of liberal 
democracy offers the hope of a well-ordered society structured through reasoned agreement. 
In her view, even models of deliberative democracy, which give space to the give-and-take of 
argumentation, are aimed at an eventual social agreement or consensus. The problem with 
this, says Mouffe, is that this 'consensus' in in fact the outcome of political processes where 
power inequalities are inherent, and the supposedly reasonable outcomes are inscribed with 
patterns of 'inclusion-exclusion'. The oppression of liberal democracy comes from the 
requirement that individuals submit to the 'consensus', the supposedly legitimate outcome of 
agreed procedures of democracy, which are either formal-legalistic or deliberative. 
For Mouffe (2000b), the democratic consensus naturalises a political hegemony. She writes 
that "consensus in a liberal-democratic society is – and always will be – the expression of an 
hegemony and the crystallization of power relations" (ibid., p. 49). She insists that what is 
considered the legitimate outcome of a democratic process is a political outcome and should 
always be contestable. 
Mouffe offers 'agonistic pluralism' as an alternative to consensus-seeking models of 
democracy. It is a model that accepts the necessity and inevitability of conflict, but directs 
conflicts towards deepening pluralist democracy. Her starting point is that: 
Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 15 
It is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal-democratic institutions that one 
can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by 
multiplying the institutions, the discourses, the forms of life, that foster identification with democratic 
values (ibid., p. 96). 
In other words, Mouffe is not looking for the legitimation of democratic decision-making that 
would provide at least a temporary closure on processes, but rather the means to sustain 
active engagements, even contests and conflicts, over differing positions. Power and politics 
are placed at the centre. Importantly, however, Mouffe differentiates between a destructive 
antagonism and an agonism, which progressively opens democratic space. With antagonism, 
there is a struggle between 'deadly enemies' but with agonism, it is between 'legitimate 
enemies', or 'adversaries' or 'opponents', who recognise the right of the other to hold different 
positions. There may – and indeed should be – a vibrant clash of ideas and positions but the 
intent is not to destroy 'the other'. While partial closure may result, agonism is not about 
reaching the final position. It is rather about keeping the democratic space open. 
While this is the broad outline of Mouffe’s position, it is of course far more complex than this. 
Mouffe herself has shifted position over time, and has been in energetic engagements with 
critics. Positions are often ambiguous. Knopps (2007), for example, is insistent that Mouffe’s 
argument is in fact quite consistent with deliberative democracy. Mouffe herself acknowledges 
in various places that a degree of closure or 'consensus' may be necessary at times to ensure 
social stability. There are many points of arguments to be made around the degrees of 
openness and closure, or conflict and consensus, or formal process and challenges to formal 
process that should be promoted in a pluralist democracy. The next sections will address some 
of these but the key point is that agonism embraces the conflicts of democracy rather than 
seeing these conflicts as a threat.  
Central to the question of 'why agonism?' is a concern about the meaning of protest for 
everyday governance by democratic institutions, from the perspective of those working within 
the state, playing a pivotal role in this thesis. In agonistic democratic state-society interactions, 
conflict is not relegated to the side-lines as it tends to be in the more co-operation-based 
approaches of liberal democracy and, hence, seemingly offers solutions to state-society 
conflict (Tambakaki 2014).  
This chapter locates the origins, position and understanding of Mouffeian agonism within the 
wider thought of classic writers tackling dissensus in democracy (such as Gramsci, Hegel, Marx 
and Engels, and Weber) and more contemporaneous ones (such as Cohen and Arato, Comaroff 
and Comaroff, Kasfir, Keane, Foucault, Habermas, Tilly, von Holdt and others in this and other 
chapters). Incorporated are intersecting conceptions contained in other vast bodies of 
literature. These include the democratic state and its roles in conflict; the state-society 
relationship; consensus; and antagonism and violent conflict. Where necessary other topics 
such as the modes of protest or collective action; state governance and its practices, 
processes, institutions and challenges; poverty; inequality; the role of planning; the emerging 
democracy; and service delivery are included here and throughout the thesis to the extent that 
they are material to the discussion. The literature reviewed in this thesis is ranges widely 
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across different disciplines, most notably anthropology; geography; history; institutional 
ethnography; international relations; linguistics; management, organisational studies; planning 
and development theory and practice; political theory, science and philosophy; public 
management; public participation; public policy and administration; research; sociology; state 
governance; urban management; and urban regeneration. 
The most significant question that emerges from this review is how to apply the ideas of 
agonism to practices of governance. Governments, and those working within the state, have 
tried to tackle the problem of conflict long before the introduction of the term 'agonism' with 
varying degrees of success. The rate of take-up by writers has been initially slow since Mouffe's 
publication of her notion of agonism in 2000, but texts on cases of agonism in practice have 
increased although they are still limited. These descriptive-analytical cases are important in 
narrowing the gap in providing clues for the institutionalisation of agonistic practices of 
governance, as a broad approach, and for detailed practices. In addition, researchers have 
hardly used agonism as a prism in research processes, despite its potential as a benchmarking 
tool in the study of strife and agonism in governance and planning; as a thematic framework to 
link various research aspects together; and as a filter to analyse data.  
Mouffeian agonism brings at least four innovations to democratic thought, namely that 
conflict is central to the democratic state, not co-operation; agonistic conflict is the agent of 
change; the democratic institution transforms antagonism to agonism; and consensus is never 
final, although limitations are also identified in the literature (see Box 2.1 below). 
2 Innovations of Agonism 
Conflict is Central to the Democratic State, not Co-operation 
The first and most fundamental innovation of agonism is its tenet that it places conflict at the 
centre of the democratic state rather than co-operation as in other democracies. Dissensus in 
democratic states is not a new concept. However, most western democracies, fashioned over 
hundreds of years on the thinking of Locke (2009 [1690]), Smith (1981 [1776]) and Mill (1863), 
see dissensus as a 'problem' to be overcome through co-operation-based approaches (Schaap 
2006).  
Box 2.1: Innovations and Limitations of Agonism 
Innovations Limitations  
 Conflict is central to the democratic state, not 
co-operation 
 Agonistic conflict is the agent of change 
 The democratic institution transforms 
antagonism to agonism 
 Consensus is never final 
 Need for some consensus 
 Antagonism discounted as the driver of 
change 
 Risk of fetishisation of conflict 
 Limited translation of agonism into practice  
Source: Own formulation 
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Although the word 'democracy' is open to multiple interpretations and meanings – as an ideal, 
a form of government, a mode or process of governance (Pinkney 1993; Gutmann 2007; Tilly 
2007; Weale 2007; Staeheli 2010), most conceptions portray liberal democracy as a system of 
government with political power, underpinned by principles of co-operation like 
representivity; aggregation; collaboration; consensus; deliberation; equality; majority decision-
making; participation; and a respect for pluralism in differing degrees with differing outcomes 
(Dahl 1989; Benhabib 1996; Held 2006; Weale 2007; Durant 2011; Rossi, U. & Vanolo 2012). 
In these conceptions of western liberal democracy, despite freedoms of speech and the right 
to hold different views, unmanaged dissensus or dissensus outside the 'rules of the game', or 
circumscribed rituals, is tolerated but largely unwelcome and discomforting for those working 
within the state (especially violent protest addressed in the next section starting on page 24). 
AS conflict is a 'problem' (Cunningham 2002c, p. 184), most liberal democracies tend to be 
driven by the desire to maintain stability and so tend to constrain or suppress conflict 
(Wingenbach 2011, pp. 105-198). Some writers speculate that democratic states are 
threatened by the potential ungovernabiity of protest (Honig 1993). Others see dissensus as a 
potential threat to democracy (Pierre 1999; Diamond 2005b, p. 3; Little 2007). 
Mouffe's conception of the centrality of conflict in democracy is rooted in her earlier work with 
Laclau on radical democracy. In 1985, in the context of rising disaffection with the western 
democratic model and the declining popularity of communism in eastern bloc countries, Laclau 
and Mouffe's (2001) publication, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, proposed a 'radical democracy', influenced by Marx and Engels (1848), and 
Gramsci (1919). Their 'pluralist-leftist' model, at least according to Janoski, Alford et al. (2005, 
p. 10), places antagonism at the heart of democracy with radical democrats working to disrupt 
democracy by overthrowing the dominant hegemony by insurgent means.  
Some fifteen years later, Mouffe adopted a less radical stance in her book titled The 
Democratic Paradox (Mouffe 2000b). She still placed conflict at the heart of democracy, but 
her conflict is a special sort, called agonism. Mouffe (2000b) offers a different approach to the 
role of conflict in democracy and governance. Mouffe's agonism is a form of conflict between 
'opponents' (or 'adversaries' or 'legitimate enemies), based on the theoretical notion that this 
conflict is a vital and necessary facet of democracy and is a positive force for change. In 
agonism, opponents recognise the legitimacy of each other's view. This is different in 
antagonism, where the opponents – as' deadly enemies' – do not recognise each other's views 
and the form of conflict is open and extreme. For Mouffe, agonistic conflict and its resulting 
constructive engagement is a sign of the healthy democracy. Despite its positive aspects, 
Mouffe's notion of agonism has come under fire for being "deeply flawed… by its Foucauldian 
reduction of values to power, and by its irrationalist account of choice under value pluralism" 
(Crowder 2006, p. 1), and for being too "pragmatic" (Wingenbach 2011, p. 62). 
Agonistic democrats are more accepting of conflict than liberal democrats are, and more 
inclined to build democracy than radical democrats, which would rather overthrow it. Mouffe 
stresses that a healthy democracy needs conflict, as without it tensions between the 
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paradoxical democratic aims of liberty and equality will materialise in other forms of conflict 
elsewhere, and will likely be dangerous to democracy as shared mistrusts solidify around 
insurmountable issues (Mouffe 2000b). Indeed, the expectations of different groups in society 
mean that democracy can only be a never-achieved ideal. Mouffe argues that agonistic 
democracy counters liberal democracy's over-emphasis on consensus and denial of resistance, 
which typically results in "apathy and disaffection with political participation" (ibid., p. 104), as 
the ongoing need to express 'the political' is denied. As every decision made means another 
decision foregone, the job of an effective democracy is to ensure that the pursuit of the 
democratic ideal does not draw "a veil of rationality" (ibid., p. 105) over the forms of exclusion 
created and the complexity of power structures that exist in pluralist society. Agonistic conflict, 
Mouffe argues, is an essential and constant element of daily democratic life, which can 
potentially reduce exclusion (ibid.).  
Agonistic Conflict is the Agent of Change  
Secondly, agonistic conflict can be an agent of change in democratic states. Relative to liberal 
and radical democratic orientations, agonistic democracy stands out as innovative in its 
portrayal of (agonistic) conflict as potentially positive and creative in bringing about 
transformation, Mouffe (2000b) argues, rather than the controlled and limited conflict in the 
liberal democracy, or the potential destructiveness of conflict in the radical democracy.  
In the liberal democracy, conflict – if it follows the rules – can drive change, although change 
can result also from non-conflict-based engagements (Weber 1946 [1919], 1978). The agent of 
change in the liberal democracy is the regulated outcomes-based strife directed towards 
obtaining agreement to make the desired change. In this context, conflict arises when political 
or economic power is sought by individuals or groups for their own benefit; rights and duties 
need delineation and clarification; and markets need mediation, according to Dryzek, Honig et 
al. (2006, p. 10) and others (Mill 1863; Smith, A. 1981 [1776]; Locke 2009 [1690]). This conflict 
ensures the state is continuously responsive to the demands made by society, presumably by 
dealing with the issue under contention to placate protestors, or in anticipation of possible 
protest. Conflict might be limited to a rational engagement in the 'public sphere' (Habermas 
1991 [1962]), where 'communicative interaction' is the way to "challenge those in power to 
live up to rules and ideals we all share, asking them to justify their actions" (Janoski et al. 2005, 
p. 121). Although theoretically tolerant of conflict, the liberal democratic state tends to 
suppress open conflict (Weber 1946 [1919], 1978). The state serves as the mechanism to 
achieve collective goals and is generally the driver of change in striving for the ideal version of 
society; the state fixes the problem. However, the extent to which the state can effect change 
in response to protest – and drive social justice and speak for all (Tilly & Tarrow 2007) –, is 
significantly constrained by its enormously complex structure and its context, argues Tilly 
(2005, p. 438).  
In the radical democracy, the antagonistic Marxist class-based struggle aims to bring about 
radical socio-economic change by overthrowing the existing dominant order with no attempt 
at reaching consensus. Only large-scale change is able to bring about this real freedom as the 
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state as the tool of the dominant class tends to suppress or mediate conflict, even with force 
(Ives 2004, p. 120), in favour of maintaining the class system. Here, the state is the problem 
(Marx & Engels 1848; Marx 1897); and conflict is a virtue (Cunningham 2002c, p. 184). 
Likewise, in Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) radical democratic work drawing on the much earlier 
work of Gramsci (1919), conflict serves to radicalise passive citizens and change them into 
active protestors fighting for rights and the end of their domination, and transforming their 
relationship with the state in the process thus enabling change (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. ix). 
However, the state can pre-empt and suppress these dissenting groups' desire to protest by 
playing on their aspirations to be like the dominant group by popularising its ideas and beliefs 
(Gramsci 1919).  
In the agonistic democracy, Mouffe's (2000b) innovation in identifying the tenet of agonistic 
conflict as a positive force for change acts as a bridge between the 'passionate' conflict of 
radical democracy and the 'rational' and restrained conflict of liberal democracy. Agonistic 
conflict is 'radical' in its aspiration to drive change but is embraced within a framework that 
recognises the right of others to hold different views. The agonistic democracy creates and 
maintains the space for conflict. But, argues Mouffe, the process of agonistic strife and the 
ultimate respectful recognition of the adversary changes behaviour and one's 'being' in a 
gestalt sense (ibid., p. 10), by bringing about "a radical change in political identity" (ibid., p. 
102), and shifting the dominant hegemonic system making room for transformation (ibid., pp. 
111-112). As conflict seems to be used increasingly as a tool by groups in society to tackle 
inequality and dissatisfaction at unmet ideals of democracy (Jessop 2002; Purcell 2009; Collins, 
M. 2010; 2010), some believe agonism can help the poor to realise the benefits of democracy 
(Roy 2013; Purakayastha 2014). Others, though, claim it underplays the "economic dimension 
of power and the transformation of the economic order" (Marti 2011, p. 6). 
The Democratic Institution Transforms Antagonism to Agonism 
Thirdly, if conflict is to be agonistic, the nature of the state-society relationship is a critical 
determinant in the shaping and outcome of the processes of conflict. As the state is the 
distributor of resources and benefits, it is frequently both target and source of dissensus 
(Jenkins & Klandermans 1995). Mouffe's (2000b) innovation is the inherent agonistic tenet that 
it is the democratic institution that transforms antagonism to agonism, thereby changing the 
nature of the conflict and making it potentially positive. 
In the liberal democracy, there are as many conceptions of the relationship between the state 
and society, and the degree of their overlapping interests, as there are contending interests. 
As governments can never be fully representative despite fair election processes, as the 
ultimate resolution of political conflict, the relationship extends to the intervals between 
elections. During these periods, the liberal democracy manages conflict mainly through 
deliberation, participation, compromise and co-operation to reach agreement through rational 
and technical arguments, with citizens' voices being heard through, for instance, voting, ballots 
and referendums (Fung 2003), and also through alliances; shared interests; compensations; 
and other means.  
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The nature of the relationship between the liberal democratic state, society and the form of 
dissensus, ranging from conflictual to collaborative, is informed by the balance of the 
adversarial-collaborative, antagonistic-agonistic and liberalist-deliberative dynamics between 
them; the location of power; the ability to affect change; and the control of the functions of 
governance (Chambers, Simone & Kopstein 2008). Models of their relationship include society-
against-the-state; society-in-dialogue-with-the-state; society-separate-from-the-state; the-
state-in-society; society-in-the-state; society-in-partnership-with-the-state; society-in-support-
of-the-state; society-in-partnership-with-the-state; and the society-beyond-the-state (Migdal 
1997, 2001; Chambers, Simone & Kopstein 2008). Their relationship is not necessarily static as 
it can shift from one model to another depending on timing, context, issues considered, 
historical influences, and whose perception of the conflict is in play (Chambers, Simone & 
Kopstein 2008). Ultimately, any agreement reached changes the behaviours of the contending 
parties.  
In the radical democracy the state, biasing its actions towards the dominant elite in society, is 
in antagonistic opposition against most of society as it (Marx & Engels 1848; Marx 1897). The 
state is powerful, oppressive and coercive, and a 'parasite' (Marx 1897), although the power of 
protest itself, made by the subjugated working class, tends to be underestimated (Domhoff 
2005). In Laclau and Mouffe's (2001, p. 180) conception, power is diffused amongst competing 
groups in society, and they resist the state. 
As the issue driving the conflict means that society frequently protests against the state, as the 
most arguably significant and strongest democratic institution, the agonistic state generally 
takes the lead in processes of conflict by providing options to society to facilitate the 
production of their identities "through discursive construction" (Mouffe 2014, pp. 27-28). A 
lead role for the state is implied with Mouffe (2000b, 2014) arguing that democratic 
institutions are to "transform antagonism into agonism" [by] providing channels through 
which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while 
allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but 
as an adversary" (emphasis in the original, Mouffe 2000b, p. 103). This agonistic interaction is 
predicated on the construction of the 'them' as 'friendly enemies', 'adversaries' or the 
'legitimate enemy', rather than a 'deadly enemy' that must be destroyed (ibid., pp. 13, 102). 
The 'friendly enemy' is one whose ideas can be disagreed with, but whose right to have those 
ideas is non-negotiable; further, adversaries share the common ground of liberal democratic 
values of equality and freedom, although 'we' may disagree with 'them' on the meaning and 
implementation of those values (ibid., pp. 101-102).  
'Consensus' is Never Final 
Fourthly, Mouffe (2000a, b, 2013, 2016) brings another innovation: her interpretation of the 
meaning of 'consensus' in the cycle of conflict as something perpetually open-ended, which is 
different to radical and liberal democratic conceptions of conflict, although van den Brink 
(2005) accuses agonistic supporters of subscribing to a "liberalism without agreement" (ibid., 
p. 245). 
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In the liberal democracy, there is an underlying assumption within much of the literature of 
the 2000s that consensus – or at least agreement – might always be possible, if only enough 
deliberation and participation measures are undertaken. However, despite its consensus-
seeking orientation, others recognise that, hypothetically, voices may be equal but weaker 
voices are often not heard in the public sphere where political and other decisions are debated 
and made, such as Walzer (2004). 
The radical democrat's view is that the purpose of conflict is to overthrow the current 
oppressive system; indeed 'consensus' represents the ideology or normative vision belonging 
to the dominant class (Marx & Engels 1848; Marx 1897). Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics reiterates this notion 
emphasising that consensus is "conceptually impossible" (ibid., p. xvii).  
However, Mouffe shifted from her earlier concern with Laclau for antagonism (Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001), to a greater concern with agonism and 'consensus' in The Democratic Paradox 
(Mouffe 2000b). She argues that the space where different groups meet to deliberate policy in 
a rational manner can never be free of power due to the pluralism of groups, each with their 
own set of needs and values, hampering "rational resolution" (ibid., p. 102). This space can 
only ever be truly free of power in all its forms in a perfect democracy, which does not exist 
(ibid., p. 104). Thus, Mouffe contends it is neither possible nor desirable to reach consensus, 
but argues that this tenet of agonism keeps democracy vital (ibid., pp. 33, 45, 48).  
Although agonistic democracy may share some common dimensions with radical and liberal 
democracies about conflict (see summary in Table 2.1 on page 22), the balance between these 
dimensions, namely the orientation towards the centrality of dissensus, the role of conflict in 
driving change; the democratic institution's transformation of antagonism to agonism; and the 
impossibility of consensus, are new. These innovations have potentially significant implications 
for democratic states in conflict management. However, there are also some limitations to 
consider, next. 
3 Limitations of Agonism 
Need for Some 'Consensus' 
Mouffe (2000b) acknowledges that conflict cannot be never-ending in the search for 
'consensus' and concedes that democratic states need "a certain amount of consensus" (ibid., 
p. 103), presumably to ensure some stability, as long as it does not foreclose conflict. Such 
consensus can be a "conflictual consensus" (Mouffe 1999, p. 755); or seen as "partial and 
provisional since consensus is by necessity based on acts of exclusion" (Mouffe 1993, p. 69); or 
"temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation" (Mouffe 2000b, p. 102). Wingenbach (2011) 
also recognises the intrinsic constraint of agonism in that it is neither possible nor 
recommended for a democracy to exist in a perpetual state of crisis and that continual non-
consensus is potentially dangerous (ibid., pp. 43-69).  
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Table 2.1: Conflict in Radical, Agonistic and Liberal Democracies  
Dimension Radical democracy Agonistic democracy Liberal democracy  
Influences Marx (1897); Marx 
and Engels 
(Marx 1897) 
Marx (Marx 1897); Gramsci 
(1919);  
Locke (2009 [1690]); Smith (1981 
[1776]); Hegel (1991 [1821]); Mill 
(1863); Weber (1946 [1919], 1978) 
Proponents  Fanon (1963); Laclau 
and Mouffe (2001) 
Mouffe (2000b) Habermas (1991 [1962]) 
Source of 
conflict 
Class struggle 
between working 
class and dominant 
class 
Identity, hegemony, plural 
interests, inequality 
Expression of political or economic 
power; pluralism 
Nature of 
conflict 
Antagonism Antagonism translated into 
agonism 
Any but uncomfortable with 
antagonism; prefers peaceful 
contestation 
Conflict's 
purpose 
To overthrow 
existing dominant 
class; change the 
system 
To build democracy, to 
make changes for the 
better 
To alert the state to shifting needs 
in society; to disrupt democracy 
Location of 
conflict in the 
democracy 
At centre At centre On side-lines; in 'public sphere' 
Democracy's 
attitude to 
conflict 
Embraces it Is healthy, vital, essential 
and potentially positive; 
embraces it if it is agonistic 
conflict 
Tolerates it within set limits; 
discomfort if outside the rules, 
supresses open conflict; un-
managed conflict is a 'problem'; 
threat to democracy; denial 
Envisaged 
change to 
issue under 
contestation 
Radical; large-scale Incremental  Incremental; regulated conflict 
leads to agreement and leads to 
change; change not necessarily 
driven by conflict; 
Relationship 
between 
opponents 
Enemies; do not 
recognise others' 
views; an enemy to 
be destroyed 
Shifts between enemies 
and 'friendly enemies', 
'adversaries' or 'legitimate 
enemies'; recognises 
legitimacy of others' views 
Collaborators; rational; proced-
urally-oriented; all theoretically 
equal but acknowledged as not in 
reality 
Change to the 
state 
No change – 
overthrown  
In 'being' and in behaviour In behaviour 
Position on 
conflict-co-
operation 
spectrum  
Antagonistic conflict; 
no attempt at 
consensus 
Mainly agonistic dissensus 
with moments of 
consensus or agreement 
Co-operation; consensus-seeking; 
elections are important in making 
decisions, but so are the intervals 
between elections 
Type of 
agreement 
No agreement Partial; temporary; 
incremental; 'conflictual 
consensus' 
Generally seen as binding; contract-
ual 
Society's view 
of the state in 
state-society 
relationship 
'Parasite; the 
'problem'; 
oppressive; coercive; 
strong; 'bully' 
In opposition Driver of change; 'fixes the 
problem'; dominated by economic 
interests 
Note: These are generalisations 
Source: Own formulation 
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Mouffe, however, remains vague on the exact dimensions of 'consensus', argues Erman 
(2009). Indeed, within Mouffe's work, the distinction between 'agreement', 'compromise' and 
'consensus' in terms of agonistic processes seems not at all clear.  
Reaching 'consensus' means that a decision-making step in the state-society relationship is 
required. Writers thus find it difficult to place agonism's open-ended 'consensus' within 
consensus-seeking liberal democratic thought, presenting a great challenge in agonism into 
practice. Others believe agonism works best with the participatory, representative and 
deliberative aspects of liberal democracy (Knops 2007, p. 116; Vink 2007; Koczanowicz 2011; 
Wingenbach 2011, p. 192; Knops 2012; Westphal 2014, p. 7). Others see agonistic democracy 
as mixing and overlapping with liberal democracy yet remaining fundamentally different and 
independent (Wenman 2003; Gürsözlü 2009; Tambakaki 2009), although they could overlap at 
the decision-making stage (ibid., p. 357). Beaumont and Loopmans (2008) argue that neither 
the dissensus-based approach of agonistic democracy, nor the co-operation-based approach of 
other democracies is sufficient on its own to deal with conflict. Finally, Mäntysalo (2011) 
presents agonism as a logical progression in the evolution of democratic thought and arguably 
an improvement on aggregative and deliberative democracies.  
Antagonism Discounted as Driver of Change  
That agonism alone can drive change is a limitation in Mouffe's work; she discounts the role of 
antagonism as also a driver of change. Significant critique has been levelled at agonism's 
inadequacy at dealing with antagonism and its implicit assumption that one can always find 
common ground with opponents and can always convert antagonism into agonism (Mouffe 
2000b; Pløger 2004; Schaap 2006; Houwen 2010; Wingenbach 2011), or "agonistic respect" 
(Connolly 1993, p. 381). 
The literature defines 'antagonism' variously as direct action, threatening violence and outright 
anarchy. To Byrne (2012), antagonistic protests are an "appeal to the authorities to behave 
differently" (ibid., p. 114). Pløger (2004) argues, though, that one's social and political 
perspective turns antagonism into agonism. In any event, it is hard to distinguish between 
antagonism and agonism as their differences can be subtle and indirect (Collins, M. 2010). 
Some claim that agonism is naïve about the destructive potential of antagonism (Breen 2009), 
as antagonism has no limits notionally (Schaap 2006, p. 269). The democratic state can thus be 
endangered if antagonism is not placated (Mihai 2014). Democratic institutions themselves 
can perpetuate antagonism if they do not invest in agonistic practices (Pløger 2006; Mihai 
2014), even though they are time consuming and difficult to carry out (Pløger 2006), with 
planning being a way to suppress antagonism, although it is bound to fail (Roskamm 2014, p. 
15).  
In the Mouffeian conversion of antagonism to agonism, the institution is assumed to always 
have enough capacity and ability to convert all antagonism into genuine respect between 
adversaries (Wingenbach 2011, p. 63). Further, it assumes some democratic principles are 
shared with adversaries (ibid., pp. xii-xiii), and the conflict does not run the risk of "destroying 
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the possibility of democratic stability" (ibid., p. 173). It also assumes the availability of 
sufficient level-headedness and "reciprocity" (Schaap 2006, pp. 256, 264, 268), and that the 
institution and adversaries are willing to engage (Houwen 2010). However, it is also aware that 
"not all conflicts are democratic and not all contestation is agonistic" (Wingenbach 2011, p. 
99). However, Breen (2009) is sceptical that agonism may be too idealistic to be useful in cases 
where antagonism descends into "limitless violence" (ibid., p. 134), as agonism is too idealistic 
and unaware of the issues of power (ibid.). The agonistic state might prefer calmer interaction 
due to its concern that acceptance of any type of protest may promote the use of physical 
force rather than taming it (Westphal 2014, pp. 19-20).  
Risk of Fetishisation of Conflict 
If conflict is given too much weight in democracy, opponents of agonism are concerned that 
agonism "fetishizes conflict" (Morrell 2009, p. 22), and is too negative and pessimistic an 
expression of dissent (Tannen 2002; Roskamm 2014, p. 15). These expressions, or 'protests', 
can be defined as "challenges to authority embodied by collective actors in public settings" 
(Ratliff & Hall 2014, p. 274), meaning that protests are wide-ranging and can include those that 
happen in the streets and in boardrooms, in the form of marches; boycotts; sit-ins; stayaways; 
petitions; memoranda; media lobbies and many more. Protests can be peaceful or 'violent', or 
''illegal' and resisting governance (Paret 2015). However, the state, too, can be 'violent' in its 
use of force in quelling protest, although its use of violence tends to be seen as legitimate 
(Nieburg 1963; Paret 2015). 
As 'open' conflict in the form of 'antagonistic' or 'violent' protest is generally considered as 
being outside the rules of liberal democracy, the meaning of 'violence' in protests, ambiguous 
and contested in the literature (Walby 2013), warrants more explanation, mainly along two 
lines. 
Firstly, 'violence' in protest, at its most elemental level means actual physical harm carried out 
by protestors against a person (Eisner 2009; Collins, R. 2013), or person and property, and can 
include emotional harm (Wikström & Treiber 2009). Accordingly, violent actions can include 
property vandalism and destruction; arson; throwing stones; physical assault and murder; 
intimidation; attacks on foreigners; vigilantism; and looting (Paret 2015), although Lodge and 
Mottiar (2016) claim some actions, like arson, are not violent and should be seen rather as 
'disruption' (ibid., p. 825). The state regards violent protest as generally "intentional but 
unwanted" (Eisner 2009, p. 42). Violence is frequently seen as synonymous with protest by the 
poor (Auyero, de Lara et al. 2014). The use of violence is at odds with western democracy 
(Keane 2004; Paret 2015), contributing to the sense that violent protest is an illegitimate form 
of dissensus.  
Secondly, the extended notion of 'violence' also includes the threat of harm to person and 
property (Ratliff & Hall 2014; Paret 2015). Here, 'violent' actions carry an emotional charge of 
"fear, anger and excitement" and are filled with "bluster and bluff", and may be in place of, or 
the precursor to, actual violence (Collins, R. 2008, pp. 4, 24, 345). Mouffe (1993) labels such 
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violence as "symbolic violence" (ibid., p. 130). These 'violent' protests are seen as the 
legitimate striving to attain the aims of democracy rather than being intrinsically anti-
democratic (von Holdt 2013), and the use of violence might even be seen as justified 
sometimes (McCloskey 1980; Zinn 2002). Thus, 'violent' actions might include – although this is 
not always so clear-cut – verbal and physical challenges like yelling, shouting, insults, digging 
up and barricading of roads with burning tyres, throwing of objects and brandishing of sticks, 
clubs and other weapons, and other confrontational gestures accompanying marches, pickets 
and other generally peaceful protests.  
Notably, any violence in protests tends to play a very minor role in all protests (Collins, R. 
2009; Ratliff & Hall 2014). However, the media exploits the ambiguity between actual violence 
and the threat of violence in protests for its shock value by labelling protests as 'violent' – even 
when it is the state that has perpetrated the violence against protestors, says Morwe (2010). 
Too, the context and type of protest might moderate the nature of the media coverage by 
individual reporters (Lohner, Banjac et al. 2016). Violence is also used by the state for its 
opportunities to control and dominate protestors, as shown by Paret (2015), and observed 
later in this case study. Both notions of violence are referred to in this thesis: 'violence' without 
inverted commas is used to describe protest actions, which were clearly documented instances 
of actual violence; and 'violence' with inverted commas describes instances where violence 
was threatened, or where the extent of actual violence could not be determined from the 
data. 
The single greatest shortfall in the notion of agonism – for this thesis – is its limited translation 
into practice in the literature and in actual governance practice, and as the questions of this 
thesis centre on this topic, the next section focuses exclusively on this aspect. 
4 Limited Translation of Agonism into Practice 
Minimal Application of Agonism in Conflict Management 
From the perspective of those working within the state who might be interested in pursuing an 
agonistic approach, its translation into practice is frustratingly minimal. The literature focuses 
mainly on agonism's conceptual aspects and offers little practical guidance or insight into its 
application, adaptation and institutionalisation into practices of governance (Deveaux 1999; 
Tully 2000; Owen 2002; Banyan 2004; Doğanay 2004; Schaap 2006, 2007; Howarth 2008; 
Glover 2011; Wingenbach 2011, pp. xi-xxi; Glover 2012; Westphal 2014, p. 1). The approach of 
planning towards dissensus has shifted over the years, but remains extremely topical. The few 
cases of applied agonism do provide some lessons about agonistic conflict management for 
the institutionalisation of agonism but – as seen in the ambiguities surrounding the notion of 
agonism itself – these are hardly clear-cut guidelines for the implementation of agonistic 
governance.  
Since the 1970s, the role of planners, a critical practice of governance according to Pløger 
(2006), has shifted from its former elitist, conflict-averse approach to one more open to 
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conflict's potential for change (Grabow & Heskin 1973). The earlier writers regarded planners, 
in the liberal democratic context, as rational, analytical, collaborative, regulatory, resourceful, 
diplomatic and administrative; and as providers of information, mediators, negotiators and 
facilitators (Forester 1987, 1989, 2011). Mostly, there was an underlying assumption that 
problem resolution was based on collaboration, with technocratic solutions available for any 
problem (Forester 1987; 1989, p. 119), and consensus achievable through methodical and 
logical debate (Healey 1996; Warren 2009). 
Towards the 1990s, however, the role of the planner was no longer so well-defined. Planners 
increasingly had to tackle greater complexity, inequalities and conflict (Yiftachel 1995; 
Sandercock 2000; Devas, Amis et al. 2004), with planning gaining prominence as a political, not 
just technical, activity in the strengthening of democracy (Jonas & McCarthy 2009, p. 302; 
Allmendinger & Haughton 2010). In liberal democracies, consensus-seeking planning seemed 
ineffective at dealing with different world views, extreme urban conflicts and competing 
interests (Holston 1998, p. 5; Stiftel & Watson 2005, pp. 11, 210, 213). On the one hand, 
Friedman (1987) believed that the planner must be impartial, separate from the community 
and the state, but adept at reflexion and imagining options within the context of a state willing 
to redistribute resources (ibid., pp. 392, 393, 398, 428). On the other hand, however, 
Sandercock (1998a) – foreshadowing agonistic principles – advocated the planner to adopt a 
more 'radical' approach to deal with conflict, imparting skills to the protesting community, 
working in allegiance with it rather than with the state even to the point of crossing over to the 
community, and facilitating community-instigated solutions (ibid., pp. 99-100). She identified 
risks, though, with 'radical' planning, such as the 'romanticisation' of the planner's role, the 
prioritisation of the interests of one group at the expense of the larger society, and the 
possible 'repressive' actions by both the community and the state (ibid., pp. 101,102). 
However, she also alerted planners to their transformative role in attaining social justice by 
dealing with challenges of power, difference and exclusion (ibid.1998a, p. 102; 1998b, pp. 107, 
109).  
Planning is seen an ever-evolving cross-cutting discipline with planners influencing and shaping 
governance (Friedmann 1989; Pløger 2006), and largely informed by its dominant context of 
the liberal democratic ideology (Gunder 2010), thus planners and others working in the state 
deal daily with conflict in ways that are consensus-seeking (Forester 1987). Since Mouffe's 
(2000b) popularisation of the notion of agonism, its initially-slow application has increased, 
and includes descriptive-analytical assessments of a handful of planning and governance-
related cases originating mainly from Australia, the United States of America, South Africa, 
Finland, Denmark, Germany and London. Although applied agonism is still relatively 
undeveloped with ambiguous findings, these cases arguably provide enough insights into its 
potential to consider its adoption in daily practices of governance by the state.  
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Agonism Applied in Cases of Planning and Practices of Governance 
Thirteen cases of the application of the tenets of agonism in planning and participation 
models, and practices of governance, are identified and reviewed next. The authors' 
commentaries emphasise the normative or the descriptive-analytical aspects of the cases, or 
sometimes both (see overview of cases of applied agonism in Table 2.2 on page 28). Each case 
explores the broad agonistic approach and, sometimes the detailed practices adopted too. 
The earliest identified application of Mouffeian agonistic principles to governance in planning 
thought and practice is Hillier’s (2002a) Direct Action and Agonism in Democratic Planning 
Practice. In response to her frustration at the poor outcomes of dialogue in conflict situations, 
she reasons an explanatory framework based on agonism, classifying, legitimising and 
institutionalising formal and informal processes of conflict. By overtly opening up processes of 
participation, purpose-designed for each context, voices of outsiders can be heard as 
effectively as those inside the sphere of interaction (ibid., pp. 120-121, 130). In her model, 
interaction ranges between consensus and agonism. She charts strategies for adversaries to 
reach 'consensus' or 'compromise', through 'negotiation', 'bargaining' or 'lobbying' (ibid., pp. 
112, 123, 124, 127).  
Hillier (2002a) says that the processes, not just the outcomes, are quite different between 
agonistic and other democratic conflictual interactions. She emphasises that this is about "the 
difference between compromise and consensus. Compromise is reached through a transaction 
or through bargaining. Consensus is reached through argument or deliberation. Both have 
elements of agreement and differences of viewpoints and values" (emphasis in the original, 
ibid., p. 124). Although she affirms reciprocity, overlapping values and an awareness of usually-
unheard voices as prerequisites for 'consensus', she argues that the impossibility of its 
eradication is a contradiction that planners must accept (ibid., pp. 122, 132). 
A few years later, Dryzek (2005) also expresses doubt about the ability of agonistic practices to 
minimise profound divides and prevent their further entrenchment, or to achieve consensus. 
He proposes a mix of the best features from deliberative discursive and agonistic models to 
handle "deep difference" (ibid., p. 220), which he claims some countries had used successfully. 
He argues that agonism focuses too much on the value systems of the contesting parties, 
rather than on their contested needs, with the effect that deadlock cannot then ever be 
overcome (ibid., p. 221). He agrees, though, that the deliberative style of interaction could well 
benefit from an injection of Mouffeian agonistic 'passion' to overcome the "deadening" (ibid., 
p. 224) effect of rationality. He adds a caveat that the neutral public sphere be distanced from 
the institutions of state to facilitate the playing out of contestation without judgment (ibid., p. 
229). 
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Table 2.2: Overview of Cases of Agonism Applied 
No Case 
 
Author and date Application type Type of analysis undertaken  Practice explored 
Model Practice Normative Descriptive-
analytical 
Broad 
approach 
Detailed 
Interaction Resources Exclusion Consensus 
1 
Framework for agonistic-
associative participation 
Hillier (2002a)          
2 
Discursive-agonistic 
deliberation model 
Dryzek (2005)          
3 
Abortion pro-life and pro-
choice debate 
Goi (2005)          
4 Model of urban politics 
Pieterse (Pieterse 2006a, 
2008) 
         
5 
Participation in five cases 
of urban activism 
Silver et al. (2010)          
6 
Mixed governance and 
planning practice model 
Sophie Bond (2011)          
7 
Planning in five Finnish 
cities 
Bäcklund and Mäntysalo 
(2010) 
         
8 
Institutionalisation of 
agonism 
Wingenbach (2011)          
9 
Public administration 
agonistic policy model 
Fortis (2014)          
10 Mini-publics Westphal (2014)          
11 Urban space redesign Munthe-Kaas (2015)          
12 Healthcare priority setting Weale (2016)          
13 
Navy SEALs decision-
making 
Fraher and Grint's (2016)          
14 
Stories of City Strife in 
Johannesburg (this thesis) 
(Pernegger 2016)          
 Element emphasised in text  Element referred to but is not a main element 
Source: Own formulation
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To understand the possibilities of applying agonism in practices of governance, not an easy 
task at all say Nonhoff (2012) and Hillier (2002a, p. 130), planners and those working within 
the state can learn from the practice of agonism in other disciplines where emotions may 
arguably run as high, and even higher. For instance, Goi (2005) finds, in the emotive issue of 
abortion marked by murders, bombings, arson attacks, assault, vandalism and thousands of 
arrests (ibid., p. 63), that a not-for-profit organisation was effective in bringing together pro-
life and pro-choice opponents to engage in agonistic debate (ibid., p. 81). The debate was 
explicitly intended to create a space for the exercise of 'the political' and to maintain, not 
tame, the conflict (ibid., pp. 60-61). The debate required a great deal of effort and activity on 
the part of the institution and the participants (ibid., p. 81). Goi claims that the benefit of the 
agonistic engagement was the exposure of the opponents' underlying beliefs to each other 
(ibid., p. 73), making it possible for them to recognise each other's viewpoints (ibid., p. 80). 
Whilst consensus-seeking on the policy aspects was deliberately not the purpose of the 
agonistic debate, positive consequences in the form of stopping some episodes of deadly 
violence at abortion clinics was attributed to the shifts in attitudes by the participants in the 
debate. As the not-for-profit organisation said, "shifts happen, and shifts matter" (ibid., p. 72).  
in search for a planning that is more appropriate to the African post-colonial, post-apartheid 
context, Pieterse (2005) draws on the tenets of agonism with his conceptual model of urban 
politics with multi-faceted and inconstant conflict manifested in the political and public 
spheres (ibid., pp. 145-158). Pieterse (2008) recognises the state-society conflict inherent in 
the complexities of daily urban governance, expressed in five diverse top-down and bottom-up 
struggle engagements in the democratic public sphere of representative groups, strategic 
alliances, collective mobilisation, political representation, local grassroots movements and 
symbolic conflicts (ibid., pp. 89-103). Pieterse (2006a) proposes that a 'transgressive politics' 
can improve urban development rather than being a crisis, and advocates for 'epistemic 
communities', those with knowledge of any kind about the difficult issue under contention, to 
contribute to the making of a democratic city (ibid., pp. 288, 289, 293, 301). Further, he claims, 
locally-developed solutions will lead to better and more sustainable urban development 
(Pieterse 2006a, pp. 301-302; 2008, pp. 130-160). 
Leading on from Pieterse, five years later, Silver et al. (2010) demonstrate that effective 
participation combines consensus-driven and agonistic practices. According to their case 
studies of urban activism in Belfast, Berlin, Philadelphia, São Paulo and the South Durban 
Basin, they conclude that the balance between the two approaches shifts according to the 
stage of the policy-making cycle (ibid., p. 454). For instance, at the start-up stage, agonistic 
practices are more appropriate than the consensus-seeking decision-making and 
implementation stage (ibid.). 
Likewise, Sophie Bond (2011) also conceptualises a mixed model for urban governance and 
planning practice, underpinned by both collaborative democratic theory and agonism. Her 
conceptual framework for the analysis of power relationships based on the Mouffeian 
"democratic ethos" (ibid., p. 174) sets the principles for engagement but leaves space for their 
interpretation as engagements unfold (ibid., pp. 176-177). The model exhorts administrators 
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to analyse the situation sensitively by applying skills of "critique" and "reflexivity" (ibid., pp. 
178-179), and recognising and acknowledging the biases inherent in governance practices. 
Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010) argues that agonism is a progression from the different 
participation approaches of consensus-seeking democracies. They overlay the approaches 
creating an "institutional ambiguity" (ibid., p. 348), in their case study on five Finnish cities. 
They show how institutional history, the specific actors and the historical state-society 
relationship combine to inform whether agonistic engagement is possible. The city of Espoo's 
experiment with agonistic practices of planning clarifies that the purpose of agonistic 
engagements is not to define the local plans needed, but rather to reveal citizens' competing 
concepts (ibid., p. 345), so to deliberately improve local democracy. They also identify the gap 
between the notion of agonism and its application. If agonism's impact on institutions and the 
practices of planning is not understood, they contend, then the notion will not be translated 
fully into practice (ibid.).  
The quest for how agonism might be institutionalised is taken up by Wingenbach (2011), who 
offers in-depth insight into the practical difficulties of the task. He supplies a framework to 
determine principles of agonistic state institutions, acknowledging the necessity of citizen 
conflict, differences in society and the power of informality. The five-part role of the state is to 
provide a robust setting for tensions to play out; set up a collective sense of citizenship with a 
shared identity, beliefs and outlook; maintain a balance between encouraging innovation and 
preserving stability; channel and synthesise contested issues; and constantly remind itself that 
consensus is not permanent (ibid., pp. 99-101).  
Fortis's (2014) thesis considers how to link but also keep separate the political spheres of 
policy-making and the state to encourage human creativity, empower citizens and raise 
awareness about the complexities of public policy extending beyond its technical aspects. His 
resultant policy model relies on agonistic interactions that are "open-ended", "conflictive", 
"deeply democratic" and "integrative" (ibid., pp. 249-250), although he is silent on how 
consensus is to be realised. 
Westphal (2014) provides concrete suggestions for institutionalising agonism in the case of 
'mini-publics', namely small groups of 12 to 500 citizens created to critique a specific 
controversial issue in society (ibid., p. 13). Unlike the deliberative representative-based 
selection of Mäntysalo et al's (2011) public dialogue, Westphal (2014) argues that the selection 
of mini-publics for the agonistic interaction must be conflict-based (ibid., pp. 18-19). Although 
counter-intuitive, such action ensures fairness towards those that are excluded (ibid.). Further, 
the institution must put procedures in place that permit participants' decision-making, 
empowerment and self-expression (ibid., pp. 16, 17, 20).  
In his doctoral research, Munthe-Kaas (2015) experiments on the Copenhagen city 
administration's co-designed public parks, to create appropriate mechanisms for agonistic 
dialogue. Using tools like a postcard campaign; workshops and interactions day and night; 
providing building materials, tools and carpenters; and publishing a blog and a website to 
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improve the future decisions about the redesign of the urban space (ibid., p. 224), he focused 
processes on gathering opinions on the design of the space, developing and implementing 
locally-derived solution. Although Munthe-Kaas could not see how to embed the experience 
into future processes of the city institution, he reports other benefits such as strengthening 
"stakeholderness" (ibid., p. 235), and the deepening of the sense of the local community, and 
the raising of broader parks-related policy issues.  
Weale's (2016) comparison of deliberative and agonistic participation in healthcare 
management finds that the agonistic approach surfaces underlying beliefs and is useful in the 
setting of priorities. Likewise, Fraher and Grint's (2016) assessment of the Navy SEALs shows 
that agonistic governance responses, such as reliance on personal resilience combined with 
other traditional approaches, facilitates decision-making in the case of 'wicked problems'. 
Implications for Implementation and Institutionalisation of Agonism 
The few writers on the application of agonism have applied its tenets (as in Box 2.2 below) to 
models and practices of governance, providing some clues for its possible translation into 
practice. Their various arguments contain two implicit potential approaches – a broad 
agonistic approach, as well as one consisting of detailed practices of governance – for the 
implementation and institutionalisation of agonism by the democratic state institution. 
Firstly, the texts reviewed present agonistic practices as a broad approach and commitment to 
agonistic principles. However, this broad approach – of the institution in practical agonistic 
conflict management – is still by no means clear.  
The adoption of an orientation towards agonism by the state in practices of governance is an 
under-specified and under-tested field, even more so from the perspective of those working 
within the state. Even Wingenbach (2011), in his work on Institutionalizing Agonistic 
Democracy, struggles to provide conclusive guidelines for the composition of agonistic 
institutions (ibid., p. 41). He supposes that the 'agonistic institution', no matter its historic 
constraints and inadequacies, can only be built on an existing institution (ibid., pp. 39, 81-82). 
Seemingly proactively then,  
…agonistic institutions must focus on opportunities to transform the 'soft' elements,… culture, norms, 
social expectations, and… the 'hard' elements, the constitutional, legal and distributive policies defended 
by social power. Thus the task of institutional design must begin within the situated possibilities… and 
aspire to highlight and strengthen opportunities within it to cultivate and foster agonistic practices… 
institutions themselves cannot express agonistic principles, but only create more or less favourable 
conditions for agonistic politics" (ibid., p. xix). 
Box 2.2: Summary of Four Tenets of Agonism 
① Conflict is central to the democratic state, not co-operation 
② Agonistic conflict is the agent of change 
 ③ The democratic institution transforms antagonism to agonism 
④ Consensus is never final 
Source: Own formulation 
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Mouffe (2013) generally agrees there is a broad role for the institution but, for her, it takes its 
cue, reactively, from the protestor. The protestor's activism stimulates "a desire for change" 
(ibid., p. 95), by alerting the institution to the possibility that "things could be different" (ibid., 
p. 96). If protestors cannot politically voice their anger, antagonistic confrontation is inevitable 
and will "be expressed through violence" (ibid., p. 121). Drawing from the review, this broad 
approach consists of the institution's support of the centrality of dissensus in the democratic 
state rather than consensus; the consideration of conflict as a potential agent of change; an 
aspiration to attain the ideals of democracy and developmental aims by improving its current 
practices and changing them where necessary; and display of a deep respect for its 
adversaries. 
Secondly, at the level of detailed practices of agonistic governance by the state, the view is 
even more obscure. However, in both actual and suggested practices, the authors reviewed 
emphasise the processes of interaction as the most critical practice in the implementation and 
institutionalisation of agonism (see Table 2.2 on page 28). To a lesser extent, writers discuss 
the limitation of exclusion; the provision of appropriate resources for the agonistic interaction; 
and the direction of attention to agonistic 'consensus' or decision-making, difficult to do when 
agonism proposes that the space for conflict must always remain open. 
What this suggests, though, about what the evidence of the implementation of the principles 
of detailed agonistic practices might look like in reality is less conclusive, and presented a 
significant challenge for the collation and interpretation of data in the process of research for 
this thesis.  
Agonism as Prism for Research 
The research plan proposed three uses of the notion of agonism as a prism for the research, 
but this proved more difficult to implement than envisaged, as seen in Chapter 3 (on page 35). 
Firstly, the notion of agonism serves as a tool for analysis by providing a sensitising filter by 
highlighting ways that the state views dissensus, with an eye to its positive possibilities rather 
than its potential destructiveness within the context of cycles of antagonism and agonism, and 
to more deliberately consider the meaning of protest.  
Secondly, the tenets of agonism provide a way to connect the various aspects of the research 
together in an iterative way, as a thematic schema and operational tool based on the tenets of 
Mouffeian agonism for the design, definition, construction, collection, collation and analysis of 
the research data (see Table 3.3 on page 57). 
Thirdly, the prism of agonism fulfils a purpose for use as a "descriptive tool", in accordance 
with Decreus et al.'s (2014, p. 137) advice. Here, Mouffeian agonism is used for the 
descriptive-analytical interpretation of the narrative of unfolding conflict and protest events, 
and the subsequent explanation of the responses of the state through the analysis and 
synthesis of the findings in the case study. 
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Questions about the state's qualification of the conflict; its response to the protestors' claims; 
its portrayal of protestors; its response to issues of power dynamics; and the form of 
agreement reached, needed to be asked and answered in the case study. Given that agonistic 
practices might not be readily recognisable, with even Mouffe (2013) saying that the diversity 
of agonistic practices makes it hard to define agonistic practice, the literature suggests a 
framework outlining the possible principles of detailed agonistic practices being implemented 
by the state (see Table 2.3 on page 34). This framework serves as a benchmark that assesses 
whether the practices of governance by the state align broadly, and in detailed ways, to the 
principles of agonism. 
5 In Closing 
Given the intensity of protests in recent times, the inherently positive possibilities of 
positioning conflict centrally in democracy and governance expressed by Mouffe (2000b), 
makes the notion of agonism seem particularly appropriate for the study of protest, conflict, 
governance and democracy. Dealing with conflict in governance is not a new theme in the 
academic literature, but since the 2000s, the implications of the concept of agonism have been 
debated it at a theoretical level. Writers in diverse fields of research have also investigated the 
application of agonism in planning and practices of governance, in both models and actual 
cases, although the practical testing of agonism remains an under-explored field. The 
implications for the implementation by, and institutionalisation of agonism within, state 
institutions, suggest that a broad approach as well as a number of detailed possible agonistic 
practices, is possible.  
All in all, agonism is a complex notion, critiqued by many, but offering arguably intellectual and 
practical resources for understanding the complexity of dissensus in democratic governance, 
certainly in this thesis. Agonism seems to offer a potentially valuable prism for developing a 
nuanced understanding of the stance of the state and its responses to protest in the 
qualitative research approach and case study method described in the next chapter. However, 
even the concept of agonism needs to be deployed with care, especially in contexts such as 
South Africa where conflict and violence are often closely intertwined. 
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Table 2.3: Framework outlining Principles of Detailed Agonistic Practices 
No Question Principles of detailed agonistic practices Authors 
1 State's 
qualification 
of the conflict 
Adopts 'ethos' of agonism; acknowledges centrality 
of conflict; 'open' to conflict; change-oriented; 
allows itself to be 'jolted' out of complacency; sees 
conflict as part of political process allowing 
adversaries to have 'a new chance to win' between 
formal elections; does not censure or denigrate 
protest 
(Goi 2005; Schaap 2006, p. 
256; Pieterse 2008; 
Wingenbach 2011, p. 115; 
Tambakaki 2014; Munthe-
Kaas 2015) 
2 State's 
portrayal of 
protestors 
Demonstrates deep agonistic respect; uses spoken 
and written language carefully, not indiscriminately, 
internally and publicly; recognises protestors as 
possible instigators of local solutions; treats conflict 
as an opportunity for building current and future 
constructive state-society relationships 
(Goi 2005; Pieterse 2008; 
Munthe-Kaas 2015) 
3 State's 
response to 
protestors' 
claim 
Recognises validity of claim, whether formally or 
informally made; provides channels and spaces for 
contestation; considers any claim as legitimate; is 
willing to do more; prioritises response at senior 
levels politically and managerially; genuinely 
considers claim and responds (presumably to the 
protest event, the effects of issue, and the root 
cause of the issue); empowers protestors not 
governs them 
(Pløger 2004; Munthe-Kaas 
2015) 
 
 
 
4 State's 
response to 
power 
dynamics 
Keeps place of power empty; opens up processes of 
participation; uncovers, acknowledges and 
moderates uneven systems of power and routines of 
exclusion to minimise exclusion; identifies common 
ground; provides shared space for agonistic debate 
and 'politicisation' of issues; separates sphere of 
interaction from the institution; shares agenda-
setting with adversaries; provides resources to 
weaker adversaries; relies on 'passion' not 'logical-
rational' reasoning; provides appropriate resources 
(leadership, those with inner agonism', empathy, 
'ethics', resilience)  
(Hillier 2002a; Fung 2003, p. 
345; Gunder 2003, pp. 254-
310; Pløger 2004; Goi 2005; 
Pieterse 2006a; McManus 
2008; Healey 2009, pp. 452-
454; Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 
2010, p. 346; Silver et al. 
2010; Bond, S. 2011; Glover 
2011; Murtagh & Ellis 2011; 
Glover 2012; Sager 2013, p. 
240; Fortis 2014; Morrell 
2014; Westphal 2014; 
Munthe-Kaas 2015; Fraher & 
Grint 2016; Weale 2016) 
5 Form of 
agreement 
reached 
Manages rather than resolves conflicts; emphasises 
the contestation itself, not the decision-making, and 
is not consensus-seeking; acknowledges any decision 
that is made is incremental, partial and short-lived; 
incorporates decisions into practices; absorbs new 
understandings from the conflict into the values of 
the organisation; finds new ways to improve 
governance, striving for perfection but recognising 
perfection is impossible (presumably whilst 
balancing positive outcomes and minimises negative 
outcomes; avoiding the creation of an institutional 
vacuum; and not damaging state-society 
relationships) 
(Gunder 2003, p. 308; 
Mäntysalo et al. 2011; 
Wingenbach 2011, p. xvi; 
Westphal 2014; Munthe-
Kaas 2015; Fraher & Grint 
2016) 
Note that the above list of authors is not comprehensive; refer also to Appendix 3: Draft Matrix of Possible Practices of the Agonistic Institution on page 311. 
Source: Own formulation 
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Chapter 3 | Designing the Research Framework: From Chaos to Case 
Study 
1 Starting with Organised Chaos 
In the initial research endeavours, the application of the originally planned qualitative research 
and case study methodology was experienced as somewhat chaotic and confusing processes, 
revealing the need to rethink the research framework, and create a significantly more 
comprehensive framework. In formulating a more fit-for-purpose framework, the researcher 
drew on various approaches already established extensively in the academic literature. The 
resulting research design framework driving the choices made for this research consists of two 
main parts, namely the research paradigm and the research process, with the figure showing 
the relationship between the two main parts and the levels within each (see Figure 3.1 on page 
36). 
The research paradigm covers abstract considerations about the underlying philosophy at the 
conceptualisation and formulation phases of the research. The paradigm is informed by the 
two-pronged nature of the research questions as already discussed in Chapter 1 about the 
descriptive-analytic aspects of state-society strife, and the theoretical-conceptual questions 
about the value of strife in governance, which draw from the literature on agonism (covered in 
Chapter 2). The research paradigm consists of a constructivist epistemology, an interpretivist-
naturalistic theoretical perspective, inductive and deductive research approaches and filters of 
agonism, a concern for the view of those working within the state on governance practices and 
the researcher's affinity with local governance matters. 
Flowing from the research paradigm, the research process incorporates pragmatic decisions 
about the research methodology, method, strategies, techniques and tools at the 
operationalisation, evaluation and resolution phases. The research process starts with the 
choice of a qualitative research methodology and the selection of the case study method. The 
iterative and interlinked research strategies of document review and interviewing, to collate 
and create data, are combined with the research techniques of document analysis and case 
study formulation to consolidate, reduce and reconstruct the data in the final case study. 
The case study method serves as both the research method for, and the research output from, 
this research. The case study, nested within the thesis, provides "thick description" for "thick 
interpretation" (Ponterotto 2006, pp. 542-543) about past strife, responses that contributed to 
better outcomes for citizens and speculations to inform future thinking about strife. 
2 Research Paradigm 
Underlying Philosophy 
'Organised chaos', or "order without predictability" (Cartwright 1991), seemed to characterise 
best the early progression of the research endeavours. As the research design unfolded, the 
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Figure 3.1: Designing the Research Framework – Paradigm and Process 
Ontology
Research approach
Inductive and deductive
Research filters
Agonism, affinity, state perspective
Research methodology
Qualitative research
Research method
Case study
Research strategies
Document reviewing and interviewing
[Data collation and creation]
Research techniques
Document analysis and case study formulation
[Data consolidation, reduction and reconstruction]
Research tools
Hardware, software and human resources
PHILOSOPHY
METHODOLOGY
METHOD
MEANS
CONCEPTUALISATION
FORMULATION
OPERATIONALISATION
EVALUATION
RESOLUTION
Problem
Theoretical perspective
Interpretivist-naturalistic
Epistemology
Constructivism
 
Source: Own formulation (partly derived from Crotty 1998, p. 4; Niglas 2001; Jonker & Pennink 2010, p. 23) 
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researcher realised that the research design paradigm had not been sufficiently understood at 
the proposal stage of the research, nor in the initial process-oriented 'roadmap' for the 
research (see Figure 3.2 on page 38), which does not fully describe the actual iterative 
analytical procedures in the research process, as in Box 3.3 on page 61. The research paradigm 
represents "how the researcher views 'reality'" (Jonker & Pennink 2010, p. 25) at the 
"philosophical level" (Niglas 2001, p. 2) and describes the underlying concepts for "the way 
knowledge is studied and interpreted" (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006, p. 2). However, the 
terminology and definitions for the different aspects of a research framework in the literature 
are contradictory, confusing and overlapping (Niglas 2001; Mackenzie & Knipe 2006, p. 4; 
Porter 2006, pp. 307-308), and had to be clarified for this research. 
Initially, the researcher made process decisions based on intuition, a common approach (Flick 
2009, p. 440), and considered a positive contribution to precise research outcomes (Jick 1979; 
Heron & Reason 1997). However, it became evident to the researcher that the originally 
planned qualitative research process contained an implicit but unclear shorthand about the 
make-up of the underlying research paradigm (Fischer, Miller et al. 2006, p. 406; Babbie 2010, 
p. 40). Further, the researcher also experienced, as many other researchers did, that various 
aspects of the research were 'messy' and 'chaotic' (Bryman & Burgess 1994, p. 2; Burawoy 
1998, p. 10; Mellor 2001; Gabriel & Griffiths 2004, p. 152; O'Dwyer 2004; Rugg & Petre 2004, 
p. 26; Ritchie & Lewis 2005, pp. 202, 213; Yang & Miller 2008, pp. 75, 76; McGregor & 
Murnane 2010, p. 420). 
The experience prompted closer attention to the formulation of the research paradigm and 
the consequent research process. Hence, the research paradigm was deliberately and 
iteratively refined in this thesis in an approach labelled as the "circular model" (Flick 2009, p. 
142), until a coherent research framework emerged with "practical steps" (Niglas 2001), seen 
as critical for good quality research outputs (Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 545). Organisations are 
seen as different to other subjects of study, with their own "special form of reality" (Jonker & 
Pennink 2010, p. 4), which is hard to read due to their complexities (McKelvey 1997; Jonker & 
Pennink 2010, p. 4). Hence, the research paradigm builds on approaches from the fields of 
public policy and administration, management, sociology and organisational studies for its 
structure (Morgan & Smircich 1980; Crotty 1998; Fischer et al. 2006; Yang & Miller 2008; Gray 
2009; Tierney & Clemens 2011).  
In interpreting the work of various writers on research for this research, the researcher tried to 
make sense of the paradigm, made up of the ontology, epistemology, theoretical perspective, 
research approach and research filters (see Figure 3.1 on page 36). These elements overlap 
each other (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006, p. 5), and influence the way the researcher 'sees' the 
world and progressively guide the researcher to a specific set of influences affecting the design 
of the research (Taylor & Callahan 2005; Mackenzie & Knipe 2006; Gray 2009, p. 19). The 
paradigm shapes how the knowledge was made (Crotty 1998, p. 4; Niglas 2001; Jonker & 
Pennink 2010, p. 23).  
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of Roadmap at Start of Research 
The problem State-citizen protest 
is a significant socio-political 
challenge for states; such conflict 
seems to represent a failure of 
democracy; the state tends to see 
conflict as negative and 
destructive; dissension is on the 
rise worldwide; state 
practitioners are hard put to see 
the positive and creative aspects 
of different sorts of strife
1
Agonism as prism As benchmark; 
as sensitising filter; to connect 
parts of research together; and as 
descriptive-analytical tool
2
Overarching question
What are the practical possibilities of 
applying normative concepts of 
agonism to future state-society 
strife, drawing from cases of open 
conflict, in respect of a state-centric 
consideration of the state's 
governance practices?
1
Research paradigm and process Exploring a possible contribution to a new narrative 
from the state’s perspective - one that incorporates conflict as a constructive force of 
democracy rather than as a destructive one – through a qualitative research 
methodology and the method of the case study of state-citizen city strife in Joburg using 
agonism as a prism and periodisation; seeking evidence of agonistic practices of 
governance in state service delivery using empirical appraisal of state responses to 
selected conflicts (1996 -2012) through research strategies of document reviewing and 
interviewing of state respondents
3
grey literature
agonism
officials
Academic literature
case study
Was the question 
answered adequately?
Was the problem 
suitably addressed?
9
The Johannesburg Case
1991
2012
Global and SA 
protest
Service delivery 
protest in SA 
Joburg and 
service delivery 
protest types
Spectrum of 
strife
4
Timeline 
of city 
strife
Orange 
Farm 
water  
wars
Inner City 
informal 
trading
Middle-
class 
billings 
backlash
8
7
6
5
joburg
argument
Q5 What does the literature say 
about dissensus in democracy 
and governance, and what is 
agonism's appeal and how does it 
feature in the discourse on 
dissensus; how have writers 
translated normative agonism 
into practice at the institutional 
level; and how have they applied 
agonism as a research tool?
1991
2012
9
Types of protests, unfolding strife 
and responses
• Many types of protest
• Unfolding irregular and  
contradictory agonistic strife
• Varied responses to protest
Extent, Outcomes and Constraints of 
Agonistic Practices
• Extent of agonism difficult to 
gauge
• Role of antagonism is important
• Different extents of agonism in 
short-term and long-term 
responses
• Mixed aspects of protest 
outcomes
• Constraints to agonistic practices 
of governance
Q2 In considering the case of local government, 
what types of public protests characterised post-
apartheid Johannesburg; how did the service 
delivery strife unfold over time; and how did the 
city administration respond to the protests?
Q3 To what extent were the city administration's 
practices agonistic; did these practices result in 
outcomes beneficial for citizens; and what were 
the constraints to agonistic practices of 
governance?
1
Working argument Citizens protest when perceive democratic ideals are unmet  and service 
delivery is poor; state prefers  conventional democratic approaches of conciliation in conflict 
processes and formal channels of protest; where agonistic engagement occurs, constructive 
change can occur but not always; factors against agonistic governance include state’s lack of 
appetite to see conflict as a constructive force for change; even if state-society link is 
agonistic,  outcomes are not always positive; however, the state can potentially draw on 
agonism to perceive and manage conflict in new ways but constraints are evident
1
Agonism Broad approach and 
detailed normative framework
2
• Intersection of state  and protest complex
• Scope for state to be more agonistic but challenges in 
doing so, including lack of appetite or insight 
• These complexities and challenges not considered by 
theorists of agonism; some strategies and examples 
but power in practice uncertain and limited
• Notion of agonism itself has limitations
• Failures or successes of governance not solely due to 
absence or presence of agonism
• Agonistic interaction on its own is not enough 
• Main value is state can draw on agonism in daily 
practice as appropriate and increase its ability to 
interact productively to realise constructive change 
from conflict
9
Agonism's practical possibilities
• Adopt agonism as ethos of governance
• Accept centrality of dissensus
• Recognise impossibility of consensus 
• Widen repertoire of responses
• Guard against 'fetishisation' of conflict
• Understand limitations of agonism
9
city administration
Source: Own formulation; refer also to Box 3.3 on page 61 
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Starting with the Problem 
The research design as in any other research started with a problem leading to a set of 
questions (see Figure 3.1 on page 36). Taking an organisational perspective, a problem is a 
problem if "someone is bothered by something: a situation, a result, or specific behaviour 
(Jonker & Pennink 2010, pp. 5-6). Further, "curiosity is the reason for research" (Fischer et al. 
2006, p. 47). The aim of this research is to satisfy the researcher's interest by asking questions 
about troubling strife and the state, describing and understanding the problem and applying 
the resultant insights to the problem (Jonker & Pennink 2010, pp. 10, 12). In this way, the 
problem and the aim of the research are integrally interlinked with the choices made in the 
design of the research (ibid., p. 13).  
Ontology 
The research paradigm starts with the underlying ontology, namely "the study of being… the 
nature of existence and what constitutes reality... ontology embodies understanding what is" 
(emphasis in the original, Gray 2009, p. 19). Most writers on research in the academic 
literature do not delve deeply into this philosophical and abstract notion and many seem to 
sidestep it completely. For example, Crotty (1998) argues, as informed by his own research 
processes, that the ontological consideration does not necessarily impact on the research 
framework (ibid., pp. 10-12). Similarly, Seale (1999) argues that research practices can be 
separated from the research paradigm, as the researcher's awareness of the challenges in the 
research design process is adequate for him or her to make the appropriate decisions (ibid., p. 
476). Specifically relevant to this case study, Watson (2006) cautions researchers and planners 
to be aware of how much and in what ways the underlying philosophy can inform their 
processes and that not being aware may mean that the negative effects of globalisation and 
liberalist democracy, namely deep difference and inequality, may be worsened (ibid.). 
Like Gabriel and Griffiths (2004, p. 2), this study recognises that ontological positions represent 
an entire field of philosophical studies in their own right and it does not matter much which 
one is chosen as the lower level research framework options cut across all positions. This 
researcher agrees with Gabriel and Griffiths (ibid.) that what does matter more is that the 
researcher is aware of value judgments being made during the research process and the 
agenda driving the research and so did not explore the ontological aspects of the research 
paradigm further (ibid.). 
Epistemology 
Then, the epistemology "tries to understand what it means to know… and provides a 
philosophical background for deciding what kinds of knowledge are legitimate and adequate" 
(emphasis in the original, Gray 2009, p. 19). In this study, the aim of the questioning is 
understanding and so the epistemological foundation of the research paradigm, namely the 
way one sees and understands 'reality' (Niglas 2001; Gray 2009, p. 19) or one's "overarching 
world view" (McGregor & Murnane 2010), is accordingly 'constructivism' (Lincoln & Guba 
2000, p. 166). Simply put, constructivism details "the individual human subject engaging with 
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objects in the world and making sense of them" (Crotty 1998, p. 79). "Truth and meaning… are 
created by the subject's interaction with the world. Meaning is constructed not discovered, so 
subjects construct their own meaning, even in relation to the same phenomenon. Hence, 
multiple, contradictory but equally valid accounts of the world can exist" (emphasis in the 
original, Gray 2009, p. 20). Constructivism was well suited for this research framework as it 
tried to reveal "the real workings behind 'reality'" (ibid., p. 34).  
Theoretical Perspective 
The next step was to clarify a particular theoretical perspective, such as 'interpretivism', 
'positivism' and 'post-modernism' (Gray 2009, pp. 21-29). The theoretical perspective of 
'interpretivism', a way to view 'reality' in sociology (Burrell & Morgan 1979, pp. 22, 28), tends 
to go hand-in-hand with the constructivist epistemology (Gray 2009, p. 20). The interpretivist 
researcher tries to understand 'reality' and recognises the impact on the research of the 
researcher's past experience, make-up and presence in the research process (Crotty 1998, p. 
67; Fischer et al. 2006, p. 408; Mackenzie & Knipe 2006, p. 3). 
The theoretical perspective can have different foci, for example, 'naturalistic enquiry', 'realism' 
and ' phenomenology'; 'interpretivism' is used in this study, which is synchronistic with a focus 
on 'naturalistic enquiry' according to Gray (Gray 2009, pp. 23-27). Expanding on this, he 
explains that naturalistic enquiry means that the research does not try to generalise but rather 
it advances "an ideographic body of knowledge that describes individual cases. Within these 
cases, plausible inferences on events and processes are made, but this falls short of claiming 
causality. Phenomena can only be understood within their environment or setting; they cannot 
be isolated or held constant while others are manipulated. The real world is too complex, 
diverse and interdependent for this" (ibid., pp. 26-27). The uniqueness of the local natural 
setting for studying the 'real' world is a critical aspect of naturalistic enquiry (Seale 1999, p. 
468; Ritchie & Lewis 2005, p. 3).  
Whilst other theoretical frameworks could have been used in this study, the interpretivist 
perspective remained dominant. For instance, there were aspects of 'pragmatism' that 
responded to the aim of this research for a practical and problem-solving approach (Gray 2009, 
pp. 28-29). Likewise, Burrell and Morgan's (1979) interpretation of 'functionalism' also fit this 
research, sharing pragmatism's concern for understanding and applying "practical solutions to 
practical problems" (ibid., p. 26), as did other interpretations (Morgan 1980, p. 5; Gioia & Pitre 
1990, p. 593; Hurt & Callahan 2013, p. 7). Further, highlighting even more subtle nuances in 
such perspectives, three of the 34 perspectives applied in organisational research detailed by 
Vibert (2004), namely his 'bureaucracy', 'institutional' and 'sense-making' theoretical 
perspectives are also mainly oriented to functionalism and could also have fit this research to 
some extent (ibid., pp. 85-88, 107-110, 134-139). 
Research Approach 
The research approach, namely the logic or the reasoning, used in this research is a 
combination of inductive and deductive approaches in response to the dual nature of the 
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research questions posed. 'Inductive' reasoning, namely that applied to thinking from "the 
particular to the general" (Babbie 2010, p. 22), or from the inside to the outside by looking for 
its internal, inherent logic (Gray 2009, p. 24), was used in assessing the case study. The case 
study itself was prepared through multiple inductive processes of working with the data to find 
general principles particular to the case study. This approach was undertaken iteratively and in 
tandem with 'deductive' reasoning, namely that applied to thinking from "the general to the 
specific" (Babbie 2010, p. 23), or from the outside to the inside by applying an external logic 
(Gray 2009, p. 24). In this research, the deductive reasoning is framed by the testing of the 
broad approach and detailed principles of agonistic practices. 
Research Filters, a Note on Positionality 
The paradigm is completed by considering the research filters for this research. The line of 
questioning uses the tenets of the notion of agonism as "sensitizing concepts" (Flick 2009, p. 
431), to shape the research process and to filter and focus the data for the research. Alongside 
this, there is a concern in the research on the role of the state in processes of conflict, rather 
than that of the citizens, which has already well covered in academic literature. The 
researcher's affinity with municipal urban governance arising from her past professional 
involvement in development challenges related to local government (Jonker & Pennink 2010, 
pp. 27, 106; Creswell 2013, pp. 20-21), also shaped the research process. 
The author has had a formal role in relation to processes of state-society conflict although this 
was some time ago. She worked for the city administration of Johannesburg, initially as an 
Architect and Project Manager between 1989 and 1996, and then as its Manager of Economic 
Empowerment and Business Support in the Southern Metropolitan Local Council between 
1996 and 1999. Further, she had responsibilities for area regeneration in local government in 
the United Kingdom and then again for the City of Johannesburg between 1999 and 2006. She 
did not engage formally in the issues and stories covered in this thesis other than with informal 
trading management between 1996 and 1999. Since 2006, her role as a Chief Director in the 
South African National Treasury until 2011 provided continued engagement with local 
processes of governance and fuelled her ongoing interest in local government management 
matters. 
Now, from the perspective as an observer, having had some distance to reflect more critically 
and objectively about her experiences in Johannesburg and having no immediate or specific 
involvement or direct interest in the issues raised in this thesis, she draws on her own 
experiences to think through some of these local government matters.  
She accepts that agonism is a two-way process and that understanding the motivations and 
actions of the other parties is equally important and acknowledges that she does not have the 
same experiences with community organisations. However, given her long experience in 
government, which has provided her with rich insights into government processes, she has 
made a deliberate choice to consider the conflictual processes in this thesis from the vantage 
of the government's role.  
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In her learning process of research and writing of the thesis, the shift from a government to a 
purely academic environment was not an easy transition, and likely remains an incomplete 
one. However, the enrichment gained from being able to engage in a more autonomous space 
with other critical thinkers.  
3 Research Processes 
Pragmatic Decisions 
The second main part of the research design framework, namely the research process, moves 
away from the conceptualisation and formulation stages of the research paradigm to the 
operationalisation, evaluation and resolution of the research framework. The research process 
includes decisions made in terms of five components, namely the research methodology, the 
research method, the strategies for inquiry, the techniques used and the tools for the research 
process (see Figure 3.1 on page 36), which are detailed in the rest of this sub-section 3. 
Qualitative Research Methodology 
A research methodology was needed that could uncover the complexities of city strife about 
state service delivery and the state's views and responses to it. Further, the methodology 
needed to be capable of finding evidence that state-society interactions in processes of conflict 
were agonistic or resulted in positive outcomes with the potential to contribute to the 
reframing of the state-society relationship in creative ways with potentially more democratic 
outcomes, though the researcher expected to also find that some processes and outcomes 
were destructive. The qualitative research methodology (see Figure 3.1 on page 36) is used for 
"exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human 
problem" (Creswell 2013, p. 4). Creswell describes this as the inquiry process typically 
comprising "emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participant’s 
setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes and the 
researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data" (ibid.). For this study, the 
qualitative research methodology was considered appropriate for four reasons as described 
next. 
Firstly, the qualitative methodology is well suited to the theoretical perspective of 
interpretivism and typically paired with it (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006, p. 3). The way to 
understand the context that prompted the research questions is only possible through the 
qualitative methodology to describe its complexities (Creswell 2013, pp. 4, 19), although 
quantitative data was drawn on where necessary, especially in the counting of protests. The 
strength of the qualitative methodology is that, particularly important for identifying conflict 
management details, it surfaces data to "provide depth and detail to create understanding of 
phenomena and lived experiences" (Bowen 2005, p. 209), and permits the refinement of 
research concepts (Flick 2009). The storytelling aspects of the methodology provide "richly 
descriptive" (Merriam 2002, p. 5) context and create meaning beyond relaying the mere facts 
(Gabriel & Griffiths 2004), to the knowing, sharing and understanding of events (Richardson 
1998; Sole & Wilson 2002; Caelli, Ray et al. 2008, p. 2). It seems unlikely that one could have 
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undertaken a study of this nature on a quantitative basis given the non-uniformity of the 
dimensions within the society being measured (Malena & Heinrich 2007). In any event, a 
quantitative methodology runs the same risk of lack of objectivity as the qualitative approach 
(Bryman 1984, 2004).  
Secondly, researchers in the sphere of agonism have set a precedent for the use of the 
qualitative methodology in their work. Agonism, as a relatively new political philosophy with 
limited translation into urban planning ideology and frameworks, has been sparsely used in 
empirical research in the terrain of governance and planning so far. However, in instances 
where cases of agonism did form the focus of the academic texts explored in Chapter 2, the 
authors stated they used a qualitative methodology to explore the impact of conflict in their 
research although few provided details of their approaches. In only a few instances is it 
possible to determine details of their methodology. Examples include the preparation of the 
monogrammatic assessments by Gunder (2003) and Pløger (2006), the detailed evaluations of 
academic texts, and the collation of empirical data through interviews to develop new insights 
into processes of conflict by Pieterse (2006b) and others (such as Pløger 2004; Vitus 2006; 
Agger & Larsen 2009; Michels & De Graaf 2010; and McClymont 2011). These studies were a 
useful starting point for the Johannesburg case study. 
Thirdly, the qualitative methodology can result in transformation, a key desire driving this 
research. The methodology lends itself to recording and provoking change in organisations 
(Brown, Gabriel et al. 2009). In this way, the work may impact on public policy in the future 
(Tierney & Clemens 2011).  
Fourthly, the flexibility of the qualitative methodology seems to outweigh its potential 
downsides (Kohlbacher 2006; Davies, W. & Beaumont 2007). Some of the challenges of the 
qualitative methodology remarked on by others were also observed in this study. However, 
the point of creating the holistic research design framework was to enable a flexible approach 
– as the qualitative methodology is – to ensure challenges were pre-empted before and during 
the implementation stage of the research through diligent and effective research design 
(Baxter & Jack 2008; Caelli et al. 2008, p. 2). Downsides include the possible variable nature of 
outputs due to the potential for differing ideological approaches (Seale 1999), including the 
construction of a particular 'reality' that may not be fully accurate (Richardson 2000). Concerns 
also included possibly insufficiently rigorous standards of research, definitional confusion 
about qualitative methods and scanty audit trails (Rubin, A. 2000; Cassell, Symon et al. 2006; 
Lietz, Langer et al. 2006). Although storytelling especially in organisational research can vary 
between monotony and entertainment, the undercurrents of emotions and symbolism can be 
and were hard to detect and decipher accurately (Gabriel & Griffiths 2004, pp. 114-124). 
Further, the process was full of dilemmas such as sympathising with respondents when 
neutrality should have been maintained (Marshall, C. 1984, p. 197). Frustratingly, for this kind 
of research, there is "no single gold standard" (Denzin 2009, p. 154). However, alert to these 
challenges raised, the qualitative research methodology was sufficiently flexible to enable the 
researcher to create measures throughout the research to address the challenges. Such 
measures included comprehensive record-keeping to provide evidence of all aspects of the 
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research; a protocol for standard interviewing approaches to minimise bias; a standard 
specification for data mining; a template approach to stories within the case study; and checks 
to ensure value judgments without supporting evidence were not made.  
Case Study as Method and as Output 
Case Study as Research Method 
Two streams of investigation were undertaken, namely into the stance of the post-1994 state 
towards state-society conflict, and the theoretical-conceptual aspects of the notion of agonism 
to such conflict. The researcher's early literature reviews showed that speculative inquiry into 
the two streams depended on the detailed investigation of service delivery dissensus to 
facilitate insights into the state's perspective of strife. 
The case study method has proven popular and appropriate for deep investigative studies (Yin 
& Heald 1975; Yin 1994). Moreover, given the degree of variation across episodes of state-
society conflict and the complexity of the state itself, the case study method seemed the 
logical choice of research method and was in accord with the qualitative research 
methodology (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, p. 2). In this study, the case study was not only the prime 
research method but also the primary research output in the manner promoted by Bowen 
(2005) and Flyvbjerg (2011). Further, the method was a creative one (Badenhorst 2007), more 
an "art" (Flick 2009, p. 463) than a science, with the process of writing the case study itself 
triggering discoveries (Wolcott 2002). 
The case study nests within and forms the substantial part of the thesis, focusing on the 
institution of the city administration of Johannesburg (see Box 1.1 Box 3.1 on page 45 for city 
overview). The research method was conducted as a rigorous empirical appraisal of state 
responses to selected processes of conflict between 1994 and 2012 by using document review 
and interviewing strategies with research techniques of document analysis and case study 
formulation (detailed in the next sub-sections on page 55 and on page 58). The case study is 
structured to provide a narrative of the high-level context framing the service delivery protests 
at the national and city context, and a concrete explanation of protest in Johannesburg. It 
maps the nature and evolution of city strife itself at the intersection with city governance in 
terms of urban service-delivery issues in Johannesburg. It considers the stance of the city 
administration towards the different aspects of service delivery strife, both agonistic and 
antagonistic. Then, a detailed investigation into a selected sample of three stories within the 
case study in different areas of the city (see Map 4.1 on page 82 for their location) pinpoints 
policy shifts impacting city governance as prompted by conflict and the presence and 
prospects of agonism in the unfolding of events within each story.  
Broadly, the case study typology is best described as a 'descriptive-analytical' one, and 
although the term does not appear to be widely used, many case studies follow a formula of 
description followed by analysis (Sandelowski 1998, pp. 376-377; Flick 2009, p. 134; Babbie 
2010, p. 309; Thomas 2011). Narratives that are centred on historical events as in this case 
study are "analytico-descriptive" accounts, rather than "emotional-symbolic" ones (Cassell & 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 45 
Symon 2004, pp. 119, 124-125). Similarly, as in Berg (2001, pp. 229-231), this case study 
combines three approaches, namely exploration, description and explanation. 
Box 3.1: Overview of Johannesburg as Case Study City 
Strife has been a constant companion to the 
Johannesburg's city administration since the 
first democratic local government elections 
took place in 1996. The city is the crucible in 
which many of the energies of democratic 
change coalesced. The backdrop for these 
conflictual processes – both on the street 
and behind the scenes – unfolded bet-ween 
the society and the city administration 
between 1996 and 2011 and provides a 
detailed understanding of the environment 
surrounding the protests with planning, 
governance and service delivery matters 
made prominent in the case study.  
Historically, the first municipality of 
Johannesburg was declared in 1897 (Van 
Onselen 1982a, p. 14), a decade after the 
discovery of gold in 1886 and the 
establishment of the mining camp (Beavon 
2004, pp. 20, 23). The area under municipal 
jurisdiction was a mere 13 square 
kilometres in 1898 (Van Onselen 1982a, p. 
30). Gold proved a powerful drawcard and the population of 3 000 people in 1887 grew to around 100 000 people 
by 1896 (ibid., pp. 2, 163). Since then Johannesburg has continued to experience waves of extensive 
transformations.  
Within a century, by the time the first democratically elected city administration had come into being after decades 
of apartheid rule in 1996, the population of Johannesburg numbered 2 633 031 people (Quantec 2014). By 2011, 
the population has almost doubled to 4 434 828 people, and the size of the footprint under administration is a 
massive 1 645 square kilometres (ibid.), within the broader city-region, namely the Gauteng provincial population of 
12 272 264 people in 2011 (ibid.). 
Now, Johannesburg is the most populated city in South Africa. It is also the biggest contributor to the Gross 
Domestic Product of South Africa at 14 percent, or R408 billion of the total Gross Domestic Product, almost twice 
that of eThekwini's at R266 billion (South African Cities Network 2011a, p. 4; 2011b, p. 20, 2009 data). Indeed, 
Johannesburg together with the broader city-region of Gauteng is a significant economic player not only in South 
Africa but in the continent, contributing 11 percent of Africa's Gross Domestic Product (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2011, p. 15). Despite the city economy's historic reliance on the gold mining sector, 
mining now contributes a scanty one percent Johannesburg's economy, with about a third of the economy based on 
finance and business services, a fifth on trade and another fifth on manufacturing (South African Cities Network 
2011b, p. 33). 
The city administration is commensurately large and complex. Pre-1994 municipalities in South Africa were 
subordinate to the other spheres of government with the national government strongly influencing city politics and 
administration (Cameron 2002, 2010). By 2011, however, Johannesburg and other cities in South Africa and world-
wide have become powerful, autonomous entities in their own right. The city institution of Johannesburg 
incorporates eleven central departments, seven Offices of the Regions and eleven independent entities (COJ 2014f, 
pp. 24, 30-31). It deploys 28 017 employees and 260 councillors across Johannesburg (COJ 2013d, p. 168; COJ 2014f, 
p. 26). The governance arrangements for political oversight and administrative functions are multi-layered and 
clustered according to the city administration's strategic aims (COJ 2014f, p. 25). By 2013, the city administration of 
Johannesburg had become a multi-billion Rand organisation, managing a R44 billion annual expenditure budget 
(ibid., p. 36). The extent of services delivered had also expanded considerably (for more on city statistics, see Table 
4.1 on page 80). 
Source: Own formulation 
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Selection of Case Study and Stories 
The selection of strife in Johannesburg as the case study was partly an opportunistic choice 
based on the location of the researcher. Moreover, early in the research process, a brief scan 
of academic and other texts, and media and Johannesburg-related material contained within 
the researcher's own archive collated between 1998 and 2011, coupled with the researcher's 
former role as a practitioner dealing with local government matters, provided multiple 
possible stories of city strife to research.  
In considering which stories of strife to investigate further in detail, consideration was given to 
picking out three conflicts that related to city strife between the local government and its 
citizens in examples of city governance, planning and the built environment. Some of these 
were marked by street protests as the visible manifestation of that protest, along the 
trajectory of each story, but others contained less obvious processes of strife possibly in 
response to certain national legislation and policies as well as city sectoral strategies and plans. 
Flyvbjerg's (2011) "maximum variation" (ibid., p. 307) sampling approach allowed for the 
incorporation of unique stories into the case study to assess whether findings would also be 
unique to their differing dimensions.  
The criteria for the selection of each of the three stories within the case study are listed in Box 
3.2 below. The three stories thus selected were of water-related service delivery protest in the 
informal settlement of Orange Farm, the informal traders’ insurgencies in the Inner City, and 
the middle-class discontent with the city administration's billing system.  
Box 3.2: Selection Criteria for Case Study Stories 
 
Each story had to: 
 Reflect different types of service delivery protest that manifested as protest by citizens, whether 
violent or not, or in the streets or not 
 Characterise a protracted series of public stand-offs between the city administration and citizens 
over a prolonged period, usually months and years, and were not one-off conflictual events 
 Highlight concerns of citizens in low-income and middle-class communities in different parts of the 
city 
 Impacts potentially hundreds or thousands of citizens 
 Reflect tensions between citizens and the local government even if other spheres of government 
were also involved 
 Consist of clusters of protests largely about the same issue, with individual incidents of conflict seen 
as forming part of an iterative process of ongoing friction between the state and citizens 
 Embody a 'wicked problem', namely a multi-faceted, messy and thorny problem as defined by 
Conklin (2006), with solutions satisfying citizens seemingly short-lived or not readily apparent 
 Lead relatively easily to the identification of a number of appropriate relevant interview 
respondents and reasonably comprehensive accounts of all types outlining the history of the 
protest and related aspects over the period selected 
 Not have already been significantly scrutinised in other studies 
 
Source: Own formulation 
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Research Strategies 
Strategies for Data Collation and Creation 
Two research strategies were selected and implemented in parallel for the collation and 
creation of research data from various sources, namely the document review and interviewing 
strategies. Both are regarded as traditional strategies to find data (Merriam 2002, p. 13), and 
are word-based (Fischer et al. 2006, p. 409). The two research strategies were used in 
conjunction with the research techniques detailed in this sub-section starting on page 55 in an 
iterative fashion from the start, as is typical of the research process according to Merriam 
(2002, p. 14) to gather data from multiple sources (see research process hierarchy, Figure 3.1 
on page 36). 
"Entire studies can be built around documents" (claims Merriam 2002, p. 13), but the 
document review strategy can be used with other strategies as well (Flick 2009, p. 255). The 
recommended blending of the two strategies was used as processes of contestation are 
complex, or essentially "wicked problems" (Conklin 2006), which need to be considered from 
many angles (Buchanan 1992; Whelton & Ballard 2002; Ritchey 2005). This approach serves 
also as a form of triangulation of research findings leading to superior research by providing 
better insights (Bryman 1984; Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; 
Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 555; Yang & Miller 2008, p. 211; Bowen 2009, p. 28; Gray 2009, p. 425; 
Denzin & Lincoln 2011).  
These combined strategies resulted in the formation of various research outputs, which then 
served as the inputs to the case study and the chapters of the thesis (see Figure 3.3 on page 48 
for linkages). All data collected and created, other than paper-based academic books, are 
available as digital appendices (see Appendix 23 for complete list, page 408). 
The duration of the data collation and its synthesis took up nearly half of the entire research 
process of five years of full-time study, and seemingly bears out the observation that case 
studies have a propensity for being time-consuming (Schell 1992; 1994; Kohlbacher 2006) (see 
Table 3.1 below, also see Appendix 23 on page 408 for detailed Research Milestones).  
Table 3.1: Duration of Phases of Research 
Summary Months Year 
Scoping and proposal formulation and approval 13 2011-2012 
Data collation and synthesis 25 2012-2014 
Writing up research for thesis and publication 20 2014-2016 
Examination, revisions and final submission 7 2016 
Total 65 2011-2016 
Source: Own formulation 
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Figure 3.3: Linkages between and Research Outputs and Thesis Inputs 
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Source: Own formulation 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 49 
Document Review 
The document review was the start of the methodical process of document analysis (Merriam 
2002, p. 14). It resulted in the generation of data that "entails finding, selecting, appraising 
(making sense of), and synthesising data contained in documents" (Bowen 2009, p. 28). A 
document analysis, also sometimes called 'textual analysis', is based primarily on written data 
(Taylor & Callahan 2005), and follows one of two approaches, namely "as an object of analysis 
itself, and… as a window into human experience" (Bernard & Ryan 1998, p. 595). The approach 
to this document analysis follows the latter approach largely, and is detailed further in the sub-
section on the Document Analysis Technique on page 55. 
Indeed, data from documents were used in multiple ways in this study. The documents 
"provide background and context, additional questions to be asked, supplementary data, a 
means of tracking change and development, and verification of findings from other data 
sources. Moreover, documents may be the most effective means of gathering data when 
events can no longer be observed or when informants have forgotten the details" (Bowen 
2009, pp. 30-31). Further, the documents serve as "a record or piece of evidence of an event 
or fact" (Wolff 2004, p. 284), as "representations of reality" (Silverman 2006, p. 153), and as 
"social artefacts" (Yang & Miller 2008, p. 215). Most importantly for this study though, they 
represent "traces of institutional interactions" (Flick 2009, p. 220), such as protest events, 
state responses and practices of governance. Documents are seen as especially credible data 
sources as they are written in the technical or political language of the various state 
institutions (Bertrand & Hughes 2005), and are unchangeable and constant, giving them an 
edge on other sources. The data for the document review, like other qualitative research 
processes, is characterised by the complexity and volume of the document review process 
(Scott, A. 1990; Bryman & Burgess 1994, p. 216), and the linkages between its different parts 
as laid out in see Figure 3.3 on page 48. Data was mostly unpackaged, and was widely 
dispersed. The study made use of input data from six different but interlinked written archival 
and contemporary sources. Firstly, secondary data was drawn from academic texts. Then a mix 
of primary and secondary data on protests and contextual themes were located within four 
other sorts of written material, namely topical reports and studies, news articles, official 
documents and statistical data, which were consolidated into 49 themed 'databanks', namely 
themed collections of raw data. Lastly, the primary data from the interview also linked into the 
document review as recorded in the next sub-section on Interviewing starting on page 52. 
Each of the six sources of data required different approaches to collation and consolidation 
and presented the 'facts' in different ways (see Table 3.2 for Details of Six Different Sources of 
Input Data). 
The majority of relevant primary data on protest events between 1994 and 2012 for the case 
study was found generally in newspaper and other articles and press briefings. To clearly 
identify this source of primary data in the thesis, in-text citations denote the name of the 
newspaper or publication rather than the author, and the date. The researcher's handwritten 
notes and 'Data Summaries' of the interviews were also useful sources for protest events, 
namely the formal records of each interview prepared in accordance with a template (covered 
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Table 3.2: Details of Six Different Sources of Input Data 
Input Data Description 
Academic texts Academic texts, books and journal articles, were drawn on extensively at the beginning 
of, but also continuously throughout, the research process to inform the wide-ranging 
topics of the research. The search strategy for the data focused on four broad subjects. 
Firstly, it paid attention to agonism as a form of democratic political thought and also its 
application and translation into practical city governance and planning matters – where 
examples could be found. Then, it focused on an overlapping set of contextual topics and 
academic issues about the dissensus in South African, and other wide-ranging issues 
about the state, citizens' expectations, protest, and state responses thereto. It turned 
then to details about Johannesburg, its make-up and recent history; in some instances, 
the academic texts yielded primary data for the case study. Lastly, it located relevant 
texts on the technical aspects of the research process itself. Paper and digital texts were 
located in the libraries and digital library databases of the University of the 
Witwatersrand. Google Scholar was also an invaluable search tool. Generally, academic 
texts were reviewed by means of literature reviews throughout the study process, 
ranging from cursory and informal, to in-depth and formal approaches, dependent on 
the role of the literature in the different parts of the research (Hart, C. 1998).  
Topical reports and 
studies 
Topical reports and studies, namely the primary data, provided details on protest and 
selected themes, and included theses and dissertations, organisational reports, and 
miscellaneous articles. These were found mainly, but not exclusively, by purposively 
repeatedly searching the Internet using specific key words in combination and 
sometimes singly, especially 'Johannesburg protest service delivery', or by project and 
area names or by issue, and dates, according to specific themes for the different parts of 
the thesis. The most useful Internet portals tended to be Google and Google Scholar. As 
the data were identified, they were cursorily screened for relevance in terms of the 
outline structure of the thesis, the research questions, the time frame, topicality, specific 
geographical areas, and themes identified by the interview respondents.  
At this stage the research process was relatively intuitive, organic and loosely structured. 
The Internet was regarded as an important avenue to follow in the research process as it 
represented a form of "social life" (Berry 2004, p. 323). It is a data gathering tool with the 
advantage of being inconspicuous and facilitating large sampling (Hewson & Laurent 
2012, p. 60), but the latter seemed more of a disadvantage to the researcher, given the 
resources required to process the data, and the research could have benefitted from a 
more focused approach to minimise the volume of data identified. Indeed, the Internet 
proved sometimes to be a frustrating tool, providing a "mixed bag of sources" (Yang & 
Miller 2008, p. 68), not all of which were relevant. However, it did have value (Flick 2009, 
pp. 278-279), but not for topics much older than ten years, which were less well covered 
according to the search strategy used. Collation of data on protest was stopped when 
coverage on individual protests began to be duplicated in the searches, and when the 
available time for this stage of the research ran out. The data were mostly converted to 
files in the Portable Document Format with Optical Character Recognition to enable 
further searches by words or terms, allowing notes to be made within the documents, 
and organised in digital 'databanks'. Databanks are collections of units of data, namely 
documents, combined into single large files, or single folders, each according to specific 
themes such as protests, contextual matters about the institutions of the city 
administration of Johannesburg, and other specific topics covered in the thesis. The 
databank approach served as a way to store the raw data to ensure they were easily 
accessible during the research process (Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 554), and provides 
evidence of the process or the data itself if required.  
News articles Likewise, news articles, also primary data, including paper and digital versions of media 
stories, and press releases and briefings, collected especially about protests in 
Johannesburg, were located through online news repositories and the Internet. The 
corporate websites of News 24, Independent On-Line News, EyeWitness News and the 
COJ, and the South African Bibliographic Information Network online repository of South 
African information through the university library, were the most productive locations of 
digital data. Some articles were also found in other newspapers, such as The Sowetan, 
The Sun, City Press, Die Beeld, and the Caxton's publications. 
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Input Data Description 
Official documents Further, official documents, critical for research on public administration (Yang & Miller 
2008, p. 279), of the city administration of Johannesburg provided additional primary 
data, typically mayoral speeches, strategies, council reports and minutes, policies, annual 
and other performance reports, and relevant government gazettes. Some of this material 
also found its way into the databanks. Although these documents were mostly freely 
obtainable from the COJ's website, the researcher encountered difficulties in accessing 
the COJ's database on applications for public gatherings, and specific reports on informal 
trading, due to the COJ's sensitivities around legal action arising from its Operation Clean 
Sweep in 2013. Despite requesting the information in writing, the data was still not 
received by 2016. 
Statistical data Statistical data for the case study, secondary data, was drawn mainly from the official 
population census in 1996, 2001 and 2011 of Statistics South Africa database, available 
from the university library (Quantec 2014). Some protest-related statistics were 
extracted from ad hoc databases, such as the sample of the COJ's petitions database over 
one year from the COJ's Petitions Unit, protest action data from the Human Settlements 
department (Matshego 2012), and a limited selection of protestors' notifications of the 
intention to gather submitted to the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
(Duncan 2014a). 
Interviews The interviewing strategy resulted in outputs stored in various digital formats. About 68 
hours of audio recordings for the 38 interviews are saved as Portable Document Format 
files linked to the audio recordings with read-out-loud viewing mode functionality suited 
to Adobe Acrobat Reader DC or similar freeware, as MPEG-4s audio files suitable for 
most standard players, and as 'Pencast' files best suited to the smartpen software. 
Handwritten notes (289 pages), Data Summaries (204 pages), and transcripts (1 330 
pages) are also stored. Some data were anonymised in accordance with the respondents' 
signed Consent Forms completed at the time of the interview (for all available interview 
outputs see Appendix 23). 
Source: Own formulation 
in the next sub-section on Interviewing starting on page 52). The most pertinent data related 
to the context surrounding the protests were sourced from speeches, web pages, reports, 
newspaper articles, Data Summaries, minutes of meetings and academic texts. The sampling of 
the data is typically based on the trade-offs between the width and depth of material needed 
for the research according to Flick (2009, p. 123), although he does not clarify the distinction 
between the two. In this research, a relatively wide approach was used to source as much data 
as possible on protests, with a somewhat deeper approach for data on related themes in 
academic texts and other written documents. However, as Ratliff and Hall's (2014) research on 
protests also found, the limitation of newspaper data lies in their 'description-bias', the degree 
to which reporters are accurate in describing protest events, and 'selection-bias', the degree to 
which newspapers cover all protest events that occur (ibid., pp. 274-275). 
Although the document review and analysis strategy for this study was low-profile, productive 
and cheap with documents generally readily available, as already determined by others (Tellis 
1997a, pp. 7-8; Berg 2001, pp. 189, 191; Bowen 2009, p. 31; Gray 2009, pp. 424-425), this 
researcher agrees with the disadvantages of the strategy observed in the literature. For 
instance, although documents can represent "social realities in institutional contexts" (Flick 
2009, p. 262), that does not mean they are unbiased (ibid.). On one hand, some data may be 
incomplete, although it is impossible to ascertain which data (Berg 2001, p. 193; Yang & Miller 
2008, p. 281). On the other hand, documents provide data for significant stretches of time, 
which an interview strategy cannot always match (Bowen 2009, p. 31). Processing the huge 
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amounts of data retrieved as detailed in the next sub-section on the Document Analysis 
Technique on page 55 proved daunting and time-consuming, a risk identified by Baxter et al. 
(2008, p. 554). Further, the data serves a historical purpose in the research as well as a social 
one. This means that the researcher had to be attuned to the data within the record already 
containing bias, which is then amplified in "the processing and evaluation of data by the 
individual researcher, whose reconstruction of the past is inevitably shaped by her language, 
culture, values, and historical location" (Dill & Aminzade 2007, p. 268). 
Interviewing 
The interviewing strategy complemented the document review strategy and resulted in 
"verbal data" (Flick 2009, p. 147). Interviews were conventional semi-structured interviews 
recommended for the gathering of primary data (Klandermans & Staggenborg 2002, pp. 92-
117). Broad guiding questions were prepared in line with the main purpose of the research to 
explore and obtain insights into the different viewpoints of the respondents towards city strife, 
as it unfolded over time (the questionnaire is contained in Appendix 4 on page 325). 
A standard approach to interviewing was adopted based on the guides provided in the 
literature (Ritchie & Lewis 2005; Gray 2009). The sampling of respondents for interviews was in 
accordance with a criterion-based or purposive sampling approach in line with Ritchie et al. 
(2005). The researcher took advantage of her location and former affiliation with local 
government in the selection of respondents. She used a blend of the 'stratified purposeful', 
'criterion' and 'convenience' sampling strategies listed by Wengraf (Marshall, M. 1996; 
Wengraf 2004, pp. 102-103) citing Patton (1990, pp. 169-183), to minimise bias and costs and 
effort in view of the number of interviews undertaken. She took into account the risk of not 
securing the appropriate respondents in terms of the research agenda as identified in the 
literature (Marshall, M. 1996, p. 524).  
As a view on the perspective of the state towards city strife was required, the key respondents 
identified were mostly officials and politicians, currently or formerly, affiliated with the public 
sector, within the disciplines of planning, the built environment, urban regeneration, 
infrastructure development, public policy and strategy. Candidates were identified for their 
knowledge and insights in the background of Johannesburg and the city administration or the 
three topics of the stories for the case study. Further, the period of their employment in the 
relevant position was also a consideration. Additional respondents were selected from 
organisations closely involved with local government. Criteria for selection ensured that the 
respondents had more than three years' experience in local government matters, were fluent 
in English; occupied strategic or management roles; held planning, engineering, public policy 
and related qualifications; and were prepared to have the interview recorded, with anonymity 
being an option if so requested.  
The required ethics clearance for the study involving human subjects was obtained (see 
Appendix 4 for Ethics Clearance Certificate and Appendix 23 for the approved submission in 
full). Respondents were contacted by phone and a standardised e-mail invitation was sent. 
Although the researcher's former professional networks with the city administration and 
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national government facilitated the securing of interviews, with 67 percent of the participants 
known to her, not all responses were positive. If the selected respondent was unresponsive 
after a minimum of three attempts to secure an interview, another respondent was identified. 
A fact sheet on the research topic was e-mailed to each respondent before the interview. The 
researcher opened each interview with a brief pre-scripted overview of the study. 
The planned notion of interviewing the recommended twelve, or even as few as eight, 
candidates per story to reach saturation (Guest, Bunce et al. 2006; Gray 2009, p. 376), was not 
an appropriate measure given that some respondents were able to speak to more than one 
topic and one period in their interviews. Hence, efforts were made throughout the respondent 
selection process to ensure balanced coverage in terms of the number of respondents as well 
as the number of total 'respondent years' covered within each five-year period for each of the 
four topics. Nonetheless, interview coverage for the earlier periods for some of the topics was 
somewhat uneven as determined during the course of the interviewing activity. For instance, 
the coverage of the earlier years for the stories on protest in the Inner City and Orange Farm 
was less than in later periods, and generally less than desired in the billing story, pointing to 
the need to augment data with increased document reviewing techniques to ensure balanced 
analysis (see Appendix 6 for Coverage of Interviews per Topic). 
About 148 possible respondents were identified and 64 were invited for interviews. The 
representivity of respondents by organisation, gender and race group was also tracked to 
minimise bias and improve the robustness and validity of the data as recommended in the 
literature (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). Three-quarters, or 77 percent, of the interviews were with 
respondents who worked or had worked for the city administration of Johannesburg. The 
remainder represented organisations closely affiliated to local government. Further, two-thirds 
of the respondents were male. Half of the respondents were white with the remainder a mix 
of black (21 percent), Indian (19 percent) and coloured (10 percent). It was not possible, 
despite best efforts, to fully attain racial and gender representivity in the number of 
respondents secured relative to national demographics (see Appendix 7 for Response to 
Invitation for Interview). 
Thirty eight interviews were held between June 2012 and January 2013, 33 of them alone 
during the nine-week period from mid-October to mid-December 2012 (see Appendix 8 for List 
of Interview Respondents). Almost every interview was done face-to-face; only one was done 
telephonically. Interviews were between half an hour and nearly four hours long with 70 
percent being between one and two hours long. Almost all interviews were conducted on a 
one-to-one basis between the researcher and the participant, with two interviews 
incorporating additional participants for part of the time. The interview process was managed 
with digital spreadsheet software (see Appendix 23 for Interviews Register). 
Each interview was recorded, bar one at the request of the respondent. During each interview, 
the researcher used a computerised smartpen with a digital audio recorder to record the 
interview, which is synchronised with the simultaneous handwritten notes made on special 
paper, thus facilitating the easy identification and replaying of any part of the audio recording 
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later, by tapping on the related handwritten text in the uploaded digital files. The researcher 
started making Data Summaries from the recordings and handwritten notes immediately after 
each interview; these were finalised at the quality control and proofing stage of each 
transcript. Any documents received from any respondent during and after the interview, were 
incorporated into the Data Summaries and formed part of the record of the interview. 
Transcripts were completed in accordance with a pre-determined specification. A template 
created by the researcher for the Data Summaries was used to ensure standardised and 
consistent summaries. The Data Summaries include details on the interview recorded; 
information on the respondent and interview; a 'word cloud' (or image made up of words 
where each word's size shows its frequency in the transcript) used as an aide memoire; a 
summary of issues raised; actions of the city administration; any high points in accordance 
with the agonistic tents; other interesting data; referrals and a list of documents if provided 
(see Appendix 9 for a Sample of Completed Data Summary of Interview on page 333, and 
Appendix 23 for all Data Summaries). Some data were anonymised in accordance with the 
respondents' requests.1 
The interviews provided rich in-depth qualitative data and many valuable insights. Important 
for developing the themes of the document analysis technique and preliminary analysis to 
facilitate the speculative discussion of the research questions, the handwritten notes and Data 
Summaries combined revealed main topics of interest and connections between items as 
observed by Flick (2009, p. 297). The interview data was further synthesised according to 
thematic topics of 'power'; 'adversaries'; 'expectations'; 'exclusion'; 'channels'; 'consensus'; 
and 'dissensus'. This thematic approach was informed by the work of various academics (Tesch 
1987; Aronson 1994; Miles, Huberman et al. 1994; Malterud 2001; Ryan 2005; Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane 2006; Elo & Kyngäs 2008; Strauss & Corbin 2008; Guest, MacQueen et al. 2012). The 
thematic structure and the data arising from the 'Interview Synthesis' process were 
incorporated into and informed the technique of document analysis (see Appendix 23 for 
Interview Synthesis, refer also to sub-section on Document Analysis Technique on page 55. 
The use of the interviewing strategy raised some flags about the nature and design of the 
research process for the researcher. For instance, a systematic approach to all stages of 
interviewing from selecting respondents to processing the data is key to ensuring high quality 
analysis and takes much forethought, effort and time (McLellan, MacQueen et al. 2003), and 
"reflexivity" (Johnson 1997, p. 284). Like Fontana and Frey (1994), the researcher found that it 
is not easy to build rapport with the respondent yet remain neutral. Further, it proved hard to 
listen continuously and be open to any new themes expressed yet steer the direction of the 
conversation according to the questionnaire, and to remain centred in the face of 
unanticipated problems such as interrupted recordings, and noisy and distracting venues. 
Nonetheless, as Berg (2001, p. 102) argues, even 'B-grade' interview material can be valuable. 
The researcher realised that the research questions and analytical techniques could have been 
more specific. If so, some of the dead ends experienced could possibly have been avoided and 
 
1 Note that any discrepancy between the numbers of listed and quoted respondents is due to some respondents requesting 
anonymity for all or part of the interviews. 
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Flick's (2009, p. 137) "short cut" of not transcribing all the interviews could have been justified 
given the mechanism of the recording the interviews and the type of analysis that followed 
(refer to Research Techniques below).  
Research Techniques 
Techniques for Data Consolidation, Reduction and Reconstruction 
As the process of data collation and creation unfolded, the twin-pronged research techniques 
of document analysis and case study formulation were undertaken simultaneously and 
iteratively for the data consolidation, reduction and reconstruction of the data. The combined 
application of the research strategies and research techniques resulted in the six research 
outputs, which in turn became the inputs into the production of the case study and the overall 
thesis, as depicted earlier in see Figure 3.3 on page 48. 
Document Analysis Technique 
Essentially, 'document analysis' is a methodical technique according to a set framework for 
appraising and assessing printed material, which "requires that data be examined and 
interpreted to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge" (Bowen 
2009, p. 27). In this research, as recommended by Berg (2001, pp. 104-105), the analysis of raw 
data was initiated at an early stage of the research process. The complexity of the issue at 
hand and the dynamic nature of the data meant that the data analysis process was iterative, 
meaning that the data analysis and its collation went hand in hand. Hence the approach to the 
analytical process demanded a great deal of ingenuity and flexibility to support the 
formulation of a cohesive and comprehensive case study (refer to Case Study Formulation as 
Analytical Technique on page 58). 
An array of available models of document analysis were assessed, all featuring the analysis of 
data along a subtly-graded spectrum from theme-based to word-based systems, such as 
'thematic analysis', 'global analysis', 'content analysis', and 'text analysis' or 'textual analysis'. 
The systems share characteristics and the distinctions between then are blurred (Vaismoradi, 
Turunen et al. 2013).  
In instances where data is complex, such as in this case, Bowen (2009) advocates the 
application of a hybrid approach to the analysis of data (ibid., pp. 32-33). The hybrid approach 
incorporates a range of these systems and also caters for the use of documents as resources 
and topics, but also pays attention to matters beyond their face value (Prior 2011, p. 97). It 
also draws on aspects of different systems, which resonate with this study to analyse the 
interlocking strands of protests events, perceptions and contextual items. Thus, drawing on 
these and other techniques, a bespoke hybrid analysis technique was devised that fitted well 
with the underlying research paradigm of the constructivist epistemology, the interpretivist 
perspective and the inductive approach, discussed earlier in Section 2 on page 35). The hybrid 
approach is also recommended in, and informed by, other texts (Lacity & Janson 1994, pp. 
151-152; Crotty 1998, p. 5; Merriam 2002, p. 14; Kohlbacher 2006, p. 13; Gray 2009, p. 495). 
This hybrid technique encompassed aspects of iterative analysis, matrix generation, content 
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and thematic analysis techniques, as well as global and schematic analysis to a lesser degree. 
The creation of a dynamic matrix in addressing complex and diverse data was valuable in 
exploring and explaining broad national service delivery expectations, policies, the role-players 
and high-level city strife stories. Thereafter, much closer scrutiny of the selected stories of city 
strife could be undertaken. The matrix was completed in accordance with a comprehensive 
specification for the mining of the data to ensure a standard approach (see Appendix 23 for 
Data Bank Analysis Workbook). 
'Content analysis', which is particularly good for research into services and policy analysis 
(Kassarjian 1977; Jacobs 2006), provided the researcher with a consistent system to objectively 
categorise data from both written or verbal sources as noted by Smith (1996) and Neuendorf 
(2002, p. 10). The researcher favoured Smith's (1996) low-intensity way over ways of 
interrogating subliminal messaging in the texts as favoured by de Sola Pool (1959), Smith 
(1996) and Truex (1996). The technique also assisted in converting large amounts of data into a 
convenient set of units (Smith, C. 1996; Neuendorf 2002, p. 10).  
This hybrid technique was also influenced by 'thematic analysis', a method for categorising and 
scrutinising the themes prevalent in the data, thus enabling the researcher to systematically 
arrange and explain the data; it also helps in interpreting the data (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 79). 
Contributions to this thematic approach were also obtained from the global and schema 
techniques of analysis. The former assisted in obtaining an overview of the data (see Flick 
2009, p. 328), whilst the latter provides a means of simplifying large amounts of data so that it 
is digestible (see Bernard & Ryan 1998, p. 604). However, making this hybrid document 
analysis technique system work in reality was a lot harder than the literature leads one to 
believe. Ultimately the approach consisted of combining four main cross-cutting themes, each 
denoting "something important in relation to the overall research question" (Braun & Clarke 
2006, p. 82). The themes are informed by agonism, the twin topics of protest and context, 
periodisation and socio-spatial dynamics.  
Firstly, the theme of agonism was used for the analysis of the data. Initially, and helped to 
sensitise the researcher to the relevant issues contained in the data (as per Flick 2009, p. 431). 
The prism of agonism was applied at all research stages to uncover any agonistic aspects of 
state-society processes of conflict. However, the prism of agonism was not enough on its own 
to identify what actually-existing agonistic practices look like relative to other conflict 
management practices. Hence, the author interpreted and imagined what agonistic practices 
could look like, by drawing on about 80 texts on agonism, developing a Draft Matrix of Possible 
Practices of the Agonistic Institution (see Appendix 3 on page 311). This exercise, whilst not 
definitive, was useful to focus the questioning. Only towards the end of the process, was this 
largely intuitive approach formalised into a set of systematic questions about the institution's 
adoption of a agonistic practices in conflict management, and included in the theoretical 
chapter (in Table 3.3 on page 57 and Table 2.3 on page 34). This tool was also used to 
synthesise findings in the case study and conclusion (Chapters 6-9). 
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Table 3.3: Agonism as Prism and its Questions 
No Question Examples at Agonistic end of Spectrum Examples at Antagonistic End of 
Spectrum 
1 How has the state 
qualified the 
protest? 
Shows acceptance; acknowledges; treats it as 
opportunity to change; takes seriously; views 
it as normal 
Describes them in negative or 
derogatory way; is dismissive; sees 
protest as crisis; sees protest as 
violent only and ignores the reason 
for it; is unsympathetic 
2 How has the state 
portrayed the 
protestors? 
Respectfully; sees them as citizens, treats 
them as belonging; views them as worthy; 
considers them partners, sees their claims as 
legitimate, deems them an 'adversary' 
As customers; as not belonging; as 
threatening; as violent or 'violent'; 
to be afraid of; as frustrating; as 
illegal; as outsiders; deems them an 
'enemy'; as criminals; as a nuisance; 
as undesirable and harmful; as 
absurd and unreasonable 
3 How has the state 
responded to the 
protestors' 
claims? (To the 
protest event? To 
the effects of 
issue under 
contention? To 
the root cause of 
the issue) 
Acknowledges; changes; makes concessions; 
adopts agonistic approach; recognises; 
empowers; prioritises; responds; manages; 
builds bridges;; experiments; empathises; has 
open door; is customer-centric; is willing to 
engage; reframes issue; is open to conflict; co-
operates; prioritises conflict; encourages 
debate; legitimises; recognises informal 
approaches 
Denies; dismisses; is unresponsive; 
is defensive; is antagonistic; 
placates; suppresses; refuses; 
controls; threatens; is hostile; is 
accusatory; is violent; represses; 
resists change; is reactive; is 
aggressive; disparages; reframes; 
narrows; appropriates; criminalises; 
ignores 
4 How has the state 
responded to 
power dynamics? 
Levels playing field; tackles exclusion; 
provides or facilitates shared spaces and 
channels for hearing and collecting objections 
and participation; co-creates; bases 
interaction on issue under contention; allows 
for joint decision-making; supports weaker 
organisations; recognises adversaries' 
legitimacy; provides proactive and agonistic 
measures to deal with power imbalances; 
mediates; follows up issue; considers claims 
Reinforces exclusion; adopts 
placatory measures; is divisive; 
undertakes minimal or no 
engagement; locks out adversaries; 
is antagonistic 
5 What was the 
form of 
agreement 
reached? What 
was the outcome 
if no agreement 
was reached? 
Changes behaviour; changes 'being'; 
incorporates decision into practice; 
agreement is implicit in actions; co-creates 
initiatives; agrees to joint initiative; agrees 
partially; believes in reciprocity; modifies 
process; undertakes complete change; 
undertakes incomplete change; adopts 
incremental solution; manages conflict rather 
than resolves it 
Reaches no agreement; conflict 
escalates; no reciprocity 
demonstrates; reneges on decisions 
6 How could the 
state have 
responded more 
agonistically and 
why did it not? 
Identify constraints that impede agonistic practices and identify positive aspects 
that can facilitate agonistic practices, such as cultivation of a positive orientation to 
conflict and to change; provision of resources of all kinds; exposing underlying 
beliefs, ideologies and physical concerns, for example, about violence; 
identification of other parallel issues and imperatives impacting on the conflict; 
surfacing internal tensions and cohesion; understanding of management and 
organisational culture, attitudes and abilities, basis of mistrust, historic relationship 
and any goodwill impacting on relationship; identification of alternative ways to 
deal with issue under contention, operational challenges and opportunities, 
inclusion of other role-players and their agendas and resources; and recognition of 
any other constraints and opportunities 
Source: Own formulation 
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Secondly, the topic-based themes identified and unpacked the protest events, with contextual 
concerns as sub-topics (namely pertinent country and city milestones, policy and legislation, 
political issues, the institutional make-up of the state, city challenges, city statistics, citizen 
expectations and state responses to strife). The topics are:  
 Power: dealing with forms of power and its manifestations, and determining which group 
is dominant in conflictual interactions 
 Adversaries: dealing with adversaries, identification of the main groups, their institutional 
make-up and practices supportive of agonism, and their stances 
 Expectations: dealing with the expectations of protesting citizens, descriptions thereof, 
meaning of satisfaction 
 Exclusion: dealing with the forms of exclusion, and descriptions thereof 
 Channels: dealing with the channels and spaces available for expression of dissensus for 
protestors 
 Consensus: dealing with forms of 'consensus', such as resolution or settlement, and nature 
of agreement 
 Dissensus: dealing with the forms of conflict and protest, details thereof and processes and 
points of friction 
Thirdly, in providing backdrops to the overview of strife and the detailed stories in the case 
study, the theme of periodisation facilitated the organisation of the data into in distinct five-
year periods labelled according to their main characteristics and dynamics within 
Johannesburg. Although the use of periodisation as an analytical tool is useful, not every event 
fits neatly into a box, but theming the data in periods helped to track the progression of events 
(see Babbie 2010, pp. 350-357). This theming helped to understand the short- and long-term 
trends and changes in the state's responses to protest, the level of agonistic interaction and 
the protests (in line with Lieberman 2001, pp. 1016-1017; Dill & Aminzade 2007, pp. 283-287). 
Theming also helped to analyse the moments of shifts at an institutional level (as described by 
Thelen, pp. 136-137).  
Fourthly, the theme of space, the socio-geographic areas of the city, facilitated the analysis of 
socio-spatial dynamics.  
Case Study Formulation as Analytical Technique  
The case study formulation technique formed part of the consolidation, reduction and 
reconstruction process of the data. The iterative research strategies and research techniques 
resulted in six research outputs that formed the inputs to the production and finalisation of 
the case study and the thesis (as per Figure 3.3 on page 48). The six outputs, detailed in terms 
of their scope and formats in Table 3.4 on page 59 are the 'Academic Library', the 'Databank 
Analysis Workbook' with the 'Databanks', the 'Protest Timeline', the 'COJ e-resource Centre', 
the 'Statistics Report' and the 'Interview Synthesis'. These outputs are all available in digital 
formats (see Appendix 23 for complete list, page 408). 
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Table 3.4: Six Research Outputs 
Report Details 
Academic 
Library 
The first output, the 'Academic Library', the digital repository for the academic texts for literature 
reviews, is a store for over 3 000 academic texts within an digital citation management system of 
over 6 000 references, which is still growing. 
Databank 
Analysis 
Workbook 
[includes 
Databanks] 
The second, and substantial, output, the 'Databank Analysis Workbook', is a single file containing a 
large dataset of different types of processed research data, on multiple worksheets, in a matrix 
format. It was created with digital spreadsheet software with functionality for indexing, 
categorising, processing, summarising and analysing the data, as spreadsheets, tables and charts. It 
proved impossible to perfectly index the data as Bryman et al. (1994, p. 158) also discovered. 
Nonetheless, the matrix was well suited to the process of consolidation, and reduction (Ritchie & 
Lewis 2005, pp. 210-217), of the primary data contained in the 49 themed databanks. Further, it 
organised the data rationally and systematically (Miles et al. 1994, p. 109), and made the data easily 
retrievable (Nadin & Cassell 2004). Although the software was an effective support tool, it did not 
replace the process of thinking (Weitzman 2011, pp. 805-806). 
Further, the Databank Analysis Workbook extensively facilitated iterative interaction between the 
different parts of analysis, summarising the data for the Protest Timeline, and providing periodised, 
topic-based and spatialised reports on contextual and protest matters. The workbook served as 
both data management and analytical tool (Ryan & Bernard 2000). The workbook contains 45 
possible fields of information for each of the pages of data stored within the databanks. Standard 
guidelines for the completion of each field framed the data mining process (see Appendix 23). The 
data mining was not difficult to do, but required intense concentration and was time consuming. 
Every page in the initial selected databanks was reviewed. But, as pressures of time mounted, the 
necessary purposive selection of targeted pages within certain databanks later in the process 
resulted in a less thorough but equally effective result of data mining. 
Additionally, the Databank Analysis Workbook contains data mined from 16 758 pages, or 48.2 
percent, of the 34 750 pages of material collated in the databanks. The data mining yielded 6 522 
units of data, or 39 percent of the mined pages. The data mining could not be completed in the 
time available, with 30 of the 49 databanks reviewed only. However, the purposive data mining 
approach addressed that lack sufficiently. The 49 databanks also form part of this research output. 
The Databank Analysis Workbook facilitated descriptive-analytical reporting and insights, iteratively 
with the case study formulation, on protest events and contextual matters. 
 On protest  Protests by name 
 Description 
 Protest reference number 
 Effective date 
 Type 
 Mechanism 
 Number of protestors 
 Reason for protest 
 Presence of violence, or threat of violence or intimidation 
 Location 
 Type of area 
 State's response 
 On 
contextual 
matters 
 The city administration of Johannesburg in terms of its profile, institutions, 
achievements, challenges, milestones, governance arrangements, links with 
other spheres of government, and priorities 
 The backdrop to the case study, such as related legislation and policy, local 
politics, service delivery, significant events, and any pertinent African, South 
African and global issues 
 Johannesburg and its city profile, development, challenges, and general items 
 Citizens' expectations 
 Broad protest trends 
 Selected topics for three stories, such as the area, the issue under contention 
and role-players 
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Report Details 
 General database management data per unit of data was also provided, 
including unique identifiers, organisational source of data, type of data, date of 
data, and the name of the data capturer 
Protest 
Timeline 
The third output, the 'Protest Timeline', is a workbook with a number of worksheets created with 
digital spreadsheet software, drawing on quantitative and qualitative data from the Databank 
Analysis Workbook. A visual representation of protests per month per type per area over 25 years is 
provided, and other analytical reports on protests and petitions. Data on protests from 2012 
onwards is minimal, but major surges or episodes of protest thereafter are recorded for the three 
stories of the case study. The analyses helped to understand the shifts over time (Koopmans & 
Rucht 2002, p. 300). 
COJ e-
Resource 
Centre 
The fourth output, the 'COJ e-Resource Centre', is a body of stored and filed digital official 
documents of the city administration of Johannesburg, as recommended by Flick (2009, p. 258). 
Seen as credible information (Yin 1994; Sarantakos 2005), there are about 4 600 files in 470 folders, 
mostly in Portable Document Format, including reports, maps, minutes, web pages, planning and 
strategy documents, other research reports, media communiqués, transcripts of speeches, and 
related survey data.  
Statistics 
Report 
The fifth output, the 'Statistics Report', is a workbook with worksheets created with digital 
spreadsheet software. It drew on official census data for 1996, 2001 and 2011 gathered by Statistics 
South Africa and provided by Quantec (Quantec 2014), a data service provider to the University of 
Witwatersrand. The statistical analysis of census data played a supporting role in the case study 
formulation.  
Interview 
Synthesis 
The sixth output, the 'Interview Synthesis', discussed previously, is a workbook with worksheets 
created with digital spreadsheet software. It identified broad themes and subthemes of responses 
of the city administration to protest. It analysed the trends in responses in each year and five-year 
period, highlighting contradictions, and details about the nature of responses. The Interview 
Synthesis, and the related interview records, informed the initial design of the Databank Analysis 
Workbook, and parts of the case study formulation. 
Source: Own formulation 
The iterative process of analysis continued during the course of the creation of the case study; 
that is the case study was not only part of the research process, it is also the final output, 
nested within the thesis. The procedures of the case study formulation followed on loosely 
from that described in some of the literature (Mayring 2000, pp. 3-4; Braun & Clarke 2006, pp. 
86-87; Gläser & Laudel 2013, p. 8). The formulation of the case study included a highly iterative 
and systematic analytical process, working in bottom-down and top-up directions and in 
parallel, between the listed main activities and moving progressively from the descriptive to 
the analytical aspects and from document-based to case-based analysis as described in Box 3.3 
on page 61. 
Observations on 'Case Study' as Method 
The process of writing in the case study formulation process is itself a form of analysis 
(Richardson 1998, p. 345), as well as "a method of knowing" (ibid., p. 362). In agreement with 
Miles (1979), the writing was incredibly hard at times and somewhat "intuitive" (ibid., p. 597), 
but it was not, as Miles claimed, "primitive, and unmanageable in any rational sense" (ibid.). It 
seems rather that a degree of skill is needed in the production of an effective case study, with 
a number of specific challenges reported in the literature on the case study method, and 
although every effort was made to address them in the design for this research, some were 
encountered in varying degrees in the research process. 
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Box 3.3: Actual Iterative Analytical Procedures in Research Process 
 Familiarisation with and displaying of the data focusing initially on interviews data provided by respondents, 
finalising the matrix for the analysis of the primary data in the databanks, piloting and reviewing reports, and 
revising and refining the matrix summarising and extracting themes, impressions, ideas and data 
 Making initial cursory observations, and searching for and identifying emerging concepts and themes within 
the data on protests and the general context per period, and linking back to the research questions, tenets of 
agonism and topic-based themes 
 Determining and summarising the broad trends of protests in a simple timeline, exploring the shifts, turning 
points and linkages, making more observations, mind mapping, modifying and refining the concepts, themes, 
and diagrammatic map of the research process (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2) 
 Reformulating and honing the research questions, and checking against the academic literature and literature 
reviews 
 Creating and polishing the outline of the case study and its components 
 Identifying, locating, capturing, indexing, cataloguing, cleaning and verifying existing and new data in matrix 
format 
 Consolidating, categorising, re-categorising, and synthesising the data 
 High-level and detailed reviewing of, and interaction with, the reports of the data themed according to 
agonism, topic, period and area in turn, to surface, explain and link patterns and issues 
 Preparing, analysing, revising and integrating timelines of protests, their themes, trends, types, role-players, 
state responses, and linkages with other milestones 
 Testing, checking and revising steps 
 Infilling the backdrop to the case study 
 Finalising the selection, drafting, writing and rewriting of the case study stories 
 Firming up the agonism prism and questions 
 Concluding the analysis, interpretation and completing the case study and the thesis 
 Finalising and revising the final document 
Source: Own formulation 
Distraction by depths of data: The researcher agrees with Baxter and Jack (2008), possibly as 
she was a newcomer to research, that it was relatively easy to be "distracted by the mounds of 
interesting data that are superfluous to the research question" (ibid., p. 555). Notwithstanding 
the volume of information, a degree of detective work in filling the gaps and piecing together 
the stories was required (Cassell & Symon 2004, p. 324). The analytical process was by no 
means perfect. For instance, at a late stage of the process, the researcher found it necessary to 
create a guideline to provide focus to part of the analytical process in line with the 
recommendation of Lynch et al. (2002) to extract better quality data from news articles (see 
Appendix 10 for Guideline for Capturing Data from News Articles on page 337).  
Discomfort at criticising the state: In spite of every effort at neutrality, as Cassell et al. (2004, 
pp. 303-304) also reported, the researcher felt some discomfort in criticising state institutions 
owing to her former role as a practitioner within the Johannesburg city administration (from 
1993 to 1999 and again from 2002 to 2006). This may have led to what Gabriel & Griffiths 
(2004, p. 117) describe as a difficulty between maintaining objectivity and intentional or 
accidental subjectivity. As the researcher has control over the design of the research process, it 
is implicit that the data cannot be "not morally or ethically neutral" (Denzin 2009, p. 142). Any 
case study is essentially a "reconstruction of life constructions" according to Flick (2009, p. 
347) citing Bude (1984), and hence can be viewed as a creation of the researcher's own 'truth' 
or 'reality' influencing the researcher's neutrality further (Flyvbjerg 2011, pp. 309-311). 
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Further, the narrative of any case study is essentially a collage of impressions; it is made up as 
much by what one leaves out as by what one includes (Gabriel & Griffiths 2004, p. 117). 
Missing and unreliable data: The researcher was aware that some documents have issues 
related to credibility, authenticity, representativeness and meaning (Scott, A. 1990, pp. 19-35). 
No matter how careful the analysis, findings can be misinterpreted if some contextual aspects 
are missing, which would provide additional insights to the text (Roberts, C. 2000). Further, 
there may not necessarily be a correlation between the meaning contained in the resultant 
case study with the meaning identified in the mind of the reader (Linde 2003; Flick 2009, pp. 
74-86). 
Difficult to implement: The case study research method was not easy to implement. The 
challenge of summarising large quantities of intricate and complex data was noted by the 
researcher. Whilst a credible case study may rely on "thick description" for "thick 
interpretation" (Ponterotto 2006, pp. 542-543), there is a danger that the case study becomes 
cumbersome and unwieldy (a criticism levelled at this method by Fischer et al. 2006, p. 408; 
and Flyvbjerg 2011). 
Lack of generalisability: Some critics of the case study method criticise the lack of 
generalisability about its findings. In this study it is arguably true that this case study and its 
three detailed stories all related to one city (Johannesburg) may not foster much 
generalisability to other cities. However, the depth and penetration of each of the intricate 
stories within this case study facilitated their deep understanding (which is the purpose of case 
studies argue Darke, Shanks et al. 1998; Meyer, C. 2001, p. 333; and Flyvbjerg 2006; 2011). 
Indeed, Kantor & Savitch (2005) argue that in the case of cities it is almost impossible to 
generalise across them anyway as each is so unique and measures are not standardised. 
Likewise, some assert that a case study need not be generalised at all as it can be designed as a 
stand-alone unique exemplar (like Stake 1978; Stake 1995; and Ruddin 2006). Moreover, even 
if the case study is not generalisable, that is not to say others cannot make practical use of it 
(claim Berg 2001, pp. 232-233; Ruddin 2006). Further, this study contributes to the debate on 
the shared challenge of service delivery protest in other settings in South Africa and could cast 
light on protests further afield as Williams (2005, p. 301) suggests. 
Causality hard to determine: Causality may be thought of as "a process involving the 
mechanisms and capacities that lead from a cause to an effect" (Bennett, A. & Elman 2006, p. 
457). The case study method can be seen as well positioned to determine causality if sufficient 
and appropriate data is available. However, the case study method is not infallible (Bennett, A. 
& Elman 2006, p. 473), and causality may be hard to determine if not enough cases are 
selected to test a particular theory (Goggin 1986; Jacobs 2006). Nonetheless, pertinent to this 
research, although determining causality in temporal narratives may be complex, "because 
events are temporal processes, they may intersect with one another, and the relative timing of 
that intersection can be of decisive importance" (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 13). 
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Method is an 'attractive nuisance': Finally, some writers see the case study method as an 
"attractive nuisance" (Miles 1979, p. 590), with data being superior and lively, but their 
collation and analysis being laborious, challenging, backbreaking and even unsystematic. 
Indeed, the case study may be downright libellous if of poor quality in its formulation, data 
handling and execution (Yin 1994). In this study, a form of triangulation was employed in which 
the holistic detailed and multifaceted research framework promoted a greater degree of 
precision, reliability and validity (Tellis 1997b; Trochim 2006; Gray 2009, p. 37). Although this 
research heeded guidance in the literature on ways to improve quality and rigour (Yin 1999; 
Baxter & Jack 2008), the writers make these seem deceptively simple. Peer review was 
another, simple, way used to improve quality (Rubin, A. 2000), with invaluable feedback 
received about aspects of this thesis that were presented at conferences and published 
throughout the research process. 
Problematic terms and words: Some terms and words are a problematic area in a thesis as 
multidisciplinary as this one is as people use the terms in multiple, and different, ways, with 
different theoretical and ideological orientations. Many definitions are contested; in this 
thesis, some specific terms are explained when first used and in the Glossary (see Table 1.1 on 
page 3). Some concepts could have been covered in this study far more than they have been. 
For instance, much has already been written by others about 'the state' and its related 
concepts, makeup, relations with society, forms, legitimacy and powers (Bluntschli 2009 
[1875]); the variations within the bureaucracy and between the bureaucracy and politicians 
(Huber & Shipan 2006); and the different models of the boundaries between state and society 
(Cohen & Arato 1994; Migdal 1997, 2001; Chambers, Simone & Kopstein 2008; Mouffe 2014, 
pp. 27-28), and more. Implicit normative judgments in this thesis, made when terms might be 
used indiscriminately, are avoided as much as possible, for example: the question of 'violent' 
protest – is it burning of tyres or is it murder that makes a protest violent? In this case, 
'violence' has been defined on page 23 to address these questions. However, it has not been 
possible to clarify every term in this thesis.  
Other challenges with case study formulation: Numerous other difficulties with the research 
process and case study formulation were observed and are summed up in Box 3.4 on page 64, 
some related to personal challenges, some to processes, some to principles, and some to 
practicalities. 
Despite the practical difficulties encountered, the case study method seemed particularly 
suited to this study as it is unobtrusive (Berg 2001, p. 10), and flexible as it can enable the 
interrogation of the planned questions and the identification of any other critical emerging 
considerations arising from the research process (Cassell & Symon 2004, p. 324). The method 
favours practical application thus appealing to practitioners (Stake 1978; Flyvbjerg 2011). The 
method is suitable for testing theories according to Flyvbjerg (2011), due to its innate ability to 
describe, explore and clarify complex real life phenomenon (Yin 1981; 1994, p. 13; Finkelstein 
& Dowell 1996; Kohlbacher 2006; Baxter & Jack 2008). Moreover, the case study is helpful in 
"building explanations" (Yin 1981, pp. 61-62). These considerations were relevant to this 
research given the questioning around agonism' value, as well as the complexity of city strife. 
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Box 3.4: Other Challenges Encountered in Case Study Formulation 
 Difficulty in distinguishing between agonistic and other participatory-deliberative practices of governance 
 Confusion between looking for agonistic principles of agonistic principles of governance and using the prism as 
the questions could only be firmed up during the course of the research process 
 Collation of the data seemed to always be incomplete 
 Impossibility of finding data on the full cycle of the conflictual interaction, irrespective of whether it was 
agonistic strife or not 
 Propensity for the data to reflect on the protest itself but not its aftermath or resolution 
 Even with agonism as a prism, and other research filters, the approach was not a definitive way to assess 
conflict, and some interpretation, speculation, assumptions and judgments were unavoidable  
 The issue of the longevity of a particular conflict was not raised in the literature but seemed critical in the 
analysis of strife 
 The inherent assumption in most of the literature on agonism is that agonistic practice is better than non-
agonistic practice but there is little or no measurement of whether the action was aligned to the organisation's 
objectives, were of any real benefit and what the extent of that benefit was 
 Personal resistance against the probability that the city administration did not use agonistic practices much 
(creating a lot of soul-searching as a former official) 
 The sheer enormity of the research questions, any of which could have formed a thesis in its own right, and the 
enormity of the responses, as reflected in the length of the thesis and pointing to the need for focusing the 
questions better (as well as the responses) 
 Complete naïveté about the implications of the different bodes of knowledge contained in the scope of 
readings across so many and such diverse fields  
Source: Own formulation 
Research Tools 
On a more prosaic note, the use of various technological tools greatly assisted creating, 
collating, consolidating and keeping the data, and probing and presenting the findings.  
The main research tool was a Lenovo ThinkPad laptop running Microsoft Windows. The 
specifications are a Microsoft Windows 7 Professional operating system (64-bit, with Service 
Pack 1), Intel® Core™ i5 CPU M 560 @ 2.67GHz processor, four gigabyte physical memory, 8.00 
megabyte ROM and 287 gigabyte hard drive.  
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional software was used, particularly Microsoft Word 2010, 
PowerPoint 2010 and Excel 2010. Microsoft Excel was extensively used as the main data 
handling, organising and analysing tool for primary data and although it is user-friendly, the 
desired reporting functionality pushed it to its limit. Some frustration was experienced at the 
frequent system crashes and the sensitivity of the software to handle large dynamic files as 
was demanded by research of this magnitude. Microsoft Windows Explorer was used for file 
management, organising and retrieval. EndNote for Students (Version X4.0), citation 
management software, complemented Explorer for the management of academic texts. The 
data in these different systems and the systems themselves were not linked, which meant that 
some data entries had to be duplicated from one system to another. The benefits of 
integrating the data to facilitate more efficient and effective analysis is spoken about by Yang 
and Miller (2008, p. 156), and the research might have benefited from a more systematic 
assessment of the software needs up front as recommended by Weitzman (2011). 
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Interviews were recorded with a two gigabyte Pulse smartpen operating on a LiveScribeTM 
software platform (Version 2.8.3.58503), with a headset and special dot paper notebooks. 
Unfortunately, at some point during the final interviews, the smartpen's display began 
malfunctioning making it impossible to tell if the smartpen was actually recording. Apparently, 
this is a common defect with the product. In spite of this, it is arguably a powerful tool for 
capturing and referencing interview material as one's handwritten notes during the interviews 
are synchronised exactly with the recording, making it very easy to pick out a particular point 
in the audio recording whenever one needs to refer to it. Had the researcher realised this 
earlier on in the research process, instead of opting for the more traditional transcriptions and 
proofing of interviews, a good deal of time and money may have been saved, certainly a point 
worth noting for other research processes relying heavily on interviews and transcriptions.  
Virtually all transcribing, a third of the data-mining; the first proofreading of the thesis; and the 
preparation of maps was completed with outsourced technical assistance. All other work 
(completion of transcriptions and proofing; data mining; and preparation of figures, tables and 
boxes) was done by the author of this thesis. 
Mind Manager Pro (Version 5) software was used for parts of the initial literature reviews, and 
conceptualisation and brainstorming processes. Word clouds were prepared with WordleTM 
(Build #1458) online freeware and provided snapshots of the content of large chunks of text.  
To support the principle of paperless document management and enable more effective use of 
digital data, Adobe Acrobat 8 Professional, Nitro Pro 10 and Microsoft XPS Document Writer 
were used to print, search, read and annotate documents. Virtually all primary data were 
digitised. All research outputs are in digital formats and are stored within a Dropbox cloud 
archive (Version 3.10.8), and shall be available for the required fifteen-year period in a cloud 
archive. All research records take up about 25 gigabytes of storage space. 
Final drafts of the thesis chapters were submitted to Turnitin, an Internet-based plagiarism 
checking service, in November and December 2015. 
4 Ending with Case Study 
'Organised chaos' seems the best way to describe the initial research steps. The 'chaos', 
coupled with confusing rather than helpful research concepts and terminology in the 
literature, prompted the formalisation of the research design framework made up of the 
research paradigm and the research process. This framework guided the decisions that needed 
to be made in the research shifting from the philosophical to the methodological, and the 
conceptualisation and formulation to the operationalisation, evaluation and resolution aspects 
of the research. 
Parts of the research process followed different paths of document review and analysis, and 
interviewing, overlapping each other at times, ultimately culminating in six research outputs 
that then became the inputs to the case study, which is nested within this thesis. The absence 
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of any standard criteria for doing case studies created frustrations about the qualitative 
research process. The case study approach, whilst tricky and complex, was selected in the 
absence of any other fit-for-purpose research method that could facilitate deep insights into 
the state's responses to strife between the city administration and citizens, in the past and in 
the future.  
In constructing the case study, following next in Part B, from the substantial collection of data, 
the researcher was continually aware that the narrative was made up as much by what was 
left out as by what was included (Gabriel & Griffiths 2004, p. 117). In trying to uncover deep 
insights from the 'reality' observed, the construction of the case study was experienced as 
being an art, even more so than as being a scientific endeavour. 
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PART B ▫  The Johannesburg Case 
Study 
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Chapter 4 | Protest and the City: The Johannesburg Story 
1 Introduction 
An understanding of the story of 'service delivery' protest in post-apartheid Johannesburg is 
only possible against the backdrop of the phenomenon of increasing street protests and public 
rallies against the authorities. The literature shows the growing disenchantment of citizens 
against the state and their "appeal to the authorities to behave differently" (Byrne, J. 2012, p. 
114). This sentiment is prevalent also in the emerging and transitioning democracy of South 
Africa and the many protests that have taken place since apartheid's demise in 1994.  
In South Africa, the local government is frequently the target for protests known as 'service 
delivery' protests. The unique characteristics of 'service delivery' protests show that these 
protests are not only expressions of concern about poor service delivery but also of disillusion 
about unmet promises made by the state. Although 'service delivery protest' is generally 
considered a phenomenon endemic to low-income communities, middle-class communities 
also undertake public 'service delivery protests (although to a lesser extent). For a holistic 
assessment of state-society conflict about the delivery of services, the notion of 'service 
delivery protests' must be broadened to include this latter type of publicised protest also.  
This form of protest has largely targeted the local level of the state and this case study 
considers the city administration of Johannesburg. Despite significant progress in service 
delivery, given the near doubling of the city's population since 1996, deep inequalities at 
economic, social and spatial levels still prevail. 
To appreciate the spectrum of strife in the city in terms of agonistic conflict management, the 
types of service delivery protests are defined according to their differing dimensions, such as 
the stated reasons for protest, the income group of the protestors, the frequency of protests 
and their physical intensity. Protests also vary in space and by protest channel and mechanism. 
The variation in the state's interaction with, and responses to, protestors is great with the type 
of protest not necessarily an indicator of the type of response made by the state.  
2 Protest Globally and in South Africa 
Before the 1990s, most international texts on dissensus focussed on the role of protests in 
bringing unjust and oppressive regimes to an end, such as colonialism in the 1950s to 1970s, 
the Cold War and Communism in the 1980s and South African apartheid in the 1990s. The 
scholarly literature addresses psychological, sociological and revolutionary dimensions of 
dissensus and especially those of violent collective behaviour (Smelser 1962; Tanter & 
Midlarsky 1967; Geen, Mallick et al. 1971; Hagopian 1974; Diani & McAdam 2003). 
In recent years, however, there has been a return to a literature on dissensus provoked by a 
new era of increasing protests worldwide. Notable protests include the wave of protests of the 
Arab Spring in early 2011 and the Occupy movement starting with Occupy Wall Street in 
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September 2011 (Byrne, J. 2012; della Porta & Mattoni 2014). Although the protests are not 
new, the scale of the protests and the number of cities affected is significantly greater (Ortiz, 
Burke et al. 2013; The Economist Intelligence Unit 2013). A thread, common in the literature, is 
that the protests express discontent about inequality and the so-called 'failure' of the 
democratic system to provide benefits for all rather than the few, especially in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis (Byrne, J. 2012; Harvey, D. 2012; della Porta & Mattoni 2014; 
Carothers & Youngs 2015; Gualini 2015; Swyngedouw 2015). The policy-maker of the state is 
the target of 80 percent of all protests in 87 countries reviewed (Ortiz et al. 2013, pp. 1, 34). 
Post-1994 South Africa, although having transitioned from intense and vigorous political anti-
apartheid protests to an era of democratic peace, has seemingly entered into a period charged 
with new protests but of a different sort. Although these localised and large-scale protests in 
the form of street marches in city centres and elsewhere may bear the shadow of apartheid 
still, they share with their global counterparts an objection to state inaction about their 
concerns.  
Protests have included, for example, the nationwide anti-foreigner uprisings in May 2008 and 
March 2015, targeting black African immigrants and refugees, as local South Africans typically 
within low-income communities perceive foreigners to be taking jobs and resources away from 
local citizens (Everatt 2011). These protests seem to be almost always synonymous with 
violence, looting, damage to property, assault and sometimes murder; they also spill over into 
other forms of protest (Everatt 2011; von Holdt & Alexander 2012; Kirshner 2014). 
Other notable national protests have been the anti-globalisation protests targeting the IMF, 
the World Bank and related financial and banking institutions over the last fifteen years and 
are seemingly part of the global resistance against the perceived ills of capitalism. The anti-
globalisation sentiment has also found its way into service delivery protests (for example, refer 
to the protests against the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Alexandra on 
page 97). Protests by taxi associations and their members have been staged against 
recapitalisation in March 2010 and at other times about the lack of public transport subsidies 
from the national government for their industry or issues of licensing of routes by the 
provincial government. The country also saw its own Occupy South Africa in 2011 (Ortiz et al. 
2013, p. 76), resistance to E-Tolling in the Gauteng province in 2012 and 2013 (Duvenage & 
Serrao 2015), the seemingly spontaneous #FeesMustFall protests at universities in October 
2015 (TimesLive 2015b), and politically motivated protests such as those led by the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (City Press 2015). Strike action and labour-related protests reflect workers' 
discontent with employers about salaries and working practices; notably in Johannesburg, 
protests against labour and crime issues far outnumbered 'service delivery' protest (Grant 
2014).  
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3 Protesting Service Delivery in South Africa 
'Service Delivery' Protests 
This research, however, focuses exclusively on protest, which is directed at local authorities 
and is about 'service delivery'. There are multiple forms of conflict involving local government, 
expressed for example in the media, in petitions, in boycotts, in meetings of various forms and 
through party-political channels. These are all addressed in the chapters of this thesis, but 
there is one form of protest that is distinctive and pervasive in South Africa requiring particular 
attention. This is the so-called 'service delivery' protest, which is a localised form of protest by 
generally low-income communities but not exclusive so (as seen in Chapter 8), targeting 
especially municipalities. Echoing global sentiments, the South African service delivery protest 
contains "an appeal to the authorities to behave differently" (Byrne, J. 2012, p. 114), as well as 
an objection against the so-called 'failure' of the South African state (Agüero, Carter et al. 
2007; RSA 2008). 
There were reportedly 1 088 'service delivery' protests occurring between 2004 and 2015 in 
South Africa, according to Municipal IQ (2016). The number is arguably far higher in reality as 
Municipal IQ collect only articles "where there is an explicit statement by a community of 
dissatisfaction with their local council’s record of delivery" (Business Day 2015), and this 
research has shown that reasons are not always stated. Moreover, Municipal IQ's, and others', 
data collection methodologies and motives, and definitions of what constitutes 'service 
delivery protest' are either not reliable or consistent (Alexander 2010; Jain 2010; Karamoko 
2011; Ngwane 2012; Nyar & Wray 2012; Alexander, Runciman et al. 2015; Lancaster 2016).  
Around 50.5 percent of protests are likely to receive no media coverage at all (Wilcox 2013). 
Even official police statistics on public protests display inconsistent and overlapping definitions 
and motivations (Alexander et al. 2015). Moreover, any other previous efforts by protestors to 
have their concerns addressed are also likely to be unreported (Duncan 2014c). This lack of 
consistency in documenting the location, purpose and frequency of protests and responses 
thereto in South Africa motivated the author's own collection and quantification of these 
protests, for Johannesburg only. The relative share of protests in Johannesburg further 
highlights the inconsistency of all data about the frequency of service delivery protests, as 
seen in Chart 4.1 on page 71. 
Most South African street protests since soon after the 1994 elections have been peaceful 
marches in the streets or assemblies in public areas (Municipal IQ 2009a, b, c, d, 2010a, b, c, d, 
e, f, g, h, i). Even if threats of violence were made, they were usually not carried out (Karamoko 
2011). If such protests were initially violent or only became so in defence of alleged 
suppression by the police is not clear (suppose Winton 2004; Hough 2008; Earle 2011; 
Karamoko 2011; and von Holdt et al. 2011), such as in the case of the stirring death of Andries 
Tatane in Ficksburg in 2011 (Karamoko 2011, p. 11).  
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Chart 4.1: Inconsistent Documentation of Quantum of Service Delivery Protests 
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2015 according to the MLGI Protest Barometer (estimated from Multi-Level Government Initiative 2012, p. 4); Municipal Hotspots 
Monitor by Municipal IQ (2016); Lancaster ((2016, p. 7) citing Alexander et al. (2014), and Multi-Level Government Initiative (2015); 
superimposed with the author's research data of the number of protests in Johannesburg alone; it seems unlikely, for example, that 
Johannesburg could account for half of all protests in the country in 2012, relative to Municipal IQ's data 
Violence as a protest tactic is reportedly used usually as a last resort of communities frustrated 
by state inaction (Duncan 2014c), with a few like Hough (2008) regarding violence as a 
precursor to revolution. However, recently, Paret (2015) found that protestors almost certainly 
became violent only in response to forceful police action.  
In South Africa, street protests have strong spatial and class aspects as communities in 
predominantly poor areas target local government (Mosoetsa 2005; Karamoko 2011). Even 
areas receiving significant service delivery improvements, albeit too slowly or not in line with 
citizen expectations, have experienced 'service delivery' protests (Jain 2010; Ngwane 2010). 
The term 'service delivery' protest has no commonly understood meaning in South Africa but is 
certainly about more than protesting about some issue to do with the delivery of services 
(Friedman 2001). The press and others who track protests frequently use the term 'service 
delivery protest' imprecisely, although the academic literature implicitly ascribes four 
meanings to the this phenomenon in the post-apartheid South African context.  
Firstly, 'service delivery protest' is used as a blanket term for any sort of protest about the 
delivery of services, frequently directed at the state, and especially at local authorities (Morwe 
2010, pp. 28-29), necessitating a working definition of 'service delivery' for this thesis. 'Service 
delivery' means the institutions of mainly government and all its resources and processes 
involved in the provision of any service as well as the service itself, especially local-level ones, 
to the citizen (Municipal IQ 2009a, b, c, d, 2010a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). Services typically provided 
range between essential and additional services, cutting across low-income and middle-class 
areas and include water and electricity, refuse removal, street cleaning, public transport, 
infrastructure investment, some health services, housing, parks, street trading and market 
stalls, social amenities and many other services, such as billing and public parking 
management. 
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Secondly, the term 'service delivery' has an embedded promise of transformation of society, 
the reversal of the damage of apartheid and of meeting basic needs as actively pledged by the 
new post-1994 democratic state to its citizens. The term 'service delivery' also arguably 
includes "social justice [as]… a tangible output that people demand from democracy” (Turski 
2011, p. 20), but which the democracy has failed to deliver (Purcell 2008). Mc Lennan (2009) 
agrees that service delivery, implicitly undertaken "in the name of justice" (ibid., p. 6), expands 
to include intangible development ideals parcelled up with expectations of democratic 
government to improve the lives of South African citizens (ibid.). The expanded notion of 
'service delivery' may possibly stretch even further, incorporating other development ideals 
such as the "right not to be poor" (Skogly 2002, pp. 60, 74). The right to development is an 
implicit one in the country's Constitution (RSA 1996a), but an explicit one in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; according to the South African Human Rights 
Commission (2006, p. 119), this right should be made explicit in the Constitution.  
Thirdly, the term 'service delivery protest' has also become a shorthand for struggles that try to 
shape ideas of what democracy and the democratic state looks like, thus extending the role of 
the state beyond the mere delivery of services, as seen in the literature considering the view of 
the protestor (Jessop 1990; Cohen & Arato 1994; Kasfir 1998; Keane 2003; Comaroff & 
Comaroff 2004; von Holdt et al. 2011).  
Fourthly, 'service delivery protests' are portrayed as being undertaken exclusively by the poor. 
However, problematising the notion of service delivery to more than a "rebellion of the poor" 
(Alexander 2010), there is a substantial array of protests by the middle class also about service 
delivery on which there is virtually no literature. This means that the meaning of 'service 
delivery protest' is even more indistinct when its significance in protests by the middle class is 
discussed, as seen in Chapter 8. Further, as the literature focuses exclusively on service 
delivery protests by the poor, its findings cannot be generalised across the classes. The stories 
in the case study show that the definition of 'service delivery' is inherently problematic as the 
state is clearly not simply a simple service provider, especially in South Africa.  
This conflation of the delivery of basic services with higher-order development ambitions, 
social justice and citizen expectations makes analysis of the protests even more difficult. For 
some, it means that when people do act, it is seen as a sign of not only 'failed' 'service delivery' 
but the "failure of democracy" (Harber 2009). Such protests are symptomatic of the 
complexities of the intersection of urban governance and planning and civil society in big cities, 
agrees Pieterse (2008). Moreover, 'service delivery' protestors usually target the municipality, 
probably as it is the most accessible level of government, regardless of whether the issue 
relates to functions of the municipality or not (Jain 2010, pp. 3, 15, 29).  
Despite 'service delivery' protests being undertaken by a collective, most of the protests 
observed in this study generally do not seem to form part of a social movement, following the 
definition by Opp (2009, pp. 37-42). Namely, 'service delivery' protests are sporadic and 
seemingly unorganised, whereas a social movement is characterised by a sense of organisation 
and of protestors coming together to collectively solve a problem (ibid.). However, the 
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Johannesburg case highlights that this distinction between protests and social movements can 
be unclear at times (see Chapter 6 starting on page 135). Protestors' actions are described as 
justifiable actions intending to persuade or disrupt an unjust social order by peaceful or by 
more coercive means (Mead 2010a, b). They could also be seen as struggles of the 'below' 
against the 'above' after the classification of Louw and Bekker (1996, p. 84). The media, 
however, is responsible for the "dehumanisation and demonization of protesters" (Morwe 
2010, pp. 22-24), and for portraying South Africa as the "protest capital of the world" (Wilcox 
2013). Of more concern, the media generally limits its coverage to the actions of protestors, 
paying little attention to their goals or the outcomes of their protests (Morwe 2010), which 
Mattes and Richmond (2015) argue masks the far more important concern about the 
difficulties of building both citizenship and democracy in South Africa.  
The protestors' reasons for 'service delivery' protest in South Africa are not the focus of this 
thesis. However, the related literature provides overlapping and sometime opposing insights 
into the many and varied reasons for protests. These point to a general dissatisfaction with any 
services provided by the state (Atkinson 2007; Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2009; COJ 
2010g) bundled under the banner of poor 'service delivery' even when not specifically 
described by the protestors (Jain 2010). There are also more complex motives fuelling 
protestors' frustrations relating to the country's transition to democracy characterised in its 
simultaneous "stability and fragility" (Beall et al. 2005, p. 687), and design challenges of the 
transition of state institutions especially at the local government level (Atkinson 2007). Writers 
ascribe protests as a response to the so-called inability of the South African state to deliver 
services due to the complexities of governance, the mechanics of the service delivery (Parnell, 
Pieterse et al. 2000), and the extent of the backlog of infrastructure and services (Atkinson 
2007). However, protest is also due to systemic issues such as maladministration, corruption, 
weak leadership and other poor governance matters (Municipal IQ 2009a, b, c, d; African Peer 
Review Mechanism 2010, p. 34; Municipal IQ 2010a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). 
A common critique of 'service delivery' explaining the outbreaks of 'service delivery' protests is 
of the lack of the state's consultation of the needs of society and an autocratic 'service 
delivery' decision-making style without reference to citizens (Fakir 2007; Friedman 2009). 
Further, insufficient or unsuccessful public participation in decision-making is identified by 
many writers as the root of the protests (Parnell et al. 2000; RSA 2004a; Mc Lennan 2007; 
Robinson, M. 2007, p. 180; van Donk, Swilling et al. 2008; Municipal IQ 2009a, b, c, d; African 
Peer Review Mechanism 2010, p. 34; Handmaker & Berkhout 2010; Municipal IQ 2010a, b, c, d, 
e, f, g, h, i; Afrobarometer 2011; Mottiar & Bond 2012). However, Lodge and Mottiar (2016) 
argue that protest is but one part of political participation and engagement.  
Some claim that protestors object to underlying principles inherent in state policies that serve 
a capitalist agenda thus impacting negatively on meeting basic needs that citizens can afford 
(Ballard, Habib et al. 2006, p. 2; Lier 2007; Ngwane 2010; Lodge & Mottiar 2016); certainly 
there is a call for more state support, especially for the poor (Seekings & Nattrass 2015), and 
for substantial, not incremental, policy changes (Lodge & Mottiar 2016, p. 286). The state's 
enforcement of policy and its repressive actions, such as its services cut-offs for non-payments, 
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also triggered protests (Ballard et al. 2006, p. 398). Others critique structural issues such as 
unemployment (Municipal IQ 2009a, b, c, d; African Peer Review Mechanism 2010, p. 34; 
Municipal IQ 2010a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i; Ngwane 2010), or lack of empowerment (Khosa, 
Meshack 2000a), or insufficient development (Ngwane 2010). Others contend that 'service 
delivery' protests are battles for various human rights (Ballard 2005; Ballard et al. 2006, p. 2; 
Parnell 2007; Ngwane 2010; Mottiar & Bond 2012), or against poverty (Everatt 2008; 
Alexander 2010). There are though also more opportunistic motives behind the actions of 
some seeking private gain at the expense of the common good (Municipal IQ 2009a, b, c, d; 
African Peer Review Mechanism 2010, p. 34; Municipal IQ 2010a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). As early as 
1997, Peberdy and Crush (1998) observed enmity of some South Africans towards foreigners 
expressed during 'service delivery' protests by street traders. As 'service delivery' protests 
appear to sometimes be interlinked inextricably with anti-foreigner protests and labour action 
(2011, p. 72; von Holdt et al. 2011), although some disagree (Alexander 2010; von Holdt & 
Alexander 2012), they are included in this account but in a limited fashion.  
The collective trauma, as one of the after-effects of apartheid, has resulted in an increased 
potential for collective violence according to von Holdt et al. (2011), bearing out the conviction 
that strong emotions, such as anger, are at the heart of protests. Considering this, the state is 
allegedly not paying enough attention to the protests, seeing them reportedly as an 
"aberration" (Ngwane 2010, p. 2), or as something to "be completely eliminated" (news24 
2009a).  
Inevitably, given the relative youth of the country's democracy, analyses of the political 
implications of the 'service delivery' protests abound. Party-political contestation is evident 
with protest activity as the driver, or the outcome, of processes reconfiguring power and the 
social order (Oldfield & Stokke 2004; Booysen 2007; Alexander 2010; von Holdt et al. 2011; 
Matlala & Bénit-Gbaffou 2012). Moreover, citizens use protest as an adjunct to the vote to 
force the ruling party to deliver services, whilst continuing to vote for it (Booysen 2007), 
although the overall electoral participation rate appears to be in decline (Independent 
Electoral Commission 2011a, b). Protestors may protest under the auspices of the ruling party, 
the African National Congress (ANC), whilst protesting the ANC's actions and maintaining their 
loyalty to it (Lodge & Mottiar 2016, pp. 826-827, 832). Protestors, too, use street-based 
protest to hold the state accountable for inadequate service delivery (von Holdt et al. 2011). 
Some writers investigate the seeming conflation of the state with the ruling party and the 
related blurring of roles between the party-state and the party-society (Katz & Mair 1995; Ku 
1998; Roberts, B. et al. 2010; Piper 2011a, b; Matlala & Bénit-Gbaffou 2012).  
Lastly, there is minimal coverage on two aspects. Namely, material on 'service delivery' 
protests that take place in less public forums elsewhere and not on the streets is under-
researched, although Bradlow (2013) shows how changes to the state institution have been 
made through processes of strife and synergy, or of "quiet conflict" (ibid., p. 109). 
Likewise, the literature on 'service delivery' protests focuses almost exclusively on the protests 
of low-income communities and hardly ever questions protests made by middle-class 
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communities (Schreiber 2013), but which also merit research attention (more on this later in 
this chapter on pages 91 and 168, and all of Chapter 8 starting on page 200). Hence, for the 
purposes of this study, from here on the terms 'service delivery' and 'service delivery protest', 
without quotation marks, are used to describe any protest related to service delivery by the 
local government – whether conceptualised narrowly or broadly – by both low-income and 
middle-class protestors. Quotation marks will be used only when matters of definition are 
raised. 
Disillusion with Developmental Local Government 
The post-1994 wall-to-wall local government became the interface between the state and 
society (de Visser 2009, p. 10). The setting up of this new sphere of government, drawing on 
two major international trends in governance with somewhat competing objectives in their 
South African adaptation, became a significant factor in the unfolding of service delivery 
protests. For many black communities, local government was their first taste of legitimate 
governance and featured prominently in setting their expectations of social development and 
securing human rights by means of service delivery (RSA 1998, p. 36). 
Firstly, internationally, the discourse in the 1980s and 1990s was of the 'developmental state', 
namely a national government that is proactive and interventionist in the economic 
development of the country (Woo-Cumings 1999), in contrast to its former hands-off approach 
(Mann 1984). In South Africa, the direct role of the 'developmental state' in driving 
development was translated into a 'developmental local government' version. However, it was 
intensified and localised to address not only local economic development but also the legacy 
of apartheid (Parnell & Pieterse 1999, p. 69), and endemic poverty worsened by the near 
doubling of the unemployment rate between 1994 and 1998 (RSA 2008, p. 43). Sanctioned by 
the ruling party (African National Congress [ANC] 1997a, 2001a), the ANC, the notion of 
'developmental local government' was envisioned in the White Paper on Local Government 
(RSA 1998, pp. 23-36). Local governments in South Africa adopted the notion as "an official 
policy objective and broad strategic framework” (Parnell et al. 2000, p. 79), and regarded it as 
the prime tool to develop previously excluded citizens socio-economically to redress the 
effects of apartheid (Cameron 1996a, 2001; Khosa, Meshack 2002). The White Paper stressed 
the "participation and rolling up of sleeves, …acting like citizens, as opposed to mere atomised 
consumers of municipal services" (emphasis added, RSA 1998, p. 7). However, the legacy of 
the apartheid struggle adds complexity to issues of dissensus about municipal services. The 
ANC is the 'liberation party' that has largely captured the state and although familiar with 
'politics-as-struggle', thus seemingly creating a fertile ground for agonism, vacillates between 
seeing protest as negative and illegitimate, to legitimate but misinformed, with different parts 
of the party and the state expressing different views when protests occurs.  
Secondly, the administration of the new South African democratic state is also influenced by 
the notion of New Public Management, a loose collection of public administration policies 
intended to improve, professionalise, refine and downscale state bureaucracies, on the rise 
since the mid-1970s (Hood 1991). In South Africa, New Public Management stimulated the 
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move to the managerialisation, corporatisation and decentralisation of the state (Boatwright 
1997; Watson 2003, p. 397; Drakakis-Smith 2004; Chipkin 2013; Cameron 2015, p. 135), 
although Chipkin (2011) argues that it was adopted as a "toolkit rather than an ideology" (ibid., 
p. 5). Nonetheless, the value New Public Management placed on technical rationality in the 
drive for consensus seems to be somewhat at the expense of the health of the state-society 
relationship (Hood 1991; Adams 1992; Flyvbjerg 1998b; Hay, Lister et al. 2006). This emphasis 
on a 'procedural' democracy has been arguably at the expense of a 'substantive' one (Paret 
2015, p. 117). 
Namely, the state's managerialist approach translates into its treatment of the citizen as a 
customer (Box 1998, 1999) – rather than as a citizen. The resultant effect was that social 
development and redistribution imperatives were traded off against the desire for profits and 
efficiency, and the pursuit of cost recovery imperatives (McDonald & John 2002; Smith, L. 
2004), compounded by a problem of under- and non-payment and minimal affordability of 
services in South Africa (Easterly 2007; Everatt 2008; Afrobarometer 2011). However, the 
citizen is also an activist – one that had to find a new role in the newly-free South Africa, but 
carrying with him a heightened awareness of rights and a propensity to battle for them 
(Ballard 2005). The ANC-led administration and the Democratic Alliance (DA) both reportedly 
favoured that "councils should be run as businesses" (Financial Mail 2000) in 2000. To 
complicate matters further, the citizen in the South African post-apartheid context is also a 
victim of the past (von Holdt et al. 2011, pp. 119-129), and continues to remain a victim of 
poverty and sluggish service delivery (Beall, Crankshaw et al. 2000b).  
In contrast to the notion of human development of developmental local governance, New 
Public Management's seeming obsession with 'deliverology' goes hand-in-hand with its 
performance management innovations. The term 'deliverology' originated in the British civil 
service and was later expanded on by a consultancy as a performance management and 
monitoring approach unitising, routinising and codifying programme management (Barber, 
Kihn et al. 2011). In this study, deliverology means the focus on the implementation of projects 
and programmes dealing with service delivery backlogs in post-1994 South Africa in a 
technocratic and systematised manner to be able to deliver services to its customers, the 
majority of which had not ever enjoyed proper services ever before (RSA 1998, p. 36). This 
emphasis on 'deliverology' even if the service delivery is inadequate, is out of balance with the 
need to build new citizens as well and contributes to the sense of disappointment at the failure 
of 'developmental local government' (Atkinson 2007; de Visser 2009), prompting attention-
grabbing headlines about the state's failure of local government to deliver services (Pretoria 
News 2007; Business Day 2009; Sunday Independent 2009, 2010; Financial Mail 2011a, b). 
There is little agreement as to whether the state's transition from apartheid to democracy has 
been effective or is even complete. For instance, some charge the state with the allegation of 
"transition without transformation" (Picard 2005, p. 176), and of being ineffective in absorbing 
and transforming the previous administration's history of inadequacies into new and capable 
local government institutions (Chipkin 2011). However, others claim the "transition is still 
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ongoing" (Von Schnitzler 2015), or the "democratic institutions are consolidated" (Heller & 
Evans 2011, p. 306).  
What does seem clear, however, is that the notion of 'developmental local government' is 
complex (van Donk et al. 2008). Transformative governance and planning is a lot harder to 
carry out in reality than the theory (Harrison 2013); insurgents are not always right and the 
state is not always wrong. Although the state has introduced programmes and policies to deal 
with cross-cutting service delivery matters (RSA 2000b, 2007a, 2009a, b, 2010, 2011b), 
criticism remains high. Some argue that the balance between centralisation and 
decentralisation is not optimal whilst others say the central state undermines the principles of 
decentralisation and the autonomy of local government (Cameron 2001, 2002), or that the 
process decentralisation has not been fully realised (de Visser 2005), challenged as it is with 
difficult intergovernmental relations (de Visser 2005, pp. 202, 210). The state acknowledges a 
shortfall in institutional capacity of municipalities (RSA Cameron 2001; 2009a; 2011a, p. 19), 
worsened by a lack of fiscal resources and skills (Cameron 2002), and the prevalence of 
patronage approach to staff recruitment (Cameron 2010).  
Unmet Citizen Expectations 
As seen earlier on page 70, the definition of 'service delivery' is a contentious one. Even more 
contentious is the question of what constitutes citizen satisfaction in terms of service delivery. 
In South Africa, service delivery expectations have arguably been created in the minds of 
citizens by explicit, and implicit, promises made in many documents. For instance, promises by 
the state were made of growth, redistribution, services and development building on the 
contents of the Freedom Charter (South African Congress Alliance 1955), the Bill of Rights for a 
New South Africa (ANC 1993), and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA 
1996a). Further promises were made through policy and legislation initiatives guaranteed by 
the national and local government (RSA 1994, 1997a, b, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2006, 2007b, 
2009a, 2011c), and manifestos of the ruling party (ANC 2000, 2001a, b, 2004, 2006, 2011). 
These promises are a multi-faceted combination of simple and complex services, and public 
goods, sometimes conflated with rights. 
It is arguably the unmet expectation of citizens that causes protests, according to Davies 
(1962) and Gurr (1968a, b, 1970). They claim that relative deprivation drives protest, when 
there is an "intolerable gap between what people want and what they get" (Davies, J. 1962, p. 
6), which has been largely the case in South African service delivery protests (Klandermans, 
Roefs et al. 2001; Ballard et al. 2006, p. 6). However, others offer very different theories. For 
instance, explanations include the complexity of diverse factors in services driving satisfaction 
(Zeithaml, Berry et al. 1993). Further, the state's liberal economic approach to public 
administration means that job creation opportunities through the production of state services 
have not been leveraged despite the pressing need to create employment (Higgs 2007), 
namely the production of services can be separated from their provision (Box 1999), and may 
increase income generation for the poor (Mitlin 2000; Pike & Tomaney 2009).  
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Of course, delivery of services and the realisation of rights, even when these rights are clearly 
articulated, are not as simple as evidenced in the rights-motivated protests for the right to 
housing, and the right to the city (Huchzermeyer & Karam 2006; Huchzermeyer 2008; Bénit-
Gbaffou & Oldfield 2014). Others, in social movement studies, cite resource mobilisation, 
political power opportunities and identity creation as causes of protests (Death 2010a; Bénit-
Gbaffou 2015b).  
There is a strong urban dimension to protest; citizen dissatisfaction is city-centric – not only in 
South Africa but worldwide. The emergence of the notion of city services as not only 
expectations but as negotiated rights can be seen as the evidence of efforts of the state to deal 
with conflictual processes at the scale of the city. For instance, the Brazilian Statute of the City 
(Federative Republic of Brazil 2001) underlines the difficulties of finding a common 
understanding of the meaning of rights and entitlements, how to localise them in the city 
context and tie them to human rights (Dowding & Van Hees 2003). In South Africa, the 
political and policy promises of rights and developmental local government impact, especially, 
on cities. However, translating that promise into reality appears to enjoy only limited success, 
if citizen feedback is to be believed (Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2009; COJ 2010g). 
The emphasis of Mouffeian tenets (2000b) on the task of democracy as channelling protest 
and conflict for productive outcomes is in line with Tilly's (1995) thinking that the state is 
obliged to build and maintain the capability to maintain a productive relationship with its 
citizenry (ibid.). To do so effectively, the state needs appropriate skills to respond to the 
constant push-pull of an agonism-based democracy. However, there is a scarcity of empirical 
research into city-level service delivery strife, especially in respect of exemplars in the 
planning, built environment and local governance milieus and the potential of agonism to 
change the state's approach, especially in the case of the South African city and Johannesburg. 
4 Protesting Service Delivery in Johannesburg 
Tradition of Protest in the City 
Developing a deep understanding, from the perspective of those working within the state, of 
the state-society strife in South Africa is complex – too complex to analyse at the level of the 
entire state. To appreciate the conundrum of service delivery protest, the case study of the 
institution of the metropolitan municipality of Johannesburg post-1994 is provided, starting 
with an overview of the city as the backdrop to the detailed stories in Chapters 6, 7 and 8).  
A rich history of conflict has impacted on Johannesburg's birth and growth and has been well 
documented in the literature starting with the break out of the Anglo-Boer war in 1880-1881 
and the Jamieson Raid of 1896 (Beavon 2004). In 1897, possibly the first protest in 
Johannesburg, white males protested unemployment and demanded the state's intervention 
in the form of a public works programme (Van Onselen 1982b, pp. 127-132).  
Other notable protests thereafter included various strikes by miners, railwaymen and tramway 
workers in the 1910s and 1920s; the black 'squatter movement' of the 1940s; the 
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mineworkers' strike in 1946; the Decade of Defiance of the 1950s and 1960s; the violent 
rebuttal to the Sharpeville demonstration in 1960; the Black Consciousness Movement of the 
1960s and 1970s; and the Soweto student uprising in 1976 and subsequent school and other 
boycotts, labour strikes and rise of ANC actions (Bozzoli 1987; Bonner 1990; Davenport & 
Saunders 2000; Beavon 2004; Gerhart & Glaser 2010; South African History Online 2015d).  
Much has also been written about the anti-apartheid political protests of the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s in the context of the South African city's transition to democracy, which took the form 
of strikes, stayaways, marches, boycotts, campaigns, rallies and bombings (Smith, D. 1982; 
Nattrass 1983; Bennett, M. & Quin 1988; Swilling, Humphries et al. 1991; Crankshaw 1993; 
Mandela 1994; Parnell & Mabin 1995; Robinson, J. 1996; Mabin & Smit 1997; Bond 2004b).  
The strong tradition of protest, also against the payment of rates and services, informs the 
current protests. Although post-apartheid protests are not necessarily dissimilar thematically 
to those during apartheid, there is a dividing line between the periods as citizens in post-
apartheid Johannesburg, especially in black areas, have a new relationship with the a new 
representative and legitimate local government (Ballard 2005; Beall et al. 2005; de Visser 2009; 
Bénit-Gbaffou 2012; Wafer, A. 2012). 
Key City Statistics 
Johannesburg is the biggest contributor to the Gross Domestic Product of South Africa at 14 
percent, or R408 billion (South African Cities Network 2011a, p. 4; 2011b, p. 20, 2009 data). 
Likewise, the city's contribution to the greater city-region's economy is 38.5 percent 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2011, p. 56), with the city-region's 
economy share of the African economy a significant 11 percent of the continent's Gross 
Domestic Product (ibid., p. 15). The city-region ranks as the second most prosperous city-
region in Africa based on Gross Domestic Product per capita, after Algiers (UN-Habitat 2013, p. 
38).  
Since the first democratically elected city administration came into being in 1996, 
Johannesburg has made enormous progress in governance and service delivery in every aspect 
(see Table 4.1 for Snapshot of City Statistics on page 80), despite the near doubling of 
Johannesburg's population and households (Quantec 2014).  
However, significant service delivery challenges remain despite the improvements between 
1996 and 2011 as observed in Table 4.1 on page 80, continuing to fuel citizen dissatisfaction. 
South Africa is by no means the poorest country in the world (World Bank 2015, pp. 22-23, 27, 
33), with citizens' access to services comparable to and even better than other parts of the 
world (ibid., p. 69). Yet, according to the UN Habitat's (2013) study on the state of world cities, 
Johannesburg is markedly the most unequal city in the world (UN-Habitat 2013, pp. 20, 24). 
UN Habitat (ibid.) argues that attaining equality is vital for the city as equity "reduces 
alienation and exclusion, paving the way for empowerment and engagement of all social 
groups and for the realization of the full potential of the entire population" (ibid., p. 85). 
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However, the outlook for doing away with inequality is uncertain given the lack of clarity as to 
whether it is growing or declining (Harrison 2015, p. 37), and high levels of unemployment. 
Table 4.1: Snapshot of City Statistics 
Indicator City statistic 1996 2011 
City governance 
 City footprint (square kilometres) 
2
1 384 1 645 
Number of municipal staff 
3
26 720 
9
28 017 
Number of municipal staff per 1 000 citizens 
4
10 
10
6 
Number of councillors 
3
270 
11
260 
Financial long-term health Fitch rating 
5
BBB+ 
12
AA- 
Financial short-term health Fitch rating 
5
F2+ 
12
F1+ 
Operating budget
1 
(billion) 
6
R6.2bn 
13
R29.4bn 
Capital budget
1 
(billion) 
6
R0.593bn 
13
R3.7bn 
Rates revenue
1 
(billion) 
7
R1.5bn 
14
R4.8bn 
Number of customers for billing - 
18
1 040 648 
Annual expenditure per citizen per annum
1
 
4
R2 580 
15
R7 464 
Service delivery 
 Number of households with water connections in house or yard
 
628 948 1 314 347 
Water connections in house or yard as share of all households 86% 92% 
Number of households with access to flush or chemical toilets 632 637 1 298 056 
Access to flush or chemical toilets as share of all households 87% 90% 
Socio-economic    
 Number of people 2 633 031 4 434 828 
City population density (people per km²) 1 902 2 665 
Number of households 731 148 1 434 855 
Number of formal dwellings 541 485 1 168 027 
Number of all other dwellings 189 663 266 828 
All other dwellings as share of all households 26% 19% 
Gross Domestic Product
1 
(billion)
 
 
2
R45.9bn 
16
R408bn 
Gini coefficient  
8
0.63 
17
0.62 
Number of people employed 938 799 1 700 209 
Number of people unemployed (official) 389 482 670 305 
Number of people unemployed (expanded) 389 482 563 686 
Percentage of people unemployed (official) 29 25 
Percentage of people unemployed (expanded) 29 28 
Number of people with higher education 206 168 588 753 
Number of people with higher education per 1 000 citizens 78 133 
Note: 
1 Rand values are nominal 10 Own calculation based on COJ (COJ 2013d, p. 168) and number of people 
2 GJMC (1996)  11 COJ (2014f, p. 26) 
3 Emdon (1998) 12 COJ (2011w) 
4 Own calculation based on Emdon (1998) and number of people 13 COJ (2011~), budget for 2011-12 financial year 
5 COJ (2006h, p. 102), 1999 data 14 COJ (2010n, p. 12), estimate for 2010-2011 financial year 
6 Emdon (1998), 1997-98 revised budget data 15 COJ (2011~), budget for 2011-12 financial year and number of people 
7 Estimated 1997-98 income (Emdon 1998) 16 South African Cities Network (2011a, p. 4; 2011b, p. 20, 2009 data) 
8 COJ (2004c, p. 33) 17 COJ (2011c, p. 23) 
9 COJ (2013d, p. 168) 18 PoliticsWeb (2011b), or 1.2 million customers (COJ 2011g), up from 
about 500 00 in 2002 (ioL 2002b); no data found for 1996 
Source: Own formulation; unless otherwise stated data is based on own calculations and analysis of Census 2011 statistics 
(Quantec 2014) (refer also to Appendix 23) 
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This inequality manifests in the perpetuation of the stark spatial segregation patterns of the 
city today, the vestiges of apartheid planning. Spatially, Johannesburg is still deeply divided 
along both economic and racial lines with 66 percent of all city household income levels below 
R76 800 per annum (Quantec 2014) (see Chart 4.2 below), in areas characterised by high levels 
of informal dwellings but also in more established areas with formal housing that may have 
degenerated over time. In terms of this research, the remaining third of all city households are 
defined as middle-class – and rates-paying – suburbs of the city, although this definition also 
incorporates low- and high-income households at each end of the spectrum.  
These persistent extremes of inequality by income and location present a significant and 
ongoing service delivery challenge to the city administration (Everatt 2008; Winkler 2009). 
However, in an informal settlement like Orange Farm, the sense of segregation is intensified as 
91 percent of household income levels are below R76 800 per annum, and a little over half or 
54 percent of all households live on less than R19 200 per annum compared to the city average 
of 35 percent (ibid.)  
Structure of the City 
There are five types of urban area within Johannesburg's boundaries, highlighting the extreme 
variation across the city, pertinent to this study described in the next five paragraphs (see Map 
4.1 on page 82). 
Inner City 
The Inner City is the historic core of Johannesburg, containing the city's densest urban 
population in and around the city centre, and is the location of the detailed story of strife in 
Chapter 7 starting on page 168 (with Map 4.1 on page 82 showing the location of the case 
study area). The Inner City accommodates generally, but not exclusively, low-income citizens in 
apartment buildings and former legally and illegally converted office blocks and warehouses. 
Chart 4.2: City Population by Income and Race Categories 
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Map 4.1: Johannesburg's Socio-Economic Spatial Structure Today and Location of Three Study Areas 
 
Source: Own formulation 
  
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 83 
The city centre was once the financial nucleus of Johannesburg and the wider provincial 
region. Many major corporate headquarters are still located there although others have 
relocated to the Sandton node, the largest of the decentralised nodes in the northern part of 
Johannesburg. Despite the state's political prioritisation of the Inner City over a number of 
years and significant investments made, urban decay is evident (COJ 2012l; The Star 2013c). 
Nonetheless, the area still contributes significantly to the city economy, providing more jobs 
than Sandton, Woodmead-Rivonia and Randburg combined (COJ 2004l, p. 14). A large portion 
of the city administration's income is derived from the Inner City, which contains 23 percent of 
the city's rateable properties by value (COJ 2006h, p. 193). Functionally, the Inner City is still a 
crucial hub for road and rail transportation for Johannesburg and the wider region, attracting 
concentrated informal street trading.  
East-West Former Mining Belt 
The East-West former mining belt, a now largely underdeveloped strip of disused former 
mining land scattered with slimes dams and industrial areas, divides the city into two roughly 
along the line of the M2 highway and Main Reef Road. The mining belt generally separates the 
middle-income communities of the city to its north from the lower-income areas to its south 
(refer Map 4.1 on page 82). 
Townships 
The main low-income townships of Alexandra, Soweto, Lenasia and Eldorado Park were 
formally established in 1912, 1931, 1958 and 1963 respectively to serve as dormitory suburbs 
for black, Indian and coloured workers (Lupton 1991; South African History Online 2015a, b, c). 
In some ways, these dormitory areas appear to be normal suburban areas with brick homes 
and formal services, especially since significant capital investments have been made in them 
by the municipality and others since 1994. However, households in townships are 
characterised by much less-than-city-average income and employment levels and fall within 
the low-income classification. Although the value of a house here is much higher than the 
COJ's maximum rate relief on the first R150 000 of the market price (COJ 2012j, p. 27), many 
households cannot afford to pay or do not pay. Non-payment is attributed to the former rent 
boycotts of the 1980s by civic and political organisations against the state and today's protests 
could be seen as a form of resistance in itself today (McMichael 2008, p. 11). Additional 
suburbs of state-provided 'RDP' matchbox houses created since 1994 also fit into this group 
(refer Map 4.1 on page 82). 
Informal Settlements 
The informal settlements are also low-income areas, notable for high concentrations of 
poverty. About 195 474 households are located in 180 informal settlements (Maina 2014), or 
13.6 percent of all of Johannesburg's 1 434 855 households (Quantec 2014). The population is 
almost exclusively black. About three-quarters of the informal settlement population are to be 
found in the southernmost parts of the city (COJ 2001c, p. 12), known as the 'Deep South' 
within the city administration (COJ 2001c, pp. 12-13), with the remainder located at the 
northern periphery of the city. The largest settlements are Orange Farm (the location of the 
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detailed story in the Chapter starting on page 135, refer Map 4.1 on page 82 for location of the 
case study area), and Ivory Park and the smaller ones include Kya Sands, Diepsloot, Zandspruit, 
Poortje, Finetown, Weilers Farm, Themb'elihle, Sweetwaters and Finetown. In these areas, 
people typically live in makeshift shacks although there may be a great number of state-
provided RDP houses too. Properties are valued far below R150 000 making them non-rateable 
(Savage, Gotz et al. 2003, pp. 34-35; COJ 2012j, p. 27) (refer Map 4.1 on page 82).  
The use of the term 'informal settlement' is a controversial one (Huchzermeyer 2011, pp. 5-9, 
133). An 'informal settlement' is sometimes also called a 'slum', 'squatter camp', 'shack farm', 
'shack land' or 'shanty town'. South African and international organisations typically 
characterise an 'informal settlement' by the illegality of its initial establishment; the presence 
of a great proportion of informal dwellings; location on unproclaimed land with low security of 
tenure for households; minimal or substandard services and amenities; and high levels of 
poverty and unemployment (United Nations 1997, p. 69; UN-Habitat 2006b, p. 21; UN-Habitat 
2006a; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007, pp. 398, 467; 
Statistics South Africa 2012, pp. 14, 88, 89, 131). Although the South African state has, since 
the late 1980s and the 1990s, formally established many new settlements such as Orange 
Farm (refer to Chapter 7 on page 135 for detail); provided numerous formal houses; 
proclaimed land and transferred ownership of plots and houses to households; and invested in 
infrastructure and facilities, such settlements continue to be labelled as 'informal', even by the 
city administration today (COJ 2011f).  
Hence, in this research, the term 'informal settlement' describes a settlement that is generally 
relatively poorly located; has minimal or sub-standard services, amenities and formal housing; 
and high poverty and unemployment levels, notwithstanding any improvements made by the 
state. 
Middle-Class Suburbs 
Middle-class suburbs (with a few of these selected to represent the detailed story in Chapter 8 
on Middle-Class Malcontents: Billing Backlash starting on page 200), are characterised by 
concentrations of predominantly formal houses, and house the 34 percent of households in 
Johannesburg that receive annual incomes greater than the R76 800 threshold in 2011. About 
1 165 021 people, or 26.3 percent of Johannesburg's population, live in middle-class suburbs 
located both north and south of the former mining belt. Less affluent middle-class suburbs 
mainly are found in the south of the city (Harrison & Zack 2014), and are home to 33.9 percent 
of the city's middle-class population with the remaining two-thirds are located north of the 
former mining belt. Although middle-class suburbs were generally built for whites before the 
advent of democratic governance, the proportion of white citizens there is still high, but there 
is evidence that the black African, coloured and Indian populations are on the increase in 
certain parts (see Chapter 8). Typically, these suburbs are affordable only to the middle class, 
which also tends to be the main paying rates-paying group in Johannesburg (refer Map 4.1 on 
page 82). 
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5 Types of Service Delivery Protests in Johannesburg 
Dimensions of Service Delivery Protests 
Each type of urban area is consistent with particular dimensions and types of protest according 
to the research data. The term 'service delivery protest' generally brings to mind the usually 
highly visible and well-publicised public street-based protest by low-income groups 
accompanied by picketing, chanting and marching, characterised by the kinds of images seen 
in the scenes of typical service delivery protests in Photograph 4.1 below to Photograph 4.3 on 
page 86. However, for a holistic assessment of conflict between the city administration and 
citizens, about service delivery across different communities, the definition must include types 
of service delivery protests that are also in the public eye, namely those lodged by middle-class 
communities, as characterised by the image seen in Photograph 4.4 on page 86, which 
contrasts with the first set of images.  
Photograph 4.1: Scene of Typical Service Delivery Protest in a Township 
 
Aftermath of a housing-related service delivery protest in Alexandra showing overflowing sewerage in the street and rubble used as 
barricades by protestors to prevent the entry of police into the township; source: photograph by Times Media, 2014, with 
permission, featured in Pernegger (2014, p. 62) 
Photograph 4.2: Scene of Typical Service Delivery Protest in an Informal Settlement 
 
A typical protest using a blockade made of burning tyres; source: photograph by Independent Newspapers, 2014, with permission, 
featured in Pernegger (2014, p. 63) 
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Photograph 4.3: Scene of Informal Trading Protest in the Inner City 
 
Informal traders protest against the operations of the Metropolitan Trading Company; source: photograph by Keith Atkins, 2002, 
with permission, featured in Pernegger (2014, p. 64) 
Photograph 4.4: Scene of Service Delivery Protest by Middle-Class Community 
 
Press briefing by the City of Johannesburg in response to protest from middle-class suburbs about the implementation of a paid-
parking scheme in their areas; source: photograph featured on web site of Democratic Alliance (2012b) 
The assessment of the research data on street protest in Johannesburg over 25 years (see 
Figure 4.1 on page 87), combined with other data on protests by the middle class, shows that 
service delivery protests can be broadly categorised into four types, as detailed in the next 
paragraphs (from page 90), according to various dimensions as summarised in Table 4.2 on 
page 88). This classification helps in understanding the state's responses to the issues under 
contention as it identifies who within the state is usually in the frontline of responses to the 
protestors. Each type of protest is multi-faceted, with shifts in frequency over the periods, and 
has a number of features ranging across a spectrum of dimensions, as schematically indicated 
in Figure 4.2 on page 89. These dimensions include: the size of protest (mass or small); the 
income level of the protestors (low-income or middle-class); the physical intensity of the 
protest (violent or non-violent); its spatial location (informal or formal area); the mechanism 
used (direct or indirect); the duration of protest (weeks or a day or two); the underlying 
themes of the protest (multiple or single); the clarity of the role-players in the protest 
(uncertain or easily identified), the nature of the service contested (basic or additional); the 
type of the service contested (minimum or maximum); and the need satisfied by that service 
(survival or quality of life). What is apparent is that the dimensions of the different types of 
protest can overlap, pointing to the difficulty in typifying them and their extraordinary 
complexity for analysis. 
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Figure 4.1: Service Delivery Protest Types over 25 Years 
1 Periodic service delivery protest
2 Protracted service delivery protest
3 Recurrent informal trading protest
4 Intermittent ad hoc service delivery protest
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015
Negotiation Transition Consolidation Maturation Current
 
Source: Own formulation; based on 453 protests in low-income and middle-class areas; note darker areas within each band indicate most active periods, refer also to Figure 5.1 on page 108 for protest themes 
over 25 years 
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Table 4.2: Types of Service Delivery Protest Summarised 
No Name Description 
1 Periodic 
service 
delivery 
protest 
These protests take place almost exclusively in the street or in other public 
places, and are initiated by low-income communities in townships, informal 
settlements and hostels. They are sometimes 'violent' and are frequently about 
the lack of basic services by the state, tariff increases, or payment requirements. 
They may also be about other quality of life issues such as housing and land-
related issues; eviction or relocation concerns; unaffordable tariffs, rents and 
rates; foreigners; effects of privatisation and globalisation; project, programme 
and policy-related matters; presence of crime; lack of jobs and other reasons. 
Protests tend to be brief and sporadic, occurring frequently, and target local 
government generally.  
The main respondents are the local ANC politicians; the Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Police Department; the Office of the Region; the South African 
Police Service (and Public Order Policing); and provincial housing. 
2 Protracted 
service 
delivery 
protest 
These protests are about the state's delivery of basic services, and are initiated 
by low-income communities, persisting over a long period, such as the decade-
long electricity and water protests, and the Landless Peoples Movement 
between 2002 and 2005. Protestors employ a number of different and 
sometimes imaginative channels to protest including sometimes 'violent' street 
protest, may enjoy support of NGOs and other advocacy groups. They target 
local government but not exclusively.  
The main respondents are the entities providing services (such as City Power 
and Johannesburg Water); legal advisors; policy makers; politicians; potentially 
in all spheres of government depending on the issue under contention; 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department; and the South African Police 
Service (and Public Order Policing). 
3 Recurrent 
informal 
trading 
protest 
These seemingly spontaneous protests by informal and market traders usually 
take place in the Inner City and are sometimes violent. Protests are often 
combined with anti-foreigner sentiment. Protests target local government, 
objecting to the enforcement of by-laws, types of markets and market stalls 
constructed, inter alia. 
The main respondents are the local ANC politicians, and also the provincial and 
national ones from time to time; the Economic Development Unit, the 
Metropolitan Trading Company; Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department; 
the South African Police Service (and Public Order Policing); and the Office of 
Region F. 
4 Intermittent 
ad hoc 
service 
delivery 
protest 
These protests, initiated by the generally rate-paying communities in middle-
class areas and sometimes in the townships, target the municipality. Protests 
are occasional, often persisting over long periods. Protestors are likely to be 
well-capacitated and powerful enough to be able to protest in alternative ways, 
using a variety of resources and channels such as the media, legal services and 
petitions, and may propose solutions in some cases. They do not generally take 
place in the streets. They may impact on fewer citizens. Examples include the 
billing crisis, opposition to the planning of the Kopanong Precinct and the 
Privatised Pointsmen initiative to counter low-income traffic management. 
The main respondents are the service departments of the city administration, 
especially billing, traffic management, roads and planning; the legal advisors; 
political committees and local politicians; and the Petitions Unit. 
Source: Own formulation 
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Figure 4.2: Dimensions of Types of Service Delivery Protests 
Informal sett lement Inner City middle-class suburbs
township low-income areas
protest-with-pickets protest-with-pockets protest-with pet it ions
essent ial
lifeline
added value
electricty
water jobs waste management local planning roads pothole repair city planning parking
food informal trading sites clinic billing
housing
Need satisfied by service Survival Quality o f life
Periodic service delivery Protracted service delivery Recurrent informal trading service delivery Intermit tent ad hoc service delivery
Nature of service contested Basic Additional
Type of service contested M inimum M aximum
Number of underlying protest themes M ultiple Single
Clarity of role-players in protest Uncertain Easily identified
Mechanism used Direct Indirect
Duration of protest Weeks A day or two
Size of protest M ass Small
Frequency of protest High Low
Income level of protestors Low-income M iddle-class
Physical intensity of protest Vio lent Non-vio lent
Spatial location Informal area Formal area
 
Source: Own formulation; based on analysis of 453 low-income and middle-class protests 
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Four Types of Service Delivery Protests 
Periodic Service Delivery Protests 
Periodic service delivery protests are seemingly usually spontaneous events: unpredictable, 
moderate in intensity but sometimes 'violent' – increasingly – seemingly disorganised, 
spontaneous and reactive, and volatile and frequent in nature, according to the researcher's 
analysis of the protest data collated. They tend to be large street-based protests with pickets 
within low-income informal settlements, townships and hostels within townships. The 
duration of a protest ranges between a day and a number of weeks.2 The main reason for the 
protests is to draw the attention of the state to the plight of poor communities, as other 
mechanisms of protest have not succeeded according to von Holdt et al. (2011). The recurrent 
protests seem to be as much about the citizens' expectations of the state to receiving basic 
services as they are about the state making good on its promise to redress apartheid's ills. 
Multiple objections may be raised simultaneously, including concerns about quality of life 
themes such as the quality and quantity of housing delivery and other housing and land-
related issues; eviction or relocation concerns; unaffordable tariffs, rents and rates; foreigners; 
privatisation and globalisation; project-, programme- and policy-related matters; the presence 
of crime; and the lack of jobs. Although the reasons for protests stated in the data may be 
common across the city, the detailed circumstances and citizen groups and role-players vary 
from place to place and over time and are not always clear. The city administration, mainly 
local and provincial government politicians representing the ANC, the Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) and the Offices of the Regions, is a critical force in 
managing the tensions. The South African Police Services and its Public Order Policing division, 
maintaining order and protecting lives and property in the case of 'violent' protests and 
sometimes resorting to forceful measures to do so (DefenceWeb 2011), sometimes using even 
violent means, triggering violence in initially peaceful protests (Paret 2015), and the provincial 
department responsible for providing RDP housing, are also integrally linked to the state's 
response.  
Protracted Service Delivery Protests 
Protracted service delivery protests are usually about the state's basic service delivery and are 
initiated by low-income communities. Such protests are frequently large and are sustained 
over a long period, such as the 'war for water' in Orange Farm (refer to Chapter 6, page 135), 
and could be considered as a social movement, as defined by Opp (2009, pp. 37-42). Protestors 
use the low-cost strategy of street-based protest extensively but are also as likely to protest 
through other channels for protest providing they have the resources. For instance, they may 
get help from advocacy groups to attain their objectives. Protestors target local government, 
but may also lobby other spheres of government that may influence the outcome of the 
process. This type of protest is driven by a sense of purpose with some access to resources and 
a seemingly deliberate and planned approach in its protest to achieve its aims. The role-
 
2 Note that this research counts protests as follows: 1) a protest is a single protest if it lasts for one or more days if the protestors, 
the cause and the location remain unchanged; and 2) if two protests occur at the same time and have the same cause but take 
place in two different areas, they are counted as two protests. 
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players are easily identifiable and tend to feature consistently in the protests over time. The 
city administration's providers of basic services, such as City Power and Joburg Water, their 
legal advisors and policy makers, and politicians of the ANC at local, regional and national 
levels, are the frontline for the response to these protests.  
Recurrent Informal Trading Protests 
Recurrent protests by informal and market traders, serving mainly low-income customers, 
seem to be usually 'spur-of-the-moment' (though they may not be), generally moderate in 
intensity but sometimes violent, and take place usually in the Inner City, but not exclusively, 
due to the preponderance of trade there. Protests have been combined with anti-foreigner 
sentiment on occasion. Protests target the local government and are objections against the 
enforcement of by-laws and the types of markets and market stalls constructed. Protestors 
make use of petitions from time to time. Protests generally do not seem to be planned, at least 
at a superficial level. The structure of trader representative groups and their roles fluctuates 
over time. Within the city administration, the key respondents to protest are local government 
politicians mainly representing the ANC, the Department of Economic Development, and the 
Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC), which by then had been incorporated into the city 
administration's Johannesburg Property Company. The MTC managed formal markets and taxi 
ranks. Other respondents included the JMPD, and the Office of Region F, which is responsible 
for urban management in the Inner City. This sort of protest is categorised separately from 
other service delivery protests because the city administration perceives both informal trading 
and the Inner City as significant and unique management challenges that involve different 
groups in society to other service delivery protests, and is detailed in Chapter 7 (see page 168). 
Intermittent Ad Hoc Service Delivery Protests 
Unlike service delivery protests by low-income communities, which are about the lack of basic 
services, the fewer and also usually high-profile ad hoc service delivery protests by the 
generally rates-paying middle-class communities in suburban areas and sometimes the 
townships implicitly acknowledge that basic services have already been delivered to them. 
They protest about other ad hoc services that are important to them. They perceive the quality 
of these services as less than satisfactory and may include specific city operations such as 
billing (as addressed in Chapter 8, refer page 200), traffic management, road quality and 
planning issues. Protestors target the city administration, limiting action only to the issue 
under contention. As protestors are relatively well-resourced, the role-players tend to be 
consistent throughout the course of the protest over time. Protests might be protracted ones, 
and might incorporate suggested solutions to the city administration. These protestors tend to 
represent the bulk of the rates-paying households of the city. Responses from the city 
administration include the departments directly affected by the protests, legal advisors and 
local government politicians.  
Dimension of Space 
Space matters in service delivery protests, especially where it coincides with the dimension of 
income. Periodic or protracted service delivery protests, and recurrent informal trading 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 92 
protests, are generally made by low-income groups. At a city level, spatial patterns of these 
low-income protests are evident as "hotspots" (Sinwell, Kirshner et al. 2009; Alexander 2010; 
Municipal IQ 2012), rather than encircling the city as a "ring of fire" (Daily Maverick 2012b) as 
is evident in a map of protests (see Spatial Distribution of Protest Hot Spots in Johannesburg, 
Map 4.2 on page 95). These protests tend to share a high degree of commonality across 
townships, informal settlements, the inner city and other low-income suburbss. According to 
this research data, protests are particularly prevalent in six areas housing 50.1 percent of the 
city's population that have been prioritised by the COJ for development and investment, 
although of these, the case study will focus only on Orange Farm and the Inner City. Protests 
originating from the middle-class suburbs generally have somewhat different dimensions 
though (as described in more detail later on page 100). 
In Townships, Informal Settlements, the Inner City and Other Low-Income Suburbs 
Most of the periodic and protracted service delivery protests take place within low-income 
communities. The recurrent informal trading protests occur mainly in the Inner City (see 
Chapter 7, page 168). The majority of all service delivery protests originating in low-income 
communities were recorded in Soweto, Orange Farm and the Inner City, namely nearly two-
thirds or 59.3 percent of all protests between 1996 and 2010 (see Map 4.2 on page 95). 
The remaining protests took place throughout Johannesburg in many other areas 
characterised by high unemployment and low household incomes. These include townships 
such as Alexandra, Eldorado Park and Lenasia; informal settlements such as Diepsloot, 
Themb'elihle and Kya Sands; industrial areas such as Cleveland and Denver; and suburbs such 
as Jeppestown, Malvern and Mayfair (see Map 4.2 on page 95). Although protests might share 
commonalities, there is an extraordinary array of differences between protests and areas, each 
worthy of closer study.  
This diversity of protests is illustrated briefly in the synopsis of protests in the five low-income 
areas prioritised by the city administration for targeted interventions (COJ 2009d) (refer to 
Dimensions of Service Delivery Protests on page 93), possibly due to the high incidence of 
service delivery protest there. The five areas are home to half, or 52 percent, of 
Johannesburg's population (see Chart 4.3 on page 93). They include the townships of Soweto 
and Alexandra and the larger informal settlements of Orange Farm, Diepsloot and Ivory Park. 
The city administration allocated nearly two thirds, or 67 percent, of its R4.1 billion capital 
budget for 2012, reflecting a programme of phased development in these low-income areas 
(COJ 2009d) (see Chart 4.4 on page 93). These brief insights into the protests in these six 
priority areas serve to illustrate that the protest trajectories in each area are unique according 
to the distinctive demographic makeup, characteristics and dynamics (the statistics supports 
this point, as in Table 4.3 on page 96; again each area is worthy of closer study than is possible 
in this research.  
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Chart 4.3: City Population per Priority Area 
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Source: Formulation by author based on COJ's population estimates of the priority areas published in planning documents and on 
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Chart 4.4: City Budget in 2012-2013 per Priority Area  
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In Priority Townships and Informal Settlements 
Soweto 
The COJ's first priority area of the COJ, Soweto, is the historic home of the apartheid activist 
movement and the tradition of protest is strong. Although the greatest number of protests in 
Johannesburg was recorded in Soweto (refer Map 4.2 on page 95), relative to its large 
population, it is relatively less vocal than Orange Farm, Alexandra or Diepsloot – based on the 
research data. The sites of protests are scattered throughout Soweto, but residents within 
Kliptown, Protea South, Phiri and Meadowlands are the most active, possibly as they are 
relatively poorer than other low-income residents of the townships (COJ 2005c), although 
there are also pockets of areas within Soweto which are relatively middle-class.  
Soweto is the largest and the oldest black township, located south of the city centre of 
Johannesburg. It was created originally in stages (Morris, Bozzoli et al. 1999), as shown in Map 
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4.3 on page 97, from 1931 onwards (Bonner & Segal 1998), for black Africans resettled from 
other parts of the Johannesburg as apartheid planning measures were increasingly 
implemented by the state. Today, 84 percent live in formal dwellings (refer to Table 4.3 on 
page 96). Soweto, including Eldorado Park and Braamfischerville, houses nearly a third of 
Johannesburg's population, namely 1 271 634 people or 29 percent, in 12 percent of the city's 
footprint according to Table 4.3 on page 96).  
There have also been numerous toyi-toying protests in Soweto – a form of protest dance in 
South Africa incorporating singing and stamping of feet – mostly about basic services and 
hostel and area upgrades and land issues, as well as other demands between 2007 and 2012. 
For instance, Protea South citizens protested about basic service delivery in 2007. In July and 
September of the same year, it was the turn of Kliptown residents to protest about the state of 
sanitation, electricity and housing. In 2010, Protea Glen dwellers expressed frustration about 
the illegal occupation of RDP houses, whilst Dobsonville residents charged the state to provide 
housing and those in Motsoaledi insisted on improved service delivery.  
In May 2011, homeowners in bonded houses in Protea South were up in arms against 
neighbouring shack dwellers that had illegally connected to the electricity grid thus 
compromising the certainty of supply of power to all homes in the area. Protests tended to be 
'violent' post-2010, such as the one in Chiawelo in July 2011, where over a number of days 
protestors torched the house of a local councillor as well as the electricity substation. Hostel 
upgrade initiatives also sparked tensions within hostels and between hostel dwellers and their 
neighbours, such as in hostels in Orlando West and Nancefield in 1997 and in Dube in 2011.  
There have been other violent protests in the form of anti-foreigner protests and attempts to 
halt the Rea Vaya ('We are Going') Bus Rapid Transit scheme. Other more peaceful 
commemorative and rights-based campaigns, petitions and marches have also taken place. 
Orange Farm 
Protests in Orange Farm, the southernmost informal settlement of Johannesburg are 
commonplace as marked on Map 4.2 on page 95). Protests occur reportedly every week 
(Interview, Radebe, 2012), although these do not appear to have all been reported in the 
media (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Orange Farm is large, with a population of 
197 030 people or four percent of the total city population. Despite the newness of the 
settlement, established only in 1988, 77 percent of all dwellings in Orange Farm are formal 
structures. The population is almost entirely black and poorer than the rest of the city (refer to 
Table 4.3 on page 96). Other than the protracted 'war for water' covered in detail in Chapter 6 
(see page 135), protests in Orange Farm tend to be periodic service delivery protests, 
especially since 2006. Protestors object to the lack of service delivery in specific areas, 
unfinished projects, inferior quality of housing and roads, the shortage of work opportunities 
and limited access to amenities.  
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Map 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Protest Hot Spots in Johannesburg 
 
Hotspots are shown as size-relative circles marking the location and number of protests between 1996 and 2010, protests in low-
income areas are marked by red circles and those in middle-class suburbs by blue ones (Source: Own formulation; drawn from the 
List of Protests Studied, refer to Appendix 11) 
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Table 4.3: 2011 Statistics for COJ's Six Priority Areas 
Priority area 
Population Share of city area 
Formal : Informal dwellings 
Apartments 
Backyard shacks 
(formal and informal) Total 
house-
holds 
All formal All informal 
Number Per-
centage 
Km
2
 Per-
centage 
Number Per-
centage 
Per-
centage 
Number Number Per-
centage 
Number Per-
centage 
Soweto 1 271 634 29 200 12 299 376 84 15 52 735 5 520 2 69 078 17 355 341 
Orange Farm 197 030 4 31 2 42 623 77 23 12 562 275 <1 6 410 12 55 624 
Alexandra 179 624 4 7 <1 47 321 74 25 15 624 4 529 7 8 741 14 63 741 
Diepsloot 138 330 3 12 <1 21 711 34 65 40 878 489 <1 23 769 38 62 833 
Ivory Park 184 391 4 9 <1 43 789 64 35 23 951 343 <1 26 487 39 68 302 
Inner City 250 071 6 19 1 79 285 97 3 2 204 59 096 72 6 519 8 81 807 
Johannesburg 4 434 828 100 1 645 100 1 168 027 81 18 255 449 144 468 10 219 478 15 1 434 855 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) 
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Map 4.3: Development of Soweto from 1930s to 1990s 
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Source: Drawn by author in MS PowerPoint, adapted from Morris et al. (1999, see also p. iv) 
Alexandra 
One of the first recorded episodes of periodic service delivery protests in Johannesburg took 
place in the black township of Alexandra in 1994, although the protest seems to have been 
mixed with anti-foreigner and political partisanship (Misago, Landau et al. 2009, p. 23) (see 
Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). That protest was a portent of the countrywide anti-
foreigner protests to start in Alexandra in May 2008 (ibid., p. 2), spreading throughout South 
Africa and leaving over 60 people injured (ibid., p. 24).  
Initially Alexandra was located at the eastern periphery of the pre-1994 Johannesburg but as 
the city developed northwards the township's siting became increasingly advantageous, as it is 
now only a three-kilometre walk away from the Sandton business district (refer Map 4.2 on 
page 95 for location of Alexandra and frequency of protests). Alexandra was also one of the 
few townships where black Africans were allowed to own properties during apartheid (Bonner 
& Nieftagodien 2008). This security of tenure ensured the township's popularity and its 
population increased to 179 624 people or four percent of the total city population today, 
almost the same size as Orange Farm's but with more households and in less than a quarter of 
the area than Orange Farm occupies (Quantec 2014). The area is considered to house many 
more people than it was planned to house (Bonner & Nieftagodien 2008, p. 370). About three-
quarters, or 74 percent, of dwellings are formal structures and the remainder are mainly 
informal shacks or backyard shacks (refer to Table 4.3 on page 96). 
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Alexandra featured prominently in the worldwide anti-globalisation and anti-World Summit on 
Sustainable Development protests of 2002. In one instance, over 40 000 people reportedly 
marched against the Summit from Alexandra to Soweto and then to Sandton, accompanied by 
heavily armed security forces with machine guns and a helicopter (The Guardian 2002). 
Protests targeted the policies promoted by the Summit hosted in Johannesburg at the time, 
with the APF censuring world leaders for "doing nothing" (ibid.) about the lack of services and 
availability of land in impoverished areas. The Summit protests are noteworthy because they 
created a precedent for large, mass marches as a protest mechanism to attract the attention 
of the state and popularised anti-capitalist sentiment against the city administration's 
corporatisation initiatives (Death 2008, 2010b). A number of other, 'violent', periodic service 
delivery protests and attacks and planned stayaways also took place, for instance, about water 
and electricity outages, lack of youth development programmes and impatience with housing 
allocations. 
Diepsloot 
Most protests in the black informal settlement of Diepsloot were periodic service delivery 
protests about basic services and land-related matters (see Appendix 11: List of Protests 
Studied), unsurprising given the poor and disorganised living conditions (claims Manase 2014, 
p. 69). Two-thirds of the population or 65 percent of 138 330 people, representing three 
percent of the total city population, live in informal and backyard shacks (refer to Table 4.3 on 
page 96) – in stark contrast to its immediate neighbour, the suburb of Dainfern, one of the 
wealthiest areas in the country. Nearby, new industrial areas also provide employment 
opportunities, critical in view of Diepsloot's economic development challenges (Mahajan 2014, 
p. 209), making it a relatively well-located informal settlement in north-western Johannesburg. 
Diepsloot was established in 1995 as a temporary camp (refer Map 4.2 on page 95 for location 
of Diepsloot and frequency of protests), intended for those relocated from other parts of 
Johannesburg (Mahajan 2014, p. 145). Since then it has crystallised as a community, although 
characterised by "anger, disillusionment, suspicion, fear – and hope" (ibid., p. 143). Diepsloot is 
renowned for its high crime levels, xenophobic stance and its vigilante-style community 
policing (Harber 2011). The anti-foreigner protests of 2008 affected Diepsloot greatly as a 
considerable number of refugees and foreign nationals reportedly work and live there 
(Mahajan 2014, pp. 168-169). Then, in 2011, the world was shocked when a group in Diepsloot 
clubbed a Zimbabwean, Farai Kujirichita and stoned him to death (New York Times 2011).  
Since 2011, there have been many 'violent' protests about service delivery in Diepsloot. For 
instance, over eight days in July 2009, as part of a countrywide wave of protest expressing the 
hopelessness of many South African citizens at the slow pace of progress, cars were stoned 
and police and protestors clashed in Diepsloot (Sinwell et al. 2009, p. 8). This was because of 
plans to tear down shacks to construct a sewer pipe and rumours about relocations of some 
residents to the Brits area distant from Johannesburg (Municipal IQ 2009e). There were other 
similar 'violent' protests in 2009 about the relocation of residents from the Extension One 
area, the discharge of raw sewage in the streets, non-operational water connections, a lack of 
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storm-water drainage, eroded roads and the shortage of housing, including an appeal to buy 
adjacent privately-owned land for new housing (Dawson 2010b, p. 111). The community also 
reportedly called for the mayor and his councillors to be sacked (Sowetan 2009b).  
Ivory Park 
Ivory Park, established in 1991 (Mohamed 2010, p. 179), forms part of the wider cluster of 
informal settlements and Tembisa that straddles municipal boundaries on the northeast fringe 
of Johannesburg (refer Map 4.2 on page 95 for location of Ivory Park and frequency of 
protests). Over a third or 35 percent of its population of 184 391 people, or four percent of the 
total city population, live in informal dwellings and backyard shacks (refer to Table 4.3 on page 
96). Despite innovative local economic development approaches by the local government in 
the early 2000s (Rogerson 2003b), the settlement is characterised by high levels of poverty and 
"poverty-in-employment" (ibid., p. 204). 
The violent anti-foreigner protests of 2008 also took place in the black informal settlement of 
Ivory Park. Then, about 25 arrests were made after structures were burned down (Misago et 
al. 2009, p. 28). In July 2009, a periodic service delivery erupted in violence when a councillor 
was reportedly accused of 'giving RDP houses to his friends' (Daily Sun 2009) (see Appendix 11: 
List of Protests Studied). 
Inner City as Mayoral Priority 
As the traditional economic and political centre of the provincial region, the city centre – 
already introduced earlier in the definition of the structure of the city on page 82 – provides 
the ideal meeting point for many inward-bound service delivery protestors and strikers from 
other cities and areas. They stage protests about matters that do not generally have anything 
to do with Johannesburg or its city centre. However, protest in the Inner City has become 
synonymous with informal traders, a story told in detail in in Chapter 7 (page 168). 
Over and above its many daily visitors, the Inner City's mainly black resident population, 250 
071 people or six percent of the total city population, lives in a mix of predominantly low-
income households mostly (72 percent) in apartments (refer to Table 4.3 on page 96). Periodic 
service delivery protests include petitions, street marches, boycotts and objections by Inner 
City residents demanding the city administration's assistance in dealing with unhygienic and 
unsafe living conditions in buildings suffering from years of neglect and lack of maintenance 
(as evident in Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Many protests are against their eviction 
from rundown buildings when a private or state developer intends to refurbish them, such as 
the Inner City Workers' Library and Khanya College Anti-Eviction protest (Indymedia 2004). 
With the support of advocacy groups there have been recent landmark legal judgments against 
the state (Chestnut Hill Investments et al. vs. Shimane et al. 2009; Dickinson 2011), a point in 
case being where the city administration was forced to provide alternative accommodation 
which, ironically, subsequently became a slum (Pernegger forthcoming). The Inner City 
continues to be a Mayoral Priority. The area is a key employer and transport hub for 
Johannesburg, a planning and budget priority of the city administration, which was targeted to 
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receive a little over a third, or 35 percent, of the capital budget for 2012 (see Chart 4.4 on page 
93). 
In Middle-Class Suburbs 
Ad hoc service delivery protests originate from middle-class suburbs, such as the billing crisis in 
the selected middle-class suburbs in the heart of the city, and is discussed in far more detail in 
Chapter 8 (refer page 200). Protests have been many and varied and are scattered throughout 
the city's middle-class suburbs, both north and south of the former mining belt. However, the 
middle-class suburbs in the north appear to be the most prominently active in carrying out 
service delivery protests, especially about the city administration's services of billing, traffic 
management and road conditions and the paid-parking scheme. Other than a concern for 
potholes, they share little in common with their township counterparts elsewhere in the city. 
However, middle-class and low-income groups were united especially between 2011 and 2012 
in their resistance against the E-Tolling initiative of the city's main freeways by the provincial 
government – thus not covered in this research (Duvenage & Serrao 2015). Other middle-class 
areas like Southgate, Bruma, Brixton, Fordsburg and Rosebank also objected to issues 
impacting directly on the quality of their properties or suburbs, such as the erection of 
billboards, redlining and slumming and project or planning proposals (refer Map 4.2 on page 
95, Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied, and Appendix 22: Timeline of Middle-Class Protests, 
1996 to 2014). 
Main Mechanisms and Channels of Protesting 
Mouffeian agonism is reliant on state providing channels to convert antagonism to agonism 
(Wingenbach 2011). Hence, although the right to protest by parading, picketing and 
petitioning is safeguarded by the Constitution (RSA 1996a, Clause 17), the city administration 
must manage and provide a number of channels for protest, with arguably some channels 
more effective and others being more of a challenge to manage from its perspective. Protest 
action can range from direct to indirect action and cuts across different types of protest, with 
different groups of protestors favouring different mechanisms. The prevalent mechanisms of 
protest observed in the research are 'protests-with-parades-and-pickets', 'protests-with-
petitions' and 'protests-with-pockets' as elaborated next.  
Protests-with-Parades-and-Pickets 
'Protests-with-parades-and-pickets' pose a particular urban governance challenge for 
metropolitan municipalities (Booysen 2007). Protests-with-parades-and-pickets feature highly 
visible crowds with pickets and banners and are staged mostly as seemingly impromptu 
events, protesting against basic service delivery within low-income communities. They seem 
variously unstructured, impulsive, explosive, recurrent, periodic and once-off. Alexander 
(2010) calls them "local political protests" (ibid., p. 26), which can be peaceful or aggressive. 
Protests are less likely to be planned and long-lasting events unless supported by resources 
provided by advocacy groups. Picketing and marches may be legal, or illegal if the required 
permission from the state, with 'illegal' protests sometimes known as 'strikes' even if not 
related to labour grievances (Paret 2015, pp. 114-115). Stratagems of protestors-with-pickets 
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typically include marches, demonstrations, setting up of barricades and toyi-toying. They may 
be stand-alone incidents, or form part of a series of other forms of protest, such as petitioning. 
Despite investment effort by the city administration, the numbers of public service delivery 
protests have been increasing and have become increasingly 'violent' in Johannesburg. 
Namely, in the five-year period from 2001 to 2005, 21.1 percent or 15 of the 71 protests 
recorded were 'violent'. However, from 2006 to 2010, 42.0 percent or 73 of the 174 protests 
recorded were 'violent'. In 2010 alone, 60.5 percent or 26 of the 43 protests recorded were 
'violent'. The level of violence and the threat of violence used also seem to have been 
amplified in the protests. Protests have increasingly included shows of aggression towards 
authority figures such as the police, councillors, ministers and metropolitan police; burning 
and looting of state and privately-owned property; killing and other physical assaults; digging 
up and barricading of roads with burning tyres, the throwing of rocks and brandishing of sticks, 
clubs and other weapons (according to the research data). The violence often seems to target 
foreigners (Everatt 2011), and also the local ward councillors (Interview, Kute, 2012) (refer also 
to definition on page 23). 
Protests-with-Petitions 
The most formalised mechanism of protest is that of 'protests-with-petitions' made to the city 
administration's Petitions Unit about any aspect of its operations. Although petitions may be a 
"wonderful tool to stop protest" (Interview, Walters, 2012), clearly it provides a channel for 
protest but is not a replacement for street protest with some protestors using both channels 
(Interview, Kute, 2012). In an analysis undertaken as part of this research of the 187 petitions 
recorded by the COJ in the twelve-month period between June 2010 and July 2011, nearly 
two-thirds of all petitions or 58 percent were submitted by groups rather than by individuals. 
In that period, the greatest number of protests in the form of petitions originated in Soweto, 
namely 44 percent of all petitions, although the figure was lower if measured relative to its 
share of the city population. A third or 34 percent of petitions came from all other low-income 
areas. The middle class submitted a fifth or 22 percent of the remaining petitions (see Chart 
4.5 below and Table 4.4 on page 102). 
Chart 4.5: Share of Petitions Relative to Share of City Population per Region 
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Own formulation; derived from the COJ's Petitions Unit petitions data for the period of July 2010 to June 2011 and other data 
(Interview, Kute, 2012 and COJ 2008e, p. 10; 2015c) 
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Table 4.4: Incidence of Petitions per COJ Region 
Region Main areas Share of petitions 
(percentage) 
Share of city 
population 
(percentage) 
A Diepsloot, Kya Sand 5 10 
B 
Randburg, Rosebank, Emmarentia, Greenside, Melville, 
Northcliff, Rosebank, Parktown, Parktown North 
15 9 
C Roodepoort, Constantia Kloof, Northgate 10 12 
D Doornkop, Soweto, Dobsonville, Protea Glen 43 29 
E Alexandra, Wynberg, Sandton 5 13 
F Inner City 10 13 
G Orange Farm, Ennerdale, Lenasia 13 16 
Total 100 100 
Source: As for Chart 4.5 on page 101 
The single largest concern of a third, or 31.1 percent, of all petitions, and common to 
petitioners in township and middle-class suburbs alike, is the desire for traffic calming 
measures. Townships and middle-class suburbs also shared a concern about the city 
administration's poor land use management in 15.5 percent of all petitions. Then, the 
remaining third of all petitions lodged by petitioners from informal settlements and townships, 
or 27.0 percent, raised objections to the lack of basic service delivery. According to the 
Petitions Unit, the issues typically were complex and costly to resolve, such as large-scale 
service delivery issues dealing with housing shortages, evictions and poor living conditions, 
especially in low-income areas, and other issues tangentially but critically related to service 
delivery on the ground such as corruption. The turnaround time for some of the more tricky 
challenges could be as long as seven years, as in the case with housing demands made by 
petitioners from Kya Sands (Interview, Kute, 2012). Further, there is a link between the 
petitions and the propensity towards street protest action. Once the avenue of petitioning to 
the COJ appears to have failed, it is observed that the leader of the petition is then often 
implicated in the instigation of the protest action (Interview, Kute, 2012).  
Protests-with-Pockets 
The relatively well-capacitated, rate-paying, middle-class protestors typically, but not 
exclusively, use a 'protests-with-pockets' strategy making extensive use of the media in the 
form of letters to the press and to Metrowatch. Metrowatch is a local government watchdog 
feature in The Star newspaper that targets service delivery failures mostly in the middle-class 
suburbs in Johannesburg and the wider region, publicising the COJ's successes and failures at 
tackling the problems raised. In some cases, the middle class has been able to sustain 
extensive but relatively low-cost volunteer-based campaigns through the media in protest 
against specific issues, such as the COJ's proposed paid-parking scheme and the billing system. 
Founder and journalist for Metrowatch, Anna Cox, said that low-income areas have hardly ever 
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made deliberate use of the media in this way with but two of sixty complaints in a week 
originating from townships or informal settlements (Interview, Cox, 2012).  
Protest action through the media did peak at times but not always in predictable ways. For 
instance, despite perceptions to the contrary, Cox said that the middle class's letters to the 
press and media campaigns declined in the lead up to the May 2011 local government 
elections, possibly due to the public's anticipation of improved local governance after the 
elections (Interview, Cox, 2012). Likewise, the number of street protests and petitions in 
Johannesburg also declined in the same period according to various sources (see Chart 4.6 
below). 
Protests-with-pockets also include litigation through the courts, sit-ins and voting stayaways. 
There are other formal and informal channels to protest, all needing resources on the part of 
the protestor to pursue. For instance, members of the public can appeal to the City Manager 
about an administrative decision taken by a senior official. Appeals can also be made through 
the ward councillor; ward committee; the Call Centre; People's Centres; Jozi Ten (a COJ 
initiative dedicating a specific number of JMPD officers to each ward); Residents' Associations; 
invited participation sessions about plans such as the Integrated Development Plan and 
Regional Spatial Development Framework (RSDF); and public hearings and comment periods 
for specific proposals, such as by-laws.  
Chart 4.6: Petitions versus Protests in Johannesburg, 2010-11 
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Source: Own formulation; based on various sources detailing numbers of street-based service delivery protests (Karamoko 2011; 
Heese 2012; Matshego 2012), and on petitions received by the COJ's Petitions Unit between July 2010 and June 2011 (Kute 2012), 
and own research data 
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6 Spectrum of City Strife 
In terms of the potential of the state to govern agonistically, a one-size-fits-all approach from 
the city administration is clearly unrealistic. To appreciate the state-society relations in the city 
in terms of agonistic conflict management of dissensus, Figure 4.3 on page 105 summarises the 
spectrum of strife, derived from the assessment of the protests researched in this study, and 
the case study, namely the nature of the strife between the city administration and citizens, 
and the form of the city administration's response to strife..  
Possible responses by the city administration to protestors range between repression and 
transformation (rather than the narrower repression-concession spectrum of Goldstone & Tilly 
2001, p. 187), as is evident throughout the case study. For instance, post-1994, the city 
administration has suppressed, disparaged, denigrated, refuted, ignored and denied 
protestors. It has also tolerated, placated, acknowledged, sympathised with and 
accommodated protestors. It has sometimes changed its agenda, made incremental or 
significant changes and offered concessions.  
The nature of the state-society strife ranges between antagonism and agonism, incorporating 
interactions that may be highly hostile, somewhat hostile or highly co-operative. 
Although the protestors and the state "act in expectation of each other’s behavior" (Ritter & 
Conrad forthcoming 2016, p. 1), the nature of the state response does not necessarily 
correlate with any particular types of protest or their dimensions categorised in the Types of 
Service Delivery Protests in Johannesburg, earlier on page 85. This dynamic has also been 
observed by Spellman (2004). The rest of the case study shows, however, that state 
concessions are more likely to be made when the protest is targeted and repression is more 
likely when the protest is violent (as observed by Franklin 2009), but not consistently.  
Frequently, the literature expresses a concern that the state is unresponsive to protest and its 
citizens. Such concern comes in various forms. For example, the local government does not 
encourage the inclusion of all its citizens into democracy (Freund 2006, p. 310). Or, the state 
shows an "ambivalence over a commitment to serve people" (Meyiwa, Nkondo et al. 2014, p. 
3). Even, the state is high-handed and unprincipled (Atkinson 2007, pp. 74-75).  
These concerns paint only a partial picture, however, of the complex reality of the intersection 
of governance and conflict in cycles of protests over time, the extent of agonism and the 
responses from the city administration, which are affected by many other contextual factors, 
as the rest of the case study shows. 
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Figure 4.3: Spectrum of Strife and State Responses in Johannesburg 
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Source: Own formulation; note there is not necessarily a correlation between the nature of the strife between city administration and citizens and the form of the responses of the city administration; refer 
also to Table 2.3 on page 34 and Table 3.3 on page 57 
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7 In Closing 
An agonistic state requires a deep understanding of the richness and complexity of protest to 
be able to engage agonistically with protestors. For instance, this chapter has shown that the 
notion of 'service delivery' means the delivery of services and intangible development ideals. 
Further, the state is implicated in the service delivery protests, having contributed to the 
creation of expectations of service delivery in the minds of its citizens. Service delivery protests 
are not confined to low-income communities but are also evident in the middle-class suburbs.  
Frustrated low-income communities resort to low-cost street protest tactics to be heard and 
the absence of clear role-players in the protesting community can make agonistic interaction 
between the city administration and citizens challenging.  
Further, sometimes, service delivery protests intersect inseparably with other issues, such as 
anti-foreigner or labour-related actions. Although there are clear distinctions between protests 
in low-income area and middle-class suburbs, the groups rarely shared common concerns 
other than the case of some petitions and the E-Tolling campaign. Even with service delivery 
protests about essential services, the research hints at the enormous variation across the city, 
with different themes specific to individual areas. The city administration faces a constant 
struggle to maintain an appropriate balance between the empowerment of citizens, in line 
with the principles of the 'developmental local government', and the improvement of cost 
recovery measures and deliverology' to provide more and effective services to its customers.  
As seen in the next chapter outlining the intersection of governance and conflict in cycles of 
protests over time, and the rest of the case study, the extent of agonism and related responses 
by the state are affected by many other contextual factors pointing to the highly complex 
nature of strife between the city administration and citizens. 
 
 
  
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 107 
Chapter 5 | Timeline of City Strife: Governance and Conflict 
1 Sketching the Intersection of Strife and the Institution  
This chapter sketches a view of how strife unfolded over time and the nature of the response 
of the city administration to the different types of protests, from the perspective of those 
working within the state, already discussed in the previous chapter. A high-level consideration 
of the extent of agonistic practices, if any, along the timeline of city strife is provided as the 
backdrop for the stories detailed in the following chapters of the case study (see Chapters 6, 7 
and 8). Having contextualised the timeline within the wider context of global and South African 
protest, and then narrowing down to 'service delivery' protest in Johannesburg and even 
further into its different types (as in the previous chapter), this chapter shows that the action-
reaction interactions of state-society conflict are not at all linear processes (as pointed out by 
Jones, B. & Baumgartner 2005).  
The timeline of city strife in Johannesburg is periodised in five five-year spans correlating with 
the main shifts in the evolution of the city administration and with the mayoral terms of office, 
starting five years before the first democratic local government elections of late 1995. This 
approximately 25-year timeline is also informed by the study of the 453 low-income and 
middle-class service delivery protests reviewed in the previous chapter. The protests increased 
steadily over the study period. The timeline (Figure 5.1 on page 108) shows that the broad 
themes of protests in low-income areas has shifted over time and includes periodic and 
protracted protests about the lack of basic services, housing and land; the presence of 
foreigners; informal trading issues; anti-privatisation; and anti-eviction and project- or 
programme-related matters. Likewise, the main concerns of the middle-class suburbs are also 
outlined.  
Showing the dramatic shifts i n the nature of the institutions of the city administration since its 
mining camp days, each phase of restructuring of the city administration's institutions and its 
expanding geographic area of jurisdiction is matched by unique dynamics in protest events. In 
summary, even the pre-liberation period, namely before South Africa's first democratic 
elections in 1994, was instrumental in nurturing the emergence of 'service delivery protest 
against the city administration.  
The negotiation period of the various city administrations of Johannesburg with the Central 
Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber and the Greater Johannesburg Local Negotiating Forum 
played leading roles, between 1991 and 1995, predating the first local government elections in 
Johannesburg and was a period of institutional fluidity. The period marked the start of rapid 
successive changes to then Johannesburg City Council (JCC) and the adjacent administrations, 
which amalgamated into the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMC) 
and its seven autonomous Metropolitan Sub-Structures (MSSs) in December 1994.  
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of City Strife by Protest Theme over 25 Years 
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The GJTMC became the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC), with the number 
of MSSs reduced to four, nine months later in September 1995. The first local elections took 
place at the end of 1995. Political protests urging the ending of apartheid rule overshadowed 
the very few, only three, service delivery protests recorded in this period, although there may 
well have been more. 
The transition period of the then new GJMC, between 1996 and 2000, also saw relatively few 
service delivery protests. The initial peace was short-lived as the middle-class areas launched 
the Sandton Rates Boycott in mid-1996. Low-income communities staged 21 sporadic protests 
in the five-year period, including the first violent ones in Johannesburg – against foreigners. 
The main protest themes were already evident in this period, being staged about basic 
services, housing delivery, anti-privatisation and informal trading. The GJMC's financial crisis of 
1997, and part of the city administration's solution thereto, signalled further restructuring, 
including the recentralisation of the separate financial systems, into a single metropolitan 
municipality, namely the City of Johannesburg (COJ).  
The consolidation period, between 2001 and 2005, saw the consolidation of the institutions of 
the COJ into a functional entity. The COJ saw a trebling of the number of protests in low-
income areas, far more than in the previous five-year period, with 71 protests against 
privatisation and pre-paid meters mainly, and peaking in November 2004. Shows of resistance 
to evictions from the Inner City and other informal settlement areas emerged. Also in this 
period, the middle-class suburbs lodged three grievances, including that of the so-called 'billing 
crisis' in 2001. 
The maturation period, between 2006 and 2010, of the COJ saw relatively minor institutional 
improvements, such as the reduction of the eleven Offices of the Regions into seven, for 
increased efficiency. Most of the 174 protest in low-income areas were about basic services, 
housing delivery and exclusion from the 2010 FIFA World Cup event in South Africa, peaking in 
July 2007 and March 2010. The anti-foreigner protests across South Africa in May 2008 marked 
the turn to increasingly 'violent' protests thereafter. Middle-class communities had different 
objections, such as to the draft By-laws relating to Dogs and Cats, the proposed Bus Rapid 
Transit and the Rea Vaya service through suburbs like Saxonwold and Rosebank, and potholes.  
The post-2010 period, of the COJ saw the centralisation of the Regions and a new emphasis on 
citizen relationship management. There were 164 protests from low-income communities in 
the three years of 2011, 2012 and 2013 alone, with the highest number of protests in the 
study period recorded in 2012. Protests continued to be about mainly basic services and 
housing delivery, peaking in June 2011, March 2012 and October-November 2012. Informal 
trading protests became a significant theme shortly before Operation Clean Sweep at the end 
of 2013 as seen later, in Chapter 7. Nine protests from middle-class suburbs were also 
recorded, with traffic management and paid-parking being important issues. 
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2 Pre-liberation Period (Pre-1991) 
The previous chapter has already shown that conflict was inherent in Johannesburg's infancy. 
The early conflicts though were generally related to processes of British imperialism, the 
formation of the Boer republic, labour action and strikes, and apartheid conflict such as the 
student uprising in Soweto in 1976. Bar few exceptions, as in the case of the Alexandra bus 
boycotts of the 1940s and the 1950s (Bonner & Nieftagodien 2008, pp. 66-82, 143-148), 
protests targeted the national government.  
Protests seemed to become more localised in the lead up to the 'negotiation' period preceding 
the first democratically elected government setting the scope and tone for later service 
delivery protests. For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, boycotts against rent and tariff 
increases and protests about housing and land shortages, targeted the then Black Local 
Authorities and the provincial and national governments (Chaskalson, Jochelson et al. 1987; 
Hendler 1991; Seekings 1991; Shubane 1991; Beavon 1997). 
Notably, in tracking the increase in protests from 1991 (see Table 5.1 on page 111, based on 
Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied), already in 1985, communities were upset about chronic 
service delivery shortages, endemic to Johannesburg's deeply polarised settlement patterns 
(Beall, Crankshaw et al. 2002, p. 45). Overflowing sewerage, lack of refuse removal, disease, 
inadequate quality and quantity of community facilities including schools, overcrowding and 
lack of housing were endemic in townships (Wilson, F. & Ramphele 1989, pp. 130-134). 
Residents felt "deeply resentful of having to confront daily this particular face of poverty and 
powerlessness" (ibid., p. 132), with this frustration to be directed at eh new post-apartheid 
state as well. 
Macro-political changes such as the abolition of the pass laws in 1986, the unbanning of the 
ANC and other political organisations and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political 
activists in 1990 (Davenport & Saunders 2000), raised the hopes of frustrated residents. 
Likewise, early city-level changes, such as the desegregation of swimming baths and recreation 
centres in 1989 by the then JCC (New York Times 1989), were a portent of its many 
institutional shifts to come (see features summarised in Appendix 12 on page 348 and 
Appendix 13 on page 350). 
Unlike today, in 1990, municipalities were answerable and subordinate to the other spheres of 
government (Cameron 1995). However, the newly-formed Central Witwatersrand 
Metropolitan Chamber, to address the problems raised by the rents boycotters in the 
townships (Beall et al. 2002, p. 74), and drive the redesign of future city governance across the 
main conurbations of Johannesburg, Pretoria, Germiston and surrounds (see Appendix 12 on 
page 348 and Appendix 13 on page 350). The main Chamber members were the Soweto Civic 
Association, the JCC and the then provincial government, the Transvaal Provincial 
Administration (TPA), with the Chamber born out of the Soweto Accord of 1990 (Solomon 
1992; Turok 1993; Mabin 1994).  
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Table 5.1: Increasing Number of Protests per Period 
Period Low-income Middle-class Other Total 
Pre-1991 Emergence of 'service delivery' protests in Johannesburg 
1991-1995 3   3 
 1994 2   2 
 1995 1   1 
1996-2000 21 1  22 
 1996 4   4 
 1997 9   9 
 1998 2 1  3 
 1999 2   2 
 2000 4   4 
2001-2005 71 3  74 
 2001 2   2 
 2002 10 1  11 
 2003 19 1  20 
 2004 31 1  32 
 2005 9 0  9 
2006-2010 174 7  181 
 2006 31   32 
 2007 32   33 
 2008 41 2  43 
 2009 27 2  29 
 2010 43 1  44 
2011-to date 164 9 17 190 
 2011 36 3  39 
 2012 71 6 9 86 
 2013 57  8 65 
Total 433 20 17 470 
Source: Own formulation; based on 453 low-income and middle-class service delivery protests identified (a further 17 protests were 
identified but disregarded as they did not target the city administration alone) 
The Chamber decided on a new non-racial agenda of city administration arrangements for 
Johannesburg to overcome pervasive urban problems caused by the lack of basic services and 
extreme housing shortages especially in black areas and to attain stability of institutional 
functions and budgets to usher in the new democratic state (Solomon 1992; Emdon 1993; 
Turok 1993; Mabin 1994; Tomlinson 1999). Coupled with heightened expectations of service 
delivery created by these pending shifts in governance, discussed in the previous chapter, 
citizen frustrations began to be directed at local government, marking the start of increasing 
and progressively 'violent' protests over the years to come especially in low-income areas, and 
notable protest incidents between 1991 and 2013 (see Chart 5.1 and Chart 5.2 on pages 112-
113). 
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Chart 5.1: Increase in Number and 'Violence' of Protests in Low-Income Areas 
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Source: Own formulation; an assessment of street-based protests per month between 1991 and 2013 shows they have increased in number and the level of 'violence' 
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Chart 5.2: Notable Protest Incidents in Low-Income Areas between 1991 and 2013 
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Source: Own formulation; an assessment of street-based protests per year between 1991 and 2013 shows the specific notable peaks in protests and increasing trend
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3 Negotiation Period (1991-1995) 
The five years of the 'negotiation' period saw the continuation of intense negotiations about 
the interim governance arrangements by the Metropolitan Chamber and its successor, the 
Greater Johannesburg Local Negotiating Forum. The new GJTMC was established with seven 
MSSs that existed for a brief time before they were reduced to a four MSS-model. Service 
delivery protests during this period were minimal, in the lead up to the first democratic local 
government elections. 
One of the first agreements in the period by the Metropolitan Chamber in 1992 was to expand 
Johannesburg's effective footprint to incorporate most of the magisterial districts of 
Johannesburg, Randburg, Roodepoort, Sandton, Alexandra, Lenasia and Soweto (see Appendix 
12 on page 348) (Tomlinson 1999, pp. 10, 12). Then, thirteen different councils administered 
the area then that became the current Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg [COJ] 2001a, p. 7) 
(see Appendix 12 on page 348). Despite progress towards the realisation of democratic local 
government, there was still ongoing international political pressure to speed up the process of 
transition between 1991 and 1995 (New York Times 1992).  
Perhaps prescient of other sorts of protests to come, the state promulgated the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act (No. 205 of 1993), setting out formal procedures for public gatherings of more 
than fifteen people for municipalities, the police and convenors to follow. However, the Act 
did not prevent the violent and deadly clash between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party, 
namely the Shell House Massacre, of 1994 (Windrich 1996), shortly before the country's first 
democratic national elections in April 1994 and the inauguration of its first black President, 
Nelson Mandela (Davenport & Saunders 2000). 
A conflictual but seemingly agonistic engagement and arbitration about the form of structures 
to govern Johannesburg ensued. Ultimately, the members of Greater Johannesburg Local 
Negotiating Forum, which had taken over from the Metropolitan Chamber the year before, 
decided in November 1994 to promulgate the provisional seven MSSs, reflecting the functional 
areas of the civic associations, and the GJTMC (Tomlinson 1999, pp. 9-10). Duly, in December 
1994, in line with the Local Government Transition Act (No. 209 of 1993), the GJTMC for the 
greater Johannesburg area was proclaimed with seven Transitional MSSs by the then Province 
of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (Province of PWV 1994). The RDP (RSA 1994) made 
explicit and implicit promises, especially to the poor and previously disenfranchised people of 
South Africa, to deliver services, infrastructure, housing and access to jobs and a share in the 
wealth of the country (Khosa, Meshack 2000b). However, it soon became evident that 
operational and organisational shortfalls of the new local government, amongst other 
challenges, made it unlikely that these promises could be realised (Cameron 1996b).  
Already in 1995, the GJTMC encountered resistance from informal trading associations (refer 
Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). The GJTMC tried to manage street traders, especially in 
the Inner City, in response to their rapid escalation in numbers when legislation restricting 
businesses was loosened (RSA 1991, 1993b). Despite agonistic interactions, the associations 
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used the tactic of mass street marches to force the GJTMC to consult only with them about its 
proposed developments (Interview, Muthialu, 2012) (see Chapter 7 for a detailed account of 
street trading protest in the Inner City).  
In the next, and interim, stage of the interim transition of Johannesburg's local government 
(Tomlinson 1999, p. 2) (see Appendix 13 on page 350), a controversial and political decision 
was taken to restructure the seven MSSs into a more decentralised, trimmed down and 
allegedly more sustainable institution (ibid., pp. 13-14). Hence, in September 1995, the new 
core transitional GJMC and its four independent and decentralised Northern, Southern, 
Eastern and Western MSSs were proclaimed including an expanded footprint incorporating 
Orange Farm and other informal settlement areas to the north of the city (Province of Gauteng 
1995a). This provisional governance arrangement readied the way for Johannesburg's first 
democratic local government elections in November 1995, its first black Mayor, Councillor 
Isaac Mogase at a time when the city administration did not have much credibility (COJ 2011•), 
and a further phase of institutional transition (Beall, Crankshaw et al. 2001). 
4 Transition Period (1996-2000) 
The newly-elected political leadership driving the 'transition' period of the GJMC between 
1996 and 2000, through a financial crisis, and the consolidation of the GJMC and the 
Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs) into a single municipality at the end of the period, 
experienced relatively few protests (Chart 5.2 on page 113), with evidence pointing to 
agonistic practices to resolving dissensus in some cases.  
In this five-year period, only 21 protests originating from low-income areas and one from 
middle-class suburbs, were recorded (see Table 5.1 on page 111 and Appendix 11: List of 
Protests Studied). Resistance emerged to the GJMC's management and development of 
informal trading, incorporating violence (real and threatened) targeting the GJMC and 
foreigners. A strong anti-privatisation sentiment against the GJMC's plans also appeared, 
fuelling many protests to come. The post-1996 newly-formed democratic city administration 
grappled with patching together the enormously divergent former administrations and driving 
a developmental agenda, it was preoccupied with restructuring, growing institutional capacity 
and driving cost recovery imperatives inherent in the New Public Management approach 
(discussed in Chapter 4, page 75), leaving generally little time or inclination for agonistic 
engagements with protestors. 
Already in mid-1996 the GJMC was feeling the financial squeeze, as the Masakhane (Let's Build 
Together) campaign, urging citizens to pay for rates and services launched by President 
Mandela the year before (ANC 1995; 2006, pp. 18-30), was not working (Cameron 2001). So, it 
was a real blow to city finances when Johannesburg's middle-class erupted acrimoniously in 
July 1996. The Sandton Rates boycotters were opposed to the GJMC's philosophy of "one city, 
one tax base" (Pillay, Tomlinson et al. 2006), namely the cross-subsidisation of the rates 
between the wealthier middle-class suburbs and low-income areas such as Soweto and Orange 
Farm (see Chapter 8 for a full account, page 200). The GJMC needed this somewhat imperfect 
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redistribution strategy (Visser 2001, p. 2; Reddy 2003; Powell 2012) to fund infrastructure 
development and in all likelihood prompted its hard-line attitude towards the protestors.  
Also in 1996, despite having experienced local government rule for but a few short months, 
the earliest anti-privatisation resistance was evident. A group of women marched to the office 
of the Mayor and undressed to mark their extreme disrespect for the city administration's 
mandatory pre-paid water meter installations in Orange Farm (Coalition Against Water 
Privatisation, APF & Public Citizen 2004).  
Pre-paid meters were regarded by the COJ as a mechanism to both provide minimum free 
water to low-income households and to curb water losses (Mazibuko vs.COJ et al. 2009, p. 28). 
However, the 'war for water' was essentially against the commodification of the provision of 
water services and access to water as a basic human right (Bond 2004b; Greenberg 2004; 
Dawson 2010a; Naidoo 2010) (see next chapter for a full account, page 135). 
The GJMC, battling to manage burgeoning homelessness and illegal squatting on any available 
space within the Inner City routinely undertook evictions (Emdon 2003, pp. 225-227). For 
instance, in January 1997 the GJMC demolished shacks in Jack Mincer Park, south of Hillbrow 
in the Inner City, and relocated the squatters to an informal settlement so it could rehabilitate 
the park for Inner City residents (Independent Newspapers 1997).  
Echoing the Soweto Rents Boycotts of the 1980s, the coloured townships of Eldorado Park, 
Noordgesig and Westbury protested in the streets against the Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council's (SMLC) application of a flat rate charge for services in February 1997 (Bond 2005, p. 
553) (refer also to Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). The protest was so aggressive that it 
prompted the harsh intervention of the police and the army and the censure of Jessie Duarte, 
the then Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Safety and Security in the Gauteng 
Provincial Government (GPG), for being "irresponsible and outrageous" (ANC Daily News 
Briefing 2006a). The action resulted in various meetings between protestors and the Mayor of 
the SMLC and other politicians, and the provincial Local Government and Development 
Planning department, to call off the protest and reach agreement about the write-off of 
arrears of service charges and other concerns (ANC Daily News Briefing 2006b). Providing 
further impetus for the resistance of the poor against evictions and the state's cost recovery 
efforts in South Africa, in February 1997, locals lobbied in one of many worldwide anti-
globalisation protests against the pervasive and undemocratic policies of the World Bank and 
the IMF (Shah 2011, p. 3). 
City centre streets were beset by a number of recurrent protests-with-parades-and-pickets by 
street traders in August and October 1997 (see Chapter 7, page 181). They were objecting to 
the GJMC's Inner City regeneration actions of the implementation of new markets and 
enforcement of its newly-formed street trading by-laws. However, their anger soon turned 
also to black foreign Africans, who were "physically assaulted… and… attacks were 
accompanied by angry and vitriolic anti-immigrant rhetoric" (Peberdy & Crush 1998, p. 5). 
These xenophobic attacks, foreshadowing those across South Africa a decade later in 2008, 
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required the intervention of the police and the army to protect foreigners' lives, and prevent 
looting and property damage. The COJ's response to the attacks was limited to the agonistic 
development of a partial solution with the traders, namely for jointly-agreed criteria for 
market allocations (the topic of Inner City street trading protest is covered in detail in Chapter 
7, starting on page 168). 
Before the 'transition' period had even been completed, the GJMC's financial crisis became 
glaringly obvious. The city administration had been unable to pay its creditors for months (COJ 
2001a, p. 32), due to the "municipality's relaxed revenue management, difficulties with the 
new valuation roll, the high level of spending of funds it did not have, and increasing capital 
expenditure demands" (COJ 2006h, p. 26). In October 1997, one of the GPG's corrective 
actions stipulated the formation of a Transformation Lekgotla, a committee made up of ten 
councillors empowered to drive immediate reforms to sort out the financial crisis without 
recourse to the officials (COJ 2001a, pp. 35-37).  
The significance of the financial crisis is that it marked the city administration's shift away from 
its previous "philosophy of growth without sustainability" (COJ 2001a, p. 28, emphasis in 
original), and from the notion of developmental local government (Parnell et al. 2000, p. 79), 
the early implementation of which was not sophisticated (Parnell & Pieterse 1999). Rather, the 
focus was on fiscally prudent governance and on the citizen as customer, with the COJ 
seemingly less inclined towards agonistic strife.  
The GPG proclaimed the first set of street trading by-laws for Johannesburg in July 1998 
(Province of Gauteng 2004) and the GJMC introduced enforcement of street trading by-laws 
for the first time in a decade (Province of Gauteng 2004). Predictably, in September 1998, 
Inner City street traders protested, violently. This time, they joined forces with UMSA, the 
Unemployed Masses of South Africa (Valji 2003, p. 33), mixing an anti-enforcement motive 
with a concern for unemployment. Again, protestors also expressed lethal hostility towards 
foreigners (Peberdy & Talibe 1997; Human Rights Watch 1998, p. 66 of 157). Other protestors 
were also left dissatisfied; the Sandton Rates Boycott came to an abrupt halt in October 1998 
when the Constitutional Court upheld an earlier High Court ruling that the GJMC's actions had 
been lawful (Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 1998a, c).  
However, the GJMC's victory was a short-lived one as its relationship with the middle class had 
been soured, feeding the billing crisis to come (see chapter 8, page 211). 
Hearing the concerns about poverty, by the end of 1998, the city administration had started 
implementing out its Indigency Management Policy, providing subsidies to poor households 
for the first ten kilolitres of water used (Mazibuko vs.COJ et al. 2009, p. 24). However, the 
policy was criticised for having only limited success due to operational challenges in its 
implementation (COJ 2004g, p. 11; Mazibuko vs. COJ et al. 2009, p. 24; Naidoo 2010, p. 207) 
(see Chapter 6, page 150). The May Day protest in Seattle in 1999, the largest march of its time 
against capitalism and globalisation, continued to propel South African gatherings in May every 
year according to the research data in this study (Worldwatch Institute). 
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In January 1999, the first City Manager, Khetso Gordhan, arguably encouraged an 'agonistic' 
management culture, certainly within the city administration. He created a much-needed 
"series of opportunities for frank and informal discussion" (COJ 2001a, p. 51), including more 
junior managers and project staff and getting the buy-in from senior managers (ibid., pp. 52-
53, 61), for the plan of political and administrative transformation, iGoli 2002 (GJMC 1999e), to 
a more performance-driven local government for Johannesburg (COJ 2002b, p. 18). However, 
civil society was less enthusiastic with the ideological aspects of iGoli 2002, especially the 
outsourcing of key service delivery functions even if the service provider was owned by the city 
administration, solely or partly (ibid., p. 53). For instance, the GJMC set up the MTC in April 
1999 to develop and manage informal trading markets and taxi ranks (GJMC 1999e). In similar 
vein, protestors in South Africa objected to capitalism and globalisation in the worldwide June 
18 campaign (Do or Die 1999). Thabo Mbeki took over from President Nelson Mandela in June 
1999, ushering in a technocratic governance ethos (Glaser 2010), intensifying the disconnect 
between the state and the citizen, and making agonistic engagement difficult. 
In September 1999, informal traders marched against their eviction from Braamfontein 
demanding the GJMC's recognition of their status as legitimate businesses (Motala 2002, p. 
27). Although the GJMC adopted a conciliatory tone (see Chapter 7 for details, page 182), 
traders were soon to become even more unhappy as the GJMC's decision to transform its 16 
formerly uncoordinated law enforcement agencies into an integrated JMPD on 1 November 
1999 came into effect (Memeza 2000). The new JMPD incorporated the street trading by-law 
enforcement function (Interview, Abrahamse, 2012).  
Deeply dissatisfied Orange Farm protestors blockaded the Golden Highway in 1999 objecting 
to the city administration's privatisation moves. Likewise, also in 1999, the Soweto Electricity 
Crisis Committee formed in objection to electricity cut-offs and pre-paid electricity meters in 
Soweto (Wafer, Alex 2005, pp. 61, 66) (refer to Chapter 6, page 150). In July and November 
2000, there were more anti-privatisation protests, this time in opposition to iGoli 2002 (City 
Press 2000; Financial Mail 2000; ioL 2000). 
These actions did not stop the integration of the former GJMC and the MLCs into the single 
metropolitan municipality of the City of Johannesburg (COJ) in October 2000, including 
additional areas to the north from the former Modderfontein and Midrand municipalities 
(Province of Gauteng 2000; COJ 2003b, p. 16) (see Appendix 12 on page 348). The choice of an 
Executive Mayor, one with decision-making authority and not merely the ceremonial role of 
former mayors, soon after the local government elections on 5 December 2000, was a 
significant step to improving governance, as it meant that accountability for service delivery 
was placed firmly within the political domain. The Executive Mayor, Councillor Amos Masondo, 
steered the COJ through its next phase, of 'consolidation' (COJ 2006f). One of the first actions 
of the COJ was to re-centralise the separate financial systems of the MLCs (COJ 2006h, p. 83; 
Faull & Rawoot 2011), a difficult task that ultimately led to incorrect billing that is explored 
further in Chapter 8 (refer to page 200). 
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5 Consolidation Period (2001-2005) 
This five-year period saw the further 'consolidation' and restructuring of the single 
metropolitan municipality of the COJ, including the creation of special-purpose entities, and 
the introduction of local administrative structures (see Appendix 12 on page 348). This period 
saw a fairly minimal number of protests in Johannesburg but they were clearly on the rise, 
with 71 protests originating from low-income areas and three from middle-class suburbs being 
recorded (see Table 5.1 on page 111 and Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). However, the 
COJ's responses to protests seemed to harden, with little evidence of the continuation of its 
former agonistic approach. The city administration consolidated in this period into a complex 
set of institutions, with a number of newly-formed stand-alone municipal-owned and 
corporatised entities dealing with specialised functions to feature prominently in later 
protests, such as Johannesburg Water in 2001 (van Rooyen, De Wet et al. 2009), traffic 
policing, street trading development and roads. The COJ also included eleven new 
administrative Offices of the Regions for the administration of a range of selected local 
functions subordinate to the centre, numbered one to eleven (see Appendix 12 on page 348 
and Appendix 13 on page 350).  
In March 2001, the COJ in the initial stages of its new billing system issued many thousands of 
wrong bills, resulting in an uproar from the middle-class suburbs (see Chapter 8 for the full 
story, page 200). In May 2001, protestors worldwide objected to the World Trade Organisation 
talks and the Doha round of talks (Shah 2011). May Day protests have proved to be influential 
in promoting ongoing dissensus in Johannesburg, especially on May Days, due to their 
symbolism of the working class struggle against the forces of globalisation and capitalism and 
apartheid in South Africa (Byrne, S., McGregor et al. 2011; Shah 2011). 
On 1 December 2001, under the stewardship of the new City Manager, Pascal Moloi, since 
2001, providing a formal channel for protests and improving city services, the COJ launched a 
new call centre, Joburg Connect (COJ 2002h). Also in December, Peoples’ Centres were 
launched in each region (NGO Pulse 2006), and were seen as helpful channels for protest, 
although other state-society communications with low-income groups were seen as largely 
unproductive by some civil society organisations (ibid.). Further, by the beginning of 2002 
however, it was clear the issuing of wrong bills was not a once-off mistake and that a billing 
crisis had emerged that was to impact middle-class ratepayers over the next decade (see 
chapter 8 for details, page 200).  
Citizens, particularly low-income ones, were further alienated when the COJ's long term vision, 
Joburg 2030 (COJ 2002d), was launched in February 2002 and led to the creation of a new 
Economic Development unit. Joburg 2030 emphasised the COJ's desire to be a world class 
African City and was an extension of the global capitalist and first-economy principles inherent 
in iGoli 2002 (COJ 2003j). However, Joburg 2030 was seen as problematic by civil society for 
entrenching poverty and not benefitting the poor (Bénit & Gervais-Lambony 2005; Mabin 
2007; Naidoo 2010). The 'war for water' (as detailed in the next Chapter, page 135) included a 
string of related protests about the cost and availability of water services. One that received 
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international coverage was the Kensington 87 incident in April 2002. Hundreds of toyi-toying 
protestors of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee resisted the COJ’s push for cost-recovery 
for services and its treatment of citizens as customers and consumers by converging on Mayor 
Masondo's home; they were fired upon and arrested (Green Left Weekly 2002; ioL 2002a; 
M&G 2002; APF 2003b; news24 2003). The furore may have prompted the COJ to be more 
open to dissensus as can be seen in, for instance, the opportunities for objections it offered to 
its proposed tariff increases on 19 April 2002, as well as 'relief measures' where needed (COJ 
2002f) 
By mid-2002, to provide an alternative protest channel and to "deepen democracy" (COJ 
2003j), according to Mayor Masondo (COJ 2003j; COJ 2004b), the COJ had introduced a formal 
petitions management channel and its political counterfoil of the Petitions and Public 
Participation Committee system (COJ 2002b, pp. 20, 26). Nonetheless, in August 2002, 
protestors against the World Summit on Sustainable Development staged marches, sometimes 
'violent', in the streets of Johannesburg against globalisation, which they believed the Summit 
was promoting initiatives (ioL 2002c; Death 2008, 2010b). The marches against the Summit 
conference in Alexandra, the Inner City and Sandton boosted efforts of service delivery 
protestors by linking the negative aspects of capitalism to the conditions of the poor in the 
city.  
As the COJ's programmes began to take effect, they seemed to prompt further protests, such 
as in the recurrent street protests by the Inner City informal traders led by the Informal 
Business Forum from Yeoville staged in September 2002 (Business Day 2002; ioL 2002e), see 
Chapter 7 on page 185 for the detailed narrative. A mass meeting in Orange Farm, also in 
2002, against pre-paid water meters led to the establishment of the Orange Farm Crisis 
Committee (Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al. 2004, p. 25). Together with the APF, it 
fought a "water war" against the "commodification of water" (Dawson 2010a, p. 381). 
Protestors resisted the COJ’s attempts to install water-saving, cost-saving and cost-recovery 
water services in Orange Farm and elsewhere. The 'water war' gained momentum during this 
period, lasting over a decade and using many channels to voice its objections to the COJ, 
including that of the courts and many that were outside the city administration's favoured 
routes of objection (COJ 2004d). A comprehensive account is provided in Chapter 6 from page 
153 onwards. By the end of 2002, the COJ had responded to these protests generally by 
replacing its former 1998 Indigency Management Policy with a Special Cases Policy (COJ 2004g, 
p. 7) to support poor households. The COJ was one of the first municipalities to provide a social 
package of free minimum water, electricity, and free sanitation and refuse removal services, 
and limited free health services (ibid., p. 11). 
In 2003, more anti-eviction resistance emerged, such as organised by the global Landless 
People's Movement, an umbrella body of various campaigners for housing and land in urban 
informal settlements in Johannesburg since 2001 (Greenberg 2004). The group protested 
against the eviction and removal by the COJ of 'illegal' residents from the Inner City, which had 
been declared as a priority intervention zone since the late 1990s, and some informal 
settlements such as the Eikenhof informal settlement as the area had been earmarked for 
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development as a cemetery (GJMC, 1998a; Greenberg 2004, pp. 17-18). The protest resulted in 
antagonistic reactions from the COJ and the controversial 'Red Ants', the COJ's outsourced 
private sector security company since 2000, with its distinctive use of red overalls as uniforms 
for its security guards (news24 2005), including firing on protestors and making arrests 
(Libération Afrique). The petitions mechanism as an alternative channel to street protest was 
at the forefront of the COJ’s agenda; the topic took up fifteen percent of Mayor Masondo's 
first mid-term address at the end of January 2003 (COJ 2003c).  
Despite the availability of the channel of petitioning, about 14 anti-privatisation protests 
especially against pre-paid meters and against relocations, by informal traders and other 
community groups in the Inner City, Orange Farm, Alexandra, Soweto, Themb'elihle and other 
informal settlements, took place in March, May, July and September 2003. The protests seem 
to be mostly in response to the COJ's launch of Operation Gcin'Amanzi, meaning 'Save Water', 
in July 2003, to reduce water losses and provide minimum free water (Mazibuko vs. COJ et al. 
2009, p. 28). The COJ's inconsistent counter-response to the protests reflects the discontinuity 
of the institution at the time, despite efforts at consolidation. For instance, protestors were 
discredited when Mayor Masondo reportedly, in his mid-term address, referred to members of 
the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee "as 'odd individuals' who articulate 'strange views' and 
habitually oppose any project the COJ undertakes" (COJ 2003e) (refer Chapter 6 starting on 
page 135).  
As the anti-privatisation movement gained traction and residents resisted the COJ's installation 
of pre-paid water meters, protests in low-income areas peaked, with nearly half, or 42.4 
percent of recorded protests in this five-year period occurring in 2004 alone (see Appendix 11: 
List of Protests Studied and Chapter 6 for the full account starting on page 135). Protests 
against water and electricity meters took place with three recorded in March 2004 alone, in 
Themb'elihle and Soweto (APF 2004a, b, c), and at the COJ's offices in the Inner City (COJ 
2004d), possibly triggered by the COJ's disconnection of water services to Phiri households 
allegedly to force them to accept pre-paid meters (War on Want 2006).  
The COJ was very proud of its petitions management and oversight system and these 
institutional modifications were showcased as an organisational strength in its first 
international bond offering on 13 April 2004 (COJ 2004b). However, township, informal 
settlement and poor communities were less impressed. For instance, the Landless People's 
Movement, colouring their cause with political overtones, protested aggressively on the day of 
national elections, 14 April 2004, resulting in 57 protestors being allegedly "jailed and 
tortured" (APF 2005b, p. 3). More protests followed in the next five months – ten recorded 
against pre-paid meters and land and housing issues alone. These include seven anti-pre-paid 
meter actions in Soweto and Orange Farm from June to October 2004; two protests about the 
shortage of affordable housing in Zevenfontein and the Inner City in June and July; a 'violent' 
large-scale protest in Diepsloot in July (Atkinson 2007); and two 'violent' anti-market 
management marches on 1 September and 17 November 2004 (see Appendix 11: List of 
Protests Studied) 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 122 
November 2004 was a very active month for land- and housing-related protestors, possibly 
inspired by the celebration of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Alexandra 
(APF 2005b, p. 7). Residents' action groups in Marlboro, Inner City, Alexandra, Wynberg and 
Kliptown in Soweto militated for better housing and land. The resistance against water and 
electricity pre-paid meters also continued, in Soweto and Eldorado Park (see Appendix 11: List 
of Protests Studied). At the end of January 2005, Mayor Masondo responded to those 
protesting housing delivery and land allocations in his State of the City Address (COJ 2005b). 
Although informal settlements had become an accepted feature of the city policy landscape 
since his speech the year before, policy had not been matched until now with meaningful 
concrete projects and budgets (COJ 2004g, p. 22).  
Mayor Masondo's promises seem to have led to a lull in protest actions, although there were 
still three episodes of resistance against pre-paid metres in Soweto and Orange Farm recorded 
in March and May 2005 (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). There was, quite likely, no 
coincidence in timing with the COJ announcing its Indigent Arrears Write-off scheme in May 
2005 to alleviate poverty in low-income households, possibly as a concession to, and 
acknowledgement of, the protests. However, activists believed the initiative was misguided, as 
it did not tackle the real human rights issue motivating the protests (APF 2005c) (see Chapter 6 
for more on this story, on page 154). In the last few months of 2005, there were more protests 
about evictions and basic services in Kliptown and Marlboro (see Appendix 11: List of Protests 
Studied).  
By the end of 2005, the COJ's deliberate efforts in this five-year span to improve its 
interactions with citizens and to deepen democracy (COJ 2004h; COJ 2006h, pp. 66-72), had 
some effect. For instance, the popularity of the petitions mechanism as a protest channel 
grew. Over the five-year period, the COJ received annually about a 100 petitions at the start 
increasing to about 150 petitions with around half calling for traffic calming measures alone 
(COJ 2003b, p. 26; COJ 2003c, p. 5). 
Many significant other formal and agonistic participation channels were introduced. Examples 
include the Mayoral Road Show since 2001, the Integrated Development Plan outreach 
programme, the ward committee system and other structured engagements. However, 
analysis shows that positive outcomes varied in intensity across the initiatives due to 
complexities, the influences of many factors, and the COJ's minimal control over some of the 
elements that directly impact citizens (Mohamed 2010, pp. 160-172). Participation inequality 
remained a challenge for the COJ (GPG 2007), as it is for many cities (Scott, A. 2008). 
Strides in service delivery were made in Johannesburg during this period, despite a substantial 
services backlog (Beall, Crankshaw et al. 2000a), and the simultaneous increase in demand for 
services due to population growth (see Table 4.1 on page 80). For instance, the tarring of 314 
kilometres of roads in Soweto between 2003 and 2005 in response to the calls for basic 
services was one noteworthy achievement (COJ 2004h). However, citizen expectations ran 
high and street protests accelerated in volume and vehemence in Johannesburg, according to 
this research. Ending the five-year 'consolidation' period on a low note, the prevailing 
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commentary was that the COJ and the system of local government needed to do more to 
realise democratic objectives for its citizens (Ruble, Stren et al. 2001; Cameron 2002; Khumalo, 
Ntlokonkulu et al. 2003; de Visser 2005; Rapoo 2005; Seedat 2005). 
6 Maturation Period (2006-2010) 
The COJ continued to mature in the period from 2006 to 2010. Although there were no major 
institutional changes, internal reconfigurations were made to integrate operations more 
strategically around the Growth and Development Strategy 2006 (COJ 2006b). However, this 
five-year 'maturation' period was also matched by an acceleration of protests in South Africa, 
with 279 protest incidents across South Africa according to Municipal IQ (2015), six times more 
than the previous five-year period (see Chart 4.1 on page 71). In Johannesburg alone, 174 
protests in low-income areas were identified, 2.5 times as many as in the previous five-year 
period and far too many to cover in any detail in this chapter (see Table 5.1 on page 111, 
Figure 5.1on page 108 and Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Further, seven protests in 
middle-class suburbs were identified (see Chapter 8 for more material on protest in middle-
class suburbs, starting on page 200).  
Soon after the local government elections in March 2006, Mayor Masondo started a second 
term in office and Mavela Dlamini was appointed the new City Manager, starting in April 2006. 
Adjustments were made to better integrate operations around the Growth and Development 
Strategy 2006 (COJ 2006b), regarded as being a more holistic strategy than Joburg 2030. 
Piloting a refined governance model, the separation between the COJ’s executive and 
legislative functions was clarified (COJ 2011}, pp. 25-26). Changes included the streamlining of 
the former eleven Offices of the Regions into seven (named A to G) with the inclusion of a 
more explicit urban management and community interaction role (COJ 2006a) (see Appendix 
12 on page 348 and Appendix 13 on page 350). The coordination of the Offices of the Regions 
was incorporated within the planning function. These changes may have disrupted 
communities, according to Christine Walters, a councillor for the ANC and member of the 
Mayoral Committee holding a variety of portfolios in the COJ since 1994, breaking down the 
former cohesiveness of the political party, civil society and communities (Interview, Walters, 
2012).  
The communities in middle-class suburbs also protested in April 2006 against the proposed the 
By-laws relating to Dogs and Cats (see Appendix 22: Timeline of Middle-Class Protests, 1996 to 
2014 on page 398). Further, the relatively slow rate of protests in low-income areas now 
increased from the three protests between April and June against slow basic services and pre-
paid meters in Orange Farm and Soweto. The watershed seems to have been the lodging of 
the Mazibuko case against pre-paid water meters in the South Gauteng High Court in July 2006 
(M&G 2009a) (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied), leaving protestors in limbo. However, 
between August and September 2006, the anti-pre-paid meter groups joined forces with the 
Landless People's Movement, staging about 20 protests in resistance to not only pre-paid 
meters but also raising concerns about housing and other basic services in Orange Farm and 
Soweto mainly, but also in Marlboro and Wynberg. The groups then seemed to disappear 
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largely and protests tapered off, with two protests staged about basic services, pre-paid 
meters and housing delivery in November 2006; and a nationwide call to protests by the Social 
Movements Indaba, an umbrella organisation, in December 2006 (APF 2007b, p. 6) (see 
Chapter 6 on page 157, Figure 5.1on page 108 and Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). By 
then, it seemed that local government had become the scapegoat for the failure of all of 
government (Atkinson 2007, p. 70). 
Between March and June 2007, the eight protests recorded were about the lack of basic 
services and housing in Freedom Park, Marlboro and informal settlements generally. There 
was a marked uptick of protests about basic services in July, attributed to the unusually cold 
winter in Johannesburg, with snow seen for the first time in 26 years (New York Times 2007), 
and a poor economic outlook globally troubled the city administration (COJ 2008t, p. 8). Seven 
protests are documented in Alexandra, Denver, Vlakfontein, Mandelaville, Phiri and 
Themb'elihle in July alone. A further four, mostly 'violent', protests took place in the Kliptown 
community demanding services and housing between mid-July and the beginning of 
September 2007 (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). The string of protest prompted the 
GPG to launch its Service Delivery Charter at the end of July 2007 (South African Government 
News Room 2007).  
In July 2007, the COJ was embarrassed by more blunders in billing (see Chapter 8, on page 
218). Further, eleven more protests about basic services in low-income areas were 
documented between August and November 2007, in Soweto, Alexandra and Orange Farm. 
Indeed, the level of activity was seen as higher than before, with the COJ reporting that the 
JMPD received between seven to ten applications for public demonstrations weekly. The COJ 
was compelled to develop a Proposed Protocol for Dealing with Community Protests (COJ 
2007g). The policy reinforces political accountability for the management of community 
tensions and proposed standard responses according to the level of threat to properties and 
lives (ibid.). Peter Kute, the assistant director of the Petitions Unit since 2008, was acutely 
aware that many of the petitions could not be concluded satisfactorily (Interview, Kute, 2012). 
However, the Petitions Unit did realise some successes in the adoption of a "walking with 
them" (ibid.) approach, engaging agonistically with petitioners to resolve their identified 
concerns. But he said, the Petitions Unit "needs a political bully" (ibid., emphasis in the 
original) to be effective. He reported that about a third of all petitions were directly linked to 
the same causes that motivated protests-with-parades-and-pickets (ibid.). In practice, the 
potential turnaround time for responses to some of the more knotty problems, such as large-
scale problems of housing shortages, evictions and poor living conditions especially in low-
income areas, could take years due to budgetary constraints, as in Kya Sands (ibid.). At the end 
of the year, unduly heavy rains caused many potholes on Johannesburg's roads and leading to 
complaints for more than five years from motorists in the middle-class suburbs.  
Street protests in low-income areas continued and between November 2007 and March 2008 
eight protests were recorded in Kliptown, Alexandra, Weilers Farm and Hospital Hill, again 
largely about the lack of service delivery and housing (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). 
Notably, and possibly fuelling these protests, the COJ was engaging with the legal advisors to a 
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group of Inner City residents of the San Jose building. The COJ had planned to evict the 
residents as the building was to be refurbished as part of the broader Inner City renewal 
initiatives but was stopped by the Constitutional Court, which also ruled that the COJ and the 
residents had to engage to resolve their impasse. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court was able 
to rule on their negotiated agreement, although the parties felt it was not a comprehensive 
one (Rubin, M. 2013, pp. 34-36). 
But the most notable blaze of violent dissent took place against foreigners in May 2008. 
Although this research does not address the anti-foreigner attacks in detail, they often 
coincided with concerns about basic services (Ngwane 2010, p. 12; von Holdt & Alexander 
2012, p. 3), the fear of locals losing jobs to non-South Africans (Centre for Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation 2008), and local intra-political clashes (M&G 2008a). The protests sparked 
initially in Alexandra, spreading to Cleveland, Diepsloot, Finetown, Inner City, Ivory Park, Kya 
Sand, Malvern, Mayfair, Soweto, Zandspruit (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied),and 
other townships and informal settlements in South Africa, resulting in over sixty deaths 
(Misago et al. 2009). The attacks were reportedly exacerbated by the way the media reported 
the events (Crush 2008), and the state's ineffectual responses (Misago et al. 2009). The state 
was criticised for seeming "torn by contradictory responses from different spheres and leaders 
… and ANC officials in some areas did nothing, while in other areas they acted swiftly to stop 
violence" (Everatt 2011, p. 29). However, the COJ, including its Migrants' Help Desk that had 
been already operating since 2006, promptly denounced the attacks (COJ 2008d), and 
apologised to foreigners (COJ 2009h). The COJ helped foreigners by setting up a joint 
operations centre with other parts of the state (COJ 2008f); formed partnerships with human 
rights and refugee support groups (COJ 2008d); and convened a meeting of Mayor Masondo 
and the Minister of Housing with 500 community representatives (M&G 2008a). Post-conflict, 
the COJ reintegrated displaced foreigners (COJ 2008p), and set up a Johannesburg Migration 
Advisory Committee (COJ 2009h). 
Anti-foreigner protests overshadowed many of the other 27 protests about the lack of basic 
services including concerns about housing and relocations and anti-privatisation across the city 
from May 2008 to February 2009, with violent protests spiking in July 2008. Protests generally 
took place within the township of Soweto – especially in Protea South, Meadowlands, 
Kliptown, Dobsonville, Motsoaledi and various hostels (see Map 4.3 on page 97 for locations 
referred to). Protests were also evident in the Inner City and in informal settlements such as 
Alexandra, Denver, Diepsloot, Marlboro, Orange Farm, Poortjie, Princess and Vlakfontein 
(Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). 
In March 2009, the High Court ruled against the Themb'elihle community's interdict to stay 
their pending relocation by the COJ (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2014). In 
April 2009, the Supreme Court ruled that the COJ's water meters were illegal (see Chapter 6 on 
page 158 for more details). Protestors seemed to back down somewhat and protested only 
three times about basic services in Soweto, Hospital Hill and Orange Farm until June 2009, 
followed by a vicious attack against a suspected thief by a group in Diepsloot at the end of 
June (New York Times 2009a). On 24 June 2009, Mayor Masondo briefed the press about the 
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Expanded Social Package or Siyasizana ('We are Helping Each Other) to the media (COJ 2009f). 
Siyasizane provided increased support to poor households according to their level of 
deprivation (COJ 2008l). Benefits targeted households in informal settlements including non-
account holders (COJ 2008o). Notwithstanding the social package, there were three more 
protests, in Diepsloot, Ivory Park and Kliptown (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). The 
'violence' in Diepsloot, one of many similar incidents across South Africa at the time protesting 
poverty and inferior housing (M&G 2009b), prompted a national minister on 22 July 2009 to 
condemn violent protestors that "use illegal means to achieve their objective" (BBC News 
2009).  
In August 2009, yet another court ruling highlighted the increasing antagonism between the 
COJ and Inner City residents. This time, the High Court ruling (Chestnut Hill Investments et al. 
vs. Shimane et al. 2009) bound the COJ to finding alternative accommodation for evictees from 
Inner City buildings targeted for redevelopment, and in its efforts to comply the COJ became 
an "accidental slumlord" (Pernegger forthcoming). No consensus between the COJ and housing 
rights advocates seems possible due to the antagonistic rights versus resources positions of 
the polarised parties, according to Jak Koseff, the COJ’s Director of Social Assistance within the 
Community Development department (Interview, Koseff, 2012). However, court rulings have 
affected policy, forcing the COJ to change its policy and provide some transitional housing 
(Interview, Phakathi, 2012). Although this issue about housing rights and the fight against 
poverty is still unresolved (Dickinson 2011; Wilson, S. & Dugard 2011), the change in policy is 
an arguably positive outcome, which might not have occurred if the interaction was an 
agonistic one. 
As the global economic downtown began to impact the South African economy in mid-2009, 
tensions also began to rise (Signalfire 2009). After about eleven or so protests about basic 
services between August and October 2009, almost all 'violent', in Alexandra, Diepsloot, 
Eldorado Park, Orange Farm, Riverlea and Soweto (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied), 
politicians pointed the blame for the protests in all directions. They blamed themselves, the 
ruling party, the government, and the administration, as if each entity of the state were 
entirely separate elements of the system of governance of the country. Examples of the lack of 
cohesion and the confusion between the party, state and administrative roles played by 
political leaders was demonstrated in the national government’s criticism of the 
ineffectiveness and irresponsibility of local government in October 2009 (M&G 2009c; news24 
2009a; Signalfire 2009). With one third of South African municipalities in difficulties, the 
national government introduced a Local Government Turnaround Strategy (RSA 2009a), in 
November 2009. One of its goals for 2014 was the eradication of (presumably violent) service 
delivery protests (M&G 2009c; news24 2009b; RSA 2009a, p. 24), seen primarily as an urban 
problem (RSA p. 27). The strategy emphasises coordination of service delivery at all levels of 
government and within municipalities.  
In the matter of the 'war for water' (Chapter 6), to the dismay of low-income communities and 
water activists, the Constitutional Court ruled in October 2009 that the COJ's pre-paid meters 
were not unlawful after all (M&G 2009d). Demotivated activists protested relatively little for 
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the rest of the year – only twice, one of which was an informal trading mass action in the Inner 
City in December 2009 against the COJ's enforcement measures to "alleviate any kind of 
lawlessness in the inner city" (COJ 2010a) (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). The 
Constitutional Court ruling meant that the COJ could approve, in January 2010, the restart of 
its installation of pre-paid water meters (COJ 2011}, p. 182).  
Disheartened communities continued to stage six service delivery protests, mostly 'violent' and 
lasting up to a week in duration in January and February 2010, in Joe Slovo, Motsoaledi, 
Orange Farm, Poortje and Themb'elihle (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). However, 
the protests peaked dramatically in March 2010, causing concern within the state given the 
imminence of the upcoming 2010 June-July FIFA World Cup event and the possibility of 
international embarrassment. There were eighteen mostly 'violent', large protests in 
Alexandra, Diepsloot, Ennerdale, Finetown, Majasana, Mereting, Orange Farm, Poortje, Rabie 
Ridge, Soweto, Sweetwaters, Themb'elihle, Thula Mtwana and Weilers Farm in March (see 
Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Thousands of protestors targeted councillors and staff 
in some instances, requiring dispersal by the police and the JMPD with rubber bullets and 
arrests of some protestors (news24 2010a, b, c). Also in March 2010, the COJ's workshop for 
the RSDF in Orange Farm had to be halted when a small but aggressive group aggressively 
broke up the meeting (Pernegger 2014b).  
The city administration was increasingly uneasy about the ongoing antagonism street 
protestors. For instance, Mayor Masondo acknowledged the service delivery protests in his 
State of the City Address (COJ 2010a) on 11 March 2010, but was firm in his statement that the 
COJ had "at all times sought to paint a realistic picture of what government can and cannot do 
… [and had] … consistently refused to promise heaven on earth" (ibid.). Further, the next day, 
the state announced that the police would be militarised, an unpopular move as it symbolised 
apartheid (Rauch 2000; ISS Africa 2012; Duncan 2015). President Zuma also insisted on 26 April 
2010 that the state get tough on government managers (South African Government News 
Agency 2010), as if distancing the ANC from poorly performing officials, yet avoiding the reality 
that a significant number of senior officials were political appointees.  
'Violent' protests, again about basic services and housing concerns, in Dobsonville Snake Park 
and Protea South within Soweto, and Finetown and Joe Slovo (see Appendix 11: List of Protests 
Studied), were staged in May 2010. The Landless People's Movement were also particularly 
active elsewhere in Gauteng during this period and had reportedly been repeatedly victimised 
for many years by the authorities who wished to support the owners of the mortgaged formal 
houses in part of Protea South (Sacks 2010, p. 11). Tension erupted between the two groups, 
possibly politically motivated, and resulted in injuries, a murder, arson of the electricity 
transformer for the area and arrests of the Landless People's Movement's members (ibid.2010, 
pp. 11-12).  
Despite the city administration's initial open approach about marches, it was rumoured it had 
imposed a blanket ban on all marches (Duncan 2010, p. 13). Nonetheless, some marches and 
at least a couple of protests still occurred including a thousand-strong march to Mayor 
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Masondo, by informal traders, also in May 2010 (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). 
They were upset at being excluded from the benefits of the World Cup event (Çelik 2011) (see 
Chapter 7, also Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-
2013, page 377 for details). In June 2010, the APF staged a protest on behalf of all poor 
communities needing housing, decrying the waste of expenditure on the World Cup event (APF 
2010). Further, there were at least two protests about basic services and anti-privatisation in 
Themb'elihle and Protea South (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Straight after the 
end of the World Cup event, 11 July 2010, marches continued and over the next four months 
there were six protests, again mostly about basic services in Alexandra, Eldorado Park, Kya 
Sands, Lion Park, Marlboro, Protea Glen and Themb'elihle (see Appendix 11: List of Protests 
Studied).  
The last recorded march in 2010, on 10 November, was by 300 traders led by the One Voice of 
All Hawkers Association against enforcement, with a petition stating 29 demands. The 
Petitions Unit said it would meet with the association the next day (M&G City Press 2010; 
2010). By the end of 2010, the work of the Petitions Unit and the Petitions and Public 
Participation Committee had matured and petitions had increased to about 250 per year. The 
concept of petitioning as a channel to protest, formerly seen as protest mechanism of the 
middle class, seems to have also gained currency in low-income areas. In December 2011, the 
COJ began a string of cut-offs of services, despite having issued vastly inflated bills. The middle-
class suburbs lambasted the COJ, forcing it to dedicate additional resources to resolving the 
problem and to making concessions for those billed incorrectly (see Chapter 8 on page 220).  
On the eve of the local government elections of 2011, Councillor Walters observed that the 
COJ's former "high level of energy and the type of leadership that was really exemplary" 
(Interview, Walters, 2012, emphasis in the original), seemed to have flagged during the COJ's 
'maturation' period. Also, its orientation from being outward-focused under the open and 
flexible leadership style of the former City Manager changed to a more rules-oriented 
administration (ibid.), and may have reduced the COJ’s ability to experiment with agonistic 
interaction. However, the ANC regional structure was aware of the low morale within the city 
administration. Hence, in 2010, the ANC created a caretaker body, the Regional Interim 
Leadership Core formed of members of the "old guard", namely key politicians and officials 
from the earlier period to provide leadership until the 2011 election and to ensure that 
members were "toeing the line" (ibid.).  
7 Post-2010 Period 
The 'current' five-year period, post-2010, not yet complete at the time of this thesis, saw the 
entry of a new Mayor and the further evolution, adaptation and experimentation of 
institutional approaches and initiatives. By the start of the 'current' five-year period, the city 
institution of Johannesburg consisted of eleven central departments, seven Offices of the 
Regions and eleven independent entities (COJ 2014f, pp. 24, 30-31). The COJ deploys a stated 
28 017 employees and 260 councillors across Johannesburg (COJ 2013d, p. 168; COJ 2014f, p. 
26). The city administration of Johannesburg had become a multi-billion Rand organisation, 
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managing a R44 billion annual expenditure budget (2013 data, COJ 2014f, p. 36). Accordingly, 
the governance arrangements for political oversight and administrative functions are complex, 
multi-layered and clustered to ensure the attainment of the city administration's strategic aims 
(COJ 2014f, p. 25). However, this period was matched by the extraordinary growth in 
documented service delivery protests. In this section, the review is limited to the data 
collected, namely only the three years between 2011 and 2013 – even so, the number of 
recorded protests in low-income areas reached 164 protests, almost as many as the 174 
protests in the previous five year-period. Protestors in middle-class suburbs also protested 
more frequently than in earlier periods, with nine protests recorded in the first three years of 
this period (see Table 5.1 on page 111, Figure 5.1on page 108 and Appendix 11: List of Protests 
Studied). 
After a relatively quiet start to 2011 bar one notable incident of violence in January in 
Diepsloot about crime in January (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied), the GPG intervened in 
the issue of the billing crisis and that of potholes, calling the COJ to a meeting in February 
2011. The COJ denied there was a crisis, and middle-class groups and the opposition party 
campaigned hard in advance of the local government elections in May 2011, again forcing the 
COJ to make concessions about overdue accounts (see Chapter 8, page 220). Further, the 
protestors in low-income areas started the first of 36 protests in 2011 about service delivery. 
Mayor Masondo was careful to make explicit and prominent statements about the COJ's 
service delivery achievements in his outgoing State of the City Address on 9 March 2011. 
Nonetheless, four protests about basic services in Diepsloot, Rietfontein and Zandspruit 
followed in March and April. Further, on 13 April 2011, the COJ stated that an informal traders' 
march and submission of petitions earlier that day was "opportunistic" (COJ 2011y), as the 
issues they raised were already under discussion between the COJ and the associations (ibid.).  
The tragic shooting of the trader Andries Tatane, during a service delivery protest in Ficksburg 
in the Free State province, sparked outrage across South Africa at the use of undue force by 
the police, and seemingly triggered a wave of additional, and seemingly more 'violent', street 
protests (Business Day 2011; Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2011; Zabalaza 
2011). The count of protests across South Africa in the first two years following Tatane’s death 
was 255 protests – nearly the same as in the five preceding years (Municipal IQ 2012).  
The new Executive Mayor, Councillor Mpho Parks Tau, and new City Manager, Trevor Fowler, 
ushered in a new approach of Business Unusual (COJ 2011{), soon after the local government 
elections of 18 May 2011. The COJ entered a phase of further institutional progression, 
adjustment and experimentation, making changes to improve service delivery and to align the 
different parts of the COJ with the themes and goals of Joburg 2040 Growth and Development 
Strategy (COJ 2011s, pp. 41-48). For instance, the Development Planning and Urban 
Management directorate was split, with the functions of the offices of the Regions centrally 
relocated into a new department called Citizen Relationship and Urban Management (CRUM) 
within the Office of the City Manager (COJ 2013b, p. 42). Likewise, the MTC, responsible for 
management of the COJ's informal trading markets and taxi ranks, was incorporated within the 
Johannesburg Property Company, which was responsible for the management of the COJ's 
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property portfolio (COJ 2011n, s, 2012a). Regardless of the changes, protests about basic 
services continued. They peaked in 2011 with half of the 31 protests recorded in Alexandra, 
Eldorado Park, Finetown, Newclare, Noordgesig, Riverlea, Soweto, Themb'elihle, Westbury and 
Zandspruit over June and early July 2011 (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Protests were 
almost all 'violent'. Allegedly, protestors stoned police and cars, torched a councillor's house 
and a substation; police used rubber bullets to disperse the crowd and arrested a few 
protestors (ioL 2011e; Municipal IQ 2011a; news24 2011b; The Star 2011d). Mayor Tau 
condemned the "mob violence" (COJ 2011v). 
After another march on 22 August 2011 by Themb’elihle protestors to issue a memorandum to 
the ward councillor, tensions simmered when they did not receive a response from the COJ 
(City Press 2011c; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2014). The rising trend of 
'violent' protests must have been a consideration of the Minister of Police when he approved a 
new policy on public order policing at the end of August 2011. He acknowledged citizens' 
constitutional right to protest, calling for dedicated, trained and equipped units for managing 
protests appropriately. The police's role had to be "both nasty and nice" (DefenceWeb 2011), 
he said.  
In response to another particularly 'violent' week-long protest in Themb'elihle at the start of 
September 2011, the provincial ANC said that the use of 'violence' in protests was "completely 
intolerable and inexcusable" (ioL 2011d), but was silent on the state's use of violence to quell 
protestors. A number of efforts were made by the then provincial MEC for Housing, Humphrey 
Mmemezi, to calm the approximately 500 protestors by addressing them and holding a mass 
hearing. 
Nonetheless, shortly after the first Occupy movement on 17 September 2011 in New York, 
eight more protests about basic services continued in Alexandra, Finetown, Ivory Park, Lawley, 
Pennyville, Soweto and Themb'elihle through to the end of 2011 (see Appendix 11: List of 
Protests Studied). Further, the COJ surrendered to the three years of lobbying from the 
middle-class suburbs of Rosebank and Saxonwold and announced on 29 October 2011 that it 
would relocate the proposed route for the Bus Rapid Transit project and Rea Vaya service. In 
December 2011, the middle-class suburb of Parkhurst lodged a grievance against the COJ's 
planned implementation of a paid-parking system in their area, forcing the COJ to stop, start 
and stop its programme and to devise a new plan over the next three years (see Appendix 22: 
Timeline of Middle-Class Protests, 1996 to 2014) 
The highest level of protests recorded took place in 2012, namely 71 protests of 433 protests 
reviewed in low-income areas since 1991. The year experienced almost double the protests of 
the former peak years of 2004, 2008 and 2010 (see Chart 5.1 on page 112 and Chart 5.2 on 
page 113). In 2012, two peaks accounted for almost half or 47.9 percent of all protests in the 
year, namely a small peak in March and a larger one in the September-October period.  
In the first six months of 2012, 30 protests were staged in Alexandra, Diepsloot, Hospital Hill, 
Inner City, Kya Sands, Langlaagte, Midrand, Orange Farm, Pennyville and Soweto. Most 
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protestors used barricades of burning tyres to block roads, but only Kya Sands experienced 
'violent' protest, in March 2012 (see Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied). Although most of 
the protests seemed to be about basic services, interrogation reveals most were related to 
housing concerns and required the response of the provincial Housing MEC. The COJ 
responded mid-year by emphasising the ideal of "social inclusion" throughout its Integrated 
Development Plan of 2012-2016 (COJ 2012f), and aimed to ensure that Johannesburg is "a city 
where none go hungry" (ibid., p. 68), and prioritising marginalised areas (ibid., p. 87). However, 
somewhat unrealistically but showing the COJ's disquiet about ongoing service delivery 
protests, it also aimed in the same plan to "eliminate protests" (ibid., p. 78) and petitions 
steadily over a three-year period by 90 percent from the 2012-13 levels (ibid., p. 276).  
The COJ's appointment of Primedia, by mid-2012, to improve its communications marked the 
end of the billing crisis (COJ 2012d, p. 165). However, between July and September 2012, 14 
protests about basic services took place in low-income areas of Alexandra, Cosmo City, Jeppe 
within the Inner City, Marlboro, Orange Farm, Riverlea, Soweto and Thula Mntwana (Appendix 
11: List of Protests Studied). The Themb'elihle community, with a long history of grievances 
about the proposed relocation of the settlement due to its location on ostensibly dangerous 
ground, protested in July, August and September 2012. In October 2012, the COJ agreed to do 
a new geological study (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2014, p. 11). Until the 
end of 2012, peaking in October and November, protestors elsewhere in the city planned 27 
protests. However, the picture is incomplete, with  sketchy data augmented by information 
gleaned from interviews and JMPD records of notifications for intended public gatherings 
(Duncan 2014a). Generally, protestors proposed to march, and issue memoranda to the state, 
about their housing or service delivery concerns. Affected areas included Alexandra, Eikenhof, 
Inner City, Lenasia, Marlboro, Midrand, Orange Farm, Riverlea, Soweto and Westbury. The 
protests included three by the One Voice for All Hawkers Association in the Inner City objecting 
to police harassment, trading spaces and the infringements of the rights of informal traders 
(see Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-2013 on 
page 377). Also, a few 'violent' protests were observed in Orange Farm, Protea South in 
Soweto and Vlakfontein (Appendix 11: List of Protests Studied).  
Protest continued unabated throughout 2013 with 57 protests recorded in low-income 
communities in the year. Between January and June 2013, 26 protests about service delivery 
were staged in areas including Alexandra, Braamfischerville, Cleveland, Eldorado Park, 
Fordsburg, Linbro Park, Newclare, Orange Farm, Slovo Park, Soweto and Sweetwaters. Protests 
were generally not violent other than one anti-foreigner protest in Orange Farm in May 2013 
resulting in police holding 93 people for looting and vandalism (Appendix 11: List of Protests 
Studied). The escalation of street trade protests is observed between 24 June and 7 August 
2013 with half of the 12 protests in the period staged by, again, the One Voice for All Hawkers 
Association in the Inner City (discussed in Chapter 7, from page 193). The rest of the protests 
were motivated by a mix of concerns about basic services and housing delivery objections in 
Soweto, Durban Deep and other unspecified areas across Johannesburg (Appendix 11: List of 
Protests Studied). Around mid-2013, the COJ included the risks associated street protests into 
its planning. In the 2013/16 Integrated Development Plan (COJ 2013b), service delivery 
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protests were listed as one of the COJ's top ten "disaster hazards" (ibid., pp. 195-196). The COJ 
also made urgent arrangements for security guards to protect councillors that had been 
attacked (COJ 2013d, p. 339). Capacity remained a challenge with high staff turnover rates 
reported, especially in functions with a high degree of interaction with citizens (COJ 2014f, p. 
180). 
From 7 August to the end of September 2013, representing a peak for the year of 14 more 
housing delivery, service delivery and anti-crime protests, all in low-income areas including 
Alexandra, Ivory Park, Marlboro, Orange Farm, Orange Grove and Soweto (Appendix 11: List of 
Protests Studied). The middle-class suburbs were outraged when the privatised pointsmen 
were removed from the roads for a few days in November 2013, but it was for a relatively brief 
period only whilst the pointsmen received compulsory training (see Appendix 22: Timeline of 
Middle-Class Protests, 1996 to 2014). Five informal trading protests took place over six weeks 
in October, November and December end of the protests for 2013. A number of other groups 
joined these mass actions, including the Workers and Socialist Party, the South African 
Informal Traders Forum and the African Traders Committee. Ultimately, the COJ's overly-
vigorous enforcement exercise in December 2013, Operation Clean Sweep, was challenged in 
the Constitutional Court resulting in victory for the informal traders (see Chapter 7 on page 
194). Also by the end of 2013, the COJ had largely resolved the impasse with Parkhurst 
residents, by considering a new approach to the challenge of paid-parking (see Appendix 22 on 
page 377). At the start of 2014, the billing crisis had also largely been resolved with the COJ 
receiving news on 31 January 2014 that it had obtained a clean audit for 2012-13 (BDlive 2014; 
COJ 2014c), the first time since 2002.  
It is too soon to form a comprehensive view of events in this period of the COJ's post-2010 
period. However, tentatively, what seems apparent is that anti-privatisation protests seems to 
have tapered off by the start of this period but protests about inferior service delivery, 
housing- and land-related concerns, and informal trading, intensified markedly. Protestors 
seemed more likely to turn to additional violence and property damage than in earlier periods. 
Communities in informal settlements were the most prolific protestors in this period; a 
number of formerly seemingly peaceful low-income areas also saw protests unfold.  
However, the story of strife and the city remains incomplete. Although President Zuma seems 
intent on berating violent protestors (Paret 2015, pp. 117-120), there are hints that the COJ is 
focused on finding more imaginative solutions to problems, such as the Corridors of Freedom 
initiative, which aims to reduce inequality in the city (COJ 2014f, pp. 12-13), and the Find and 
Fix application of April 2014, which is used by the public to report potholes (Johannesburg 
Roads Agency 2015). The COJ is also providing more support measures for the poor, such as 
Jozi@Work announced in August 2014, an economic empowerment project tying together 
public spending and targeted areas (COJ 2014g), and increased allocations for Siyasizane (The 
Star 2011c). Further, Mayor Tau emphasised in his State of the City Address in May 2015 that 
the COJ supported the nationally-endorsed "'back-to-basics' approach for local government" 
(COJ 2015d, pp. 11-12). He also said that the COJ would ensure standards of service delivery 
are agreed with all service entities with failures being dealt with speedily through a 
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coordinated central point, which is connected to the "provincial service delivery war room" 
(ibid., p. 12). 
8 In Closing 
Recent large-scale countrywide protests such as the anti-foreigner uprisings in March 2015 
(SAMonitor 2015), and the #FeesMustFall education-related protests in October 2015 
(TimesLive 2015b), although not directed at local government, show the enduring nature of 
the culture of protest. This chapter shows that service delivery protests in low-income and 
middle-class areas have steadily intensified in the case of the post-1994 city administration of 
Johannesburg. Seemingly, every low-income area has experienced periodic and protracted 
protests-with-parades-and-pickets. Likewise, the protests-with-pockets were prevalent and as 
visible as protests-with-parades-and-pickets, although in the media rather than the streets. 
Importantly, whilst there may be distinct types of protests, these do not correlate with set 
responses from the city administration. Further, the maturation of the evolving city 
administration did not necessarily lead it to draw progressively on agonistic principles in 
conflictual interactions. Rather, three crosscurrents are evident in this timeline of city strife 
that are explored further in the narratives that follow (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8 next).  
Shifts between Agonism and Antagonism 
As the city administration has evolved and as protestors' demands shifted across the periods, 
its approach shifted between agonism and antagonism in response to different protests. In the 
'negotiation' and 'transition' periods, possibly because of the overarching negotiations about 
the shape of the new local government structures and the dynamic transition processes of 
South Africa in the 1990s, there seemed to be a sense of agonism in interactions with the 
relatively few, periodic protests. Ironically, however, the post-apartheid city administration 
seems to have shifted away from agonism in some arenas.  
Anti-Protest Mind-Set  
In explaining why the mind-set of the city administration seems to be largely anti-protest, the 
enormity of the challenge facing the city administration seems to have been a factor in its 
stance towards protest. Whilst street protests may be a low-cost strategy for low-income 
groups, it means that the motives for the objections can be hard for the city administration to 
decipher and respond to appropriately given the sheer number of protests, their intricacies, 
unique community and area dynamics, timings and contexts, thus resulting in incomplete 
political and administrative responses, unsuited to agonistic interactions. In some 
circumstances, an antagonistic stance may be the appropriate response, from the view of 
those working within the city administration. For instance, the city administration saw no 
other course but to respond firmly when the Sandton Rates Boycott compromised the financial 
viability of the institution and city development, or when violent protestors threatened lives 
and damaged property. Sometimes the protestors' antagonism needed to play out before any 
agonistic interaction could be considered, as in the case of the RSDF outreach protest in 2010. 
Fatigue arising from institutional restructurings may have weakened the city administration's 
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ability and desire to be experimental, prerequisites for agonistic interactions. Further, the 
destabilisation effect of restructuring on the institution and on communities may be under-
estimated.  
Varied and Variable Outcomes 
Many varied and incremental impacts on the policy, agenda and structure of the city 
administration are evident, although the outcomes may not always be directly attributed to 
any specific protest, and may not be consistent or instantaneous. Examples of outcomes due 
to processes of city strife include the partial restructuring of the city administration for 
improved service delivery, adjustments to projects and plans and the allocation of more 
resources to specific issues under contention. Further, service delivery protests have made the 
city institution extend and improve its range of more structured channels for protest and 
agonistic strife. Examples of these channels include the petitions system and the Petitions 
Unit, and the regular participation processes for the Integrated Development Plan and other 
project and planning exercises. However, limits of these channels are evident as they are 
reliant on protestors having the appropriate resources to use them and the harmonisation of 
internal operations of the city administration. Further, an agonistic interaction may not always 
be in the best interest of citizens as it may be the antagonistic conflict itself that provokes 
changes to city policy, and may be the only way to address intractable problems through 
negotiation, as in the rights-versus-resources battles of the Inner City housing conundrum, or 
the Sandton Rates Boycott. However, this approach may not always yield positive outcomes, 
as in the case of the court-forced relocation by the COJ of Inner City evictees to a temporary 
facility that subsequently fell into disrepair. Sometimes, though, antagonism does not force 
positive change but impedes it, as in the instance of the RSDF plan that had to be prepared by 
the COJ in isolation of the community's input due to the disruption of the planned 
participation session by antagonistic protestors.  
In closing, however, it is impossible to provide a wall-to-wall timeline of all strife and all 
protest in the city of Johannesburg, thus thereby placing a limit on this analysis. The picture of 
the city administration's response to protests seems incomplete as data on the intricacies of 
the protests is inadequate and can only provide an overview of, and insight into, the changing 
institution of the city administration and the shifting themes and trends of protests. Rather, 
the three crosscurrents evident in this timeline are explored further in the detailed narratives, 
necessary to deepen one's understanding of the intersection of the city administration with 
conflict. Hence, three stories follow, namely dissent in the 'Deep South' about the 'water wars' 
of Orange Farm; informal trading struggles in the streets of the Inner City; and the billing 
backlash of the malcontents of selected middle-class suburbs (in Chapters 6, 7 and 8).  
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Chapter 6 | Dissent in the Deep South: Water Wars of Orange Farm 
Photograph 6.1: Views of Orange Farm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photographs of Orange Farm, from top to bottom: 1) street scene in 2010 (COJ 2010q); 2) the Ridge Walk connecting the train 
station and the Eyethu Orange Farm shopping mall with Orange Farm beyond it over the ridge in 2014 (Property Wheel 2014); and 
3) typical shacks in 2012 (copyright Marinovich 2012) 
1 Introducing Orange Farm Dissenters and the State 
The isolated, intensely poor, relatively well-serviced but unevenly developed, city-within-a-city 
of Orange Farm (typical scenes in Photograph 6.1 above), in the 'Deep South' of Johannesburg 
has been the location of a recorded 51 water and other service delivery protests between 
1996 and 2012. This story of strife, the first of three such stories in the case study of 
Johannesburg, offers an in-depth understanding of the state's stance on, and handling of, 
dissensus in Orange Farm, and the outcomes of these processes of conflict.  
During the first of three waves of steep growth and development of Orange Farm since its 
establishment in 1988 (for diagrammatic timeline see Figure 6.1 on page 137), and many 
changes to its local governance, its residents were optimistic about the future of the new 
settlement. The 'water wars' (term used by Bond, 2004a) emerged in the early 2000s and were 
staged by the social movements of the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee (OFWCC) and the 
Anti Privatisation Forum (APF) in sometimes aggressive objection to the state's water policies 
and the city administration's programme of prepaid water meter installations. Although the 
city administration governed in accordance generally with democratic principles, the evidence 
suggests it had a low appetite for engaging in processes of conflict, with only limited displays 
of agonism in engagements. Mostly, the city administration displayed ambivalence, 
defensiveness, disrespect and antagonism towards protestors, sometimes responding with 
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court actions or the use of the force of the police and the private security firm, the 'Red Ants', 
to quash dissensus. 
Once Mazibuko and others in the nearby Soweto had escalated in 2006 the 'water wars' in 
objection to the prepaid water meters to the courts, the water wars in Orange Farm receded 
whilst other service delivery protests and activists surfaced in Orange Farm. The city 
administration modified its governance approach to manage proactively the escalating number 
of increasingly 'violent' service delivery protests in Orange Farm. Although the state had 
developed significant services and housing in Orange Farm and other informal settlements, 
development was uneven. Orange Farm residents continued to struggle against their real and 
perceived deprivation, compared with the levels elsewhere in Johannesburg.  
Protests in Johannesburg were most prolific in Orange Farm, second only to Soweto, and 
accounted for nearly a fifth, or 17 percent, of all protests in Johannesburg between 1996 and 
2012. Ultimately, the combined weight of the water wars, and other service delivery protests 
in Orange Farm, seem to correlate with responses by the city administration in the form of 
systemic changes to its operations, such as the modification of the water tariff in 2005 in 
response to water activists. The city administration has year-on-year increasingly prioritised, 
not just Orange Farm but also other informal settlements, in terms of budget allocations and 
spatial planning effort. The city administration also created additional institutional capacity to 
deal specifically with the interface between the city administration and citizens. 
2 Snapshot of Orange Farm Today 
Less than three decades ago, the Orange Farm area was farmland, the site of orange orchards 
(City of Johannesburg [COJ] 2010q), and home to but a few white families and black labourers. 
Today, Orange Farm – despite significant investment in housing and infrastructure – is one of 
the largest, newest and poorest of Johannesburg's 'informal settlements', characterised by its 
great number of informal residential dwellings in parts, minimal services and amenities and 
high levels of poverty and unemployment (for a reminder of the definition of 'informal 
settlement', refer to page 83).  
The 3 086 hectare boot-shaped area, about 10 kilometres at its widest, is bounded by the N1 
Golden Highway, St. Patrick Road and the Johannesburg-Vereeniging passenger rail line (COJ 
2010r, p. 3) (refer Map 6.1 on page 138). This area is not to be confused with the 'Greater 
Orange Farm' area, a term also used by the city administration to describe the area made up of 
Orange Farm and all non-contiguous informal settlements to its west and north up to Soweto 
(COJ 2013b, p. 145). 
 
 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 137 
Figure 6.1: Diagrammatic Timeline of Protests in Orange Farm, Pre-1991 to 2000 
Pre-liberation Negotiation Transition Consolidation Maturation Current
Pre-1991 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015
National Community Development & Planning, TPA National Planning and Housing, TPA, consultants SMLC, GJTMC, GPG, consultants COJ, GPG Housing, Region 11 COJ, GPG Housing, Region G COJ, GPG Housing
Initial establishment Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
1983 300 squatters lived on Weilers Farm
1986 'Controlled squatting' permitted by 'orderly urbanisation' 
policy, relocation of Weilers Farm squatters announced 
1987 First of proclamations allowing controlled squatting in 
Orange Farm on former smallholdings in greenbelt
1899 TPA settled first families in Orange Farm
1989 600 families lived in Orange Farm
1990 TPA realised standard of services and affordability levels 
were lower than elsewhere
1991 First wave of growth started
1993 MMS appointed
1993 Orange Farm officially named 'Orange Farm'
1993 TPA gave permission for creation of BLA (not implemented)
1994 RDP stated water is a right but must be paid for
1995 Orange Farm incorporated into Northern Vaal TMSS of Vaal 
TMC in January, then into SMSS and GJTMC  in September
1995 President Mandela launched Masakhane campaign in SA
1995 SMLC interim management team managed Orange Farm
1996 Second wave of growth started
1996 RDP office closed
1996 Over 60% population were below poverty line
1996 SMLC agreed to hold Masakhane workshop in Orange Farm
1996 First anti-privatisation protests in Orange Farm
1997 Free lifeline water announced by state
1997 Protests against state's cost-recovery approach staged in 
Gauteng and SA
1997 GJTMC's financial crisis was evident, all capital projects 
stopped
1998 Indigency Management Policy launched citywide
1998 City administration still debated Orange Farm's inclusion into 
COJ
1999 iGoli 2002 launched
1999 Water ran out for 6 weeks in Orange Farm
1999 Golden Highway peaceful anti-privatisation blockade against 
prepaid water meters
2000 COJ metropolitan municipality formed
2000 State's new services outstripped Orange Farm's rate of 
growth but still inadequate
2001 Third wave of Orange Farm growth started
2001 Joburg Water started operations
2001 First Joburg SDF noted Orange Farm as liability and COJ saw 
informal settlements as temporary, so investment was limited
2001 COJ plans 25 litres free water, part of package of free 
services approved by COJ in 2002
2001 Unaccounted for water cost Joburg R325m per year, COJ 
planned to install prepaid meters
2001 Worldwide anti-globalisation protests took place in Gauteng 
and SA
2002 WSSD protests staged in Joburg
2002 Prepaid meters in Joburg piloted in Stretford
2002 OFWCC created to protest prepaid water meters
2002 Special Cases Policy replaced Indigency Management Policy
2003 Operation Gcin'Amanzi launched
2003 RSDF 2003 for Region 11 allocates 4% of its capital budget to 
Orange Farm
2003 OFWCC carried out Operation Vulamanzi forcing COJ to get 
interdict  to stop protestors
2004 COJ conceded settlements are permanent
2005 COJ incentivised debt payments through Indigent Arrears 
Write-Off scheme 
2005 COJ redesigned water tariff
2005 First inclusion of Orange Farm into 2005-2006 SDF, and 
citizen-centric plans
2006 Protests began to be increasingly violent, with COJ using 
forceful measures to stop them
2006 Unaccounted for water losses reduced
2006 Yellow Humvee incident, 'yellow elephants' and LPM action 
contributed to protest peak
2006 Marked reduction in water wars and other protests after 
mid-year due to lodging of Phiri water meter objectors' case and 
APF leadership change 
2008 High Court ruled prepaid meters as unlawful and orders 
water allocation to be doubled
2008 COJ suspended Operation Gcin'Amanzi
2008 Anti-foreigner protests took place in SA but not Orange 
Farm, but marked shift to more protests about basic services
2008 COJ launched Informal Settlements Upgrading and 
Formalisation programme, Orange Farm was one of four priority 
areas but allocated 3% of programme budget
2008 COJ appointed Radebe, manager of Urban Management and 
Service Delivery
2008 COJ introduced its Expanded Social Package (Siyasizane)
2008 Mayor announced a plan to build 100 000 homes also for 
Orange Farm
2009 Supreme Court reduced water allocation of 50 litres to 42 
litres per person per day but upheld previous ruling that meters 
were unlawful
2009 Constitutional Court finds meters are not unlawful
2009 COJ approved restart of Gcin'Amanzi 
2010 COJ identified 5-year need for over R1bn investment, could 
allocate only a third
2010 First integrated long-term planning undertaken
2010 COJ's RSDF outreach aborted due to protest
2011 Third wave of Orange Farm growth ended
2011 Orange Farm a place of 'permanent informality' in popular 
imagination
2011 Local government elections in May
2011 Service delivery protests continue
2012 COJ wanted to 'eliminate protest' in 2012/16 IDP
2012 Orange Farm's share of budget is 12 times larger than in 
2008, a quarter of COJ's five-year budget
2013 COJ considered protest as a 'Top Ten' business risk
2013 COJ emphasised water shortages
Phiri-Mazibuko prepaid 
water meter case lodged
all low-
income 
protests 
in city
protests 
in 
Orange 
Farm
2011 42 092 households with access to flush or chemical toilets
2001 20 241 households with access to flush or chemical toilets
1996 8 754 households with access to flush or chemical toilets
2011 26 856 water connections to  households
2001 7 851 water connections to  households
1996 5 574 water connections to  households
600  households
42 436 people
124 507 people
163 250 people
197 030 people
11 200 households
31 152 households
47 813 households
55 624 households
Service delivery protests
Water Wars Water Wars Gcin’Amanzi & Vula Manzi
Orange Farm 
protests peak
anti-foreigner 
attacks in SA
worldwide anti-globalisation 
protests & WSSD
15
2
5
3
5
2
6 6
111
5
42
 
Source: Own formulation: 1) figure maps three waves of growth superimposed on six periods of administration of Orange Farm per wave and period and shows the relationship between them and a) key events, b) the extent of water and sanitation services provision (blue dashed and green dotted lines respectively; 
c) the growth in the number of households and people (burgundy and pink shaded areas respectively, and d) the number of protests in Orange Farm and Johannesburg (orange and brown shaded areas respectively); 2) data on services, population and households available in Table 6.1 on page 141 and Table 6.3 on 
page 141 Table 6.5 on page 144 and on protests in Appendices 11 and 15 on pages 338 and 357; 3) diagram is not to scale and indicates relative positions only
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Map 6.1: Location of Orange Farm in Johannesburg 
 
Source: Own formulation 
Orange Farm is considered as poorly located, at about 40 kilometres, or 25 miles, away from 
the city centre of Johannesburg (for features see Map 6.2 on page 140). Orange Farm's marked 
sense of isolation from the rest of Johannesburg is due largely to the lack of significant centres 
of employment and development along most of the route between Orange Farm and the city 
centre (Beall et al. 2002, p. 62), although the railway is an important link between the 
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settlement and the rest of the city. Furthermore, Orange Farm's location at the southernmost 
point of Johannesburg reinforces the pre-existing income and racially-based north-south 
suburban divide of Johannesburg, which was evident already in the 1960s partly due to the 
barrier effect of the east-west belt of former mining land (Hart, G. 1968; Beall et al. 2002, p. 
62). The two industrial towns, Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark, located about twenty 
kilometres further south of Orange Farm, are as important to Orange Farm residents as the 
Johannesburg city centre is, if not more so, for jobs and amenities (Wray & Gotz 2014, pp. 32-
33).  
The city administration manages many other informal low-income settlements near Orange 
Farm in the 'Deep South', as the COJ has dubbed this southernmost part of Johannesburg (COJ 
2001c), which is home to about three-quarters of Johannesburg's informal settlement (COJ 
2001c, p. 12). Settlements there include Themb'elihle, Ennerdale, Sweetwaters, Poortje, 
Finetown and others (Map 6.2 on page 140), but Orange Farm is the largest in population 
terms. 
Today, a large number of people live in Orange Farm, namely 197 030 people in 55 625 
households on 46 000 plots in Orange Farm by 2011 (Table 6.1 on page 141). Orange Farm is 
the result of three waves of population and settlement growth between 1991 and 2011, after 
its initial set up in 1988, with each wave correlating generally with distinct shifts in its 
governance by the state (see summary of waves, Table 6.5 on page 144). The inhabitants of 
Orange Farm are 99 percent black Africans (Quantec 2014), with low levels of skills as only four 
percent over the age of 20 have a higher education, which is lower than that the city and 
provincial averages of 19 percent and 18 percent respectively (ibid.).  
Levels of absolute and relative poverty prevail, between areas within Orange Farm and 
between Orange Farm and the rest of the city. The level of household incomes in 2011 was 
lower in Orange Farm relative to the city as a whole (Quantec 2014), making Orange Farm one 
of the largest concentrations of poverty in Johannesburg (Map 6.3 on page 142), and the 
province (COJ 2008u, p. 17; Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2014). Also, the average 
unemployment rate of its residents aged between 15 and 64 was at 39 percent in 2011, which 
has declined markedly since 1996, but was, nonetheless, still far higher than the city's average 
at 25 percent (Table 6.2 on page 141). 
The quality and quantity of the level of water services, both central to this story, have 
improved significantly in Orange Farm throughout its three waves of its growth (refer Table 6.5 
on page 144) (more on improvements in next Sub-Sections, for summary see Table 6.3 on page 
141). By 2011, 98 percent of households had access to a water connection in the dwelling or in 
the yard of the dwelling. Further, the rate of water provision in Orange Farm was better than 
the city's rate of 92 percent, or of the province's rate of 89 percent, or South Africa's rate of 73 
percent. In terms of sanitation, 76 percent of households in Orange Farm had access to flush 
and chemical toilets, and almost all other households had access to other types of toilet 
facilities (Table 6.4 on page 141). 
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Map 6.2: Features of Orange Farm's Location 
 
Source: Own formulation 
Today, Orange Farm consists of four Main Places, namely Stretford, Lakeside, Orange Farm and 
Drie Ziek, enumerator areas used in the official census, which correlate largely with Orange 
Farm's 32 formally proclaimed townships and extensions (COJ 2010r, p. 3; Quantec 2014) (Map 
6.4 on page 143). Orange Farm is highly regularised but unevenly so across these four areas in 
three ways. Firstly, the majority of houses are formal structures located on individual plots of 
land (Map 6.5 on page 143). For instance, 77 percent of all dwellings, or 42 623 dwellings, in 
Orange Farm were formal brick or concrete structures by 2011 (Quantec 2014), and were built 
by the state, businesses and the residents themselves (COJ 2010r). Another 12 562 informal 
dwellings have also been erected (Quantec 2014). Within Orange Farm, Lakeside had the 
To Vanderbijlpark and Vereeniging  
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highest rate of formal housing at 98 percent whilst Drie Ziek had the lowest at an average of 56 
percent (Quantec 2014). The rate of formal housing is higher than the provincial rate of 59 
percent and the country rate of 65 percent (Quantec 2014). Secondly, many residents own 
their plots, with ownership of around 30 000 plots reportedly transferred to residents (COJ 
2010r). Thirdly, 94 percent of the townships of Orange Farm are formally constituted planning-
legal areas with state and private sector-led approved township applications or general plans 
in place (COJ 2010r, pp. 14, 35). 
Table 6.1: Growth of Population, Households and Plots in Orange Farm 
Year Population Households Plots 
1996 124 507 31 152 - 
2001 163 250 47 813 
a  
36 190 
2011 197 030 55 624 
b  
46 000 
Note: 
a   Estimate (COJ 2010r, p. 14). 
b   Table 2.15 (ibid., p. 35). 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) unless otherwise stated 
Table 6.2: Official Unemployment Rate in Orange Farm Relative to Johannesburg 
Year 1996 2001 2011 
Orange Farm 50% 58% 39% 
Johannesburg 29% 37% 25% 
Note: 
Statistics South Africa sanctions and records two unemployment measures: the 'official' unemployment rate (not used here) based on an economically active population 
consisting of the number of people employed plus the number unemployed; and the 'expanded' rate based on an economically active population consisting of the number of 
people employed plus the number unemployed plus the number of discouraged work seekers. The 'expanded' unemployment rate arguably presents a more accurate picture 
of the full extent of unemployment. 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) 
Table 6.3: Improvement in Sanitation and Water Services in Orange Farm 
Year Household access to flush and chemical 
toilets 
Water connections in dwelling 
Number Percentage of all 
households 
Number Percentage of all 
households 
1996 8 754 28 5 574 18 
2001 20 241 42 7 851 16 
2011 42 092 76 26 856 48 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) 
Table 6.4: Orange Farm Services Relative to Other Areas in 2011 
Area Household access to flush 
and chemical toilets as 
percentage of all 
households 
Water connections in house or yard as percentage of 
all households 
In dwelling In yard Total 
Orange Farm 76 48 50 98 
Johannesburg 90 65 27 92 
Gauteng 87 62 27 89 
South Africa 63 46 27 73 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) 
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Map 6.3: Concentrations of Poverty within Administrative Regions of Johannesburg 
 
Source: Own formulation; note one dot represents 100 low-income households earning less than R76 800 per annum (Quantec 
2014);this value was selected as a natural breakpoint in the Census data that indicates relative and absolute poverty in 
Johannesburg; concentrations of poverty in townships and informal settlements is readily apparent but this map may mask the 
extent of poverty in, say, Orange Farm as the dots also indicate the relatively lower spatial density of households in Orange Farm 
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Map 6.4: Suburbs in Orange Farm 
 
Source: Own formulation (the four Main Places and the numbered Sub Places are in accordance with the Census 2011 official areas 
and correlates with the names of the suburbs in Orange Farm) 
Map 6.5: Level of Informal Housing in Orange Farm 
 
Source: Own formulation (note the greatest degree of informal housing in Orange Farm is found in Drie Ziek in its west at 44 
percent, and the lowest is found in Lakeside in its south at but 2 percent, of all dwellings) 
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Table 6.5: Waves of Growth of Orange Farm 
Wave Period Description 
Admin-
istration 
Period Household numbers Increase in households Population numbers Increase in population 
Period 
starts 
Period 
ends 
Number 
of years 
At 
period 
start 
At 
period 
end 
Number 
in 
period 
Percentage 
in period 
Percentage 
per annum 
At 
period 
start 
At 
period 
end 
Number 
in 
period 
Percentage 
in period 
Percentage 
per annum 
Set-
up 
1988-1991 
Initial establishment of Orange Farm, 
first families move in by December 
1988, by end 1989 there were 6001 
families, and by March 1991 there were 
42 436 in 11 2002 households 
TPA 1988 1991 1.25 600 11 200 10 600 1767 1413 2000
3
 42 436 40 436 2 022 1617 
1 1991-1996 
Steep growth of settlement, three-
quarters of houses are shacks by end of 
period, services are minimal 
TPA 1991 1996 5 11 200 31 152 19 952 178 36 42 436 124 507 82 071 193 39 
2 1996-2001 
Significant but slower growth, 39% of 
houses are shacks by end of period, 
substantial services installed 
SMLC 1996 2001 5 31 152 47 813 16 661 53 11 124 507 163 250 38 743 31 6 
3 2001-2011 
Growth slower, with new households in 
backyard shacks emerging, 23% of 
houses are shacks by end of the period, 
almost all have services 
COJ 2001 2011 10 47 813 55 624 7 811 16 2 163 250 197 030 33 780 21 2 
Note:  
1 Mtshelwane (1989) 
2 TPA (1992, p. 62) 
3 Own estimate 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) unless otherwise stated 
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Orange Farm falls within the boundary of Region G, one of seven sub-areas of jurisdiction of 
the metropolitan municipality of the City of Johannesburg (COJ) (Regions shown on Map 6.3 on 
page 142). The COJ also provides other services and development initiatives to Orange Farm. 
For instance, it provides weekly refuse collection to households. The COJ has planted 
thousands of trees, including orange trees. The COJ has tarred all main roads and gravelled 34 
of the 81 kilometres of roads, and street lighting has been installed in some places (COJ 2011e, 
pp. 43, 44). Other initiatives completed include some storm water and sewage infrastructure, 
the upgrading of the Stretford node, and the provision of parks, 69 schools, public ablutions, a 
sports complex, a library and a skills centres (COJ 2010r, p. 51; COJ 2011}, pp. 93, 95, 112, 155, 
156, 170, 177, 254).  
Despite the improved levels of all services and the formalisation of Orange Farm, some levels 
are lower relative to elsewhere in Johannesburg and South Africa. For instance, by 2011 the 
rate of sanitation services in the form of flush and chemical toilets accessible to households in 
Orange Farm was far lower at 76 percent than the city's rate of 90 percent, or the province's 
rate of 87 percent, but still far better than the country's rate of 63 percent (Table 6.4 on page 
141). Although 98 percent of households had direct access to a water connection, either in the 
dwelling itself (48 percent) or in the yard of the dwelling (50 percent), the rates of connection 
within the dwellings themselves was only half of the rate of the city, the province or the 
country. Also, many roads are still not gravelled or tarred. 
Writers and interview respondents use implicitly negative terms to describe Orange Farm. For 
instance, it has been called a community of "disposable people" (Murray 2008, p. 90), and the 
"Joburg's orphan" (Interview, Narsoo, 2012). Orange Farm remains largely "forgotten", 
according to Councillor Walters, a councillor for the ANC and a member of the Mayoral 
Committee managing a variety of political portfolios in the COJ since 1994 (Interview, Walters, 
2012). The bleakness of the environment of Orange Farm, its relatively minimal amenities, 
uneven development, spatially concentrated poverty and poor prospects for reduced 
unemployment reinforce its citizens' sense of unmet expectations of the democratic state. 
Couple these factors with Johannesburg's extreme inequality (raised earlier in the Key City 
Statistics on page 79), and relative deprivation (Davies, J. 1962; Gurr 1970) (mentioned in 
Chapter 4 on page 77), and expectations of better service delivery (Booysen 2007; Higgs 2007, 
2011), protest seem inevitable. However, the exploration of the history of Orange Farm's 
administration during Orange Farm's three waves of growth (see Table 6.5 on page 144) casts 
light on the state's stance towards protest and the outcomes of dissensus, with the story of 
strife providing a far more multi-faceted explanation of strife.  
3 Seeds of Discontent (Pre-1996) 
Hidden Urbanisation 
Orange Farm's genesis occurred during the decade-long transition, from the repression of 
apartheid, to the reforms of democracy and the conceptualisation of wall-to-wall local 
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government in South Africa, envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA 
1996a).  
Up to the 1980s, the Orange Farm footprint was an assembly of hundreds of white-owned and 
white-occupied farms, called smallholdings, portioned initially from three large farms named 
Orange Farm 371 IQ, Drie Ziek 368 IQ and Wildebeestfontein 536 IQ. The area is located to the 
far south of Johannesburg, and north of the industrial towns of Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark 
and Sasolburg (see Map 6.2 on page 140). Between 1957 and 1982, the Orange Farm area fell 
within the sparsely populated statutory greenbelt of agricultural land between Johannesburg 
and the economic centres to its south. 
Apartheid restrictions prohibited black Africans from settling in the greenbelt, other than the 
very few that lived and worked there legally (Hindson 1987, pp. 77-78). The state forcibly 
removed any 'squatters' from restricted areas within the vicinity of Johannesburg and the 
province (Bekker & Humphries 1985; Hindson 1987, p. 413). In addition, state plans during this 
period only made provision for the urban black African population in the form of minimal 
expansions to existing black townships (Union of South Africa 1957; RSA 1974; 1975, 1979, 
1981, 1982). 
The resultant crisis of urban black African homelessness by the 1980s, well addressed by a 
number of authors (Black Sash 1989; Crankshaw 1993; Stevens & Rule 1999; Guillaume & 
Houssay-Holzschuch 2002), led to a process of 'hidden' urbanisation. Importantly for this 
narrative, in one instance 300 squatters had settled by 1983 on Weilers Farm about five 
kilometres northeast of the current Orange Farm (Crankshaw & Hart 1990). Despite the state's 
repeated eviction attempts, more squatters settled on Weilers Farm after its owners 
abandoned it in 1985 (Crankshaw & Hart 1990). 
'Orderly Urbanisation' 
By April 1986, a key step in the disassembly of apartheid was the state's acknowledgement of 
the enormity of the 'hidden' black urbanisation in the White Paper on Urbanisation (RSA 
1986b). The White Paper outlined a benevolent rather than repressive solution calling for a 
new approach of "orderly urbanisation" (RSA 1986b, p. 19), by sanctioning "controlled 
squatting" (ibid., pp. 20-21). In an initial implementation step in June 1986, the then President 
and the Minister of Constitutional Development announced that the state planned to relocate 
the Weilers Farm squatters to the Orange Farm vicinity by October 1988 (Crankshaw & Hart 
1990, p. 8).  
By mid-1986 and the abolition of influx control legislation, the state faced the challenges of an 
urbanisation and housing crisis, collapsing government structures and increasing societal 
pressure for change and racial equality (Howe 1990, p. 67; Jochelson 1990). Adopting a new 
approach, the state attempted to address these challenges by incorporating the former 
segregated and fragmented local and regional governance functions into a restructured 
Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) (ibid.), although its functions were to remain largely 
in disarray until its reconstitution as the new GPG post-1994 (Lodge 2005). The national 
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Constitutional Development and Planning department then devolved the function of 'black 
communities development' in January 1987 to the TPA (RSA 1987), including the responsibility 
of the relocation of the squatters from Weilers Farm (Crankshaw & Hart 1990). Also in 1987, 
the department targeted the Orange Farm area for 'controlled squatting' (Black Sash 1989; 
Hendler 1992), proclaiming the first of many statutory changes over the next two years 
allowing 'controlled squatting' in the Orange Farm area (RSA 1988b, a, c, d, 1989, 1990a, c, d, 
e) with the TPA following suit (Province of Transvaal 1990a, b). By December 1988, the TPA 
had settled (or resettled) the first of many families on Orange Farm (Transvaal Provincial 
Administration [TPA] 1990, p. 66), either voluntarily or forcibly (Black Sash 1989; Crankshaw 
1993; Stevens & Rule 1999).  
The TPA, despite its apartheid conservatism, was reportedly, in April 1989, willing to engage 
constructively with society about development in line with a guiding principle to treat 
'squatters' in a "humane fashion" (South African Institute of Race Relations 1990, pp. 238-239 
of 1461). However, despite the TPA's supply of only limited basic services (Crankshaw & Hart 
1990, p. 9), service delivery protests in Orange Farm were seemingly limited. Development 
discussions were constrained to the TPA's engagements with an eight-man committee of 
purportedly dubious representivity made up of mainly ex-Weilers farm residents (Mtshelwane 
1989, p. 24), the church and the residents committee (Crankshaw & Hart 1990). The TPA was 
optimistic that Orange Farm, despite its distance from urban centres, was to be one of the first 
"cities of the future" (TPA 1990, p. 68). Many of the 600 families, living on Orange Farm by the 
end of 1989 (Mtshelwane 1989), were also positive about the prospects of the settlement 
(Crankshaw & Hart 1990, p. 34). Despite its disadvantages, the settlement symbolised the 
move away from apartheid, allowing black Africans to own homes (Hindson 1987). This move 
ended their persecution as illegal 'squatters', offered secure tenure, more services than other 
'squatting' areas, a school, a crèche, and access to public transport (Crankshaw & Hart 1990). 
The state began to formalise local governance arrangements for the Orange Farm settlement; 
in July 1990, the TPA promulgated regulations for the control and management of Orange 
Farm (Province of Transvaal 1990b). That month, the TPA announced it was to make 
development decisions in consultation with the Orange Farm Informal Committee, established 
in terms of the regulations and was intended to serve as the foundation of an interim local 
authority (Sowetan 1990). 
By the end of 1990, the TPA's initial enthusiasm for the 'orderly urbanisation' of the Orange 
Farm area was tempered by the realisations that the state could not match the level of 
services needed in areas of 'controlled squatting' against its higher standards elsewhere, and 
that residents would not be able to afford them (RSA 1990b). Nonetheless, the shortfall of 
services did not stop the growth of the Orange Farm area and, by 1991, 42 436 people 
inhabited the settlement (Quantec 2014). By 1992, the "abnormal proportions" (TPA 1992, p. 
7) of 'squatting' seemed to overwhelm the TPA, and it compared its work to "a boat which 
finds itself in rapids" (ibid., p. 49).  
In 1993, the settlement was officially named as "Orange Farm" (RSA 1993a). Needing 
administrative support, the TPA appointed the consultants, Municipal Management Services, 
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in July 1993 (Naidoo 2010, p. 249). The provincial government decided to proclaim, in July 
1993, more formal governance arrangements for Orange Farm. The TPA gave permission for 
Orange Farm to establish its own Black Local Authority (Province of Transvaal 1993), despite 
that system of governance symbolising the controls of apartheid (Cameron 2002), and being 
on the verge of financial and administrative collapse (Bennet, Mason et al. 1986, p. 7). Both 
concerns were swept away eighteen months later when transition arrangements for local 
government repealed this permission (Province of Gauteng 1995c). 
'Some for All Rather than All for Some' 
Soon after the first democratic national elections in April 1994, the then President Mandela 
tabled the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (RSA 1994) in Parliament in 
November 1994. The RDP raised expectations of South African citizens by making numerous 
specific commitments (Pillay, Tomlinson, et al. 2006, pp. 287-289). Focusing on water services, 
it assured citizens that water is "an indivisible national asset belonging to all South Africans" 
(RSA 1994, p. 80). The RDP promised that the state would overcome the legacy of apartheid by 
ensuring "redistribution through the provision of basic services" (ibid., p. 6), and also said that 
citizens were to have a say in how water was to be managed (ibid., para. 1.4.4). Its objective 
for the supply of water was to ensure "some for all rather than all for some" (ibid., p. 80), 
noting that the "principle of payment for services is fundamental to the implementation of the 
RDP, with due cognizance given to poverty, administrative constraints and an equitable and 
fair default procedure" (ibid., p. 19). This message was reinforced by President Mandela's 
encouragement of all citizens to pay for rates and services in his launch of the Masakhane 
('Let's Build Together') campaign in February 1995 (ANC 1995; Mngomezulu 2006, pp. 18-30). 
The state saw local government as the key implementer of the RDP's development and 
redistribution agenda (ibid., pp. 19-20). To that end, it fashioned new metropolitan local 
councils from various existing local authorities. After a brief eight-month period under the 
jurisdiction of the newly-proclaimed Northern Vaal Transitional Metropolitan Sub-Structure 
and the Vaal Transitional Metropolitan Council (Province of Transvaal 1993), Orange Farm was 
then incorporated within the area of jurisdiction of the GJMC and the SMLC on 1 September 
1995 (Province of Gauteng 1995a, b). The new SMLC cobbled together an interim management 
team to take over the functions from the TPA. The team was led by three local councillors, 
with institutional support drawn from the former administrations of Ennerdale, Lenasia, the 
South East MSS, Poortje, the Orange Farm administration office, and the TPA's consultants at 
the end of 1995 (Southern Metropolitan Local Council [SMLC] 1995). 
The Orange Farm settlement, only seven years since its establishment, had experienced very 
steep growth since the start of 'orderly urbanisation' policy. All the while, the community itself 
was in a state of flux and had been experienced the shifting and overlapping governance 
efforts of nearly 20 state institutions, all themselves shifting during South Africa's transition to 
democracy. 
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4 The 'Excluded Outsiders' (1996-2000) 
First Local Governance and First Protests of Orange Farm 
The first local governance efforts by the then SMLC, and the GJMC, took place in the city 
administration's transition period between 1996 and 2000. Orange Farm grew astoundingly, 
and the state provided many services. However, its citizens were the "excluded outsiders" 
(term for the poor relegated to living at the edges of cities by Murray, M. 2008, p. 96).  
By 1991, only 16 months after its initial set up, Orange Farm had grown to 42 436 people in 11 
200 households. By 1996, its first wave of growth at a steep population growth rate of 39 
percent per annum since 1991 (an overall increase of 195 percent in five years) resulted in 
124 507 people in 31 152 households. At that point, the state had provided 28 percent of 
Orange Farm households with access to flush and chemical toilets, and 18 percent of 
households with in-house water connections (Table 6.3 on page 141). Moreover, the 
remaining households also had access to services, but of a lower standard. For instance, 65 
percent had access to pit latrines, and 7 percent to other forms of sanitation (Quantec 2014). 
In terms of water, a further 37 percent of households had taps in their yards, 41 percent 
accessed communal taps and 4 percent accessed other forms of water provision (Quantec 
2014). Further, 71 percent of its households lived in informal dwellings (ibid.). 
Prospects for Orange Farm households seemed unlikely to improve in the face of harsh 
economic realities. In 1996, over 60 percent of its households lived below the poverty line of 
the-then R840 per month (GJMC 1996, pp. 3 of 9, State of Poverty). Competition for jobs was 
fierce. Unskilled workers in Johannesburg made up about 90 percent of the service sector, 
when the changing city economy was demanding sophisticated skills, and the numbers of jobs 
were declining in virtually every economic sector (Beall et al. 2002, pp. 40, 43, 52). Many low-
skilled workers were located in the south of the city further deepening the north-south divide 
of Johannesburg (ibid., p. 61). Amenities were minimal. For instance, the closest school was 
located seven kilometres away and the nearest clinic was at least ten kilometres away north of 
Ennerdale (GJMC 1996, p. 6 of 9, State of Poverty). 
The reality of the enormity of the financial challenge of the provision of services and the extent 
of homelessness in Johannesburg become apparent to the SMLC as it sought funds for urgent 
infrastructure projects in Orange Farm in May and June 1996 (SMLC 1996a, c). In June 1996, 
the state, concerned about the lack of resources to implement the RDP and having already 
closed the RDP office in April 1996 (Pillay, Tomlinson, et al. 2006, p. 57), shifted to the pursuit 
of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy to drive 
national economic growth to fund the RDP's promises (RSA 1996b). Even the SMLC approved 
the holding of a Masakhane workshop in Orange Farm for September 1996 (SMLC 1996b; ANC 
1997b, p. 45 of 92).  
Evidently, the Orange Farm community began to resist the state's approach. By the end of 
1996, the first two water-related protests in Orange Farm had taken place (Appendix 15 on 
page 357). In one, a group of women marched to the office of the then Mayor, undressing to 
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mark their extreme disrespect for the state's mandatory prepaid water meter installations in 
Orange Farm (Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al. 2004), part of the restructuring 
initiative suggested by the World Bank in the early 1990s (Bond 2007, p. 8). Countrywide, 
community resentment against the global system emphasising capitalism continued to rise. 
Possibly in response, the state announced free lifeline water in May 1997 (ibid., pp. 40-41). 
Township activists protested in Gauteng and two other provinces between July and September 
1997, 'violently' in some places, against the local government's firm cost-recovery measures, 
including the cut-off of basic services (ibid., p. 41). Meanwhile, in October 1997, the SMLC 
struggled to match the need for services in Orange Farm, with the supply of infrastructure. For 
instance, its search for capital funds for construction of a critical sewer project in October 1997 
(SMLC 1997a), was abruptly halted by the confirmation of the crisis of the city administration's 
imminent insolvency (Emdon 1998, p. 8 of 28). 
Local Governance Post-1997 Financial Crisis 
The extent of the city administration's financial problem came as a "something of a shock to 
the new councillors" (Beall et al. 2002, p. 88). By June 1998, the city administration had taken a 
number of corrective measures (Emdon 1998, pp. 8-27 of 28), including stopping any new 
projects, and cutting that year's capital budget by two-thirds (ibid., p. 9 of 28). Further, the 
Sandton rates boycott since mid-1996 (Beall et al. 2000b), had all but paralysed city 
investment (Emdon 1998, p. 7 of 28), until the Constitutional Court upheld the city 
administration's policy in October 1998 (Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 1998a). At last, the city 
administration was thus able to implement its 'one city one tax basis' approach, a way to unite 
the polarised city (Beall et al. 2000a, p. 118), and to motivate for restructuring of the city 
institutions to attain financial stability to counter the financial crisis (Emdon 1998, pp. 24-28 of 
28). The GJMC, in response to the rising dissatisfaction of poor citizens' exclusion from the 
benefits of the new democracy, had launched a citywide Indigency Management Policy by the 
end of 1998 providing subsidies to poor households for the first ten kilolitres of water used 
(Mazibuko vs.COJ et al. 2009, p. 24). However, the policy was criticised for having limited 
success only due to operational challenges in its implementation (COJ 2004g, p. 11; Mazibuko 
vs. COJ et al. 2009, p. 24; Naidoo 2010, p. 207).  
Pointing to the degree of high uncertainty surrounding the SMLC's governance of Orange 
Farm, as late as at the end of 1998, the city administration still debated whether the 
settlement should fall within its jurisdiction. "There were some who felt that Orange Farm 
made no sense, while yet others felt there was no alternative but to have it" (ibid., p. 24 of 28). 
'It Cannot be Business as Usual' 
By 1999, it was clear that the city administration had to implement further measures to ensure 
financial sustainability; it could not be "Business as Usual" as declared by the cost-driven 
rescue plan of 1999, iGoli 2002 (GJMC 1999e), a plan which fanned anti-privatisation 
sentiment. Further, as Bond (1998) claimed, the city administration's technical rather than 
participatory approach to the plan and infrastructure development meant it could not engage 
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agonistically as it was not "prepared to host conflicts over differing interests that are at stake" 
(ibid., p. 67).  
iGoli 2002 called for the restructuring and streamlining of the city administration. The 
administration had to cut its budgets again, this time for three years. That meant, for instance, 
that a scant R44 million capital funds was available for the 2000-2001 financial year for the 
entire city, so no investments by the city administration in backlog infrastructure were possible 
(ibid., p. 7), and certainly not those of the still-growing Orange Farm. The GJMC did clarify, 
though, that Orange Farm was indeed part of Johannesburg. Successfully overcoming water 
losses promised to yield significant savings (ibid., p. 7), so the provision of appropriate water 
infrastructure was thus an important initiative of the city administration. Further, the plan 
compared the ideal functioning of the city administration with that of a business (GJMC 1999e, 
pp. 15-17), labelling its relationship with citizens as one with "clients" (ibid., p. 14).  
In October 1999, the water reservoir supplying Orange Farm had run dry (SMLC 2000b). Many 
residents had no water for six weeks until the SMLC, Rand Water and the adjacent Lekoa-Vaal 
Metropolitan Council could remedy the situation in the short term with water tankers, with a 
longer-term solution needing an estimated R187 million (SMLC 2000b). By the end of 1999, the 
GJMC had entered into an agreement with a private sector water services company (ibid. 
2002, p. 104), fuelling the anti-privatisation lobby. Similarly, there was another protest in 1999, 
this time a peaceful blockade of the main route into Orange Farm, about the proposed 
installation of prepaid water meters (Appendix 15 on page 357). Despite its constraints, the 
SMLC had tackled various housing, planning, land and infrastructure initiatives to formalise 
Orange Farm, sometimes with the provincial government (SMLC 1996a, d, 1997a, b, e, 1998c, 
f, 1999b, 2000a; COJ 2001b). The SMLC and the GJMC also attempted to boost economic 
development in Orange Farm through the creation of a small informal trading market, 
prioritising discussions for integrated public transport management, and the facilitation of 
shopping centre development (SMLC 1998d; GJMC 1999g; SMLC 1999a).  
By 2000, however, it was clear that Orange Farm needed much more investment as did most 
parts of Johannesburg as infrastructure was at its limits. This provided impetus for the GJMC 
and the MLCs in 2000 to merge its many parts into a single metropolitan entity, the COJ, to be 
able to deliver services (Beall et al. 2000b, p. 118). By the end of the second wave of growth, 
the population of Orange Farm had increased by a further 31 percent, or by 38 743 people, in a 
total now of 47 813 households, which represented an annual growth rate in the population of 
6.2 percent over the five year period. The state had improved access to most services 
considerably, outstripping the rate of growth of the settlement. For instance, access of Orange 
Farm households to flush and chemical toilets had more than doubled since 1996 to 20 241, as 
had the number of water connections in households to 38 800, by 2001 (see Table 6.3 on page 
141, Table 6.4 on page 141 and Table 6.5 on page 144). At the same time, the level of formal 
housing increased by an astounding 20 873 formal dwellings, from 7 770 to 28 643 (Quantec 
2014). However, progress was perceived as inadequate and levels of dissensus continued to 
grow.  
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5 The Water Wars (2001-2005) 
Orange Farm as 'Liability' 
Between 2001 and 2005, the newly-consolidated COJ encountered a fourfold increase in 
service delivery protests in Johannesburg relative to the previous five-year period; half were 
water services related protests in Orange Farm reflective of the COJ's technical and social 
difficulties in supplying water services. In 2001, the Office of Region 11 of the COJ was hands-
on in the daily management of Orange Farm and reported to the core executive team in the 
city centre offices. Johannesburg Water had started operations in January 2001 as a stand-
alone corporatised entity of the COJ in line with iGoli 2002 to deliver water and sanitation 
services. The COJ was ostensibly indifferent to the objections about corporatisation initiatives, 
fuelling more protests to come (van Rooyen et al. 2009, p. viii), and the COJ was "dismissive" of 
the APF's standing and its actions and this feeling was reportedly mutual (COJ 2001a, p. 73). 
The COJ's long-range plans were contradictory about informal settlements. On the one hand, 
the Sustainable Housing Strategy of 2001 stated that citizens had a "right to adequate and 
affordable housing" (Huchzermeyer, Baumann et al. 2004, p. 22). On the other hand, the first 
strategic plan to include Orange Farm and the Deep South in 2001, the Spatial Development 
Framework (COJ 2001c), described Orange Farm as a "liability" (ibid., p. 13), being located in an 
unsuitable position outside the urban core and not part of the city's economy (ibid., pp. 12, 
13). Johannesburg's envisaged "north-south development corridor" (ibid., p. 49) stopped short 
at the city centre and did not extend further south, reinforcing the spatial and economic 
isolation of Orange Farm (ibid., p. 49). Further, the city administration held that due to the 
supposedly temporary nature of informal settlements and the poor likelihood of cost recovery, 
levels of services should be minimal (COJ 2001a, p. 91). Predictably then, the state's 
investment was seen as limited and poorly coordinated (Interviews, Radebe and Walters, both 
2012). 
Moreover, the state of absolute poverty and relative deprivation of the settlement meant that 
residents were unable to pay for the minimal services they received. Official figures put 
unemployment in Orange Farm at 58 percent in 2001, up from 50 percent in 1996, and greater 
than the city average of 37 percent in 2001 (Table 6.2 on page 141), whilst COJ data put it as 
high as 62 to 70 percent (COJ 2004e, pp. 62, 76). Poor communities in the Deep South were 
seen as "net spenders rather than contributors for rates" (Beall et al. 2002, pp. 78-79), and as 
relative newcomers to Johannesburg, they were less likely than longer-term residents were to 
get good jobs (Crankshaw & Parnell 2002, p. 22). Only poverty alleviation measures and urban 
agriculture seemed to offer economic prospects in the Region, albeit limited (COJ 2004e, pp. 
78, 96, 114). 
In February 2001, the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Ronnie Kasrils, announced the 
provision of free water to each indigent household (RSA 2001). In response, the COJ's 
Johannesburg Water planned to supply the six kilolitre free monthly allocation, calculated as 
25 litres per person per day based on an eight-person household, as part of a broader package 
of free services, which was approved by the COJ a year later (COJ 2004g, pp. 7, 34, 51). 
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In June 2001, Johannesburg Water started planning to reduce unaccounted for water losses, 
which cost the COJ R323 million annually (COJ 2006h, pp. 110-121), and were most 
problematic in Soweto, Orange Farm and other informal settlements. Johannesburg Water 
proposed to repair and replace damaged infrastructure and residential plumbing at its own 
cost. Further, to ensure the provision of the free water allocation and to reduce financial 
losses, it planned to increase metered water services from mid-July 2001 to low-income areas 
(Savage et al. 2003, p. 42), and install prepaid meters (van Rooyen et al. 2009, pp. 54-57) – a 
decision that was to garner much criticism and lead to more protests. The dominant critique 
was of the state's commodification of water services rather than its provision as a human right, 
at the expense of the poor (Fiil-Flynn & SECC 2001). The COJ's allocation of minimum free 
water was seen to be inadequate (World Health Organization 2003, p. 13), causing social 
hardship and the breakdown of neighbourly relations (McDonald & John 2002, p. 189). Almost 
all poor households struggled to afford the extra water due to poverty and high 
unemployment (Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al. 2004, pp. 18-19).  
Enter the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee 
In August 2002, protests against the World Summit on Sustainable Development marked the 
high point in Johannesburg of the worldwide anti-globalisation sentiment prevalent since the 
late 1990s (noted earlier on page 97). Johannesburg Water, in its goal to be financially self-
sustaining, increased its tariffs sharply, affecting the poor the most, and increased service cut-
offs of non-paying households (McKinley 2003). The first prepaid meters in Johannesburg were 
piloted in Stretford in 2002. Believing the pilot to be successful and to be community-backed 
despite some minor misgivings (van Rooyen et al. 2009, pp. 60-62), the approach then 
informed the design of future water projects (McKinley 2003; Naidoo 2010, p. 204). 
However, activists accused the COJ of lying about the levels of participation and agreement 
reached with the community for the meters (Bond 2006; Smith, L. a. 2006). The COJ was also 
censured for installing prepaid meters under the guise of supplying new water systems to 
households who had not had this service before, of forcing poor residents into payment 
systems they could not afford (2004; Naidoo 2010), and of using the meter systems to enable 
cut-offs for non-payment later (McKinley 2003).  
To campaign about these concerns, the OFWCC was born in 2002. Led by Bricks Makolo, it 
organised and staged the first of many protests against prepaid water meters (Appendix 15 on 
page 357) (Naidoo 2010, pp. 25-26, 138, 198, 267). The OFWCC also battled against the 
commodification of other services, poor quality of life, and lobbied for jobs (Bond 2004b, p. 31; 
Greenberg 2004). The OFWCC frequently joined its sister grass roots movements battling for 
state provision of water and electricity as rights rather than as commodities. The OFWCC's 
strongest links were with the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (Wafer, Alex 2005, pp. 61, 
66), and the APF. The latter two organisations had been formed earlier, in 1999, by Trevor 
Ngwane, a former ward councillor who had been expelled from the ANC for opposing the COJ’s 
iGoli 2002 plan (Runciman 2012, p. 159); the APF was linked to at least 20 other activist groups 
with similar anti-capitalist ideologies (APF 2007a). The OFWCC marched, held rallies, 
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campaigned in the media and took legal action against the COJ (McKinley 2003; Bond 2004a; 
Kavanagh 2005).  
Response to these and other protests, and supporting poor households, the COJ replaced its 
former 1998 Indigency Management Policy with the Special Cases Policy (COJ 2004g, p. 7). The 
COJ was one of the first municipalities to provide an allocation of free basic water and 
electricity, free sanitation and refuse removal services, and limited free health services (COJ 
2004g, p. 11). As part of the package, the COJ also implemented a zero assessment rate for 
properties valued below R20 001, meaning that residents in informal settlements and 
townships effectively did not pay rates to the city administration (Savage et al. 2003, pp. 34-
35). 
Operation Gcin'Amanzi, Operation Vulamanzi 
Johannesburg Water launched the extensive and politically endorsed Operation Gcin'Amanzi 
('Save Water') in July 2003, to reduce water losses and provide minimum free water citywide 
(Mazibuko vs.COJ et al. 2009, p. 28), but especially for areas that had not had metered water 
before (Pillay, Tomlinson, et al. 2006, p. 291). One of Soweto's suburbs, Phiri, was targeted for 
the initial operation as unaccounted for water losses there were very high at 68 percent (van 
Rooyen et al. 2009, pp. 56-57). The city administration at that stage provided households in 
Soweto with unmetered water at a monthly flat rate (Mazibuko vs.COJ et al. 2009, p. 28), 
meaning some households consumed far more water than they paid for.  
The COJ allocated a negligible four percent of the city's capital budget for Region 11 as a whole 
in terms of the RSDF in 2003, when the upgrading of the dirt roads alone in Orange Farms 
needed R173 million; it was allocated a mere R13.9 million (COJ 2003f, p. 97). This was despite 
the COJ's recognition in the RSDF of the Deep South's extremely limited provision of social 
services and infrastructure (COJ 2003f). In a 2003 survey by the COJ, the most dissatisfied 
residents in the city lived in informal settlements where the gap between the perception of the 
importance of water and sanitation services, and the levels of satisfaction, was twice that 
encountered in other parts of the city (COJ 2004g, p. 36).  
Dissatisfaction was also driven by the structure of the tariff, announced mid-year for the 
forthcoming year, which prejudiced the poor with an inordinately high increase of 32 percent 
for the lowest-but-one step of the rising block tariff. Although wealthier consumers, who used 
greater amounts of water, could easily have borne the greater increases, the increases for the 
higher steps were far more modest (between only -2 and 14 percent) (Dugard 2010). Despite 
the higher prices for water and the COJ's urgent push to roll out Operation Gcin'Amanzi, 
auditors discovered that Johannesburg Water was bankrupt in September 2003 (van Rooyen et 
al. 2009, p. 54). 
In resistance to the tariff and Operation Gcin'Amanzi, the OFWCC with the support of the APF 
and Ngwane, aggressively countered the COJ's operation with its own Operation Vulamanzi 
('Open Water'), in 2003. The OFWCC blocked installations of new water meters, ripped out or 
bypassed them, and illegally reconnected dissenting households to the water supply system 
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(Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al. 2004, p. 25). The COJ took a dim view of the APF's 
alleged 'bullying' of non-protesting citizens to join the protests and political tactics of the APF 
(van Rooyen et al. 2009, p. 64). In one instance, the COJ and Johannesburg Water had no 
option but to obtain an interdict in 2003 against the protestors (ibid.), and called on the police 
and the private security firm, the 'Red Ants', to stop the protestors' destructive actions (APF 
2003a) (Appendix 15 on page 357). 
Xolile George, the Regional Director of the Office of Region 11 and in the line of fire of service 
delivery protests in Orange Farm and other areas in the Deep South, from 2003 to 2006, 
believed that protests were about "political posturing" (Interview, George, 2012), as new social 
movements emerged or as elections became imminent. However, most protestors' grievances 
were, nonetheless, valid and fell "in the realm of human rights" (ibid.). 
Eventually, by 2004, the COJ conceded, "settlements are permanent and will not face 
relocation in the future" (COJ 2004h, p. 7 of 17), given that it had already formalised 47 
informal settlements in Johannesburg and had provided thousands of RDP houses (COJ 2004g, 
p. 22). Mayor Masondo noted in the 2004 State of the City Address (COJ 2004h) that resources 
were constrained. For instance, the COJ could promise improvements to only less than a tenth 
of households in informal areas in Johannesburg between 2004 and 2006. But for the first 
time, it publicly earmarked Orange Farm, amongst others, for development (COJ 2004h). 
In 2005, the COJ tried to popularise the installation of prepaid meters in fractious Soweto 
households by writing off longstanding services arrears through its Indigent Arrears Write-off 
scheme of 2005. This was a concession by the COJ, and an acknowledgement of the protests, 
rather than evidence of any consensus negotiated between it and the OFWCC. However, the 
activists believed the write-off policy was misguided, as it did not tackle the real human rights 
issue. Nonetheless, the APF did concede that the COJ's action had been more transparent than 
its former efforts (APF 2005c). Their demand for a pro-poor tariff structure was partly satisfied 
as, after the first free water allocation, the next step of the rising block tariff increased but at a 
lower rate relative to the higher steps. This meant that, for the first time, the greater the water 
consumption, the greater the tariff is for the higher steps, effectively subsidising the lowest 
steps, a policy that continues to this day (APF 2005a; 2005c; Bond 2007; Anciano 2012; 
observations from Fiil-Flynn 2013, p. 37).  
6 Voices of the Poor (2006-2010) 
Yellow Humvee, Yellow Elephants and Protests in 2006 
The 'voices of the poor' (term used for those excluded from decision-making in selected poor 
areas in Johannesburg by Richards, Narsoo et al. 2004) of Orange Farm continued to express 
dissatisfaction in Orange Farm during the COJ's maturation period between 2006 and 2010. In 
about 15 percent of the recorded 29 protests during this five-year period, the COJ used 
'Casspir' armoured vehicles, rubber bullets and electroshock weapons to quell protests 
(Appendix 15 on page 357). 
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At the start of the period, however, Mayor Masondo, starting his second term of office, noted 
in his State of the City Address of 2006 that Johannesburg Water had reduced the unaccounted 
for water losses from 40 percent in 2001 to 32 percent in 2006 through Operation 
Gcin'Amanzi. Further, 43 percent of households did not need to pay for water at all as they had 
remained within their six kilolitre free monthly allocation, with the remainder paying on 
average R41.61 for additional water (COJ 2006a, pp. 6-7 of 10; 2006h, p. 114).  
For the first time, area-based plans such as the Spatial Development Framework (SDF 2005-
2006) included Orange Farm as the southernmost point in the north-south development 
corridor (COJ 2005d, p. 68). Plans were also more overtly "citizen-centric" and "customer-
centric" (COJ 2006d, p. 35).  
Protests peaked in 2006, at 14 protests recorded that year, due to long-burning anger in 
Orange Farm caused by many reasons, according to Thamsanqa Radebe, Region G's manager 
of Urban Management and Service Delivery (Interview, Radebe, 2012). Reasons included the 
cancellation of planned projects, no or poor communication between the city administration 
and citizens, councillor bravado, political misconduct, nepotism, inappropriate projects, and 
half-finished projects that Radebe – with tongue firmly in cheek – dubbed 'yellow elephants'. 
'Yellow elephants', such as the Stretford Station Taxi Rank, are projects that cannot be used as 
they are not completed due to the contractor's bankruptcy before their completion, he said. 
'Yellow elephants', not the same as 'white elephants', also cannot be used but because they 
are not fit for purpose even when completed. According to Radebe, both 'yellow elephants' 
and 'white elephants' are costly and useless, and make the community furious. Likewise, a 
local councillor's purchase of a yellow Humvee, a costly sports utility vehicle, purportedly led 
to community fury at his flaunting of wealth amidst poverty, and seemed to mark the start of 
increasingly violent protestors harming councillors' and damaging their homes during service 
delivery protests (TimesLive 2010a, b; City Press 2011a) (Appendix 15 on page 357). 
In 2006, a second faction of 'service delivery' protestors emerged in Orange Farm, joining 
briefly in the OFWCC's water wars over a few months. The Landless People's Movement, a 
social movement, campaigned for housing and land in some urban informal settlements in 
Johannesburg (Greenberg 2004). The combined protests in Orange Farm by the two groups 
made up half of all protests in Johannesburg that year.  
However, around mid-2006, the OFWCC's and APF's presence in the water wars and other 
protests declined markedly for the rest of 2006 and 2007 (Appendix 15 on page 357). The 
reduction is possibly attributed to the move of the battle for free services from the streets to 
the courts when the Phiri water meter objectors lodged their case in the South Gauteng High 
Court in July 2006 (M&G 2009a). It may also be due to shifts in the APF's leadership occasioned 
by the earlier departure of Ngwane (APF 2006a, S. 5; Ngwane 2011, p. 121). Further, many 
objectors had capitulated to Operation Gcin'Amanzi and had started paying for water (APF 
2006c, pp. 25-26). The APF claimed that their protests had directly led to the South African 
Local Government Association's efforts to improve the capacity for public participation within 
ward committees in 2006 (APF 2007b, p. 3 of 16), which may also have contributed to the 
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reduction in protests. Moreover, in mid-2006, the COJ approved a revised and extended Social 
Package Policy although it was to encounter implementation delays. Also, in December 2006, 
the COJ approved an increase in the previous six kilolitre free monthly allocation, to ten 
kilolitres, calculated as 25 litres per person per day based on a now thirteen-person household. 
An extra four kilolitre free annual emergency allocation per household, as well as additional 
free water, was available on application in circumstances of need (Mazibuko vs.COJ et al. 2009, 
p. 43).  
The improved free water allocation, however, did not stop other demands with the Landless 
People's Movement and the APF applying to the COJ to hold a march to protest against 
housing and land-related evictions for which permission was refused by the JMPD in 
September 2006 (APF 2006b, p. 69).  
Reactive but Resolute State between 2007 and May 2008 
Other new service delivery dissenters staged a resurgence of the relatively few periodic low-
key protests in 2007 in Orange Farm, although some were 'violent' (see Appendix 15 on page 
357). Other than these few protests, the number of protests seems lowest in 2007. The COJ 
also prepared a more detailed RSDF for the 2007-08 financial year for Region G, with a 
deliberate emphasis on specific areas in Orange Farm to overcome backlogs, poor quality 
services, uncoordinated development and poverty (COJ 2007h). However, even the COJ's 
increased attention to spatial and economic planning could not address poverty or the retail-
dominated survivalist local economy (COJ 2008u, p. 81). 
The Johannesburg Poverty and Livelihoods Study, undertaken in 2007 (de Wet, Patel et al. 
2008), underscores this poverty and food insecurity in Orange Farm at the time. Of the eight 
areas studied, 62 percent of households in Orange Farm were classed as severely food 
insecure, much higher than the study average of 41 percent (ibid., p. 21). A high number of 
households, 79 percent, felt vulnerable to socio-economic changes related to birth, illness, 
death, divorce or separation and costs of education. This was again far higher than 
experienced in the other areas, which had rates ranging between 13 and 36 percent (ibid., p. 
20). Onyango (2010) found that 26 percent of Orange Farm households relied on skipping 
meals; 31 percent on the use of poor quality food; and 16 percent on food aid as food coping 
strategies (ibid., p. 138). Physical insecurity was also an issue with about 65 percent of 
households perceiving Orange Farm to be unsafe or very unsafe during the day rising to 87 
percent at night, and considering it as one of the most unsafe areas (de Wet et al. 2008, pp. 
29-30).  
Nonetheless, 84 percent of Orange Farm residents felt a great sense of belonging to their 
settlement, far more so than other communities did except for Ivory Park (ibid., p. 29). Orange 
Farm offers its citizens positive 'queuing opportunities' for services and a way to 'belong' by 
staking their claim to the city, according to Jak Koseff, the director of Social Assistance within 
the COJ's Community Development department since 2007 (Interview, Koseff, 2012). Further 
contributing to an improved sense of permanence of Orange Farm, the COJ launched a 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 158 
'regularisation' policy in April 2008 aiming to formalise most of the informal settlements in 
Johannesburg in terms of land, legal and housing issues, other than those that were located on 
geologically unsafe ground (COJ 2008x). 
Operation Gcin'Amanzi received a major setback when Judge Tsoka of the Johannesburg High 
Court ruled in favour of the Phiri water meter plaintiffs on 30 April 2008 and declared the COJ's 
meters to have been "unconstitutional and unlawful" (Mazibuko vs. COJ et al. 2009, pp. 49-50). 
Tsoka also ordered the COJ to double the supply of free water per person per day to 50 litres, 
up from its former 25-litre allocation. Mayor Masondo attacked the Tsoka water-meter ruling 
and declared "judges are not above the law. We cannot have a situation where a judge wants 
to take over the role of government" (APF 2008a; Sowetan 2008). Notwithstanding the COJ's 
frustration, the ruling induced other cities in South Africa, such as Cape Town, to change their 
minimum free water policies (M&G 2008b). The COJ then appealed the ruling, and in the 
interim, the COJ stopped Operation Gcin'Amanzi in May 2008, but reported that it had 
installed 162 000 meters and achieved a saving of R359 million by then (COJ 2011}, p. 182). 
Also in April, the COJ did not increase, above the free water allocation, the first step of the 
tariff for the year to come, thus intensifying its pro-poor approach (Bond, P. 2011, p. 9; Fiil-
Flynn 2013, p. 37). 
In May 2008, violent anti-foreigner protests took place in almost every town and township in 
Johannesburg and across South Africa, side-lining tensions about prepaid water (see Chapter 5, 
section starting page 123 for details on the attacks). Notably, Orange Farm did not experience 
the anti-foreigner attacks (Monson, Takabvirwa et al. 2012), although foreigners clearly 
concerned Orange Farm residents (Everatt 2011), possibly due to the interventions of the COJ's 
'social cohesion' office in Orange Farm and a non-governmental organisation (Monson et al. 
2012, pp. 50, 69). The low number of non-South African-born residents in Orange Farm, at 8 
percent of its population relative to the city's 16 percent, may also have been a factor in the 
lack of violent action against foreigners (Quantec 2014). 
Pro-Active Service Delivery from May 2008 to 2010  
The nature and quantity of throughout Johannesburg changed after the May 2008 xenophobic 
attacks. In Orange Farm, protests became more spur-of-the-moment, no longer lasting but a 
few hours rather sometimes for a week or more, with violence directed at people and 
property. Barricading of main roads in and out of settlements became ever more common (see 
Appendix 15 on page 357). According to JMPD data cited by Duncan (2014a), the COJ 
frequently did not grant permission for these gatherings.  
In September 2008, the COJ reported that about 55 percent of households with prepaid water 
meters had remained within their free water allocation thus effectively not paying anything for 
water. Further, those that did use more than the free allocation used 70 percent less than they 
had before the meters had been installed (COJ 2008c). 
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Notwithstanding the long-lasting policy vacuum about informal settlements at national and 
provincial levels, according to Harrison (Interview, 2012), the COJ officially finally approved the 
Informal Settlements Upgrading and Formalisation programme in line with the 'regularisation' 
policy launched earlier in April in 2008 (COJ 2008x). The COJ then ranked Orange Farm as one 
of its four focus areas in its initial Upgrading of Marginalised Areas Programme but allocated it 
a paltry three percent of the programme budget (COJ 2008u).  
In a seeming turn to an agonistic ethos, the COJ deliberately drew on the experiences and 
credentials of ex-activists, for instance, by appointing them as officials to manage the 
immediate impact of service delivery protests. In the case of Orange Farm, the COJ appointed 
Thamsanqa Radebe in 2008 as Region G's Urban Management and Service Delivery manager. 
Radebe, who lived in Orange Farm, had also been a councillor and an activist in the past. 
Radebe's effective ability to switch between his roles within the city administration, civil 
society and local politics to tackle insurgency was useful to the state in creating stability in 
Orange Farm (Interview, Radebe, 2012) (Pernegger forthcoming).  
COJ officials drew direct links between poverty and protests. For instance, Syd Moodley, 
working in the Social Assistance Directorate of Community Development within the COJ, 
believed that poverty is at the root of the protests (Interview, Moodley, 2012). This thinking 
lies at the heart of the COJ's 2008 motivation behind the introduction of its Expanded Social 
Package (ESP), or Siyasizana ('We are Helping Each Other') with increased support measures 
for the poor on a one-stop shop basis (COJ 2009m). Siyasizana targets multiple levels of 
deprivation by using spatial mapping tools to determine a person's level of poverty and 
eligibility for various subsidies (COJ 2008l). The COJ targeted informal settlements, extending 
the benefits of Siyasizana beyond its three-year limit and non-account holding applicants (COJ 
2008o). 
The first infrastructure-based plans for the wards of Orange Farm in November 2008 also seem 
to have been a way for the COJ to empower communities though decision-making in the 
preparation of detailed ward plans (COJ 2008g, h, i, j, k), with the COJ continuing to prioritise 
informal settlement upgrading and housing delivery. At the Human Settlement Summit of 
2009, Mayor Masondo announced a plan to build 100 000 houses by 2011 and provide security 
of tenure to residents to overcome the uncertainty of settlement living, with Orange Farm also 
to benefit (COJ 2009o). Additional plans followed in the form of the COJ's (2009n) Urban 
Development Framework for the Stretford Node in 2009, an expansion of an earlier plan in 
2007 (COJ 2007l, p. 11), and a Township Regeneration Strategy in 2009 (ibid.). 
The COJ was partly successful in its appeal against the Tsoka ruling in the Phiri water meter 
case. The Supreme Court, in April 2009, reduced the previous court order of the free monthly 
allocation of 50 litres per person per day to 42 litres, but it upheld the appeal in favour of the 
plaintiffs about the so-called illegality of the meters. The Constitutional Court heard the case 
thereafter and, to the dismay of water activists, ruled in favour of the COJ in October 2009 that 
prepaid meters were not unlawful (M&G 2009d). A few months later, in January 2010, the COJ 
approved the restart of Operation Gcin'Amanzi (COJ 2011}, p. 182). By November 2009, every 
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Region in Johannesburg had prepaid electricity meters to some degree, although only Regions 
C, D and G had prepaid water meters (COJ 2010g, pp. 6, 66-67). 
Protest seems to have spurred national changes to the grant-funding regime, which rewarded 
metropolitan municipalities with larger grants if they submitted appropriate and 
comprehensive plans for their cities. Accordingly, the COJ's Built Environment Performance 
Plan of 2010 included quantified infrastructure challenges on an area-by-area basis. The COJ 
had determined an overwhelming "immediate need" (COJ 2010b, p. 62), of R1.035 billion of 
capital investment in Orange Farm alone over the next five years in water, sanitation and other 
infrastructure, community facilities and housing (ibid., pp. 31-32, 62). However, only a third of 
the required capital budget was provisionally allocated in the draft five-year capital budget 
given the needs of other priority areas (ibid., p. 103). Orange Farm was again prioritised in the 
Integrated Development Plan for 2010-2011 (COJ 2010i, p. 69), and identified in the RSDF for 
Region G, as needing "extra-ordinary measures" (COJ 2010u, p. 14). The first scheme though to 
focus exclusively on long-term future planning for the whole of Orange Farm, rather than the 
wider Region G, was the Orange Farm Integrated Development Framework and Business Plan 
of 2010 (COJ 2010r). 
The COJ began to put even more effort into public participation processes than before. Liana 
Strijdom, the senior planner responsible for strategic planning in the southern regions of the 
metropolis in the COJ's Development Planning and Urban Management directorate, shared 
that the presence of city representatives met with a range of positive to unconstructive 
responses from community groups. There were instances where meetings were characterised 
by "order, and even respect", possibly fostering a sense of agonistic co-operation. However, 
there were other instances, such as the RSDF Outreach in 2010, where "aggression and 
testosterone" permeated proceedings making the threat of violence very tangible (Interview, 
Strijdom, 2012) (refer to Pernegger forthcoming), adding possibly a gendered dimension to 
agonistic interaction not yet discussed in the literature. 
The COJ's Customer Satisfaction Survey 2010 (2010g) reflects the negative perceptions of 
Region G's residents about the COJ's service delivery. Satisfaction levels about sanitation that 
year, the lowest since 2006, had been consistently lower as compared to other Regions and 
the city average over each of the previous five years. Clearly, despite improvements, sanitation 
remained a significant challenge. Further, the dominant reported cause of frustration was with 
the lack of water services, although they had actually improved in reality, with two-thirds of 
respondents in 2010 stating they had access to water compared to only one-third in 2007. 
However, a reason for citywide unhappiness with water services was the regular water 
outages, which had increased markedly from 12.1 percent in 2007 to 38.5 percent in 2010 
(ibid., pp. 54, 57, 58).  
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7 'The Struggle is Not Yet Over' (Post-2010) 
'Business Unusual' 
By the post-2010 period, the rate of service delivery in Orange Farm was significant and had 
outstripped the rate of each of its waves of growth since 1991. The COJ's long-term plans for 
Orange Farm were more cohesive than before with costs of investments quantified and 
greater capital budget allocations planned. However, Orange Farm was still a place of 
'permanent informality' due to its marginal nature, high levels of deprivation, and differential 
development across the settlement.  
The third wave of Orange Farm's population growth had slowed down between 2001 and 2011 
to an annual growth rate of 2.1 percent, meaning that by 2011 the population had increased 
by 21 percent, or 33 780 people, to 197 030 people over the decade. The number of 
households over the same period also increased by 16 percent, or by 7 811 households, to 
55 624 households. Simultaneously, though, housing formalisation also increased markedly 
with the number and percentage of informal dwellings reduced to but 23 percent of all 
dwellings. However, many of the new households, 17 percent of the total, were located in 
formal and informal backyard shacks pointing to the internal densification of Orange Farm and 
adding to its development challenges (Table 6.5 on page 144) (COJ 2010r, pp. 34-35). By 2011, 
20 percent of households in Orange Farm had no income, whilst a further 71 percent of 
households received less than R76 800 per annum (see Map 6.3 on page 142 for density of 
poverty) (Quantec 2014), pointing to the continuation of poverty. 
Coupled with Orange Farm's levels of absolute and relative poverty, its citizens might have felt 
that "the struggle is not yet over" (New York Times 2009c). However, Orange Farm residents 
have been "heard and listened to by many managers" and they have had "plenty, plenty, 
plenty" consultation according to Walters (Interview, 2012). Nonetheless, the COJ continued 
improve its participation outreach and communications channels, including calling for 
community participation in, and support of, ward committee and petitions processes in its 
Growth and Development Strategy 2040 (COJ 2011s). 
A Place of 'Permanent Informality' 
The state has provided many amenities in Orange Farm. However, service levels are still lower 
than the rest of Johannesburg. For instance, there are far less libraries in Orange Farm when 
compared to the "forest of libraries" of the more developed middle-class suburbs of the city 
(Interview, Koseff, 2102).  
Despite Orange Farm's increasingly formalised services and housing, it persists as a place of 
"permanent informality" in the popular imagination (Naidoo 2010, pp. 250-254), and in the 
minds of officials and politicians of the city administration, possibly because of its poverty and 
areas of still informal housing. They label it an 'informal settlement' (COJ 2011f), and a "post-
apartheid housing scheme", a "marginalised area", one of the "individual marginalised areas 
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which also have informal settlements" within them, and as containing "priority informal 
settlements" within its boundary (COJ 2013a, pp. 21, 63, 199, 200). 
Notwithstanding the lack of a common definition of the nature of the settlement, Orange Farm 
remains a place that is "still not part of the city" (Interview, Phumzile, 2012) with the label of 
'informal settlement' used as convenient shorthand to describe its level of "high deprivation" 
(COJ 2013a, p. 63). The COJ's spatial mapping of its Indices of Multiple Deprivation ranks areas, 
including Orange Farm, as "marginal" due to their living conditions, health, education and 
income and employment levels, meaning they are "needy" and "deprived" (COJ 2014a, pp. 66-
67) (Interview, Koseff, 2012).  
Although street protest continued in 2011 and 2012, protestors have also increasingly used the 
petitions system. The makeup of protests shifted again, with objectors seemingly gradually 
more specific in their demands about areas and issues, but no longer mobilising around water 
issues as the OFWCC did (see Appendix 15 on page 357).  
Officials have inconsistent attitudes towards protest. COJ respondents range between two 
extremes, from feeling unafraid of protest and being "used to it" (Interview, Sibaya, 2012), to 
considering protest a "disease" (Interview, Radebe, 2012). City policy has absorbed this 
inconsistency. For instance, the COJ's Integrated Development Plan 2012/16 (COJ 2012f) 
stresses the notion of "social inclusion" (ibid., p. 23), but also aims idealistically and 
unrealistically to "eliminate protests" (ibid., p. 78), and to reduce petitions steadily over a 
three-year period by 90 percent from the 2012-13 levels through a R15.2 million civic 
education and awareness programme (ibid., pp. 76, 276). Protests possibly also provide 
impetus for the COJ's continued emphasis on Orange Farm's development. The share of the 
budget for Orange Farm in 2012, at R290 million (ibid., p. 125), was twelve times larger than 
that made in 2008, at R23.6 million (COJ 2008u, p. 26). Indeed, the COJ has allocated a full 
quarter of the COJ's five-year capital budget to Orange Farm (COJ 2012f, p. 93), indicative of its 
commitment to the ongoing development of the area over the next decade.  
However, the COJ is also aware that it must manage real risks associated with protest, as 
incorporated into its 2013/16 Integrated Development Plan as one of its 'Top Ten' 
management risks (COJ 2013b, p. 195). The COJ has also had to make urgent arrangements for 
security guards for councillors that had been attacked (COJ 2013d, p. 339). The COJ continued 
to emphasise water shortages and the importance of not wasting or losing water although it 
does not mention Operation Gcin'Amanzi by name (COJ 2014h).  
8 In Closing 
This story of strife draws on no fewer than 51 recorded episodes of dissent in Orange Farm in 
the 'Deep South' of Johannesburg, ostensibly about water but also about the provision of 
other services and housing, between 1996 and 2012. The study arguably offers at least five key 
insights into the state's qualification of the conflict; portrayal of protestors; responses to 
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protestors' claims; power dynamics; and the form of agreement, drawing from the synthesis of 
conflict management in Table 6.6 on page 164. 
Firstly, there is the temporal dimension to the city administration's responses to conflict in 
Orange Farm showing that both short- and longer-term responses have been made, sometimes 
simultaneously, and sometimes reflecting different approaches. The short-term or immediate 
responses by politicians and officials were generally direct, hard-line and anti-protest, focusing 
on an immediate response to the protests themselves, and ranged between repudiation and 
antagonism. For instance, responses by the authorities included 'denial', 'acknowledgement' of 
demands without a response, shows of 'disrespect' and instances of 'placation', all practices of 
handling conflict generally not in keeping with the spirit of agonism as outlined by theorists, 
and possible agonistic practices (Chapter 2 starting on page 14). For instance, antagonistic 
short-term responses included accusations made by the city administration of protestors' 
unacceptable actions against non-protestors in 2003; the COJ's use of the 'Red Ants' private 
security firm to forcibly prevent the destruction of water meters and make arrests in 2003; the 
refusal of permission for a public gathering in 2006; and the use of armoured vehicles, rubber 
bullets and electroshock weapons to quash protests in about 15 percent of protests between 
2006 and 2010. 
However, continuing the assessment of the temporal dimension, the city administration's 
longer-term responses to the effects of the issues under contention and their root causes were 
less antagonistic and more considered, seemingly addressing protests collectively rather than 
on a one-by-one basis. The city administration offered a variety of inter-related institutional 
rejoinders, resulting in incremental changes to the benefit of the citizens of Orange Farm. 
These included the increase in 2005 of the six kilolitre free monthly allocation to a ten kilolitre 
one; new pricing structure for the water tariffs in 2005 arising in response to pressure form 
protestors and activists; the suspension of Operation Gcin'Amanzi in 2008 pending the court 
ruling; and the active incorporation of Orange Farm into the plans and budgets of the city 
especially from 2008 onwards. Further, support to all poor households in Johannesburg was 
increased, as evidenced by the introduction of the Indigency Management Policy of 1998; the 
package of free services in 2002; the write-off of arrears in 2005; and the announcement of 
the expanded social support package, Siyasizane, in 2008. Also, administrative arrangements 
were improved, including the strengthening of the petitions channel between communities 
and the city administration in 2006 and the appointment in 2008 of a manager to the Region G 
Office who had a background in community activism. However, on the whole, the city 
administration stance on protest was negative, as demonstrated by its 2012 plan to 'eliminate' 
them along with petitions. Whilst a definite improvement in Orange Farm (and other informal 
settlements) was observed over the case study period, one can only speculate how processes 
and outcomes may have been otherwise affected if more deliberately agonistic practices had 
been adopted by the city administration. 
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Table 6.6: Synthesis of Conflict Management per Period in 'Dissent in the Deep South' 
# Question 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-to date 
1 State's qualification of 
the conflict 
Justified in its actions to save 
water and recover costs; negative 
Political posturing though 
justifiable on humanitarian 
grounds; acknowledgment; 
negative 
Violent; justifiable; unfair; failure 
of democracy; grudging 
acceptance and 
acknowledgement 
A Top Ten business risk; fear, a 
'disease'; ambivalent; wants to 
'eliminate' protests, reduce them; 
takes them seriously 
 
2 State's portrayal of 
protestors 
Non-paying, defaulting 
customers; clients; 'squatters'; 
hardly on radar; people of the 
Deep South, not really part of city 
Denial; paying customers; net 
spender' not contributors; a 
liability; informal settlements are 
temporary; denigrate as 'odd 
individuals' with 'strange views' 
 
'Queuing' clients; belonging; 
residents paying for water; taken 
seriously in participation; respect; 
needy; violent; threatening; 
frustrated; fear 
Respect; citizens worthy of more 
investment in participation; 
needy; deprived; still not part of 
the city 
3 State's 
response 
to 
protestors' 
claim 
To protest 
event 
Unresponsive; continues with 
cost-recovery measures; denial; 
defensive 
Unresponsive; antagonistic, e.g. 
interdict against Operation 
Vulamanzi; use of force, police 
and Red Ants; ignores; denial; 
dismissive of APF; denigration 
 
Denial; placates protestors, 
aborts RSDF workshop; appoints 
Radebe; refuses permission to 
march; defends case in courts; 
supresses with force 
Denial; plenty consultation; does 
not refer to Gcin'Amanzi by 
name; supresses protests; some 
acceptance and understanding; 
political leaders and managers 
placate protestors 
 
To effects 
of issue 
under 
contention 
Overwhelmed by 'squatting'; 
provides water tankers; adopts 
'user-pays' approach 
Installs prepaid meters despite 
protests; redesigns and changes 
water meter tariff structure; 
Indigent Arrears Write-off 
scheme; denial; acknowledgment; 
makes concessions; agonistic 
approach at times especially with 
Petitions Unit 
Recognises need for 'abnormal 
measures'; suspends Gcin'Amanzi 
till 2010; provides more resources 
for participation; placates through 
Radebe; other cities change 
minimum free water policies in 
response to court case; SALGA 
improves councillors' 
participation capacity 
 
 
 
Justifies actions by emphasising 
water shortages; makes systemic 
changes to operations; empowers 
citizens through civic education 
and awareness programme 
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# Question 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-to date 
To root 
cause of 
issue 
Provides infrastructure; Indigency 
Management Policy; Minister 
announces free life-line water; 
facilitates economic development 
through limited infrastructure, 
economic and services initiatives 
Special Cases Policy; zero rates for 
properties less than R20 001; starts 
provision of 6, then 10, kilolitres of 
free water; investment but negligible; 
concedes permanence of informal 
settlement; includes Orange Farm 
into Spatial Development Framework 
and other plans; launches Operation 
Gcin'Amanzi 
Acknowledgement of poverty; does 
not increase water tariff at first step 
above free allocation; prioritises 
Orange Farm with policies for 
upgrading, planning and housing; 
approves free water increase; 
prioritises more with integrated 
spatial and business plans at ward, 
local and city levels; provides more 
budgets; extends social package twice 
 
Prioritises Orange Farm and other 
informal settlements with 12 times 
bigger budget in 2012 than 2008; 
increases 5-year budget; provides 
more plans; invests more in social and 
other infrastructure; progressively 
more responsive to underlying issue 
4 State's response to 
power dynamics 
A few project-based interactions  Sets up petitions channel and political 
committee 
 
Gains control through Radebe's 
mediation; provides RSDF workshop 
forum as shared space, and other 
planning-related participation 
processes 
 
Favours structured channels like 
petitioning and planning forums; 
creates more participation channels; 
protestors feel excluded from 
decision-making despite measures 
5 Form of agreement 
reached (or outcome if 
none) 
None; implicit agreement in 
Mandela-endorsed Masakhane 
Partial as tariff structure decision 
included in policy to date and 
practice; no agreement to Vulamanzi; 
conflict escalates to courts; mistrust 
solidifies 
 
Conflict escalates to courts; forced to 
stop Gcin'Amanzi, hostility limits 
agonistic interactions as no 
reciprocity; no agreement but forced 
to shift own approach, ' being' and 
behaviour due to court action 
 
Agreement implicit in responses to 
effects and root cause of issues but 
little evidence of direct and agonistic 
engagement with protestors 
6 How could the state 
have responded more 
agonistically and why did 
it not? 
Arguably agonistic management 
culture but focus on restructuring; 
constrained by 1997 financial crisis; 
shrinkage of already-low resources; 
cost recovery drive; influence of 
capitalist ideology; influence of New 
Public Management and treatment 
of citizen as client; operational 
challenges 
 
Could have been less abrupt and 
more proactive to build positive 
state-society relationship; 
constrained by enmity with APF; need 
to protect water as scarce resource 
and supply free water; ongoing 
pressure to be financially self-
sustaining 
'Violent' reactions to meter 
installations constrains potential to 
build productive relationship 
Increasing violence hampers 
engagement; own attitude of area as 
'orphan', and not quite 'legitimate'; 
could be that antagonistic conflict 
was effective and thus no need for 
agonistic approach 
Source: Own formulation 
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Secondly, the prevailing contextual factors significantly influenced the city administration's 
propensity for agonistic governance. Here, the city administration's stance towards protests 
shifted generally from ambivalence to antagonism in some cases, or increasing responsiveness 
without agonism in others, as prompted by various factors. Over time, the residents of Orange 
Farm increased considerably in number, becoming more institutionally cohesive, and made 
demands on the city administration. Orange Farm was no longer a marginal corner of the city 
that could be ignored. The city administration itself matured, from a financially fragile 
transitional administration with short-term objectives into a relatively stable and better-
capacitated administration with clearer long-term aspirations and visions. In this context, the 
status of Orange Farm shifted from being a temporary settlement to being a properly 
acknowledged and formal part of the city. In tandem with these processes, the nature and 
intensity of the protests changed, as did the protestors, and their tactics. The city 
administration was compelled by both the power of protest, and the contextual changes in 
their own right, to respond more constructively to Orange Farm dissenters and their demands, 
but not necessarily agonistically. The city administration's attitude changed from perceiving 
the marginalised Orange Farm as Johannesburg's 'orphan' and a 'liability', to adopting a more 
'citizen-centric' approach by including the settlement more explicitly and ever-increasingly in 
city budgeting, planning and operations.  
Thirdly, there is a limitation of the resolution of protest or conflict as protestors respond to the 
reality and perceptions of relative deprivation. Despite substantial actual improvements in the 
provision of water, sanitation and housing in Orange Farm, which can be verified objectively, 
the community’s sense of satisfaction with services provided by the city administration 
declined, and remained lower than the city average. Although somewhat consistent with 
Gurr's (1970) argument that relative deprivation underlies protests, it is clearly not their only 
driver. Nonetheless, there is some correlation between the city administration's responses to 
the water wars, and the declining rates of related protests, for example, households started 
paying for water by 2006, with the incidence of protest dropping to its lowest in 2007.  
Fourthly, the case-study shows that deliberate state-society engagements aimed at resolving 
conflicts can result in unanticipated and unsuccessful outcomes sometimes, as the protests 
themselves are complex and varied and so are difficult to respond to coherently. The protests 
are also entangled with multiple other unexpressed concerns that often extend beyond the 
scope of local government. In Orange Farm, before 2006, the stated objective of the protests 
was inequity in the provision of water. However, there were clearly also other underlying 
resentments and motives expressed by communities and civic agencies mobilising the 
communities, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum’s linking of local protest to a global 'anti-
neoliberal' agenda. The city administration could respond somewhat constructively to the 
issue of water, although the obscured objectives meant that a direct and immediate response 
to the concerns of the protestors was unlikely. Moreover, after around 2006, the stated 
objectives of the protests became even more varied – to include 'sanitation', 'roads and 
streetlights', 'housing' and 'land tenure'. Other more complex concerns included 'having a 
stake in projects', 'the ward councillor’s purchase of an expensive Humvee' and 'accurate 
representation of protests', as well as more general issues such as 'development', 'corruption 
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free governance', 'jobs' and 'exclusion from human rights'. Hence, the agonistic task became 
massively complex, and agonism could mean at best a broad shift towards greater institutional 
responsiveness and agonistic governance practices, not necessarily linked to any specific 
protest. 
Fifthly, although the city administration's responses to dissensus were not necessarily 
agonistic, they were not undemocratic. In many cases, the city administration did engage with 
communities, although in accordance with governance practices in line with participatory and 
deliberative democratic approaches, favouring more structured channels for protest than 
agonism does. These practices were frequently difficult to undertake successfully as seen in, 
for instance, the fruitless RSDF outreach protest of 2010. The impulse to reach consensus is 
strong. Hence, typical of participatory democratic regimes, many of the city administration's 
officials and politicians tended to see protest as a 'failure' of democracy, rather than a symbol 
of its growth. By not appreciating conflict as a useful mode of engagement, the city 
administration tended to dedicate resources to the pacification of protestors rather than to 
agonistic engagement with them. 
In closing, these points sharply illustrate that there is no doubt that the city administration's 
responses to conflict in Orange Farm matured over time. However, mostly, the city 
administration's appetite for conflict was low, and when it did respond it was generally 
defensive. The role of agonism was relatively minimal in attaining the largely positive 
outcomes of conflict for Orange Farm residents in the long run. Further, the city administration 
appeared to have missed opportunities to maximise the benefits inherent in governance 
practices that are agonistic, possibly yielding different outcomes in closer alignment to the 
demands of protestors. Despite the lack of agonistic practices, real improvements were 
attained in response to fundamental concerns raised by citizens of Orange Farm and other 
informal settlements. Still, however, real and perceived poverty prevail in the 'Deep South' and 
Orange Farm, and will continue to drive dissensus for years to come. 
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Chapter 7 | Struggle Streets: Informal Trading and the Inner City 
Photograph 7.1: Views of Street Trading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Street trading in the Johannesburg city centre: 1) at top, unidentified location, undated photograph by Alon Skuy (TimesLive 
2015a); and 2) at bottom, in De Villiers Street, photograph by Ntombikayise Khambule, copyright 2014 (refer Figure 7.3, Bénit-
Gbaffou 2014, p. 211) 
1 Introducing Street Traders and the State 
The city administration of Johannesburg has clashed often with informal traders in the 
intensely congested Inner City in its struggle to find a balance between the empowerment and 
enforcement imperatives of its street trading policy, since the deregulation of street trading in 
the late 1980s. This is the second of three profiles of strife forming the case study of the city 
administration of Johannesburg that looks systematically and rigorously at a unique set of 
protests within a unique spatial setting to enhance the validity of research findings across the 
scenarios. This narrative, derived from multiple data sources, explored street traders (typical 
scenes of dense street trading in Photograph 7.1 above), and the distinct patterns of protests 
against the metropolitan government over five-year periods, especially between 1994 and 
early 2015. The profile ascertains the nature of the responses by the local state, its resultant 
perspectives and the extent to which Mouffeian constructive agonistic practices were adopted 
in its handling of the conflicts. The story shows that the city administration displayed irregular 
and inconsistent agonistic attributes in varying degrees during the period assessed, within 
three overarching waves shifting from an antagonistic approach towards traders, to an 
agonistic one, before shifting back to an antagonist one. 
A timeline of 49 identified incidents of state-street trader strife post-1994 until Operation 
Clean Sweep occurred in 2013 forms the basis of this assessment (see Summary of Municipal 
Informal Trading Management and Development per Period on page 354). The enormity of the 
scope and scale of street trading in the Inner City, a priority area for the city administration, 
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informs the intricate and contentious interplay between street traders and the state, with 
street marches as well as memoranda and media lobbies the main forms of protest. This 
material supports the claim that, prior to the 1980s, the city administration was antagonistic 
towards traders and their protests. However, there were some exceptions, such as the 
Johannesburg City Council's (JCC) implicit sanction between 1943 and 1962 of the increasing 
number of coffee-cart traders and the growing permanence of their stalls, until 1962 when 
their numbers reached 2 000 'illegal' traders.  
In the 1980s, however, ideology in much of the world shifted to a new concern for the 
liberalisation of the global economy as seen, for example, in the wide use of the term 
'deregulation'. In South Africa, too, this shift took the form of greater acceptance of informal 
enterprise and coincided with the state's loosening of some of its apartheid strictures by 
abolishing influx control into cities in 1986, for instance. Traders in the Inner City numbered 
between 200 and 250 in 1980 and remained fairly constant until these new freedoms sparked 
a sudden surge in the street trading population in 1988. By 1991, the JCC counted between 
1 498 and 2 050 predominantly black traders in the city centre and they continue to expand. 
The scale of trading presented a completely new challenge to the local government of 
Johannesburg, which was gradually forming new democratic governance practices in 
anticipation of a 'new urban order' through largely agonistic city-street trader engagements 
from the mid-1980s until about the end of the 1990s. Even so, protests by informal traders 
were to be amongst the first 'service delivery' protests in Johannesburg post-1994.  
However, ironically, as the democratically elected city administration entered the new 
millennium, its attitude towards traders once again hardened as informal trading's associated 
'anarchy' and 'chaos' compromised the prioritised municipal vision of the regeneration of the 
Inner City. The city administration returned to primarily antagonistic relations with traders, 
although there were sporadic displays of agonistic intent. The wave of the antagonistic 
approach of the city administration peaked in 2013 with the calamitous Operation Clean 
Sweep. Thereafter, the prospect of a renewed constructive city-street trader engagement 
seemed unlikely at the time of the research in the face of measures taken by the COJ that 
seemed to deepen the 'old ways' of working rather than adopting new, possibly agonistic, 
practices. Some of the complex factors fuelling state-street trader hostilities and hampering 
the ability of the state to manage conflict agonistically were the prevailing context, the sway of 
individual personalities and the unresolvable tension between the competing aims of the 
street trading policy of the city administration. 
The account provides a chain of evidence supporting the claim that the stance of the 
metropolitan government vacillated from what can be described as largely antagonistic, to 
agonistic, and back to antagonistic, albeit interspersed with occasional events contradicting 
the main trends. The tale locates the pivotal contextual events as they intersect with the 
evolving and overlapping patterns of trader resistance, bringing about the changes in the 
stance and actions of the city administration to the benefit of traders and others. The research 
provides some speculations about the potential and historic role of agonism in the local 
government. 
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2 Snapshot of Inner City Informal Trading Today 
Inner City Locus of Street Trade 
The considerable pedestrian footfall within the Inner City, the historical nucleus of 
Johannesburg and the epicentre of its public transport and many significant corporations, is a 
magnet for street traders (Map 7.1 on page 171). Traders serve many of the 1.4 million daily 
visitors to the Inner City, a third of which arrive early every morning; two-thirds arrive by 
public transport (City of Johannesburg [COJ] 2010j, pp. 3-4). In addition, there are about 
250 000 mainly black residents in the Inner City, or six percent of Johannesburg's population, 
mostly staying in rented apartments, with half being poor as they earn less than R76 800 per 
annum (Quantec 2014). 
Within the broader Inner City area, the M2 highway, the M1-N1 double-decker section of the 
motorway, the Joe Slovo Drive off-ramp and Smit Street delineate the city centre and the heart 
of the Inner City (Map 7.2 on page 172 and Map 7.3 on page 173). Street trading density is 
greatest in the city centre (see Map 7.4 on page 174), an area covering about 375 city blocks. 
Traders here cater to those commuters moving between places of work, especially banks, 
mining houses and the public sector; places of education; and the transport hubs, namely 
Metro Mall Taxi Rank and Market, other taxi ranks, Ghandi Square, Park Station and other 
stations, and within the transport hubs themselves (refer Map 7.3 on page 173) (Interview, 
Dinat, 2012) (COJ 2009i, p. 18). 
Trading also occurs elsewhere in the Inner City in smaller concentrations along the high streets 
of the residential areas of Joubert Park, Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville, the housing and sports 
stadium precinct, the industrial strip of City Deep and Benrose, the cultural precinct of 
Newtown and the office area of Braamfontein (Map 7.4 on page 174). As in other South 
African cities, each trading area has dynamics specific to its locality (Charman & Petersen 
2014). The acute level of congestion of street trading especially in the city centre makes 
enforcement of street trading by-laws by the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
(JMPD) almost impossible in some places (Interview, Gerneke, 2012). 
Traders and Trading Places 
The quantum and nature of the street trading population is difficult to measure, and has been 
since the 1980s. Even reputable data tend to be at a citywide scale and are inaccurate due to 
small sample sizes, the fluidity of the sector, differing definitions of informal trading, and the 
need to serve the differing agendas of the city administration and the traders associations (see 
Appendix 16: City Centre Street Trading Counts, 1953-2013 on page 362). Hence, the data 
serve only to sketch the scope and scale of street trading in the Inner City. An estimated 6 000 
to 8 000 traders operate on pavements and public spaces in the Inner City (COJ 2013g), about 
half of the total number of traders in Johannesburg (Motala 2002), and reportedly too many 
according to the traders themselves although some streets are relatively trading-free and have 
space (Bénit-Gbaffou 2016, pp. 111-112). 
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Street traders are informal vendors, or 'hawkers', of goods and services, such as hair styling, 
food vending, telephony, fruit and vegetables, traditional medicines, cosmetics, toiletries, 
mobile phones, clothing, shoes, appliances and household goods. Traders have turned to 
trading due to structural adjustments of the economy, low economic growth and barriers to 
formal employment (Heintz & Valodia 2008), but continue to form part of the 'working poor' of 
Johannesburg, despite working (Altman 2008, p. 28). 
Map 7.1: Location of the Inner City in Johannesburg 
 
Source: Own formulation 
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Map 7.2: Suburbs within the Inner City Boundary 
 
Source: Own formulation (the red dotted line delineates the city centre within the broader black dotted line of the official Inner City demarcation)  
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Map 7.3: Features of the City Centre 
High-density residential area
Area under CID management
Public transport areas
Banks & mining houses
Public sector buildings
Approximation of medium & high-density street trading
Park Station
Metro Centre
ABSA Bank
Standard Bank
Bank City
New Doornfontein station
Joubert Park
High Court
Magistrate’s 
Court
Metro Mall & Taxi Rank
Gauteng 
Legislature
Ghandi Square
 
Source: Own formulation; drawn by author in MS PowerPoint (adapted from Interview (Dinat, 2012) and multiple sources including Community Agency for Social Enquiry 1995a, pp. 17-19; COJ 2008r, p. 11; 
2009i, pp. 18, 20, 24, 26, 37, 75, 87; 2010j, pp. 5-17, 16-71; 2010k, pp. 4-52; 2012l, pp. 5, 9; 2013g, p. 8; Bénit-Gbaffou 2014, pp. 68, 107, 131, 158, 187, 205, 206; CID Forum 2014; University of Witwatersrand 
(School of Architecture and Planning) 2014c, pp. 113, 118)  
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Map 7.4: Concentrations of Street-Trading in the Inner City 
city centre
Residential
Housing & sports 
stadium
Industrial
offices
cultural precinct
Commercial 
Fordsburg 
Mixed use
Inner City
city centre 
street trading
Other trading sites
 
Source: Own formulation; drawn by author MS PowerPoint, adapted from Interview, Dinat, 2012 and various sources (COJ 2004l, p. 5; 2009i, p. 18), see also Appendix 17 on page 363 
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City centre traders target mainly low-income consumers; about 85 percent of traders serve 
less than 20 customers per day, each with traders reporting the lack of trading infrastructure 
and business cash flow as challenges to trading (Willemse 2011). The limited growth prospects 
of such 'survivalist' traders are well documented (International Labour Organization 2002; 
Rogerson 2003a; Callaghan 2012b; Mavunga 2014). The gross daily earnings of 60 percent of 
the traders range between R230 and R310, and the maximum ceiling is R352 (2010 data, 
Callaghan 2012a, pp. 92, 95-96). 
Eighty one percent of street traders are younger than 50 years old (Horn 2011), and about 60 
percent of young traders are foreign black Africans with low skills levels (Ecumenical Service 
for Socio-Economic Transformation 2007). Although their business acumen and 
resourcefulness contributes significantly to the overall economy (Ligthelm 2006; Williams, C. & 
Nadin 2010), as acknowledged in city policy, the associated congestion of the pavements, litter 
and disorder present an urban management challenge to local government (COJ 2013g).  
Street traders operating from formally designated markets, fixed stalls or kiosks, or 
demarcated sites, are called 'market' traders. Stalls can improve daily incomes and allow 
traders to work longer hours and provide better products (Callaghan & Gwatidzo 2013). The 
city administration has provided some stalls and sites, managing them through permits or 
leases. It has built, or dismantled and rebuilt, over 50 formal Inner City markets since the 
1990s (see Appendix 17: Formal Markets in Inner City, 1990s-2013 on page 363). All traders 
must comply with the street trading by-laws as enforced by the JMPD and those that trade 
within restricted and prohibited trading areas in contravention of a by-law, or in illegal goods, 
are 'illegal' traders. 
The COJ estimates it manages 65 percent of the 3 723 traders in the city centre, with the 
Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) managing the balance (2013 data, COJ 2013h, p. 2). 
The CJP has represented, in the Inner City since 1992, the interests of private and public 
property owners (Central Johannesburg Partnership [CJP] 2006d), which own the greatest 
share of office space in Johannesburg, outstripping the Sandton business district in the 
northern part of the city (Johannesburg Land Company (Pty) Ltd. 2014). Some property owners 
have mitigated the negative impact of informal trading adjacent to their buildings by 
participating in the CJP's precinct-based management of City Improvement Districts, which 
includes managed street trading (Fraser 2008). Some writers find these Districts to be 
exclusionary (Nuttall & Mbembe 2008, p. 159; Didier, Morange et al. 2013), although Bénit-
Gbaffou et al. (2012) highlights that the balancing act between the groups' differing priorities 
within this management model is more successful than might be evident at face value. 
Nonetheless, formal businesses continue to have negative views of the impact on their 
properties of street trading activities (Mavunga 2014). 
Many departments and entities of the COJ play a complex array of roles in respect of street 
trading. Various Committees exercise political oversight, such as the Inner City Committee, a 
political committee advising the Council's decision-making Executive Committee until 2010. 
The Office of Region F is responsible for urban management in the Inner City. The Department 
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of Economic Development creates sectoral policy and strategy for informal traders and 
partners with other parties to provide skills training. The COJ's development entity, the 
Johannesburg Development Agency, developed some markets, sometimes as part of broader 
Inner City regeneration initiatives. The JMPD enforces street trading by-laws. The 
Development Planning department creates citywide strategy that affects the built 
environment of traders. Until the restructuring of the MTC in 2013 and the absorption of its 
functions into the Johannesburg Property Company (COJ 2012c, p. 8), and other parts of the 
COJ, the MTC had been responsible since 1999 for the facilities management and development 
of markets and taxi ranks, some of which are combined facilities. 
The interests of traders have been represented by over 20 advocacy and representative 
groups, as well as over 60 informal trading associations created since the 1990s (see 
Appendices 18 and 19 on pages 374 and 375). Six of the seven most dominant groups currently 
are less than ten years old (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014). Associations tend to be localised in nature, 
are inclined to fight 'everyday struggles' and not exert much influence on city policy formation 
(ibid.). Relatively few traders belong to associations, estimated at between 15 and 20 percent 
of traders at any time (Thulare 2004; Skinner 2008, p. 22; Willemse 2011), bringing the 
representivity of informal trading associations into question (Motala 2002; Ecumenical Service 
for Socio-Economic Transformation 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou 2014). 
Affinity-Hostility Link between the State and Street Traders  
The public and the state have mixed views about street traders. Formal businesses regard 
them as a 'real' and 'perceived' nuisance, and a 'serious problem' (Tomaselli 1985, p. 132; The 
Star 2014b). City officials, whilst recognising the traders' entrepreneurialism as vital for the city 
centre and traders' livelihoods, see them as compromising the implicit vision of the "city 
beautiful" (Rogerson 1990, p. 124), since the earliest visions for the city centre of 
Johannesburg (Beavon & Rogerson 1986). Peberdy's (2015) study shows the public's diverse 
sentiments have about street traders, making it difficult for the state to manage the sector, 
with half of respondents, or 52 percent, agreeing traders make an area safer, whilst 44 percent 
agree they damage the image of an area (ibid., p. 24). The affinity-hostility nature of this state-
street trader link, common to many countries, is manifested in the tension between the city 
administration's developmental intentions and its antagonistic operations (Bekker & Fourchard 
2013, pp. 145-168; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2015a; Rogerson 2016). 
3 'The Rise and Rise of Hawking' (Pre-1996) 
Repression and Regulation 
The tension between the developmental and control aspects of informal trading management 
is not new terrain for the Johannesburg city administration. From the 1920s until the dramatic 
"rise and rise of hawking" (COJ 2002g) in the 1980s, the then JCC curtailed street trading by 
enforcing the restricted trading area of the city centre (Beavon & Rogerson 1982, pp. 113-115), 
with the number of both black and white street traders limited to a few fixed sites. The JCC 
adopted a generally antagonistic stance towards traders' objections in line with the country's 
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laws of segregation at the time, but did so inconsistently, such as its declaration of an effective 
six-month truce on enforcement in 1943 so traders could find alternative incomes (Beavon & 
Rogerson 1986, p. 205). For instance, Beavon and Rogerson (1986) documented the JCC's 
implicit sanction of the increasing number of black 'coffee-cart' traders that catered for the 
purchasing needs of the black workers in recognition of black unemployment, from the 
adoption of apartheid in 1948 until 1962 (Beavon & Rogerson 1986, p. 205). During this period, 
the JCC initially seemed to ignore the rising numbers of 'coffee carts', tacitly accepting the 
growing but 'illegal' permanence of their structures (ibid.). However, the JCC became 
progressively more authoritarian over the period, and began to carry out punitive enforcement 
and engage in legal action against the traders (ibid., pp. 205, 211). 
Further tightening of apartheid policies, coupled with pressure from national government and 
formal business; a long-standing municipal desire to clear the streets of traders (ibid., p. 205); 
and public health concerns, led to revised legislation in 1962. Also in 1962, the JCC obtained a 
court ruling in its favour, meaning that unlicensed traders were classed as trading 'illegally' in 
terms of its then new by-laws (ibid., p. 207). By then, there were 2 000 traders in the 
commercial and industrial areas of Johannesburg (Rogerson 1985 p. 2). In an antagonistic turn, 
the JCC reduced the number of coffee cart traders through intense surprise raids known as 
'blitzes'. By 1965, their number had been reduced to only 77 traders, and by 1967, they had all 
been removed (Beavon & Rogerson 1986, pp. 205, 207). The JCC continued to enforce its by-
laws strictly thereafter as apartheid controls tightened. However, from 1976, the state's 
attitude towards black traders softened somewhat (ibid., p. 214), and by 1980, there were 200 
to 250 unlicensed black traders in the city centre (Beavon & Rogerson 1982, p. 119; 1987, p. 
222), although they faced "repeated harassment" (Tomaselli 1985, p. 142). Given the political 
constraints, protests were limited to legal challenges to the enforcement regulations (Beavon 
& Rogerson 1986, pp. 211-213). The local government responded antagonistically by defending 
these actions in the courts; found new and alternative means to control trading (ibid., p. 206); 
and changed the street-trading legislation. 
From Regulation to Deregulation  
In the 1980s, a new concern in much of the global North for economic liberalisation was 
reflected in, for example, the wide use of the term 'deregulation' by Margaret Thatcher, the 
then British Prime Minister (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones 1997, p. 101; Leitner, Peck et al. 
2007), influencing the South African regime headed by State President Botha. This factor, 
coupled with the loosening of apartheid strictures, was to change the face of street trading in 
the Inner City dramatically. Firstly, the restructuring of the economy in the country led to rising 
black unemployment and an acceptance of the increased informalisation and deregulation of 
the South African economy. The state, then, supported further informalisation as a job 
creation strategy (Beavon & Rogerson 1982, 1987), and as a solution to unemployment and 
poverty (Wellings & Sutcliffe 1984; Rogerson 2003a). Secondly, in 1985, the President's Council 
approved the move to deregulate the informal sector, especially black businesses, by doing 
away with discriminatory legislation in favour of 'nurturing' economic development to address 
unemployment (Tager 1989, pp. 1-2). One such action was the declaration of the city centre of 
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Johannesburg as a desegregated free trade area in February 1986 (South African Institute of 
Race Relations 1988, p. 588). Further, although the state had not yet formally abolished 
apartheid, it had scrapped influx control into cities in July 1986 (RSA 1986a).  
Thus, as Johannesburg emerged "from apartheid's shadow" (Rogerson 1988, 2000), these new 
political freedoms sparked the sudden surge of growth of street traders in 1988 (Community 
Agency for Social Enquiry 1995b, p. 5). The expansion immediately impacted on the urban 
environment of the city centre, requiring new governance practices aligned to the reformist 
practices of State President Botha's government (which sat uncomfortably with the 
simultaneous repression of traders). The transition process was to be an uneven one. On the 
one hand, the JCC's Hawker Squad fined many traders in terms of the then by-laws in 1988 
(South African Institute of Race Relations 1989, pp. 603-604), but on the other hand, the State 
President lifted more trade restrictions in December 1989, other than for food vendors (ibid., 
p. 978). The South African Police Services and traffic officers continued to arrest traders for by-
law contraventions, 304 of them in January 1990 alone (South African Institute of Race 
Relations 1990, p. 989). Political liberalisation accelerated with the unbanning of the liberation 
movement and Nelson Mandela's release from prison in February 1990 (Davenport & Saunders 
2000). These events seemed to mark the shift of the city administration from an era of 
repression and antagonism to one of largely agonistic and constructive city-street trader 
engagements, with the JCC approving its first developmental street trading policy in 1990, as 
put forward by its Inter-Departmental Committee for Informal Trading proposal (Johannesburg 
City Council [JCC] 1990). The policy, in response to pressure from formal business, also 
incorporated "strict enforcement" (ibid., p. 186). 
From Policy to Projects 
The state removed the restrictive conditions of the Businesses Act (Act No. 71 of 1991), but 
that was not enough to lift traders out of the "informal economy of survival" (Rogerson 2003a, 
p. 169). By 1991, the JCC counted between 1 498 and 2 050 predominantly black traders in the 
city centre (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 1995b, p. 4), presenting a significant renewal 
challenge to the authorities, which were unable to tackle the challenge alone. In 1992, the city 
administration, businesses and the community formed the CJP to deal jointly with city centre 
renewal challenges (CJP 2006d). 
Further, agonistic engagement between the JCC's Urbanisation Department and the 
Metropolitan Chamber created the platform for new developmental policies to manage street 
trading, taxis and bad buildings, according to Sabera Bobat, the Policy Specialist and then 
Deputy Director of Economic Development within the Health, Housing and Urbanisation 
department between 1993 and 1997 (Interview, Bobat, 2012). In 1993, informal trading 
associations, and formal and informal businesses, approved a "ground-breaking" and "holistic" 
street trading policy, incorporating markets development, education, training and 
enforcement (Interview, Bobat, 2012). The JCC's implementation of the policy was to be in a 
fashion that won "the co-operation and support of the majority of citizens, including the 
informal traders themselves" (JCC 1993a, p. 330). As many Informal Market Trading Division 
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staff had been employees of the former ActStop (the then Action Committee to Stop Evictions, 
a civil society group rallying residents to protest against eviction from Inner City buildings), 
bottom-up development and agonistic interaction was the modus operandi and protest was 
minimal (Interview, Bobat, 2012) (see Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading Protests per 
Five-Year Period, 1993-2013 on page 377). 
From Projects to Policing 
The JCC implemented initiatives supporting street trading from 1993, such as the 
accommodation of trading within new major developments, the construction of the market in 
Hoek Street and elsewhere, and the restriction and prohibition of selected trading areas to 
prevent unmanaged trading within them thereby supporting the viability of the newly-created 
markets (JCC 1994b, f, g, h, i). However, the JCC could not fulfil its enforcement mandate as 
the national government had repealed all municipal by-laws in terms of the Businesses 
Amendment Act (Act No. 186 of 1993b) in 1993. The JCC thus needed new by-laws before it 
could undertake effective enforcement, which were negotiated in a forum of the city 
administration, formal businesses, associations and traders in January 1994 (CJP 2006a), and 
ultimately approved by the Council in April 1994 (JCC 1994g, p. 45) 
By mid-1994, the future conflictual nature of the relationship between the state, the informal 
trading associations and businesses began to emerge. The JCC responded by including a focus 
on "managing conflict" (JCC 1994f, pp. 8-9), between the parties, in its project-based approach 
to meet the challenges of street traders. Further, in October 1994, the JCC planned to manage 
the conflict not only though the enforcement of by-laws but also by understanding the 
development needs of the informal traders and their growth and impact on Johannesburg (JCC 
1994g, p. 45). Also in October 1994, the JCC approved the building of enforcement capacity in 
the form of uniformed street trading inspectors (JCC 1994a).  
However, restructurings of the Johannesburg city administration between December 1994 and 
the first local government elections in November 1995 (Province of PWV 1994) overshadowed 
development efforts. Thereafter, the Urban Development cluster of the SMLC and its Local 
Economic Development Directorate, formed from the former Informal Market Trading Division 
of the former JCC became responsible for the management of informal trading in the Inner City 
(Province of Gauteng 1995a; Skinner 1999, p. 16). The GJMC also played a lead role in the 
development of the sector although there was some confusion and contestation over the 
Inner City between various parts of the city administration (Tomlinson 1999, p. 28). 
Although the city administration continued to consult with street trading representatives, 
especially on project matters during this change period, informal trading associations wanted 
more. Nomi Muthialu, a specialist project manager consulting to the city administration on the 
implementation of informal trading projects for about six years from 1993 onwards, recalled 
that the associations protested against the city administration's project and policy processes 
and demanded "entry to council" in the form of meetings in 1995 (see Appendix 20 on page 
377). The associations also used other channels to protest, using mass street marches to force 
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the council to consult only with them (Interview, Muthialu, 2012). Although the city 
administration had demonstrated it was open to negotiation with formal and informal 
businesses (Sher 2013, pp. 25, 34), the two-fold increase in the number of traders over the 
previous four years (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 1995a, pp. 1, 3), made deep 
interaction increasingly impractical. The SMLC and GJMC, pressured by the imminent 
relocation of the seat of the provincial government from Pretoria to the city centre of 
Johannesburg (CJP 2006b), drove a by-law drafting process with affected groups at the end of 
1995 (Business Day 1996b), including the CJP, which by then represented the interests of 
formal businesses only (CJP 2006d). 
4 'From the Streets into Markets' (1996-2000) 
From Protest to Intervention, from Intervention to Protest  
Building on its agonistic practices in the previous years, the first democratically elected local 
government in Johannesburg in its first five-year term between 1996 and 2000, adopted 
largely agonistic principles in engagements with street traders, reflecting the new democratic 
principles. Notwithstanding agonistic and inclusive state-street trader consultations on the 
proposed by-laws, traders marched on 18 April 1996 in some of the first 'service delivery' 
protests in Johannesburg against the by-law creation process and the proposed clean-up of the 
Inner City (see Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-
2013 on page 377). The African Council for Hawkers and Informal Businesses claimed that the 
city administrators had not consulted them about the new by-laws submitted earlier, in 
January 1996, to the Gauteng Premier for approval (Interview, Bobat, 2012). The GPG 
convened a meeting with the city administration and the traders after the protest in response 
to the protestors, publicly rebuking the GJMC, said Bobat (Interview, Bobat, 2012). Thus, the 
GJMC could submit only the first and least controversial phase of the proposed by-laws dealing 
with the cleanliness and conduct of traders, inter alia, to the GPG, for approval (GJMC 1997b, 
1998b), which was partly attained in January 1997, a year after the initial submission to the 
GPG (Province of Gauteng 2004). The informal trading policy was also updated and approved 
by the GJMC in October 1996 to complement the impending by-laws (GJMC 1998b, p. 2). 
However, protest by property owners in 1997 about the ongoing lack of by-law enforcement 
failed to prevent the mothballing of some landmark buildings in the city centre, such as the 
Carlton Centre in 1997 (The Citizen 1997) (see Appendix 20 on page 377). 
While the SMLC continued to focus on market development to move traders from the 
pavements into markets, the CJP provided about 50 city blocks in the city centre with more 
intense urban management than the city administration could provide, including street trading 
management (CJP 2006c). In the spirit of the democratisation of the Inner City (Bremner 2000), 
and to devise solutions for renewal challenges jointly with affected parties in the public and 
private sectors, the GJMC set up the Inner City Committee in 1997, with power to make 
recommendations to the GJMC's Executive Committee (Urban Inc. 2011). Further, in April 
1997, the GJMC and the relevant MLCs established the Inner City Street Trading Interim Crisis 
Committee (ICSTICC) (GJMC 1997b) to find and recommend "practical management" solutions 
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for the street trading "crisis" (GJMC 1997b, 1998a). The provincially-driven Mayivuke renewal 
strategy, launched in July 1997 by the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, also exerted 
pressure on the city administration to implement improved urban management measures (The 
Star 1997c; Urban Inc. 2011), including a substantial component on street trading 
management (Johannesburg Inner City Development Forum 1997). 
Traders 'Up in Arms' about Foreigners 
Traders were "up in arms" (Peberdy & Talibe 1997) about the presence of foreign black African 
traders in their midst (Peberdy & Talibe 1997; Human Rights Watch 1998, p. 66 of 157). On the 
9 July 1997, they marched and issued a memorandum to the then Mayor, Isaac Mogase, 
protesting the SMLC's inclusion of foreigners in implementing market-related projects (see 
Appendix 20 on page 377). The state undertook forceful actions to quell anti-foreigner 
violence and protect lives and property (Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2008). 
In response, the SMLC and the traders agreed to revise criteria for the allocation of stalls 
tending to favour local traders (SMLC 1997f, p. 2). Later, in August 1997, the GJMC approved 
an urgent report to facilitate the establishment of a joint consultative forum of the city 
administration and an informal trading umbrella body (GJMC 1997b), known as the Gauteng 
Informal Sector Forum (GISFOR), to bring the associations, the SMLC and GJMC together to 
discuss development issues (Interview, Goldsmith, 2012). 
Resentment continued to brew, partly as foreign traders were seen as more profitable than 
local ones (Peberdy & Talibe 1997; Human Rights Watch 1998). Local traders attacked foreign 
traders in violent protests on at least four occasions, in August and October 1997 and 
September 1998 (see Appendix 20 on page 377). Notwithstanding the intimation of the Deputy 
Minister of Home Affairs that refugees were "trading illegally" (Human Rights Watch 1998, p. 
68 of 157), and an earlier agreement in March 1997 between the GPG's Safety and Security 
department and the African Council for Hawkers and Informal Businesses sanctioning the 
association's 'arrests' of 'illegal foreigners', the GPG condemned the violence (ibid. 1998, pp. 
27, 67 of 157). The Foreign Affairs ministry stated that South Africa had an obligation to help 
those that need protection in terms of accords with the Organisation for African Unity and the 
United Nations (M&G 1997a). This left local traders unimpressed, with police protection of 
foreigners thought to be ineffective anyway (Peberdy & Talibe 1997). Protestors that looted 
formal and informal retailers, damaged properties, assaulted people, and marched illegally 
were arrested by the police (Peberdy & Crush 1998, pp. 5, 6). These anti-foreigner tensions 
remained largely unresolved, foreshadowing those that flared up in 2008, albeit at a much 
larger scale across South Africa (see page 191).  
Further, the financial crisis of the GJMC in 1997 immobilised almost all its interventions in the 
sector (Tomlinson 1999), which might have contributed to a more effectively managed trading 
environment. By mid-1998, the SMLC was unable to appoint more staff as positions had been 
frozen; it could tackle only informal trading 'hotspots' across Johannesburg with its negligible 
seven staff and also had to compete for scarce project funding internally with limited success 
(Skinner 1999, pp. 16, 37). 
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State Prioritisation of the Inner City 
The Inner City, as the source of a quarter of the rates of Johannesburg (COJ 2001a, p. 124), 
received renewed political prioritisation signified by the establishment of a dedicated Inner 
City Office in April 1998 (COJ 2001a). The team experimented with new ways of city 
governance, largely on a project-based approach (Gotz & Simone 2001). Even enforcement of 
street trading by-laws and better management of Inner City traders, integral to the broader 
regeneration agenda (COJ 2001a, pp. 126-129), was tackled on a project basis, according to the 
'zero-tolerance' enforcement approach approved, but hardly implemented (GJMC 1997a). In 
1998, however, the city administration approved the plan for a more consistent, dedicated, 
multi-sectoral team for by-law enforcement as part of the wider city safety strategy under the 
control of the Inner City Office (GJMC 1998a, b).  
The impetus for the city administration to conduct concerted enforcement of street trading 
by-laws for the first time in a decade, however, was provided when the GPG proclaimed the 
combined set of by-laws for the MLCs in July 1998, including the authority for the creation of 
restricted and prohibited trading areas; confiscation of goods; and standardised penalties 
(Province of Gauteng 2004). Blitzes were undertaken as concentrated and intermittent 
operations, undertaken by collaborating officials from traffic police, building control, 
environmental health and other departments, on a street-by-street basis and informing 
traders in advance, according to Uriel Abrahamse, the first co-ordinator of street trading by-
law enforcement in the GJMC, from June 1998 (GJMC 1999b), until the late 1990s (Interview, 
Abrahamse, 2012).  
The GJMC's Inner City Informal Trade Management Plan of March and April 1999 reiterated 
the planned move of street traders "from the streets into markets" (GJMC 1999c, d), involving 
the creation of 5 000 trading spaces in three years through public and private sector 
partnerships, with traders paying nominal rentals. Key to the success of the plan though, was 
to ensure that as traders left the streets, those streets would remain clear. To that end, the 
SMLC approved 25 areas in the Inner City as restricted trading areas in March 1999 (GJMC 
1999a), with the requisite proclamation following in August (Province of Gauteng 1999). In 
response, traders protested when the GJMC then cleared traders from the restricted area in 
Braamfontein in September 1999 (Appendix 19: Informal Trader Associations on page 375). 
Although the traders' demands were not met, Motala (2002) noted that a mission by the GJMC 
officials and trader representatives "began a process of negotiations on the rights and 
responsibilities of street traders and city officials" (ibid., p. 27). 
To provide the institutional capacity to implement the management plan for informal trading, 
the GJMC set up the MTC in April 1999, as part of the formation of the soon-to-be-
implementation of the consolidated city administration of Johannesburg and iGoli 2002 (GJMC 
1999e). The MTC, a stand-alone entity, was responsible initially for the facilities management 
of markets and taxi ranks and later for their development facilitation, marketing and business 
development (Metropolitan Trading Company [MTC] 2004). Traders were optimistic about the 
prospect of owning shares in the markets, but this part of the plan had to be abandoned as it 
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contravened clauses of the new Municipal Finance Management Act (Pernegger 2001, pp. 12, 
79).  
By mid-1999, the city administration had engaged with over 1 200 traders in about 20 
formalised markets in the Inner City (refer Appendix 17: Formal Markets in Inner City, 1990s-
2013 on page 363). The COJ's plan was to charge traders a nominal one Rand per day (SMLC 
1997f). Such 'user-pays' driven endeavours met with great resistance. For instance, when the 
Yeoville Market opened its doors in December 1999 (Photograph 7.2 below), it was to a 
barrage of opposition in the media from both traders in the markets and 'illegal' traders in the 
surrounding streets, forcing the MTC to declare a moratorium on market rents for at least the 
first three months (Gotz & Simone 2001, pp. 8-10) (see Appendix 20 on page 377).  
5 'From Pavements to Profits' (2001-2005) 
Unicity and Inner City 'Anarchy' 
The period between 2001 and 2005 heralded the intensification of street trading by-law 
enforcement by the newly-established consolidated city administration, the COJ. The creation 
of the new COJ seemed to mark a shift towards a more antagonistic approach in response to 
increasing pressure from other spheres of government, property owners and the Inner City 
political committee to implement the earlier Mayivuke regeneration strategy of 1997 and 
preserve investments made by the COJ and the private sector. Half of the approximately 14 
protests in this period conveyed scepticism at the COJ's notion that markets could lift them out 
of poverty, "from pavements to profits" (Pernegger 2001).  
Photograph 7.2: Views of Yeoville Market 
 
Source: (Johannesburg Live 2015) 
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Other protests in this period were objections against the COJ's efforts to clear the Inner City of 
uncontrolled trading's 'anarchy', so-called by COJ respondents (Interviews 2012 and 2013) (see 
Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-2013 on page 
377). Against this backdrop, the COJ's propensity for agonistic engagements with traders 
seemed to dissipate. 
In 2001, the then new Executive Mayor of Johannesburg, Amos Masondo, declared the Inner 
City as one of six priorities as he took office. The then new Johannesburg Development Agency 
took over most of the functions of the former Inner City Office in April 2001 (COJ 2001a, p. 
122), whilst the still-new MTC developed markets. The multi-sectoral Inner City Task Force of 
30 officials (COJ 2002g), located within the Office of Region 8, enforced street trading and 
other by-laws, frequently in a blitz approach (COJ 2004m, pp. 13-20). In response to a 2 000-
strong protest march in July 2001 against the alleged confiscation of stock and the lack of a 
management plan, the COJ displayed some agonistic interaction with the Gauteng Hawkers 
Association, which resulted in the demarcation of trading spaces on pavements with the help 
of the police in October 2001 (Motala 2002, pp. 25-26). 
In the turn to a more antagonistic stance, Fundi Khabakazi, a former ANC activist and trade 
unionist with leadership roles in politics in Johannesburg since the late 1990s, said that 
councillors thought that uncontrolled street trading had become a "nuisance", "a danger and a 
hazard" and a "free-for-all'' (Interview, Khabakazi, 2012). Hence, the COJ fortified its street 
trading by-law enforcement abilities by incorporating this function into the then new JMPD 
(Interview, Abrahamse, 2012), established on 1 November 2001 in accordance with the iGoli 
2002 plan (GJMC 1999e). The Inner City Task Force continued its Inner City work with the new 
JMPD, the police and Home Affairs.  
The impact of additional enforcement was soon felt by the traders, particularly when the JMPD 
intensified its enforcement of street trading by-laws in February 2002 (COJ 2002g). In one 
instance, protestors were baton-charged, thus prompting the Gauteng Hawkers Association to 
approach the High Court for an urgent interdict to stop the enforcement (news24 2002a) (see 
Appendix 20 on page 377, February-March). The court ruled in favour of the traders 
association, compelling the City Manager, Pascal Moloi, to comment to the media that the COJ 
was "dealing with anarchy" (Sunday Independent 2002). However, the High Court set aside its 
order on the 20 February allowing the JMPD to return to enforcement in at least the city 
centre. That day, traders laid charges of theft, harassment and bribery against some JMPD 
officers (AllAfrica.com 2002).  
Although city administration-street trader relations were hostile, the COJ incorporated street 
trading into its Joburg 2030 strategy of February 2002 (COJ 2003e). Joburg 2030 said street 
traders could add a unique "African flavour" to Johannesburg as a world-class city as long as 
the extent of trading was reduced, its negative image overcome and enforcement undertaken 
on a "zero-tolerance" basis (COJ 2002d, pp. 84, 111, 123). Whilst some said that Joburg 2030 
favoured the interests of investors over those of the poor (Emdon 2003, p. 228), others argued 
that the COJ's complex task to "manage the chaos" of the many Inner City interest groups was 
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a little accredited one (Lipietz 2004). The JMPD had assembled a dedicated by-law 
enforcement unit of 115 officers by February 2002 for the enforcement of restricted and 
prohibited areas of the street trading by-laws, as well as other related by-laws (COJ 2002g).  
Joburg 2030's follow-on Informal Trading Development Programme, in 2002, consolidated all 
informal trading plans made since the late 1990s into one city-wide plan for informal trading 
(COJ 2002a; 2006h, p. 178). This plan reiterated the assumption that traders would graduate to 
progressively more formal trading spaces and to formal employment, reducing the demand for 
trading spaces on the streets (COJ 2002a, pp. 6-7). In apparent acknowledgment of the anti-
enforcement protests, the COJ delayed rigorous enforcement for a few months until after 
sufficient implementation of the Informal Trading Development Programme plan had been 
achieved, as planned for April 2003 (ibid., pp. 17-18). Hence, other than protests about forced 
removals from the World Summit on Sustainable Development conference sites in August 
2002, the nine or more protests from mid-2002 to the end of 2003 tended to mostly be against 
market-development and management rather than enforcement (see Appendix 20 on page 
377). For instance, in August 2002, despite rental concessions previously made by the MTC in 
the form of halving the Yeoville market's rentals (COJ 2002g), Yeoville traders protested. 
Enforcement, however constrained, continued throughout. For instance, the JMPD's 'Nude 
Ants' campaign was launched on 18 September 2002 and it was a twelve-month multi-pronged 
campaign with the South African Police Services dealing with all by-law violations including 
"illegal trading and other crimes" (COJ 2003b, pp. 76-77; 2003j). On 2 October, the MTC used 
the private security firm, the 'Red Ants', to evict non-paying tenants from Yeoville Market 
(Business Day 2002). 
Metro Mall, Sinkholes and Blitzes 
As part of the renewal work, the new Metro Mall market and taxi rank in the Inner City opened 
officially in January 2003 (COJ 2002e) (Photograph 7.3 on page 186. The project was the MTC's 
flagship development and the largest of its kind in Johannesburg, catering for about 600 
traders, 3 000 taxis and other formal retailers (ibid.). In February 2003, restating the 
importance of the Inner City economy to Africa and the city, the COJ approved the Economic 
Development Unit's repackaging of the Inner City Regeneration Strategy Business Plan (COJ 
2004m, Annexe AA8). Two of the five pillars of the plan emphasised the importance of dealing 
with areas of severe decline known as "sinkholes" and "intensive urban management" (ibid.), 
identifying dedicated capacity within the JMPD and the Inner City Task Force to enforce by-
laws and restricted trade zones (ibid.).  
The taxi associations located in Metro Mall disagreed with the MTC's application of the COJ's 
'user-pays' principle, one abhorred by Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2002) for perpetuating 
the 'divided city'. The taxi associations objected to their omission from state subsidies for 
public transport operators and matters came to a head in April 2003 when they refused to pay 
their fees for the rank (see Appendix 20 on page 377). The MTC then locked them out of the 
rank and only reopened it after it had received payment, but this issue was to resurface in 
2004 (see Appendix 20 on page 377). 
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Revised By-laws, Metro Mall Lock-Out and Cages 
Mayor Masondo made it clear in his State of the City Address on 28 January 2004 that the COJ 
saw markets as a way to to limit "unfettered informal trading" (COJ 2004h). The COJ's 'user-
pays' policy seems to have taken hold, with about "85 percent of taxi associations and informal 
traders paying their rentals timeously" (ibid.).  
Photograph 7.3: Three Views of Metro Mall Market and Taxi Rank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ludwig Hansen Architects and Urban Designers (2001) and COJ (2015b) 
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The pursuit of the concept of the "orderly city" (COJ 2006h, p. 226), remaining high on the 
COJ's agenda, saw the establishment of a municipal court, a new safety strategy for the JMPD 
jointly with the police and a revision of the street trading by-laws in 2004 (COJ 2003a, 2004h, 
2006h). Although enforcement was the COJ's raison d'être as Councillor Sol Cowan, the 
Chairperson of the Inner City political committee between 2000 and 2005, put it (Interview, 
Cowan, 2012), the COJ seemed to have no capacity to tackle the sheer scale of congestion of 
traders (ibid.). Atkins (Interview, 2012) pointed out that the success of the MTC's markets 
relied heavily on the JMPD's effective enforcement of the proclaimed restricted and prohibited 
trading areas to keep the areas outside markets clear from pavement trading but, 
disconcertingly for the MTC's viability according to Atkins, the JMPD did not regard such 
enforcement as a priority (Interview, Atkins, 2012). 
Trader and taxi factions were quick to take advantage of the COJ's internal dissension to boost 
their own power (Thulare 2004, pp. 17-18). Atkins recalled that the concessions that the COJ 
did make were not enough; various associations objected to politicians that they had not been 
consulted when in reality they had been but "they just weren't getting to hear what it was they 
wanted to hear …[even though]…a lot of concessions were made over various things" 
(Interview, Atkins, 2012). 
For instance, the taxi associations of Metro Mall had, once again, been locked out of Metro 
Mall in May 2004 owing to non-payment of user fees (see Appendix 20 on page 377). The 
Mayor, seemingly conflict-averse and at the instigation of the taxi associations according to 
Atkins, requested that the MTC reopen the rank at once (Interview, Atkins, 2012). However, 
the issue under contention was never resolved despite a number of seemingly agonistic 
engagements thereafter chaired by various political leaders (ibid.). Rentals were increasingly 
withheld from the MTC, even in other ranks and markets. Hence, the MTC limped along, 
needing to be heavily subsidised, until its restructuring in 2012 (COJ 2012c, p. 8; and Interview, 
Atkins, 2012). The GPG's proclamation of the consolidated by-laws of the former MLCs in May 
2004 (Province of Gauteng 2004), supported more diligent enforcement by the JMPD. Adding 
to the ongoing enmity between the COJ and the traders, the MTC laid charges against 
Mannetjies Solomon of the Gauteng Hawkers Association in June 2004 for extorting money 
from traders whilst purporting to allocate stalls on behalf of the COJ (AllAfrica.com 2004).  
In trying to augment the slow pace of development of the off-street formal markets in terms of 
the Informal Trading Development Programme approved earlier in 2002, the COJ's Economic 
Development Unit and the MTC began implementing the 'cages' initiative in August 2004 (COJ 
2004f). According to Atkins, the initiative was intended to formalise the unmanaged trading on 
the pavements by providing on-street facilities, which satisfied the traders, as they would not 
have to be relocated into off-street markets (Atkins 2015). After months of planning, 
negotiations and consultations with informal traders, formal businesses, traders associations 
and other affected groups, the traders chose their favoured stall from three prototypes 
manufactured for the initiative, and agreed on the location of the stalls. The stalls were called 
‘cages’ as they could be folded up at night and locked (see Photograph 7.4 on page 188), 
providing the traders with much-needed storage space for their stock (Atkins 2015). Almost 
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immediately though, the initiative was doomed to failure as some formal businesses lodged 
legal challenges against the COJ, ultimately forcing it to stop the initiative before it had been 
completed (Interview, Dinat, 2012) (see Appendix 20 on page 377). 
Around this time, too, in late 2004, the JMPD launched Operation Token Days, a 500-day "high 
profile" series of blitzes to enforce multiple by-laws (COJ 2006h, p. 228). Blitzes continued to 
be a popular enforcement tactic in the context of Inner City regeneration, as they tackled a 
number of safety issues and by-law infringements simultaneously as an adjunct to systematic 
enforcement (McMichael 2015). However, Gerneke observed that the lack of the JMPD's 
"command and control", pervasive in policing culture, combined with the JMPD's frequent 
restructurings meant that the JMPD was "totally unstable" with systematic by-law 
enforcement being difficult to carry out (Interview, Gerneke, 2012). Evidently, some traders 
were dissatisfied with market management, enforcement and the installation of the 'cages' 
and staged 'violent' protests in September and in November 2004 (see Appendix 20 on page 
377). Although the COJ engaged with traders, Cowan felt compelled to condemn publicly the 
bullying, looting and destruction by protestors (Cowan 2004). Around the end of the year, 
shortly before Christmas in 2004, 'illegal' traders invaded the MTC's recently redeveloped 
Commissioner Street market rousing objections from both formal and informal traders' against 
the COJ's inability to keep areas clear of 'illegal' traders (see Appendix 20 on page 377). 
Photograph 7.4: View of 'Cages' in Jeppe Street near Troye Street, City Centre 
 
Source: Photograph by Tanya Zack, 2010, with permission 
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To provide a constructive channel for traders to deal with their concerns, the COJ set up a 
monthly forum in mid-2005, but traders felt the forum was a window dressing exercise and 
limited to "briefings" (M&G 2005) about the COJ's plans for restricted and prohibited trading 
areas in terms of the by-laws (ibid.). However, unlikely to have supported agonistic 
interactions within the forum, the JMPD also launched Operation Jaywalker at the beginning of 
August 2005 to address the "culture of lawlessness" on the streets. In its first week, it 
confiscated goods from over 100 traders, arrested 140 people and issued a number of fines 
(The Citizen 2005). Adding pressure to reduce uncontrolled trading in designated areas, the 
JMPD, the Economic Development Unit and the Environmental Health department entered 
into operational agreements with performance targets with each other during the year (COJ 
2005a, p. 24). Although it might have seemed the COJ focused on in this period, it also 
facilitated the skills development of some traders ((The Star 2005), proven to substantially 
boost their business acumen (Radebe 2007). 
6 'Seen as a Nuisance' (2006-2010) 
More Blitzes, Inner City Charter and Smart Cards 
The period, from 2006 to 2010, saw the continuation of the largely antagonistic state-street 
trader relationship as the COJ continued to prioritise by-law enforcement, the registration of 
traders and the construction and management of markets. Around two thirds of the 
approximately 14 protests in this period tended to be anti-enforcement, or anti-markets, with 
other protests reflecting the emerging concern for the rights of traders to operate on the 
streets (see Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-2013 
on page 377). Although progress with Inner City regeneration initiatives had been made (COJ 
2006c, pp. 190-203), the national government demonstrated antipathy towards uncontrolled 
street trading reportedly seeing it "as a nuisance" (Cape Argus 2006).  
Over 59 percent of Inner City business owners and managers also expressed negativity 
towards unmanaged street trading in 2006 (COJ 2006e, pp. 29, 40). Mayor Masondo, then in 
his second term of office, echoed public sentiment by opening every Mayoral Committee 
meeting with a "homily" on "the shocking levels of disorder in the Inner City", recalled Philip 
Harrison, the then Executive Director of the Development Planning and Urban Management 
directorate. Despite the COJ's distraction by its relatively minor institutional adjustments in 
2006 and 2007, its enforcement measures over the next five-year period reflected the Mayor's 
"very hard line" against Inner City "chaos" (Interview, Harrison, 2012). The fit of the 
Development Planning department with the Offices of the Regions responsible for urban 
management and enforcement, was an awkward one. The lack of clarity of the purpose and 
role of the 'urban management' function made service delivery difficult. Nonetheless, it was in 
the Inner City that the urban management function was the strongest, implementing a block-
by-block approach to secure order. The "zero tolerance" approach towards traders in 
Johannesburg by the JMPD, working with the Office of the Region, netted the impoundment of 
6 709 items of stock and the issuing of 6 884 fines for trading in non-designated areas in 
Johannesburg over the year ending in June 2006 (COJ 2007b, pp. 58-59). The JMPD, in 
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September 2006, launched Operation Hleka ('Clean Up'), saturating the city centre with 1 300 
patrolling officers (The Star 2006b). The JMPD also undertook the first blitz of its ongoing 
multi-year Operation Thiba ('Prevent' or 'Stop'), involving the South African Police Services and 
other regulatory agencies and included action against "illegal" traders (ioL News Online [ioL] 
2006; COJ 2007e; ioL 2009b).  
The COJ also pursued developmental goals in the training of 1 222 traders in food hygiene in 
2006 (COJ 2007b, p. 49), and 519 traders in business skills (ibid., p. 103). Nonetheless, the 
newly-formed Johannesburg Traders Crisis Committee (JTCC) objected to the COJ's alleged 
persecution of traders and corruption within the JMPD in 2006 (Elias 2006; The Star 2006b, a) 
(see Appendix 20 on page 377). The COJ reassured traders of its ongoing commitment to 
informal traders, evidenced by the numerous meetings and workshops between traders and 
the COJ, the training of traders and the effort to overcome corruption (The Star 2006a). The 
COJ seemed, however, to struggle to maintain a balance between development and 
enforcement imperatives, reminding the traders' committee that the enforcement of by-laws 
benefitted all users of the Inner City (ibid.). The COJ, then, continued to conduct enforcement 
blitzes in the first half of 2007 (M&G 2007). 
The COJ's revised draft policy for informal trading of July 2007 seems to have been overtaken 
by events following on from the multi-stakeholder Inner City Summit held two months before, 
in May 2007, as the culmination of an eight-month long set of engagements with multiple 
Inner City stakeholders (COJ 2007d). Prominent themes in the resultant new Inner City 
Regeneration Charter of July 2007 that guided the COJ's work in the Inner City included the 
betterment of urban management, and again, the development of street trading (ibid.). The 
regulative dimension of 'urban management' proved fairly successful (Interview, Harrison, 
2012). However, progress on strategic attention to trading seemed to lag, said Graeme Gotz, 
the then Specialist of Strategy and Policy in the COJ's Central Strategy Unit in the Office of the 
Executive Mayor from 2006 to 2009. Gotz thought that the Central Strategy Unit's strained 
relations with the Economic Development Unit accounted for the Charter's limited attention to 
informal trading development. The Charter dealt with trading "only to the extent that the 
Inner City Charter unavoidably couldn't not deal with it" (Interview, Gotz, 2012). Although the 
COJ undertook in the Charter to provide a completed Smart Card system registering all traders 
by the end of 2007 to facilitate market management and development, training and 
enforcement (COJ 2007d, pp. 25-26), progress was slow as the COJ had issued only 665 Smart 
Cards by August 2008 (Tissington 2009, p. 19). In October 2007, the politicians reportedly 
approved the Informal Trading Policy (COJ 2009a, p. 8). 
'We Must Make it Hurt' 
The Regional Director of the Office of Region F, Nkosinathi Mthethwa, appointed in April 2007 
(COJ 2010c, p. 50), was reputed to have a hands-on approach and strong views about the need 
for enforcement in the Inner City. In October 2007, he said that inadequate by-law 
enforcement was a "disease" and that the COJ was like "a snake without poison" (2007c). 
Believing the COJ had to be far tougher on by-law infringements, he said "[w]e must make it 
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hurt" (ibid.). Mthethwa adopted a multi-agency approach to block-by-block "spring blitzes" 
(COJ 2007j), in September and November 2007. In December, Hillbrow was the target of 
Operation Shanyela ('Sweep it Up'), part of the effort to deal with the 900 tons of monthly 
waste illegally dumped in the Inner City, with informal traders receiving 3 724 refuse bags and 
about 86 citations for health violations (COJ 2007f, 2008b). Keeping the pressure on, in 
February 2008, the JMPD ran another five special enforcement campaigns in the city centre 
(COJ 2008b).  
'If the Inner City Fails, the Whole City will Fall' 
Although the year 2008 saw 1 067 informal traders trained in food safety and by-law 
compliance city-wide and the extension, again, of the completion of the Smart Card 
management system to June 2008 (COJ 2008o), the COJ did not stop its enforcement of by-
laws. Uncontrolled street trading prompted Mthethwa to say, "if the inner city fails, the whole 
city will fall" in March 2008 (COJ 2008m), motivating for the continued focus on enforcement. 
Soon thereafter, the One Voice of All Hawkers Association (OVAHA) marched in protest to 
Mayor Masondo and the MTC on 24 April 2008 (see Appendix 20 on page 377). Despite the 
friction, the COJ planned to meet with traders on 29 April 2008 to redraft the street trading by-
laws (The Citizen 2008). The outcome is not known as events were overtaken by violent anti-
foreigner protests not specific to trading alone (Appendix 19: Informal Trader Associations on 
page 375), erupting across the country in May 2008, based on citizens' perceptions that 
foreigners took jobs away from local citizens (Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
2008).  
The COJ continued to struggle to balance its development and enforcement goals. The update 
on the Inner City Charter announced that two more markets were coming on line in 
accordance with designs consulted with, and approved by, beneficiaries (COJ 2008q). In terms 
of the Regional Urban Management Plan for Region F, including the Inner City area (COJ 
2010c, p. 51), the COJ refined the urban management function and included a partnership-
driven Integrated Inner City Safety and Security Plan (COJ 2009g; 2010c, pp. 66-71). Now, 
explicitly linking development with enforcement for successful urban management and service 
delivery, the Office of Region F stated that it was "essential that there is political will and 
capacity to remove informal traders from all areas other than designated markets" (COJ 2010c, 
p. 69). 
To ensure alternatives to trading on the street were provided, the COJ announced its Master 
Business Plan for Linear Markets for the Inner City of Johannesburg in October 2008 (COJ 
2008r). The plan was the result of a number of, presumably agonistic, certainly consultative, 
interactions over eight months between the MTC, 700 traders, trader representatives, the 
private sector, the South African Police Services, ward councillors, COJ departments and 
agencies (COJ 2008r; 2008w; COJ 2008s, 2009j). The plan was to alleviate congestion and 
enable by-law enforcement through the creation of linear markets targeting initially 21 streets 
or areas. The plan, once implemented, would accommodate 3 538 of the 6 815 traders in the 
Inner City (ibid.). The MTC also reiterated its intention to register each trader through the 
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Smart Card system (ibid.). Markets were seen by some as a positive management approach 
(Bantubonse 2008), benefitting traders by ensuring stability (Lund & Skinner 2005) and 
enabling their 'graduation' from the informal to the formal economy (COJ 2008n, p. 132). 
Some were sceptical though about the ability of markets to achieve such benefits (Rasmussen 
2007; du Toit 2008; Rogerson 2008; Simone 2009). 
Preparations for the 2010 June-July FIFA World Cup in South Africa buoyed up most of the 
country during 2009 with the GPG publishing special by-laws for the management of street 
trading at events in February 2009 (Province of Gauteng 2009). Traders, upset at being 
excluded from the benefits of the event (Çelik 2011), protested at least three times, including a 
thousand-strong march to Mayor Masondo in the lead up to the soccer event (see Appendix 20 
on page 377, see 2009 to May 2010). Ongoing fractious relations, after the COJ's daily multi-
disciplinary enforcement measures to "alleviate any kind of lawlessness in the inner city" (COJ 
2010a), were also evident in the mass actions of late 2009, such as the South African Informal 
Traders Forum (SAITF) protest against the COJ's ongoing by-law enforcement and purported 
human rights' infringements in August 2009 (see Appendix 20 on page 377). In December 
2009, OVAHA demanded the closure of the MTC, an investigation into alleged corruption 
within the JMPD and the provision of more trading spaces in the city centre (see Appendix 20 
on page 377).  
In an effort at agonistic engagements, the Department of Economic Development created and 
chaired the Johannesburg Informal Trading Forum in 2009 with traders, municipal 
departments and agencies, formal business associations and political committees represented 
(Matjomane 2013, p. 55). The forum's purpose was to facilitate the participation of affected 
parties in the streamlining of the by-laws and their implementation, to create a new policy and 
to advise the COJ on the implementation of sites and stalls and operational management (COJ 
2010v). However, arguably, the forum's true purpose was to "divide and rule and box ticking" 
(Matjomane 2013, p. 81). So, although the Department of Economic Development and the 
MTC had two more street markets nearly finalised by May 2009 (COJ 2009j), and had 
organised adult basic education and training for 500 traders (COJ 2009k), agonistic interaction 
seems to have been limited. The COJ adopted, again, an informal trading policy in June 2009, a 
revision of its 2007 version (COJ 2009a), allowing trading to happen only in designated areas as 
declared by the COJ. Tissington (2009, p. 16) reported that the COJ also approved new by-laws 
in 2009, but questioned the legitimacy of enforcement as formal proclamation could not be 
confirmed (Tissington 2009, p. 16).  
Friction within the COJ worked against possible agonistic engagements with traders. In August 
2010, four MTC board members "resigned against politicians meddling in corporate 
governance matters" (Sowetan 2010), when the COJ's Mayoral Committee ordered the 
reinstatement of the then Chief Executive Officer (Alfred Sam, now deceased), who had been 
dismissed for alleged misconduct (ibid.). Such confusion undermined the COJ's already tenuous 
link with street traders, according to Simon Letsoalo-Ngcobo (Interview, 2012), a senior COJ 
public transportation official, as it played on the development-enforcement tensions within 
the COJ's policy. The tension highlighted that traders have high expectations of the ANC, 
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insisting that it is 'their' government, making emotional appeals to the state to "support… 
and… protect" them (Interview, Letsoalo-Ngcobo, 2012), yet whilst protesting against the state 
at the same time (City Press 2010; M&G 2010). 
7 'Tempers, Tussles and Traders' (Post-2010) 
'Business Unusual' 
The informal trading story would be incomplete without a brief discussion of the strife post-
2010 that culminated in Operation Clean Sweep and the subsequent Constitutional Court 
challenge in 2013 with extensive coverage in the press of the resultant "tempers, tussles and 
traders" (The Star 2013i). The new Executive Mayor, Councillor Mpho Parks Tau, who took 
office in May 2011, declared a new approach to service delivery of "Business Unusual" (COJ 
2011{). Nonetheless, traders continued to protest with about 80 percent of the 11 protests 
between 2011 and 2013 being rights-based ones (see Appendix 20: Inner City Informal Trading 
Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-2013 on page 377). Although the COJ's policy statements 
did uphold people's need to make a living, Matjomane (2013) found that the COJ's support 
seemed unforthcoming with the Johannesburg Informal Trading Forum meeting but once in 
2011, and traders seeing it as a divisive forum (ibid., pp. 56, 71). 
Traders seemed to be beyond enforcement due to the complexity and scale of the street 
trading sector. Traders also knowingly broke the rules, said Nazira Cachalia, the Manager of 
the City Safety Programme, originally in the Economic Development Unit in 2001 and then in 
the Office of the Chief of Police of the JMPD in 2006 (Interview, Cachalia and Mamonyane, 
2012). Echoing Cachalia's concern, the Public Protector purportedly stated in August 2011 that 
traders and others had gotten away with by-law violations leading to "anarchy in the city" (The 
Star 2011a), in response to the COJ's municipal court's dismissal of around 16 000 of 21 000 
notices for illegal street trading as they contained falsified and incorrect information,. On 14 
March 2012, new Informal Trading By-Laws were promulgated, again, underscoring the role of 
designated areas and markets (Province of Gauteng 2012). The COJ received four formal 
objections and requests to march against the proposed changes to the by-laws from the 
Concerned Hawkers Group and OVAHA between May and November 2012 (see Appendix 20 
on page 377). The relationship between the COJ and traders became progressively antagonistic 
when the COJ allegedly reneged on an agreement reached with associations in June 2012 to 
use enforcement only as "the last resort" (The New Age 2012).  
Other senior managers and politicians in the COJ were also frustrated about the apparent 
inability to deal effectively with "the sad reality that the Inner City is on a slippery slope to 
potentially becoming a slum" (COJ 2012l, p. 1). This concern, expressed by Councillor Roslynn 
Greeff, the then Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) for Development Planning and 
Urban Management, to the Development Planning Committee in October 2012 (ibid.), was the 
genesis of the imminent Operation Clean Sweep. The report put forward that the "old ways of 
doing things have not worked" in addressing challenges of dirt, crime, congestion, illegal 
trading, building invasions, homelessness, anti-social behaviour, neglect and the COJ's 
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inadequate urban management (ibid.). It also proposed that the Mayor would spearhead a 
Mayoral Clean Sweep Inner City Initiative (ibid.), that would focus on getting the basics right, 
including enforcement, in a coordinated way. Thereafter, the Mayor would hand the initiative 
over to the MMC of the Development Planning (ibid.). The earliest 'Clean Sweep' operation 
took place in October 2012 (The Star 2012b), but was a limited campaign possibly due to 
institutional restructuring of the COJ at the time (COJ 2011n), which also included the 
Johannesburg Property Company absorption of the MTC's market management functions in 
November 2012 (COJ 2012c, p. 8). 
National government, also, seemed frustrated about unmanaged trading. The Department of 
Trade and Industry signalled a profound intensification of enforcement with its Draft Licensing 
of Businesses Bill (RSA 2013) in March 2013. The Bill proposed that the state would establish 
an inspectorate of police, metropolitan police and peace officers, and have the right to 
question, search, fine and jail informal traders who contravened the law (ibid.). Traders and 
their associations, formal businesses, political opposition parties and others were united in 
criticising the bill's impracticality, xenophobic stance, sloppiness, expense and regression to 
apartheid-style rule (M&G 2013a). As of January 2015, the Bill had still not proceeded past 
draft stage (PoliticsWeb 2015).  
In the lead up to Operation Clean Sweep of 2013, OVAHA stepped up the number of protests 
planning five marches between June and August 2013 to demand the right to trade and to 
trading spaces (see Appendix 20 on page 377). The GPG responded by proposing the 
development of a uniform policy across the province as informed by talks in July 2013 with a 
new umbrella body of informal traders (Province of Gauteng 2013), whilst the new head of the 
JMPD strengthened by-law enforcement endeavours (ioL 2013b). 
Operation Clean Sweep and Beyond 
The Operation Clean Sweep story unfolded over a ten-week period, since its start on 1 October 
2013 (see Appendix 21 on page 390 for the detailed timeline). In summary, the COJ planned 
the operation to start on 1 October as a response to complaints from pedestrians, formal 
businesses and other members of the public in the Inner City according to the office of Roslynn 
Greeff (The Star 2013c). The operation targeted informal trading, which was said to be in a 
state of "unmanaged chaos" (ibid.), as well as crime and grime issues, illegal dumping and 
littering, building and land invasions and illegal services connections (The Star 2013h). A 
coordinated inter-departmental multi-disciplinary team consisting of Public Safety, JMPD, JRA, 
City Power, Joburg Water, Environmental Health, the Johannesburg Property Company, Home 
Affairs and SARS (to address the issue of counterfeit goods) carried out the operation (The Star 
2013b), according to the Integrated Inner City Safety and Security Plan for Region F.  
Reminiscent of violent state repression of street trading commonplace in other cities such as 
Dhaka (Etzold 2015), the JMPD purportedly heavy-handedly evicted between 2 000 and 8 000 
traders from stalls and streets (Business Day 2013a; M&G 2013c; The Star 2013c). The COJ 
simultaneously cleared illegal and legal stalls from the streets and re-demarcated sites (The 
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Citizen 2013a). The COJ's process of verification of permits showed that it had issued only 800 
permits to traders for appropriate and legitimate trading sites (M&G 2013c). However, there 
were about 2 000 to 3 000 permits in circulation that appeared to be fraudulent, duplicated or 
related to sites that had been sublet to others (The New Age 2013a).  
Matters between the COJ and traders were tense, each accusing the other of telling lies 
(Business Day 2013a). A number of street protests and ultimatums to the COJ ensued (City 
Press 2013b, d; ioL 2013a; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2013a). The COJ and 
various representatives of the informal traders agreed to try to break the impasse (COJ 2013k). 
However, after about ten separate meetings between 25 October and 8 November 2013, they 
failed to arrive at mutually beneficial solutions and the talks collapsed (see Appendix 21 on 
page 390). 
Many organisations, as variable as the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa, 
departments of the Witwatersrand University and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) vilified the operation as being 'anti-poor' (Harrison, Charlton et al. 2013; Socio-
Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2013a; The Citizen 2013b). The traders sought 
immediate relief from the High Court on 26 November 2013, which postponed their 
application agreeing with the COJ's view that the matter was not urgent (Business Day 2013g). 
The traders' appealed successfully for a temporary stay of the interdict from the Constitutional 
Court on 5 December 2013 (The Star 2014c). The COJ had to allow their return to their trading 
spots in the interim without interference from the JMPD (The Citizen 2013c; The Star 2013d). 
The Constitutional Court's final ruling on 4 April 2014 declared the COJ's actions as 
procedurally and legislatively flawed and a violation of the traders' right to trade (The Star 
2014a). 
As a constructive follow up to the earlier censure in the press of Operation Clean Sweep 
(Harrison et al. 2013), the University of Witwatersrand's School of Architecture and Planning 
drafted a series of reports, collectively dubbed 'AFTRAX' (Alternative Formalities, 
Transnationalism and Xenophobia) (2014a, b, c, d, e). The intention of AFTRAX was to help 
break the impasse between the COJ and traders and provide an alternative approach to street 
trading management.  
Although the COJ did not stop enforcing its by-laws, it did modify its way of declaring restricted 
and prohibited trading areas in May 2014 (COJ 2014e). The COJ also re-instigated discussions 
in July 2014, for a "lasting" solution to the ongoing challenges posed by the street trading 
sector (The Citizen 2014a). Talks took place over a number of weeks (CityBuzz 2014), but 
despite apparent goodwill amongst the parties, the matter was reportedly unresolved by 
August 2014 (The Star 2014b), and the GPG's Department of Economic Development planned 
to convene a session of municipalities and 37 informal trading associations on 21 September 
2014 (The Citizen 2014b). Although the outcome is not known, what seems apparent is that a 
turn to an agonistic cycle is unlikely, given the COJ's launch of Operation Ke Molao (It's the 
Law) in February 2015, seemingly a repeat of Operation Clean Sweep (TimesLive 2015a; 
Webster 2015). Further, Zack's (2015b) view of events post-Operation Clean Sweep indicates 
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that "there is little evidence that Operation Clean Sweep has taught the COJ any new lessons; 
in fact it seems that it is deepening the old ways" (ibid.). Bénit-Gbaffou (2015a) of the Centre 
for Urbanism and Built Environment Studies (CUBES) of the University of the Witwatersrand, in 
protest against the COJ's Operation Clean Sweep and supporting some of the informal trading 
associations, acknowledged the complexities of the COJ's governance of street trading and 
proposed recommendations that the COJ could consider. However, despite many attempts in 
2014 and 2015, intractable issues continued to block any agreements (Bénit-Gbaffou 2016, p. 
1111), and the COJ seems to continue its emphasis on the regulation of the sector rather than 
its development, as of the end of 2015 (eNCA 2015; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South 
Africa 2015a; Zack 2015a). 
8 In Closing 
Six main observations about the application of agonistic municipal governance emerge from 
this narrative of the street-based struggles of informal traders in the Inner City, from apartheid 
times to Operation Clean Sweep in 2013, and based on the synthesis of the conflict 
management in this story in Table 7.1 on page 197. 
Firstly, there is no linear progression in municipal responses to informal trading and related 
protests but rather ongoing cycles and swings between antagonism and agonism. These 
responses have swung, in phases, from antagonistic state practices during apartheid, to 
agonistic ones between 1985 and 2001 and seemingly increasingly back to antagonism from 
2002 onwards. The history of the city administration and the traders is a long and much-
contested one certainly since the adoption of apartheid in 1948, with simultaneous 
authoritarian but laissez-faire controls of street trading. The local government maintained 
stringent control of the minimal trading allowable in the city centre. However, from 1976, the 
state relaxed its controls, and by 1980, there were 200 to 250 unlicensed black traders in the 
city centre, although they faced 'repeated harassment'. Given the political constraints then, 
protests by black traders were limited to legal challenges to the enforcement regulations. The 
local government responded antagonistically by defending these actions in the courts, found 
new and alternative means to control trading and changed the street-trading legislation. 
However, the city administration seemed to engage agonistically with traders but this 
approach seemed short-lived only to revert increasingly to antagonism form 2002 onwards. 
Clearly, one needs a long historical perspective on these changes, as a lack of 'institutional 
memory' might lead to overstated and simplified conclusions around the shifts between 
antagonism and agonism.  
Secondly, local agonistic practices must be contextualised in terms of wider processes. In the 
1980s, for instance, even before the ending of apartheid, there was a shift towards agonistic 
conflict management. This happened within the context of a global ideological shift from direct 
state control to economic liberalism, indicated in the emphasis given to de-regulation. State 
President Botha’s administration, while repressive in many other respects, was influenced by 
economic liberalism and removed some restrictions, which constrained activities of small     
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Table 7.1: Synthesis of Conflict Management per Period in 'Struggle Streets' 
# Question 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-to date 
1 State's qualification of 
the conflict 
Hotspots; protest taken seriously; crisis; 
right to trade; anti-foreigner violence 
unacceptable; violent 
Chaos; anarchy; nuisance; danger; hazard; 
free-for-all; culture of lawlessness; 
unfettered trading 
Nuisance; chaos; lawless; unmanaged; 
violent 
Anarchy; unmanaged chaos; violent; neg-
ative 
2 State's portrayal of 
protestors 
Partners; outsiders; citizens; legal; illegal; 
untruthful; cheats; disingenuous; illegal 
foreigners; allies; vigilantes; violent; 
survivalists; strong; manipulative; 
vulnerable 
Thief; illegal traders; African flavour; 
criminals; bullies; looters; vulnerable 
Traders; criminals; responsible for 'fall of 
Inner City; wanting protection but 
protesting at same time; playing emotional 
card 
Beyond enforcement; anarchists; dirty; 
illegal; law breakers; criminals; business 
people; gatekeepers (associations) 
3 State's 
response 
to 
protestors' 
claim 
To protest 
event 
Firm suppression of anti-foreigner protest Baton charge; forceful suppression; 
evictions by Red Ants 
Denial; overlook; ignore; evictions by Red 
Ants; antagonistic; forceful repression of 
anti-foreigner protests 
Denial; heavy- handed repression (Oper-
ation Clean Sweep); defensive 
To effects 
of issue 
under 
contention 
Willing to engage agonistically; managing 
conflict; provincial intervention; 
Braamfontein traders and GJMC negotiate; 
traders associations included in Inner City 
structures (ICSTICC, Inner City Committee) 
Agonistic engagements with taxi 
associations and politicians but no 
resolution; GJMC negotiates; delayed 
enforcement 
Instigates ITF; smart cards; make traders 
hurt; agonistic; continues management-by-
markets approach; joint sessions for by-
laws; consults market beneficiaries 
Repression; denial; accusations of lying; 
defends court action; talks collapse; 
antagonism  
To root 
cause of 
issue 
Builds bridges by using ex-ActStop activists 
as staff; MTC plan to empower traders 
through shares; moratorium on rents; 
experimental approach 
Halves rentals; decides with traders and 
immediately implements setting out of 
trading spaces with South African Police 
Services; skills development; cages 
Delays enforcement; provides skills and 
adult basic education training; anti-
corruption measures 
Antagonistic; tentative attempts to revise 
policy in consultation; deepen old ways of 
working 
4 State's response to 
power dynamics 
Facilitates extensive interaction for policy 
and projects; creates GISFOR and ICSTICC 
for dialogue and decision-making; support 
to associations  
Antagonistic; set up monthly forum but 
divide and rule; less comfortable with 
informal channels; 
Many meetings and workshops; Inner City 
summit, presumably agonistic engagement 
for business plan for linear markets 
ITF seen as divisive; traders gain (some) 
power through violence; space for traders 
attained only through courts; traders 
associations are not legitimate 
5 Form of agreement 
reached (or outcome if 
none) 
Co-created policy; agreements on projects 
and allocation policy; joint amendment of 
by-laws 
None; implicit in state response to root 
cause of issue 
Charter but limited in terms of traders; ITF 
as forum but only briefings say traders 
None; modifies process for declaration of 
restricted and prohibited areas; reneges on 
agreement; mediates unsuccessfully 
6 How could the state 
have responded more 
agonistically and why 
did it not? 
Some agonistic interactions earlier in 
period due to post-apartheid goodwill; 
constrained by huge growth of traders; 
1997 financial crisis cuts resources; 
Mayivuke; private sector property owners; 
protection of rates base; Inner City decay 
Emphasis on dealing with sinkholes; world 
class city focus; Inner City priority  
Internal COJ relations strained; political 
meddling; 2010 World Cup; anti-foreigner 
protests; Inner City priority 
Mistrust solidifies after Operation Clean 
Sweep; parties sceptical of benefit of 
engagement; Inner City priority 
Source: Own formulation 
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traders, de-racialising trading to some degree, including the declaration of the city centre of 
Johannesburg as a 'free trade zone' in 1986. The subsequent administration under President 
De Klerk continued with these reforms through the removal of restrictions contained in the 
Businesses Act (Act No. 71 of 1991). As a consequence, the number of traders in the city centre 
increased significantly to between 3 167 to 6 893 traders by 1994 (CASE 1995a, pp. i-ii). Local 
government and private sector partners responded to these global and national shifts in 
approach. There was, for example, the approval of a new co-created developmental informal 
trading policy in 1993 and the start of new market projects. The first post-apartheid local 
authority administration adopted the new spirit of freedom and inclusion that followed the 
ending of apartheid rule and pursued generally agonistic practices, such as jointly amending 
the by-laws with traders in 1998; incorporating developmental aims into the new MTC in 1999 
including a share-ownership scheme for traders; and supporting and engaging with the new 
umbrella body of traders' associations. 
The challenge, however, is to explain why the post-apartheid city administration took an 
antagonistic turn from around 2002, peaking in Operation Clean Sweep in 2013. This is not 
easily understood in terms of the context and objectives of post-apartheid governance, or in 
terms of the global economic crisis from 2008 and high unemployment levels in South Africa, 
despite the government's stated policy support for livelihood efforts such as informal trading. 
To clarify the more recent trends, one must look more carefully at the specific interests and 
politics of local role-players. For instance, the aspiration of the city administration and formal 
businesses for a 'world-class' city may have left little room for the disorder associated with 
informal trading. Then, there were also the negative reactions from various groups to the 
extent of informal trade and to the relatively liberal policy and regulatory street trading 
frameworks. As political and business sentiment hardened towards the 'chaotic' 'free for all' of 
Inner City street trading, the local government began to intensify its by-law enforcement 
efforts. It also stepped up market development, including tighter revenue controls to ensure 
their viability. Street traders resisted these measures and began protesting more frequently, 
and levels of antipathy and acrimony deepened between the city administration and street 
traders and their associations. 
Thirdly, there are multiple processes, often concurrent and contending, evident within the 
broad trends making agonistic governance practices, where they exist, hard to see and complex 
to undertake. For instance, despite the antagonism towards traders during the early apartheid 
periods, the city administration declared an effective six-month truce on enforcement in 1943 
so traders could find alternative incomes. Likewise, during the relatively agonistic phase 
between 1985 and 2001, the state undertook forceful actions to quell anti-foreigner and other 
protest-related violence, and to protect lives and property in 1997 and 1998. Likewise, during 
the local government's antagonistic period between 2002 and 2013, it undertook many 
parallel responsive initiatives, including halving the Yeoville market's rentals in 2002, delaying 
enforcement for a few months in 2003, and convening various meetings between traders and 
senior politicians and officials. Moreover, the local government stopped the 'cages' initiative in 
response to protests from informal and formal traders in 2004. The local government initiated 
an Informal Trading Forum in 2009 for agonistic interactions but traders criticised it as 
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perfunctory, and also held various, presumably agonistic sometimes, consultative discussions, 
such as for its Master Business Plan for Linear Markets for the Inner City of Johannesburg in 
October 2008. The city administration, at the height of its hostility towards traders, reacted by 
stopping Operation Clean Sweep and held numerous public meetings and workshops for 
agonistic engagements, albeit inadequately.  
Fourthly, this narrative indicates there are limits to consistent practices of agonism. 'Local 
government' and 'traders' are not cohesive groups. For instance, there have been numerous 
internal tensions within the city administration towards informal traders and different 
approaches by different departments, and even individuals, from within the administration, 
each reflecting their unresolved attitudes of affinity or hostility towards traders. Again, this 
means multiple, frequently contradictory, tendencies within the broad trends towards, or 
away from, agonism. The traders too were also often irresolute in their interests, approaches 
and demands, making consistent, productive interactions with the city administration difficult. 
The challenge was compounded by the fluidity of positions within the groups themselves 
within the context of their changing internal politics and broader contexts.  
Fifthly, the city administration's default response of antagonism towards street trading and 
related protests was due to the prevailing apartheid context pre-1985 and hard-line Inner City 
management efforts post-2000. The city administration's occasional agonistic responses and 
accommodations of protestors varied between tentative and robust throughout the period 
studied, but failed to resolve underlying tensions, or improve its relationship with street 
traders, or better its governance practices. Further, other groups with interests in the Inner 
City are overlooked in this struggle and became increasingly disgruntled at the city's ineffective 
management of street trading, pressurising for stricter governance efforts in turn. Considering 
the complexities and diversities of the responses above, the considerable scale of the 
antagonism between the state and the street traders consequently dwarfed and constrained 
any efforts at agonistic practices.  
Lastly, in closing, the insights in this chapter derived from the experience of informal trading in 
the inner city acknowledge that there were moments of agonism but the complexities of the 
context framing the governance practices meant that the possibility of implementing agonism 
was highly constrained in practice. The degree of agonism in practice is not a linear 
progression and is informed by political and other constraints and opportunities, as well as the 
city administration's affinity-hostility stance towards street traders. In the post-2010 period, 
given the apparent shortfall in the city administration's learning from its experiences post-
Operation Clean Sweep, the outlook on its potential to try agonistic interaction to (re)build the 
relationship between the city administration and the street traders seems pessimistic. 
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Chapter 8 | Middle-Class Malcontents: Billing Backlash 
Photograph 8.1: Views of Middle-Class Suburbs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle-class suburbs: 1) top, retail node in Rosebank (Rosebank Management District 2009); and 2) bottom, typical middle-class 
suburban high-walled house in Parkhurst (Monare, Morton McKay et al. 2014, p. 115) 
1 Introducing Strife and the Suburbs  
This chapter is the last in the trio of stories forming the case study of city strife in 
Johannesburg. The municipality-middle class relationship is explored, focusing on one long-
lasting protest between the late 1990s and 2012 – the backlash of the middle class to the so-
called 'billing crisis'. The selected middle-class area is located in the oldest parts of 
Johannesburg, historically white but not exclusively so today (typical views of the study area in 
Photograph 8.1 above). Evidence shows that this community, despite its relatively small share 
of the city's area and population, significantly influenced the city administration's 
implementation of billing service delivery. Five crosscutting elements are found, which made 
city governance in the situation of conflict about the billing system extraordinarily intricate. 
Firstly, the antagonism fuelling the billing crisis between the middle class and the city 
administration and the consequent damage to their relationship find their origin in the 
Sandton rates boycott of the late 1990s, the first notable protest by the middle-class 
community post-1994.  
Secondly, the billing crisis was guaranteed to be a drawn-out battle, due to the technical 
difficulties experienced by the city administration in creating a single data platform for billing 
and later integrating the billing system with its other business operations. The constant stream 
of related protests, led by determined and diverse dissidents using multiple objection 
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strategies, many of which were registered with the city administration as customer complaints, 
peaked on eight discernible occasions during the billing crisis between 2001 and 2012.  
Thirdly, the public embarrassment of the billing system pressured the city administration to 
concede there was a 'crisis' and respond with corrective measures.  
Fourthly, the city administrators tried different conflict management approaches, albeit 
discursively and inconsistently, ranging from tactics of antagonism, denial and positive 
reactiveness, to a mix of experimental, deliberate and more sophisticated and proactive 
responses from mid-2011.  
Lastly, this story of city strife has the added dimension of inter-party politicking between the 
ANC-led city administration and the opposition party of the Democratic Alliance representing 
the selected middle-class suburbs, which is largely responsible for the city administration's 
sound fiscal health through their rates payments.  
2 Snapshot of Selected Middle-Class Area 
Northern Middle-Class Suburbs as Locus of Protest 
The case study offers this, third, view on protest, this time lodged by the middle class of 
Johannesburg. Although the press has featured stories on middle-class dissensus since the 
1990s, it has been largely overlooked in the academic literature despite its significant influence 
on the city administration's implementation of billing service delivery. This research focuses on 
a sample area of 17 contiguous residential middle-class suburbs located at the centre of 
Johannesburg (see Map 8.1 on page 202 and Map 8.2 on page 203). Together they represent 
but 1.4 percent of all households and 1.8 percent of the geographic area of the city (Quantec 
2014). Their combined footprint at 28 square kilometres is similar to that of Orange Farm's 31 
square kilometres (ibid.). The sample falls within the larger mainly white suburbs in the north, 
more upmarket than their southern counterparts (Hart, G. 1968; Harrison & Zack 2014; Mabin 
2014) (see page 81 for a reminder of the city structure). 
Although established mostly in the early to mid-1900s (Table 8.2 on page 205 contains 
establishment dates), the southern part of the study area is the oldest. By the mid-1940s, 
Saxonwold; Parkwood; Parktown North; Rosebank; Dunkeld; and Parkhurst had been 
developed, according to the city administration (JCC 1946). The central-to-northern part had 
been developed in phases by the 1970s (Beavon 2004, p. 88), along the main transport routes 
radiating from the city centre, namely Hyde Park; Craighall; Craighall Park; Sandhurst; 
Hurlingham; Hurlingham Gardens; Glenadrienne; New Brighton; and Parkmore, as were 
Pierneef Park and Victory Park on the north-western edge. 
Plots in these selected middle-class suburbs are large, except for those in Parkhurst. Each 
suburb has a distinctive character generated by its developer and the then prevailing planning 
trends (Mabin 2014, p. 401). Rosebank is the dominant economic centre, the third largest in 
Johannesburg (Rosebank Management District 2009, p. 10), and there are a few high streets to 
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be found throughout the study area. The main spine of Oxford Road bisects the study area, 
linking it with the city centre in the south and the Sandton business district in the north (refer 
Map 8.1 below). 
Map 8.1: Location of Selected Middle-Class Area in Johannesburg 
 
Source: Own formulation 
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Map 8.2: Suburbs in Selected Middle-Class Area 
 
Source: Own formulation 
Shifting Statistics and Features of the Selected Middle-Class Suburbs 
Three subtle but notable shifts in the makeup of the population and households of the 
selected middle-class suburbs since apartheid times are evident over the fifteen-year period 
between 1996 and 2011 as detailed next (summarised in Table 8.1 on page 204 and Table 8.2 
on page 205) (unless otherwise stated, data in this Sub-Section is from Quantec 2014). 
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Table 8.1: Key Indicators for Selected Middle-Class Suburbs, Percentages 
Indicator Selected 
middle-
class 
suburbs 
Johannes-
burg 
Gauteng South 
Africa 
Total population growth between 1996 and 2011 34 68 57 28 
White population growth between 1996 and 2011 20 10 12 4 
Black population growth between 1996 and 2011 47 84 70 33 
Households growth between 1996 and 2011 45 96 89 60 
Whites as share of total population, 2011 61 12 16 9 
Black Africans as share of total population, 2011 30 77 77 79 
Unemployment (official), 2011a 3 25 26 30 
Access of households to internet, 2011 69 50 47 35 
Car ownership by households, 2011 71 38 38 30 
Households with income > R76 801, 2011 64 34 33 24 
Households with income < R76 800, 2011 36 66 67 76 
Population with Grade 12 and higher education, 2011 57 19 18 12 
Note: 
a Refer to note to Table 6.2 on page 141 for an explanation on the 'official' and the 'expanded' unemployment rates in South Africa. 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 1996 and 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014) 
Firstly, the total number of all households and population has increased in the selected middle-
class suburbs but at half that of the city's increase. Namely, the number of households in the 
selected suburbs grew from 13 722 to 19 936 households during the period, an increase of 45 
percent relative to the city's overall increase of 96 percent. Likewise, the number of people 
grew from 33 684 to 45 061, an increase of 34 percent relative to the city's overall increase of 
68 percent. 
Secondly, the black population has increased in the selected middle-class suburbs and points to 
the gradual shift towards a more representative demography. Namely, the black population in 
the selected suburbs has increased during the period although at proportionally far lower rate, 
at 47 percent relative to the average increase in the overall black population of the city at 84 
percent. However, the increase in the black population during the period was at a much higher 
rate than the increase in the white population in the selected suburbs (over double or 20 
percent). 
Thirdly, the white population in the selected middle-class suburbs has also increased even 
though its share has shrunk. Namely, the increase in the white population in the selected 
suburbs at 20 percent was double the 10 percent increase in the white population of the city 
overall during the period and five times the increase of four percent in the white population of 
the country. However, the white population's share of the total population in the selected 
suburbs shrunk from 67 to 61 percent during the period. The black population's share of the 
population in the selected suburbs though increased from 27 percent to 30 percent over the 
period, which was less than half that of their share of the overall city, provincial and national 
populations at 77, 77 and 79 percent respectively in 2011. Likewise, the share of the coloured 
and Indian population of the total population in the selected middle-class suburbs increased 
during the period from six percent to nine percent. 
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Table 8.2: Demographics per Suburb in Selected Middle-Class Area 
Suburb
a
 Date 
established
b
 
 
 
 
Households Population 
Total % 
with 
in-
come 
> R76 
801 
p.a. 
Total White Black Other Per household 
No. in 
1996 
No. in  
2011 
%  of 
Total in 
2011 
% 
differ-
ence, 
1996-
2011 
No. in 
1996 
No. in  
2011 
%  of 
total in 
2011 
% 
differ-
ence, 
1996-
2011 
No. in 
1996 
No. in  
2011 
%  of 
total in 
2011 
% 
differ-
ence, 
1996-
2011 
No. in 
1996 
No. in  
2011 
%  of 
total in 
2011 
% 
differ-
ence, 
1996-
2011 
No. in 
1996 
No. in  
2011 
%  of 
total in 
2011 
% 
differ-
ence, 
1996-
2011 
No. in 
1996 
No. in  
2011 
Craighall 1930-1949 763 1 268 6 66 74 1 733 2 639 6 52 1 264 1 694 64 34 403 791 30 96 66 154 6 134 2.3 2.1 
Craighall Park 1900-1909 1 536 2 376 12 55 67 3 797 5 626 12 48 2 817 3 602 64 28 815 1 537 27 89 165 487 9 195 2.5 2.4 
Dunkeld 1910-1929 565 651 3 15 64 1 528 1 474 3 -4 896 936 64 5 561 428 29 -24 71 110 7 54 2.7 2.3 
Glenadrienne Post-1956 135 124 1 -8 69 324 197 0 -39 224 83 42 -63 80 95 48 19 20 19 10 -7 2.4 1.6 
Hurlingham 1930-1949 1 093 1 329 7 22 71 2 984 3 929 9 32 2 029 2 438 62 20 872 1 167 30 34 83 324 8 289 2.7 3.0 
Hurlingham Gardens Post-1956 45 101 1 127 58 126 148 0 17 81 113 76 39 40 28 19 -30 5 7 5 45 2.8 1.5 
Hyde Park Post-1956 852 1 899 10 123 55 1 623 3 637 8 124 946 1 923 53 103 627 1 474 41 135 50 240 7 380 1.9 1.9 
New Brighton 1900-1909 72 106 1 47 77 498 466 1 -6 333 239 51 -28 145 171 37 18 20 56 12 176 6.9 4.4 
Parkhurst 1900-1909 1 673 2 399 12 43 74 3 538 4 851 11 37 2 708 3 572 74 32 703 1 014 21 44 128 265 5 107 2.1 2.0 
Parkmore 1900-1909 1 933 2 567 13 33 68 4 476 6 456 14 44 3 030 3 886 60 28 1 315 1 786 28 36 131 784 12 498 2.3 2.5 
Parktown North 1900-1909 1 378 1 775 9 29 60 3 441 3 856 9 12 2 388 2 576 67 8 944 1 079 28 14 109 201 5 84 2.5 2.2 
Parkwood 1900-1909 1 081 1 153 6 7 63 2 567 2 564 6 0 1 688 1 561 61 -8 777 767 30 -1 103 236 9 130 2.4 2.2 
Pierneef Park 1910-1929 102 293 1 187 56 319 705 2 121 210 342 49 63 101 310 44 207 7 53 8 611 3.1 2.4 
Rosebank Pre-1900 719 524 3 -27 52 1 884 1 085 2 -42 909 362 33 -60 438 555 51 27 537 168 15 -69 2.6 2.1 
Sandhurst 1900-1909 573 1 413 7 146 52 1 316 2 472 5 88 787 1 146 46 46 438 989 40 126 92 337 14 267 2.3 1.7 
Saxonwold 1910-1929 764 1 089 5 42 60 2 113 2 556 6 21 1 371 1 478 58 8 656 708 28 8 86 370 14 330 2.8 2.3 
Victory Park 1910-1929 486 869 4 79 58 1 417 2 400 5 69 1 021 1 357 57 33 349 700 29 101 48 343 14 615 2.9 2.8 
Total  13 772 19 936 100 64 45 33 684 45 061 100 34 22 700 27 308 61 20 9 262 13 599 30 47 1 723 4 154 9 141 2.4 2.3 
Note: 
a Suburbs correlate with Sub Places used in the official Census 2011  
b Derived from Mabin 2013, p. 10 citing Union of South Africa 1957, p. 35 Mabin (2013, p. 10) citing Union of South Africa (1957, p. 35) 
Source: Own formulation; based on Census 1996 and 2011 statistics (Quantec 2014), unless otherwise stated
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However, there are huge variations in these shifts between the individual suburbs within the 
selected middle-class area pointing to micro-trends, which vary markedly from the average 
trends. For instance, the greatest increases in the numbers of households were in Parkwood, 
Sandhurst, Hurlingham Gardens and Hyde Park during the period (187, 146, 127 and 123 
percent respectively) relative to the small increase of, say, only 15 percent in Dunkeld. In 
agreement with Mabin's (2014) speculation, the growth cannot be attributed to the City of 
Johannesburg's (COJ) densification policy of 2003 (City of Johannesburg [COJ] 2003i) alone, as 
much of it occurred prior to the date of the policy. Also within this cluster, the most racially 
integrated, although possibly not economically, suburbs are Hyde Park and Sandown, with 40 
percent and 41 percent respectively of their populations being black. Likewise, the least 
integrated suburbs are Parkhurst and Parktown North with 21 percent and 28 percent 
respectively of their populations being black. 
Further, the selected middle-class suburbs are wealthy relative to the rest of the city. Namely, 
two-thirds of households in the study area, 64 percent, have household incomes higher than 
R76 801 per annum, in 2011. This is far higher than the city and provincial rates of 34 percent 
and 33 percent respectively, and the country rate of 24 percent. The most significant suburbs 
in the selected middle-class area, in terms of the coincidence of the greatest numbers of 
people, households and share of household incomes greater than R76 801 per annum, are 
Parkhurst, Parkmore, Craighall Park, Parktown North and Hyde Park. These five suburbs 
contain over half of the households and people, at 55 percent and 54 percent respectively, of 
the seventeen suburbs making up the study area (Quantec 2014). 
The economic prospects and resources of the citizens in the selected middle-class suburbs are 
superior to the rest of the city. When considering employment, education, car ownership and 
access to the Internet in the selected suburbs relative to the city, province and country, 
statistics point to the relative advantage of the area. For instance, in 2011, the unemployment 
rate amongst those aged 15 to 64 years old was 3 percent, far lower than the city and 
provincial rates of 21 percent and the national rate of 22 percent. Of those people older than 
20 years, 57 percent were likely to have a Grade 12 and higher education, far greater than the 
city and provincial rates of 19 and 18 percent respectively and the national rate of 12 percent. 
Around 71 percent of households in the area owned a car in 2011, compared to 38 percent of 
households in the city and the province and 30 percent in the country. Likewise, 69 percent of 
households had access to the internet, either from home, from work or from their cell phones, 
again higher when compared to 50 percent in Johannesburg, or 47 percent in the province, or 
35 percent in the country (see Table 8.1 on page 204). 
The selected middle-class suburbs contribute substantially to the city's financial resources. By 
2001, the "upper middle class" and the "middle middle class", not necessarily white, had 
consolidated spatially in the northern suburbs since 1996 according to Selzer and Heller (2010, 
pp. 163-166). The selected suburbs in this story fall within these most exclusive and elite areas 
of the city (Mabin 2014, pp. 407, 409), and are amongst the most significant contributors to 
the city's economy and its rates base as the home to some of the richest people in the country 
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(BusinessTech 2012), with property values the highest in the city and the country 
(BusinessTech 2014; Steedley 2015).  
The selected middle-class suburbs are not the political constituency of the ANC, making for 
challenging city governance. The selected suburbs are all represented by DA ward councillors, 
the main opposition party to the ANC (COJ 2013i; COJ 2015a). Formerly the Democratic Party 
until 2000 (Democratic Alliance [DA] 2015), the DA has 91 councillors whilst the ANC has 164 
councillors representing the citizens of Johannesburg (COJ 2015a). Moreover, importantly for 
this story, the city administration is led by the ANC (or at least it did until the local government 
elections of 3 August 2016, as this thesis was being concluded). 
Protests-with-Pens and Protests-with-Pockets  
Contrary to Schreiber's (2013) view that the middle class in South Africa does not protest, a 
number of instances of the 'suburbanisation' of protest are documented (refer to Appendix 22: 
Timeline of Middle-Class Protests, 1996 to 2014 on page 398). Although not the focus of this 
story, these recorded protests reflect the middle class's "vision of themselves" as Bacqué et al. 
put it (2015, pp. 2-3), and their localised particularities. Although social movements of the 
middle class are driven by different logics to those of low-income groups (very different in the 
case of Johannesburg, but with some overlapping interests as seen on page 101), they both 
seek to change the level of participation in democratic governance as demonstrated by 
Fuentes and Frank (1989). 
For instance, 6 000 pet lovers objected to the COJ's draft By-laws relating to Dogs and Cats in 
2006 (Interview, Phakathi, 2012); and the Rosebank and Saxonwold communities resisted the 
COJ's proposed public transport project along Oxford Road between 2008 and 2012 (Rea Vaya 
2008; news24 Online [news24] 2011a). Motorists were also outraged about potholes and 
traffic congestion (ioL News Online [ioL] 2011f; iTWeb 2011i); residents were incensed by the 
alleged closure of their local library in 2011 (The Star 2012f); and shopkeepers and residents 
contested the installation of paid-parking in the high Street of Parkhurst from 2012 to 2014 
(ioL 2014b).  
Although protests by the middle class sorts of protests might not immediately come to mind 
when thinking of 'service delivery protests', many of those working within the city 
administration stressed the attention and responses required to manage them. About eight 
unique sets of protests were identified through the research strategies of interviewing and 
document reviewing. In each case, the city administration responded to protests with varying 
degrees of agonism, inconsistently, including bouts of antagonistic displays (see Figure 8.1 on 
page 208 and Appendix 22 on page 398). 
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Figure 8.1: Overview of Protests in Selected Middle-Class Suburbs 
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1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
5
 
Sandton rates boycott                     
Billing crisis                     
Dogs and Cats By-Laws objections                     
Rosebank anti-Rea Vaya alignment protest                      
Pothole protest                     
OUTsurance Pointsmen                     
Anti-Parkhurst library closure complaint                     
Paid-parking protest                     
 
 Lead up to protest 
 Main protest events 
 Details provided for this period in Appendix 22 on page 398, note that the billing crisis is not included as it is covered in detail in this Chapter 
Source: Own formulation; based on protest timeline data 
The form of dissensus used by the middle class is also generally different to the 'protests-with-
parades-and-pickets' type employed by the communities in the other two study areas covered 
in Chapters 6 and 7 (pages 135 and 168 respectively). Middle-class objectors might, very 
infrequently, stage a street protest or a sit-in, but it will not be violent, except in one instance 
where a protest turned into a scuffle between factions within the protesting group (looklocal 
2011c). 'Protests-with-pens', or activism through material 'penned' by journalists or activists 
are the preferred tactic though, being high-profile but relatively low-cost and sustainable over 
long periods. 'Protests-with-pens' can take the form of a concerted media campaign, or a 
petition or a memorandum, by a group or an individual (Interview, Cox, 2012). 
In the context of the middle class, the media is critical in fuelling the protest. 'Protests-with-
pens' centre on articles by investigative journalists, reporters and opinionistas, in hard copy or 
digitally, such as newspapers; trade publications; blogs; radio talk shows; and television 
features, and may be published locally, nationally and internationally. The two corporations, 
Primedia and the Times Media Group, prominent in South Africa and in the Johannesburg area, 
own newspapers, radio stations and satellite and terrestrial television with middle-class 
protests a popular topic (Primedia 2015; Times Media Group 2015). Independent Newspapers 
and Media, Naspers, the South African Broadcasting Corporation and other media are also 
important forums for protest (Caxton and CTP Group 2012; ioL 2015; Naspers 2015; South 
African Broadcasting Corporation 2015). The tactic of the weekly Metrowatch column in The 
Star newspaper is to 'embarrass' the COJ, said Anna Cox its senior journalist and Metrowatch 
founder (Interview, Cox, 2012). Cox is at pains to say that a complaint, made usually by an 
individual rather than a group but typically reflecting a complaint common to many middle-
class households), is only featured as a protests in the column if the COJ has not acted within a 
month of it having been lodged with the COJ's call centre. Middle-class malcontents also 
protest through structured channels like the COJ's call centre, or the Presidential Hotline. 
Protestors can also use the petitions system (Chapter 4 already covered the matter of 
petitions, refer page 101).  
Whilst a single complaint in itself does not necessarily constitute a protest, it can be a 
precursor to one. The 'malcontent' makes a 'complaint' to a specific authority in the 
expectation of a response or redress. Should the authority fail to address the complaint, the 
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malcontent will find another way, usually publicly, to bring the issue to the attention of the 
authority. Such a complaint is easily escalated by the media, and if a sufficient number of 
people share the same concern, their rage and sense of betrayal, injustice and powerlessness 
can escalate this dissatisfaction into a protest, with the malcontents acting collectively for their 
dissatisfaction to be resolved (DeHoog, Lowery et al. 1990; Ward & Ostrom 2006; Grégoire & 
Fisher 2008). 
The full extent of such protests is not easy to see, says Peacock, responsible for customer-
relations management in various roles in the COJ between 1996 until 2011. Such protests 
might seem small, driven by only a few activists, but purport to be representative of the 
community (Interview, Peacock, 2012). Nonetheless, officials are sensitive to the potential for 
the media to blow a matter out of proportion, said Phakathi, a legal advisor to the COJ 
(Interview, Phakathi, 2012). More rarely, because of the costs involved, protestors will reach 
into their pockets and go to court, or threaten to go to court, hence the term 'protests-with-
pockets', as they did in the billing crisis and in the Sandton rates boycott featured next.  
3 'One City, One Tax Base' (1996-2000) 
Significance of the Sandton Rates Boycott 
The 'one city, one tax base' concept, popularised in the black resistance struggle (Cameron 
2006, p. 10), was the cornerstone of new local government in South Africa (Van Ryneveld 
2006), underpinning the localised redistribution agenda of the city administration of 
Johannesburg (Reddy 2003), and central to the Sandton rates boycott, in the period of city 
restructuring between 1996 and 2000. Turning the slogan into reality was fundamental in 
restructuring resources to facilitate city integration, according to Visser (2001, p. 2). However, 
the processes to do so were far from perfect (Powell 2012). Immediately post-1994, the 
jurisdiction of the selected suburbs was split between the Sandton, Randburg and 
Johannesburg Councils. When the then GJTMC and the decentralised MLCs were created in 
November 1995 (Emdon 1998, p. 3), the selected suburbs fell then under the management of 
the Eastern and Northern MLCs (Beavon 1997; COJ 2001a; 2003g; 2003h, and comparison of 
spatial overlays of data). The computerised administration functions of the MLCs and the 
GJMC, featuring prominently in this story, were then in their infancy. The first use of the 
Internet in South Africa was recorded in 1991 (Lawrie 1997), with computers only becoming 
commonplace in the city administration in the mid-1990s (Knight 1986). 
In 1992, the residents falling under the then former Sandton Council lost their battle with the 
ANC over the new form of the wider city administration (Clarno 2013, pp. 1195, 1196). Later, 
the residents of the new Eastern MLC area were concerned that the Eastern MLC's rates base 
would be the target of redistribution across the greater Johannesburg. The Eastern MLC's 
share of city revenue was significant, at 43.6 percent, or R642.92 million, of the total annual 
rates income of the city of R 1.47 billion (1998 data, Emdon 1998, p. 2). Moreover, the 
payment level of northern suburbs' ratepayers was near 100 percent, whilst Orange Farm's 
was 5 percent and Soweto's was 27 percent (Tomlinson 1999, p. 19).  
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Then, in July 1996, the Eastern MLC sharply increased the property taxes, called 'rates' in South 
Africa, allegedly without comprehensive communication (COJ 2001a, p. 25), in what could be 
called an antagonistic move. This action resulted in a "rates revolt", as the city administration 
dubbed it (COJ 2006h, p. 26). The increase reportedly ranged between 150 to 358 percent 
(Clarno 2013, p. 1196). The aim was to standardise rates across the municipal area of the 
GJMC and redistribute the revenue (ibid., p. 1197) to fund developments in the poorer areas of 
SMLC and Western MLC (Emdon 1998, p. 3). Sandtonites were outraged at the 'wealth tax' 
(COJ 2001a, p. 21), feeling the decision was unfair. Moreover, they did not think the city 
administration would spend it wisely (Tomlinson 1999; Bell & Bowman 2002), as the 
autonomous MLCs had already been spending irresponsibly since January 1996, believing the 
GJMC would cover their shortfalls (COJ 2006h, p. 26). The 'rates revolt' and the level of 
withheld payments soon deeply concerned the GJMC and the provincial government (Emdon 
1998, p. 8; Camay & Gordon 2004, p. 21). 
Antagonism between the city administrators and protestors is obvious in the accounts by 
Clarno (2013), and Camay and Gordon (2004) (see timeline of the rates boycott, Appendix 22: 
Timeline of Middle-Class Protests, 1996 to 2014 on page 398). Firstly, the city administration's 
talks with SANFED, the alliance of residents associations, in November and December 1996, 
were so rancorous that a stalemate arose with interventions by the provincial government 
worsening the impasse (Camay & Gordon 2004, p. 17). Secondly, another group called 
'Fedsure', representing ten corporations including Fedsure Life Assurance and other property, 
investment and insurance businesses in the Sandton area, 'protested-with-pockets'. Fedsure 
took the matter to the High Court in December 1996 and later to the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
arguing that the increase was neither procedural nor lawful (Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 
1998b). 
Camay and Gordon (2004) concluded that the city administration learnt valuable governance 
lessons from the conflict (ibid., pp. 28-35). In terms of agonistic principles, the state's stance 
towards SANFED and Fedsure largely perpetuated the ongoing deadlock. Not only did 
protestors think the GJMC was unsympathetic (The Globe and Mail 1997; Camay & Gordon 
2004, p. 12), it accused SANFED of "hysteria" (Camay & Gordon 2004, p. 19), and "undermined 
rather than promoted resolution" (ibid., p. 27). Further, from the perspective of the protestors, 
the state seemed to have no commitment to resolving the problem (ibid., p. 25), adopting a 
prejudiced approach (ibid., p. 19), and using divisive tactics (ibid., p. 17). The ANC's sense of 
having the moral high ground may have driven the state's behaviour according to Camay and 
Gordon (ibid., p. 17), but the leaders of the MLCs and the GJMC failed to detach themselves 
from party politics and govern without bias (ibid., p. 35). The media played an active role in 
painting the GJMC as bullying tyrants (Clarno 2013, p. 1197), and as acting unfairly (Camay & 
Gordon 2004, pp. 20-21). The city administration's treatment of protestors as defaulters, 
rather than as citizens, by conducting a simultaneous vigorous revenue collection drive, likely 
added to the ratepayers' sense of grievance. 
Within the hostilities, however, there were instances of responsiveness by the city 
administration, although these did not succeed in breaking the impasse. For instance, the 
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Eastern MLC's write-off of interest on rates arrears to incentivise payments in an attempt to 
break the boycott were poorly executed as the amounts were wrong on its offer letters 
(Interview, Peacock, 2012). Ratepayers rejected the proposal to waive the interest on arrears 
(ibid., p. 19), as it did not address their interests.  
In July 1997, the by then established GJMC transferred the billing function to the MLCs thereby 
making it virtually impossible thereafter for the city administration to get a full picture of its 
cash position (Tomlinson 1999, p. 20). The GJMC was feeling the financial pressure and had to 
borrow money to fund its cash flow in August 1997 (Camay & Gordon 2004, p. 25). The GJMC 
also did not apply the annual increase on the rates in July 1997, responsive to the existing 
censure from opposition parties (ibid., p. 24). The financial squeeze continued into 1998, with 
ratepayers owing the city administration R180 million by June (Emdon, p. 10). Ultimately, the 
Constitutional Court settled the Fedsure battle in October 1998 when it upheld the High Court 
ruling that the city administration's actions had been lawful and procedural, although the 
judges' decision was split (Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 1998a, c). The boycotters then had no 
choice but to capitulate and began re-paying the outstanding rates to the GJMC (Camay & 
Gordon 2004, pp. 29-30). 
Results of the 'Rates Revolt' 
The "rates revolt" (COJ 2006h, p. 26), an interaction decidedly antagonistic bar a very few 
moments of constructive engagement, led to anxiety and acrimony and the middle class's 
mistrust of the city administration and resulted in four other factors impacting on the future 
relationship between the city administration and the malcontents. 
Firstly, it 'tipped' the city administration into the financial crisis of 1997 in October (Lipietz 
2008, p. 145), but was also due to the city administration's somewhat laissez-faire revenue 
management approach; difficulties with the new valuation roll; the high level of spending of 
funds it did not have; and ever-increasing capital expenditure demands (COJ 2006h, p. 26).  
Secondly, the boycott overshadowed the early signs of the billing crisis. For instance, in August 
1997, the Eastern MLC would not accept payments against bills containing mistakes to avoid 
any tacit admission that the amounts were accurate but proceeded to cut off services for non-
payment anyway (Camay & Gordon 2004, p. 20). The city administration later acknowledged 
that such inaccuracies of billing further damaged its reputation and relationship with the 
middle-class suburbs (Interview, Peacock, 2012). 
Thirdly, the 'rates revolt' highlighted the multi-dimensional and complex relationship between 
the city administration and citizens. The city administration was obliged to treat all protestors 
as equal citizens, no matter their political inclination (ibid., pp. 35, 38, 39, 43, 46). The racial 
dimension, whereby the newly-powerful black city administration claimed its power in the 
transition from apartheid to democracy, is embodied in the protest itself (Clarno 2013). The 
city administration was sensitised about "the priorities of a broad range of powerful vested 
interests" (Beall et al. 2000b, p. 850). The city administration also treated citizens as customers 
in line with the New Public Management approach to public service (already outlined in 
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Chapter 4, page 75, refer also to Box (1999), and Fountain (2001). The Revenue department 
saw citizens as "account numbers, without which they are not recognised at all" (Hunter & 
Phakathi 2010, pp. 6-7). Even the press recognised that the bill had thus "become the symbol 
of communication between local government and its citizens" (Business Day 2001).  
Lastly, the rates revolt propelled the GJMC into its restructuring, according to the GJMC 
(Emdon 1998, p. 8). The new COJ was a consolidation of the former GJMC and the four MLCs. 
In 2000, related to the iGoli 2002 plan (GJMC 1999e) (see Chapter 5 for details starting on page 
115), the COJ began to centralise the separate financial systems that fell previously under the 
MLCs (Faull & Rawoot 2011), in turn comprising data derived from the 13 former 
administrations (COJ 2006h, p. 83).  
New Centralised Billing Function 
The COJ was reorganised as six new central departments and eleven Offices of the Regions 
(ibid., p. 28). The COJ then also separated and corporatised specific services into 14 new 
service delivery entities (ibid., p. 28), redeploying 25 834 staff across the city (ibid., p. 30). The 
new main entities of City Power, Joburg Water and Pikitip, supplying electricity, water and 
refuse removal respectively, developed separate revenue, financial management and billing 
systems and even call centres (ibid., p. 28), which were not harmonised with the COJ's 
departmental systems (ibid., p. 106). These systems contained disjointed data and used 
different software packages, some encompassing in-built defects (ibid., p. 83). External state 
departments with billing responsibilities, namely the Registrar of Deeds and the Surveyor 
General, were also not aligned to the COJ's requirements (Hunter & Phakathi 2010, p. 12).  
The first attempts by the COJ to integrate the billing systems and functions failed. Successful 
integration relied on the transfer of clean data from each billing-related department and entity 
to a common system. However, data was unchecked, corrupt, incompatible and inconsistent. 
The COJ's lack of a sufficiently methodical approach, compounded by billing needed for parts 
of the city that had never been billed before, and the needs of the fast-growing city, resulted in 
the scheme's failure (Interview, Peacock, 2012). The COJ perpetuated the false impression for 
years to the disgruntled middle class that the resultant billing problem was a simple matter 
that could be speedily and simply resolved in a few months (ioL 2002b), rather than clarifying 
that the billing challenge was part of far larger enterprise redesign that was needed to support 
the multi-billion Rand business of the COJ. 
The combined effects of the 1997 financial crisis; the high debt repayments; and the COJ's less-
than-ideal ranking of BBB+ in 1999 by Fitch, the international finance rating agency (COJ 
2006h, p. 102), alerted the COJ to the need for new and improved financial systems that 
included effective billing, and clean audits, to reduce its costs of long and short-term 
borrowings (ibid.).  
To help the city administration, the GJMC awarded a R500 million, five-year contract for 
information technology services to Sebedisana in October 2000 to centralise, integrate and 
update its computer and data needs (iTWeb 2003, 2007, 2009a). Sebedisana was a joint 
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venture between Masana Technologies, known as 'Masana', and IBM South Africa, with 
Masana as the junior partner (van den Berg, van der Meer et al. 2006, pp. 97-98; iTWeb 2007). 
Masana was a relatively new company, set up in 1997 and incorporated into the Peu Group in 
1999 (Peu Group 2015). 
4 Suburban Strife (2001-2005) 
Johannesburg the 'Blunderburg' and First Two Peaks in Billing Crisis 
By January 2001, with a R3.6 billion deficit, the COJ turned to debt-collecting agencies in a bid 
to improve its collection rates (City Press 2001; ioL 2001; news24 2001c). Efforts were 
hampered by 20 000 inaccurate accounts discovered in March 2001 when they were 
transferred to the new City Power database (news24 2001c), leading to the city 
administration's first of eight peaks in the billing crisis (see Table 8.3 on page 214). As the COJ 
managed to attain a positive cash balance, for the first time in four years In March 2001 (ibid.), 
such inaccuracies must have seemed trivial. By mid-year, though, despite the improved 
collection rate, at 86.9 percent for the 12 preceding months (COJ 2006h, p. 106), a large deficit 
remained. 
Providing a formal channel for protests and the improvement of city services, the COJ 
launched a new call centre, Joburg Connect, on 1 December 2001, to receive and appropriately 
route all complaints about service delivery, including billing. The call centre expected a call rate 
of 50 000 complaints per month, according to the spokesperson for the then Executive Mayor, 
Councillor Amos Masondo (ioL 2002b). Revealing the seemingly sudden escalation of billing 
problems, Mayor Masondo said 76 percent of the 176 000 calls received by the call centre in 
its first month were about billing (COJ 2002h). By now, the media were closely scrutinising the 
COJ's actions, and reported, on 23 January 2002, that an alleged estimated third of the then 
500 000 COJ customers had incorrect bills and were frustrated by the ineffective call centre 
(ioL 2002b). Moreover, bills were reportedly not received by 40 000 to 70 000 northern suburb 
customers including Sandton and Randburg due to a one-off problem with postal services, 
according to Dan Painter, the then Head of Revenue (ioL 2002b, d). 
In response to the thousands of individual complaints and amidst much media coverage, in this 
second peak of the billing crisis, Mayor Masondo acknowledged the call centre's "operational 
teething problems" (COJ 2002h). In his State of the City Address on 31 January 2002 (ibid.), he 
assured the public that the Mayoral Committee had approved the appointment of consultants, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to audit the revenue department in an attempt to clear up billing 
problems, and that the COJ was overhauling its Revenue management team. This was the first 
of the COJ's commentaries on the billing system, usually to highlight that it received the 
highest priority in Johannesburg; to provide explanations to the public; to advise customers on 
ways to engage with the city administration to resolve their queries; and to defend the COJ's 
actions.  
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Table 8.3: Eight Peaks in Billing Crisis 
2001-2005 2006-2010 Post-2010 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
            
1 2  3  4   5 6 7 8 
March 
20 000 
inaccurate 
accounts 
January 
176 000 
calls to Call 
Centre 
40 000-70 
000 
incorrect 
bills 
 March 
53 152 new 
queries, 
also 
backlog 
June 
381 660 
valuation-
billing 
mismatches 
 March 
Still 
thousands 
complain 
  July-August 
Carte 
Blanche 
feature, 
Masana 
liquidates  
June 
744 852 
accounts 
migrated to 
new system 
July 
Queries 
increase 
again with 
backlog of 
20 823 
problems 
older than 
30 days of 
which 13 
699 were 
due to 
inflated 
electricity 
costs 
January 
Outcry at 8 
333 
electricity 
cut-offs; 65 
000 queries 
logged 
about 
inflated 
charges; sit-
in protest 
February  
 Street 
protest 
December 
High Court 
with 
Property 
Owners and 
Managers 
Association 
 
March 
8 000 
complaints 
to 
Presidential 
Hotline 
since April 
2011 
June 
Over 3 000 
complaints 
on DA Open 
Day 
July 
Resistance 
to cut-off 
policy 
August 
Road map 
fiasco 
Source: Own formulation 
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By mid-2002, the COJ had implemented incremental improvements to the billing system by 
streamlining and targeting initiatives on a project-based approach (COJ 2006h, p. 106), but 
encountered problems with systems consolidation; staff shortages; and an inability to match 
systems with the scale of the city's growth (ibid., pp. 83, 106). Clearly, the COJ had not made 
sufficient progress according to the public, as in July 2002, the Star featured the billing 
problems under the disparaging banner of "Welcome to Blunderburg" (ioL 2011c). Six months 
later, the COJ reported a still-considerable debt burden and was set to write off an 
unrecoverable portion of its by-then R4 billion debt in December 2002, according to the then 
City Manager, Pascal Moloi (City Press 2002a). Concerned that customers would see this as an 
excuse not to pay their bills, Mayor Masondo warned defaulters that they would face service 
cut-offs and legal action if they did not pay (ibid.).  
In early January of 2003, Mayor Masondo reminded citizens in his State of the City Address 
(COJ 2003j), that "Revenue is the lifeblood of the City" (ibid., p. 4), and seemed satisfied that 
the COJ's improvement measures were taking effect. By May 2003, the call centre's 
performance had improved over threefold since February 2002 (COJ 2006h, p. 79). By mid-
2003 both new and backlog queries (those older than 30 days) were steadily declining (ibid., p. 
107). Around this time, the COJ started to reconcile the billing system data with that of the 
valuation roll to determine the gap between what the COJ charged and what it should be 
charging ratepayers (ibid., p. 102), which was a critical step towards ensuring a clean audit. 
Consequently, the numbers of new queries shot up (ibid., p. 107), and the number of backlog 
queries began to increase again (ibid., p. 107). 
In mid-2003, Keith Sendwe, the then Chief Executive Officer of the newly-formed Revenue 
Shared Services Centre, the COJ's institutional structure to manage billing queries, also noted 
challenges with meter readings and the high rate of non-payment by "big business, residents 
of affluent areas such as Houghton, and parastatals" (M&G 2003). Nonetheless, the COJ 
managed to collect over R100 million in the last few months of 2003 from government 
institutions (ibid.).  
'The City is facing a Crisis with its Billing System', Third Peak in Billing Crisis 
In September 2003, Councillor Parks Tau, the then MMC for Finance, contested the claims of 
the protestors, saying that only an estimated 20 000  of the COJ's 1.2 million ratepayers were 
experiencing billing problems and denied the accusation that "the City is facing a crisis with its 
billing system" (COJ 2003e). Ironically, a few months later and reportedly in error, the COJ cut 
off water to the headquarters of the ANC for five days in December and summonsed it for 
unpaid water and rates (M&G 2004a). Despite these problems, by the end of 2003, Fitch was 
satisfied with the COJ's performance and improved its rating as A- grade investment quality 
(COJ 2006h, p. 102). Mayor Masondo, in his State of the City Address for 2004 on 29 January 
2004 (COJ 2004h), although smarting from the media protests about billing (ibid., p. 5), again 
denied media claims of a billing crisis, saying complaints of bad service were "isolated" (ibid., 
p. 24). However, in an apparent bid to address the billing issues more responsively, he started 
his speech announcing his plans for revenue and billing matters (ibid., pp. 4-7), stating that 
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senior managers for the Revenue Shared Services Centre had been appointed and the 
Directors of its Board would be in place within three months (ibid., p. 6).  
Despite these measures, in March 2004 the COJ experienced the third peak in the billing crisis 
with 53 152 new queries logged, representing 7.1 percent of the COJ's customer base, in 
parallel with a rise in the number of backlog queries (COJ 2006i, pp. 106, 107). Revenue and 
Customer Relations Management department officials themselves finally, internally, called the 
ensuing eight-month period a "billing crisis" (ibid., p. 4), and a "customer services crisis" (COJ 
2006h, p. 106) made up of problems with the administration of billing and an increase in non-
payments due to rising consumer debt (ibid., p. 106). Even the then President, Thabo Mbeki, 
on a campaign trail in March, was supposedly "stunned… to hear about the chaotic practices" 
(M&G 2004a) of the COJ. According to the COJ, the protest was not unfounded (COJ 2006h, p. 
106), but was not significant enough to stop the oversubscription, by 3.8 times, of the COJ's 
first bond, worth R700 million, in April 2004 (ibid., p. 103). The billing protest also did not seem 
to hinder the COJ's intended collection of R7.4 billion cash for the year (Engineering News 
2004b), aiming for a payment level of 93 percent (COJ 2006h, p. 106). However, the Revenue 
Management unit recorded a new hurdle in June 2004, now being 381 660 data 'mismatches' 
between the valuation roll and the billing system (COJ 2006i, p. 16), guaranteeing that protest 
would not abate soon. 
Reacting responsively to the by then thousands of protestors, Mayor Masondo reported that 
corrective measures had been put in place to deal with the queries (Engineering News 2004a). 
These included dedicating Roland Hunter, the then Executive Director of the Finance 
department, on a fulltime basis to fixing the billing system (COJ 2006h, p. 83); making 
improvements in reading meters; and ensuring staff accountability (Engineering News 2004b). 
Also in May, the COJ suspended Sendwe for alleged 'non-performance' and 'irregularities' 
(Engineering News 2004a); Sendwe resigned in June 2004 and Hunter stepped in as the acting 
Chief Executive Officer of the Revenue Shared Services Centre (Daily Sun 2004; Engineering 
News 2004a). By June 2004, the number of backlog queries had again risen, to 49 975 or 6.1 
percent of the COJ's customer base, with 27 867 queries, or 3.6 percent of customers still 
needing resolution three months later (COJ 2006i, p. 4; 2006h, p. 106). Despite the challenges, 
the COJ made significant progress with query resolution by September 2004; only 27 867 
queries older than 90 days representing 3.6 percent of the customer base were still unresolved 
(COJ 2006i). The national government, also concerned with the spate of protests across the 
country launched Project Consolidate, a short-term national support project to help local 
government address a variety of service delivery backlogs (RSA 2004b; M&G 2006). 
'Customers are Never, Ever Wrong' 
Seemingly setting the stage for possible agonistic interactions in the future, Mayor Masondo 
said that customers deserve respectful treatment and are "never, ever wrong" (COJ 2005b, p. 
29) in his State of the City Address on 27 January 2005. He also reported progress on the 
reduction of billing queries by 39.3 percent, and that the COJ was continuing its data 
correction efforts (ibid., p. 29).  
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Again in a positive response to ongoing complaints, the COJ decided to create Phakama ('Rise 
Up' or 'Arise') in March 2005, a programme to set up a single billing and customer interface 
system from the "bottom to top" (COJ 2006h, p. 107). Kick-starting Phakama, the COJ started 
implementing the SAP system, or 'System Applications Products' developed by a German 
business software company, in 2005 (Faull & Rawoot 2011). In about mid-2005, the COJ 
awarded a five-year contract to Masana, this time as the lead contractor, for R208 million, to 
consolidate and upgrade Johannesburg's billing system (ibid.). Masana subcontracted some of 
the work to firms such as IBM and Dimension Data, also information technology companies 
(ibid.). By June 2005, billing matters had dramatically improved, with customers logging but 6 
881 new queries monthly, leaving only 6 252 complaints older than 90 days outstanding (COJ 
2006h, p. 106). The COJ had succeeded in significantly reducing the valuations-billing 
mismatches, but it had not finalised 40 percent of the data mismatches, namely 156 862 of 
381 660 (COJ 2006i, p. 16).  
Ensuring it did not lapse into complacency, in July 2005 the COJ's City 'scorecard' for the 2005-
06 financial year stated that the COJ was to "urgently address inaccurate and inconsistent 
billing and delays on issuing clearance certificates" (COJ 2006h, p. 61). Further, the COJ was to 
pay special attention to the "single customer interface" (ibid., p. 107) by improving operations, 
such as providing call centre operators with scripts (ibid., p. 80). The COJ also planned to 
migrate 170 000, or 30 percent, of Joburg Water's revenue base to the Revenue Management 
unit of the COJ (ibid.). 
5 Phakama Programme (2006-2010) 
Fourth peak in Billing Crisis and Phakama Programme 
The COJ continued to placate the still thousands of outraged customers that had lodged 
complaints with its call centre, in the fourth peak of the billing crisis. For instance, Mayor 
Masondo, then in his second five-year term since the local government elections of 1 March 
2006, publicly reassured citizens at his State of the City Address for 2006 on 29 March that 
"there is no crisis" (COJ 2006a, p. 5), and that the billing "problem is under control" (ibid.).  
Behind the scenes, however, the COJ acknowledged it had to improve the billing system in 
direct response to the "customer service crisis" (COJ 2006a, p. 106; COJ 2006h, p. 107). In 
recognition of the "unacceptable" (COJ 2006a, p. 23) service, the COJ pledged to achieve "a 
significant improvement in billing" (ibid.) within 12 months through Phakama (COJ 2006i). The 
COJ launched the detailed blueprint for Phakama in May 2006 to create a single customer 
interface, linking services and land transactions on one platform from the "bottom up" (COJ 
2006h, p. 107). This meant that each financial and administrative link in the billing systems of 
business operations of all "value chains" (ibid.), had to be standardised before integrating 
them (ibid.). By mid-2006, the Executive Director of the Finance and Economic Development 
directorate reported its planned to replace all financial and administrative Venus-based 
software systems with the SAP system by 1 April 2007, to lay the foundation for future systems 
integration (COJ 2009c, pp. 67, 156, 176, 177, 178).  
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The COJ understood this integration to be an uncertain and fraught process. The business plan 
of the COJ's Revenue and Customer Relations Management Department (COJ 2006i) 
anticipated the likelihood of national television and local newspaper coverage as a moderate 
to major risk and the "potential to damage reputation" (ibid.) as a major risk. The COJ 
predicted that "open trouble tickets" (ibid., p. 19) would increase from 0.67 to 1 percent by 
the end June 2007 (ibid.). Revenue collection still remained a "critical challenge" to increase 
the COJ's revenue due to inaccurate billing, commented Mayor Masondo in his State of the 
City Address for 2007 (COJ 2007k). 
'Service Delivery Problems go Middle Class' in Fifth Peak of Billing Crisis 
Seemingly, the public was satisfied by the COJ's efforts to deal with the protests, as there was 
a lull of two and a half years in the billing crisis, according to the data in this research. When 
Mayor Masondo delivered his State of the City Address for 2009 on 26 February (COJ 2009m), 
the only mention of billing is that data cleansing was underway. However, in the interim, the 
DA admitted running a "concerted and well-executed campaign" in the media to discredit the 
city administration (DA 2011). In July 2009, the public became, again, infuriated about the 
billing crisis, in this its fifth peak, when Carte Blanche, a weekly satellite television show 
broadcasting investigative features targeting the middle class in South Africa, exposed the 
COJ's billing problems under the title of "Bills and Blunders", starring DA councillors, Masana 
and the COJ (Carte Blanche 2009; Daily Maverick 2009).  
Shortly thereafter, in August 2009, Masana filed for voluntary liquidation (iTWeb 2009b), 
triggering the automatic termination of its contract with the COJ (Faull & Rawoot 2011). 
Masana reportedly said it was not able to pay its creditors as the COJ had not paid it on time 
(Balancing Act 2009). At the time of cancellation in September 2009, the COJ reportedly still 
owed Masana an amount of R64 million (ibid.). COJ officials and politicians apparently thought 
Masana had misjudged the size of the contract and did not have the appropriate management 
expertise (ANC 2010, pp. 9, 10). The COJ arranged for Dimension Data and IBM to manage the 
contract from October 2009 for 12 months (COJ 2011k, p. 137), with Dimension Data taking 
over most of the staff of Masana (iTWeb 2010). 
The Johannesburg Advocacy Group (JAG), an independent and voluntary group established in 
2009, campaigned against the city administration's poor service delivery on behalf of middle-
class individuals and residents associations in Johannesburg (Johannesburg Advocacy Group 
[JAG] 2014). JAG's founder, Lee Cahill, an experienced strategic marketing consultant, had an 
extensive network of television and radio broadcasters, newspapers and other media (Cahill 
2015), within Primedia and the Times Media Group, proving useful for activism about the 
billing crisis. JAG launched a petition and a Facebook page in September and called for a rates 
boycott (The Star 2009), demanding a 'City Charter' from the COJ (Cahill 2009). On 2 November 
2009 though, JAG's petition fizzled out having received only 44 signatures by the time it closed 
(ibid.). Notwithstanding the JAG's unsuccessful campaign up to then, it continued to play an 
active role in the billing crisis until 2012.  
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Likely in response to the DA's political challenge, and the contractual difficulties encountered 
with Phakama, the ANC appointed a task team in November 2009 around that time to prepare 
a confidential report for it on the billing problems, inter alia (ANC 2010). The report highlighted 
that the management of the outsourcing of information technology "left a lot to be desired" 
(ibid., p. 9). The report also raised concerns about insufficient contract management capacity 
within the COJ to manage the billing system contract; high programme risks; unrealistic 
revenue data; and a communication breakdown between the COJ and the services entities 
(ibid., pp. 9-11). 
In spite of these disadvantages, the COJ piloted its SAP implementation programme, 'Go-Live', 
on 16 November 2009 in phases to minimise problems (COJ 2006g, 2010f; 2011}, p. 76). By 
December 2009, the COJ had completed the two-month roll-out of the first phase of Phakama 
in the western suburbs of Johannesburg (COJ 2009l, 2010s). Based on hundreds of listeners 
making calls to Talk Radio 702 about problematic electricity bills (Daily Maverick 2009), there 
were still evidently billing problems although the service provider had reportedly fixed the 
faults (iWeek iTWeb 2011). By the end of 2009, the COJ had billed R13.3 billion in the year 
(Hunter & Phakathi 2010, p. 6). By then, the impact of the billing crisis had not yet manifested 
in the COJ's annual reporting, as it was able to announce a clean audit for the 2008-09 financial 
year on 27 January 2010, its last for the next few years (COJ 2010d). However, ongoing billing 
problems despite the COJ's claims to the contrary (COJ 2009l, 2010s), and frequent power 
outages, continued to incense the middle-class communities, prompting social commentators 
to liken their concerns to those of the service delivery protestors in low-income areas, claiming 
that "service delivery problems go middle class (Daily Maverick 2009) in December 2009. 
From 'Relatively Few Hiccups' to Cut-Offs in Sixth Peak in Billing Crisis 
Mayor Masondo announced in the State of the City Address, on 11 March 2010, an allocation 
of a further R170 million for the final stage of Phakama and the associated Land Information 
System (COJ 2010a). The COJ had recently implemented the second phase of Phakama for 50 
000 accounts in areas to the north of the study area, including Midrand and Ivory Park with 
"relatively few hiccups" (COJ 2010t). MMC Tau supposedly said around mid-April that the 
value of the 'nightmare' contract was R700 million, R350 million over budget, due to "honest 
mistakes made in good faith" (Business Day Live [BDlive] 2010). Nonetheless, the COJ received 
an industry gold SAP Quality award for Phakama in June 2010 (COJ 2010l). Further, the COJ 
reported in its annual performance report that the integration of system, people and 
processes resulted in successes for the year ending mid-2010, including the COJ's delivery of 
bills to 95 percent of customers; the answering of calls by call centre operators within 70-75 
seconds; and the issuing of 94 percent of refunds and 85 percent of clearance certificates 
within 30 days (COJ 2010f, pp. 3, 141). 
By 30 June 2010, the entire database of the COJ had been incorporated into the single SAP 
billing system (COJ 2010h; COJ 2011}, p. 64), although challenges were experienced with the 
migration of some billing to the COJ's revenue unit (COJ 2010e, pp. 24-25). Marking the sixth 
peak in the billing crisis, billing queries older than 30 days numbered 20 823 or about 1.7 
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percent of the estimated 1 200 000 COJ's accounts, with 13 699 or about 66 percent of these 
queries related to City Power issues alone (Hunter & Phakathi 2010, p. 16). The COJ contracted 
EOH Mthombo, a business technology solutions service provider, from 1 July 2010 for a 12-
month period to undertake post-implementation enterprise resource planning and end-user 
training and billing system development (COJ 2012d, pp. 132, 140, 161). EOH Mthombo's 
contract overlapped the work of Dimension Data and other service providers who continued to 
provide services until March 2011 whilst EOH Mthombo geared up for its activities (ibid., pp. 
132, 145). By July 2010, the COJ had switched 744 852 accounts to the new system 
(PolitcsWeb 2011b). In August 2010, the COJ continued to capture accounts and Mayor 
Masondo announced a new 'unified' 24-hour call centre to help customers (COJ 2010o). By 
October 2010, all COJ accounts had been moved to the new system.  
However, according to the DA, the process was a "fiasco" (EyeWitness News Online [EWN] 
2010) and not at all a smooth one (EWN 2010), with customer complaints escalating greatly in 
this period (EWN 2011p). The COJ reportedly said that many of the complaints in recent 
months were related to bills containing hugely-inflated, erroneous electricity charges (EWN 
2011j), and that it hoped to fix them by the end of 2010 (EWN 2010). The JAG urged 
customers, in November 2010, to complain to the Presidential Hotline again, and the National 
Consumer Commission and Public Protector amongst others (JAG 2010), trying to publicly 
shame the COJ into acknowledging it had a problem. In a distinctly antagonistic turn, the COJ 
issued 13 404 final notices and cut services to 8 333 customers in December 2010 (COJ 2011p), 
even though the problem with inflated bills had not been resolved (EWN 2011j). The DA 
accused the COJ of being "arrogant" and "indifferent" (ioL 2011b) and drove then a concerted 
media campaign until the local government elections in 2011 (DA 2011). 
6 Of Sabotage and Secret Agents (2011) 
'Endless Queues' in Seventh Peak of Billing Crisis 
Following the COJ's cut-offs at the end of 2010, the malcontents erupted in outrage, signalling 
an extended, and seventh, peak in the billing crisis (SA News 2011). Throughout 2011, the 
middle class objected extensively in the media, complained to call centres; sent communiques 
to other state agencies and spheres of government; staged a sit-in and a street protest; and 
threatened court action.  
 JAG's founder, Lee Cahill, responsible for about 58 press releases and radio and television 
appearances, 60 percent in 2011 alone (Who's Who Southern Africa 2015), and excluding 
frequent blogs on the JAG website (JAG 2014), picked up the pace of its media campaign from 
14 January. Even the Revenue staff allegedly downed tools in exasperation at the "endless 
queues" (iTWeb 2011e; looklocal 2011a) of complaining customers on 19 January (looklocal 
2011a). Low morale of staff, internal tensions, inaccurate data and a pervasive silo mentality 
further affected customer interactions negatively (Hunter & Phakathi 2010). On 20 January, 
Talk Radio 702 gave airtime to the billing crisis (JAG 2011c), publicising the frustration of the 
protestors. Further, Cahill said on 25 January 2011, that JAG had called fruitlessly on the then 
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MEC for Local Government and Housing in the GPG, Humphrey Mmemezi, for an official 
investigation into the billing system (Sowetan 2011b).  
After the COJ had cut off electricity to a number of angry customers without notice, they 
staged a sit-in protest at the COJ offices on 21 January, demanding that their bills be fixed (JAG 
2011c; TimesLive 2011a). The DA, egged on by the fracas, tried unsuccessfully to motivate the 
Council to convene a special session that day (DA 2011; ioL 2011b). 
The COJ seemed responsive, trying to explain the complexities of Phakama (COJ 2011p) 
(PolitcsWeb 2011b), with Mayor Masondo expressing "empathy" (COJ 2011x). Further, on the 
22 January, it apologised for the few account holders that were experiencing problems (COJ 
2011x; ioL 2011h), and "acknowledging it [was] wrong" (EWN 2011h). Nonetheless, the next 
day, the JAG launched a Twitter campaign (JAG 2011b). To the COJ's mortification, Sicelo 
Shiceka, the then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs in the national 
government announced on 24 January that he was "stepping in" (EWN 2011p) and would meet 
the GPG about the billing matter (ibid.). The media reported that Minister Shiceka, too, was a 
"victim of the billing chaos" (ibid.), having received an incorrect bill for a property he had not 
lived in for two years (EWN 2011o). Mayor Masondo briefed the media on 26 January, denying 
the collapse of the system although acknowledging management problems, and said that the 
COJ's data cleansing had achieved the good result of 1 040 648 customers receiving bills by 
then (COJ 2011p, x; iTWeb 2011j; PolitcsWeb 2011b). COJ billing was difficult and complex, he 
explained, but "the idea of a heartless city has no basis whatsoever" (iTWeb 2011j). Indeed, he 
maintained, the COJ had a "people centred approach… [with] …an open door policy… [and] 
…must learn that the customer is King!" (PolitcsWeb 2011b). 
He reiterated, "there was no crisis" (TimesLive 2011a), and that the COJ would discipline the 
officials responsible for the inflated bills (COJ 2011p). However, the middle class-municipality 
relationship became increasingly antagonistic. Dramatic public opinion likened "being shot in 
your bed at night to getting the wrong bill" (Grootes 2011). The accusation of Mayor Masondo 
as a "do nothing, head-in-the-sand, don't-care, fiddle-while-Joburg-burns" (ibid.) mayor, by the 
opinionista Stephen Grootes, also a host of Talk Radio 702, added to the air of extreme 
hostility. Minister Shiceka announced the launch of an official investigation on 1 February 
(TimesLive 2011c). On that day, the COJ's call centre operators also admitted that they were 
on a go-slow and had called radio stations in frustration at the computer system, which was 
allegedly almost always not working (EWN 2011m). On 2 February, Mayor Masondo personally 
visited two council revenue centres, insisting there was no crisis, although he regretted the 
inconvenience to the affected customers (News Tonight Africa 2011), saying that "heads could 
roll" (BDlive 2012), or unsuitable staff would be reassigned elsewhere.  
Only a 'Few Glitches' or is it Sabotage?  
Escalating the matter of billing and (potholes) politically within the ANC, the Regional ANC 
convened a meeting of the 14 ANC mayors of Gauteng province for 3 February 2011 (ioL 
2011a). The delegates agreed with Mayor Masondo that there was "no crisis" (ibid.), but rather 
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only "a few glitches in the system" (ibid.), which had been blown out of proportion by the 
media.  
That same day, the ANC provincial secretary, David Makhura, allegedly said the ANC suspected 
that sabotage was responsible for the billing problems (The New Age 2011a), providing fodder 
for humorous response in the media (see Figure 8.2 below). The DA sarcastically 
complimented its "secret agents" (TimesLive 2011d), for infiltrating the COJ and causing the 
billing crisis and called for the resignation of Mayor Masondo (ioL 2011b; TimesLive 2011d). 
Simultaneously, some customers were furious at the alleged harassment and unethical 
practices of the COJ's debt collectors (Daily Maverick 2011). A DA ward Councillor, Dave 
Dewes, said on 8 February that 30 ratepayers had signed up for his planned class action in the 
High Court against the then City Manager, Mavela Dlamini (iTWeb 2011a). 
The JAG felt dismissed by the ANC, which had reportedly claimed that billing was "not a crisis 
because people are not protesting" (EWN 2011e), pointing to a possible assumption by those 
working within the state that a protest could not be serious if it was not in the street. The 
JAG's responded by holding a public street protest outside the COJ's Revenue offices on 18 
February 2011 (M&G 2011). The protestors numbered less than the 500 protestors hoped for, 
reportedly turning violent at one stage although no detailed information was provided (Daily 
Maverick 2011; itWeb 2011b; M&G2011). Responsive to the street protest, Vicky Shuping, the 
then Executive Director of Billing and Revenue since 2008 (ioL 2011c), said, "we are hearing 
the noise, we are responding" (M&G 2011).  
Figure 8.2: Is it Sabotage? 
 
Source: "ANC Johannesburg mayor accuses opposition party of sabotage in billing system crisis", cartoon by Zapiro (Sunday Times 
2011) 
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The COJ's positive responses included, for instance, the establishment of a one-way hotline to 
deal with the estimated 65 000 queries logged about inflated billing since January, according to 
Dlamini, the City Manager (COJ 2011g, l). The COJ also extended the operating hours of 
customer centres in the northern suburbs and set up a 60-person dedicated team (COJ 2011i, 
l). Thereafter, the COJ met with the JAG but said the JAG could not provide "a single genuine 
complaint" (EWN 2011d), according to a news report (ibid.). Although seemingly initially 
dismissive, in a later responsive move, the COJ confirmed in a press release on 22 February 
that it was 'listening' and would not do cut-offs if an account was "inaccurate on a case-by-
case basis" (COJ 2011j) until the case had been resolved. A COJ spokesperson, Tshidiso 
Nkgoedi, reportedly said on 24 February that the COJ's hotline operators had called 21 000 of 
the affected customers, reaching 9 900 of them (EWN 2011g). 
'Losing the billing crisis battle' 
The COJ seemed to be "losing the billing crisis battle" (City Press 2011b), despite being 
increasingly responsive to protesters, with Dlamini and the JAG publicly debating the billing 
issue on Summit TV, a satellite television show on 3 March 2011 (JAG 2011a). Mayor Masondo, 
at his last State of the City Address (COJ 2011a), on 9 March 2011, apologised for the problems 
with billing and announced the COJ's remedial measures already underway, which included a 
significant discount scheme for unresolved queries and debt settlements. On 10 March, 
Dlamini stated that Gerald Dumas, the former head of Joburg Water, would replace Shuping as 
the new Executive Director of Billing and Revenue (TimesLive 2011b). The COJ and the then 
acting Minister for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Nathi Mthethwa, also 
apologised for the billing problems (ibid.), with MEC Mmemezi submitting his report of the 12 
billing problem areas he would monitor to Minister Mthethwa, on 10 March 2011 (ibid.). 
Dumas reportedly said on 14 March 2011 that the billing problem would be fixed within six 
months (EWN 2011r). The COJ claimed on 17 March that 28 000 of the inflated bills had been 
resolved (EWN 2011c, r). MEC Mmemezi also reportedly noted improvements "almost on a 
monthly basis" (Municipal IQ 2011b). In a blow to the protestors, the Public Prosecutor 
decided on 31 March not to proceed with the case that the Blairgowrie Community Association 
had lodged six weeks earlier (EWN 2011n; ioL Property 2011) undoubtedly to the relief of the 
COJ.  
Mayor Masondo, acknowledging the positivity of conflict, said again on 7 April that there was 
no crisis but that the media publicity about the billing problems had reminded the COJ "to 
become even more customer centred" (COJ 2011a). In an instance of intra-state co-operation, 
the COJ, the Public Protector and the MEC Mmemezi jointly confirmed on 14 April, that the 
billing issue would be resolved within six months (The New Age 2011b). According to the Public 
Protector, Madonsela, the COJ had already resolved 55 of the 267 cases her office had 
received in between February and April 2011, and about half of the action items identified 
(COJ 2011m; Moneyweb 2011).  
The JAG seemed but briefly mollified, demanding written proof of the claim (JAG 2011d). 
Further, the COJ announced on 15 April that it had placed a moratorium on cut-offs for queries 
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outstanding for more than 3 months (EWN 2011k). The COJ had also resolved a little over half, 
or 35 353, of the 65 000 queries logged (COJ 2011m), and a further 5 000 new ones (EWN 
2011f). The COJ planned, also, to develop a Customer Service Charter (COJ 2011m). A month 
later, on 16 May, the COJ declared that it had resolved nearly 80 percent, or 51 388, of the 
original 65 000 queries (COJ 2011g; EWN 2011q). Customer Services Centres continued to 
operate extended hours to assist those with unresolved queries (COJ 2011d).  
At the local government elections on 18 May 2011, as an outcome of the DA's stated 
electioneering on the billing crisis ticket (DA 2011) and the genuine grievances with the billing 
system and other governance issues, the COJ's customers' dissatisfaction was reflected in the 
loss of confidence in the AND-led administration to meet their expectations. Although the ANC 
won the elections in Johannesburg, the DA had increased its share of the vote substantially 
(PolitcsWeb 2011a).  
First Qualified Audit Due to Billing Errors 
The then new Executive Mayor, Councillor Parks Tau, said that it would "not be business as 
usual" (COJ 2011b), in his acceptance speech on 26 May 2011. He acknowledged that billing 
was a problem and said residents would soon benefit from the "single entry point into all city 
services" (ibid.). A month later, he then also emphasised the importance of ensuring 
expenditure was aligned with revenue (COJ 2011~). At the same time, the COJ heard that it 
had received its first qualified audit in four years, for the 2009-10 financial year (COJ 2011o). 
Dlamini, the soon-to-be-outgoing City Manager, was "deeply disappointed" (ibid.), pointing to 
the change in accounting treatment between former and current accounting methods, which 
resulted in billing inaccuracies (ibid.). In the meantime, the COJ extended its contract with EOH 
Mthombo, which had helped it to stabilise the billing system and deal with the information 
requirements of the Auditor General (COJ 2012d, p. 161), for a further month until the end of 
July 2011 (ibid., p. 132).  
By mid-2011, the COJ had undertaken "experiential marketing" (COJ 2011c, p. 54), in an 
attempt to address customers' negative perceptions of service quality through radio, print, 
billboard and advertorials (ibid.). By then, too, the COJ had succeeded in weeding out further 
cases of problematic billing by spatially matching 94 percent of properties to the Land 
Information System (ibid., p. 88). The COJ had also closely monitored the call centre, provided 
more training and set up a problem-solving multi-sectoral task team (ibid., pp. 88-89), and had 
paid staff overtime wages to resolve the queries (ibid., p. 94).  
Although billing had stabilised, Mayor Tau said on 3 August that he was still "not completely 
happy" (EWN 2011i). Taking up the case of 200 queries that had been submitted to it, the 
National Consumer Commission issued a 14-day ultimatum on 4 August (EWN 2011q) to the 
COJ to resolve the queries, threatening a fine of R1 million per query (EWN 2011q). On 26 
September 2011, the COJ objected to the National Consumer Commission's warnings and was 
to follow the matter up with the independent National Consumer Tribunal (COJ 2011h). 
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Revenue Step Change Programme 
Following the COJ's announcement about the National Consumer Commission, the JAG 
appealed that same day to Yunus Carrim, the then Deputy Minister of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs to step in (itWeb 2011f). Deepening tensions, the COJ had no option but 
to mount an unpopular mass arrears recovery campaign and electricity cut-offs. Allegedly, the 
COJ had only enough cash reserves to cover no more than 12 days of operations according to 
the DA on 10 November (iTWeb 2011d). In a move to placate protestors, the COJ launched its 
Revenue Step Change Programme on 22 November (COJ 2011{; 2011|; EWN 2011l; Fin24 
2011), with an associated 'roadmap', to improve accuracy and centralise billing data with more 
"customer-centricity" (COJ 2011|). The Step Change programme included deadlines, and 
oversight and accountability measures for senior management and staff; changes to the call 
centre; the adoption of smart metering; development of customer services standards; and a 
focus on clearing the backlog in billing queries and objections about valuations. The DA 
criticised the plan for having "too many promises" (iTWeb 2011c). By late November, there 
were more allegations in the media about the COJ's poor process management of mass cut-
offs, with Sandton customers also complaining after the COJ had cut off their electricity 
services (EWN 2011a). Even President Zuma was affected on 7 December 2011 by service cut-
offs to two apartment buildings he owned in the city centre that had allegedly been 'hijacked' 
(taken over illegally) and had had accrued unpaid accounts (EWN 2011b). 
In what proved ultimately to be a partly agonistic and productive interaction, albeit forced, 
that changed city policy, 13 companies and members of the Property Owners and Managers 
Association lodged an urgent case on 5 December 2011 in the High Court (iTWeb 2011g; 
Schindlers Attorneys [Schindlers] 2011a; 2011b). The case, brought against Mayor Tau and 
Trevor Fowler, the new City Manager since 3 October 2011, sought to stop the COJ's 
improperly handled service cut-offs to buildings of its members (COJ 2011r; iTWeb 2011g). The 
COJ announced it had developed a set of court-endorsed rules in "amicable" (COJ 2011q) 
agreement with the Property Owners and Managers Association. The rules clarified the actions 
to be taken in the event of billing, disputes and cut-off processes, and the customer's 
obligation to pay, regardless whether he had logged a query or received no bill (COJ 2011q; 
Property Owners and Managers Association vs. COJ et al. 2011; Schindlers 2013a). 
7 Billing 'Step Change' (2012 and Beyond) 
Second Qualified Audit due to Billing Inconsistencies 
On 26 January, the COJ received its second qualified audit, for the 2010-11 financial year 
(Fin24 2012). Reportedly, the Auditor General was concerned about insufficient internal 
controls of the revenue management system and inconsistent billing records mainly, said 
Fowler, the City Manager (Fin24 2012). Even Dumas then acknowledged that the billing 
situation was a "crisis" (COJ 2012g).  
On 9 February, the JAG was interviewed by Radio France Internationale, broadcasting in 
Europe and Africa (JAG 2012b), simultaneously submitting a public request to the Premier of 
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the Gauteng Province, Nomvula Mokonyane, asking her to investigate the COJ's billing system 
(JAG 2012d). The COJ, seemingly responsive to protest, said it would set up an escalation team 
by the end of February 2012, according to a media report on 10 January (itWeb 2012a). 
On 19 March 2012, Mayor Tau met Obed Bapela, the Deputy Minister in the Presidency for 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, and MEC Mmemezi about the 8 000 calls that 
customers had made to the Presidential Hotline since the previous April (EWN 2012b; 2012c; 
ioL 2012b). Deputy Minister Bapela was reassured that COJ had already addressed 5 000 of 
those complaints (EWN 2012c). The COJ reportedly said it was still trying to finalise the 
remainder of the 65 000 queries that had been logged before the beginning of 2011 by the end 
of the year (EWN 2012e). Mayor Tau, aware of customers' poor experience of interactions with 
the COJ, aimed to restore "confidence in the integrity of our billing system" (COJ 2012h) 
through the comprehensive Revenue Step Change Programme (ibid.). JAG noted its scepticism 
in a South African Broadcasting Corporation television news feature, on SABC 3 TV News, on 
the billing crisis on 19 March, and on radio, on the SABC SAfm Breakfast Show, on the 20 
March (JAG 2012c). 
The COJ raised an alarm about the notable rise of non-payment levels since around mid-2011, 
on 20 March 2012, following a meeting between Mayor Tau and Deputy Minister Bapela (COJ 
2012b; EWN 2012c). The COJ, embarking on another drive to collect arrears, urged customers 
to pay outstanding accounts or have their services terminated (ioL 2012a; The Star 2012e). The 
COJ prepared to send out 22 000 final demand notices to those customers that had not logged 
queries on their accounts by the end of February 2012, but allowed defaulters to make zero-
deposit repayment plans with the COJ or provided interest reversals on account, on condition 
they were paid up (COJ 2012b; The Star 2012e). 
Mayor Tau, in his first State of the City Address, on 22 March 2012, emphasised the 
importance of improving collections, matching this with the COJ's need to spend R100 billion 
on Johannesburg in the next decade (COJ 2012a). The JAG condemned his Address, on 26 
March, for avoiding "some of the most pressing problems… [and failing]… to acknowledge the 
nature and extent of the billing problem" (ioL 2012d). Around the same time, another avenue 
of protest for the middle class seemed to close as the National Consumer Tribunal ruled in 
favour of the COJ, cancelling the complaints received because the National Consumer 
Commission had not complied properly with the processes of the Consumer Protection Act 
(COJ vs. National Consumer Commission 2012). Electricity-related inaccurate billing prompted 
Roslynn Greeff, the Councillor and then Member of the Mayoral Committee for Environment, 
Infrastructure and Services, with the Managing Director of City Power, to motivate for calling a 
tender for the supply and installation of smart meters on 2 April 2012 (Moneyweb 2012). 
Meanwhile, the JAG, yet again, urged citizens, on 5 April, to keep reporting complaints to the 
Presidential Hotline (JAG 2012a).  
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'Actually there is no Plan', Last Peak in Billing Crisis 
The COJ's appointment of Primedia by mid-2012, to "provide communication channels" (COJ 
2012d, p. 165), seemed to have marked the shift away from its negative publicity. By the end 
of June 2012, the COJ reported on its Facebook page that it had 'taken stock' of billing 
(Facebook 2012) and had achieved the numerous goals of the Revenue Step Change 
Programme, namely responsive; effective; good quality; accurate; and customer-focused 
service (COJ 2013e, p. 61). By then, the billing system for rates and services was the prime 
means for the management and collection of R24 billion revenue, or 68 percent, of the COJ's 
income (COJ 2012d, p. 8). On 20 June, the COJ held a 'Key and Corporate Accounts Open Day' 
drawing together all affected departments with 900 customers in attendance and was able to 
resolve many queries that day. The Public Protector reportedly commended the COJ's plan for 
electricity billing and addressing complaints, when she met Mayor Tau, on 11 July. 
Nonetheless, the very next day, a media report showed that customers were still enraged, this 
time at the COJ's latest policy of electricity cut-offs if its meter readers were unable to access 
meters to read them for billing purposes (ioL 2012a).  
The media seemed to have a poor impression of the COJ's Revenue Step Change Programme, 
reporting on 13 July 2012, that the COJ was unable to stick to its own deadlines of the 
'roadmap' (The Star 2012e). After repeated requests, the media obtained copies of the COJ's 
'roadmap' on 20 July, but project management experts deemed the COJ's documents to be 
vague, incomplete and not fit for purpose (ioL 2012c), casting doubt, again, on the COJ's 
management abilities. Deputy Minister Bapela paid a surprise visit to the Randburg Customer 
Service Centre at the end of July 2012 and was reportedly shocked by the poor building 
condition and management (BDlive 2012). The COJ, now on the defensive, explained on 9 
August 2012 that it was not obliged to make the more detailed operational part of the 
'roadmap' public (The Star 2012a), leading the media to allege on 20 July that "actually there is 
no plan" (The Star 2012c). 
A few weeks later, the COJ announced on 10 August 2012, it had made significant inroads into 
the backlog of queries, reporting that only 1 200 queries of those logged before November 
2011 were not yet resolved (ioL 2012c). The DA refuted this claim and hosted their own 'Open 
Day' on 18 August (ioL 2012c), allegedly gathering over 3 000 billing-related queries (Truluck 
2012a). Accusations followed in the media, on 20 August, of the COJ's alleged 'cruelty' towards 
residents, implying it had lied about the extent of the billing problem" (ioL 2012c). The DA 
claimed that the ANC had apparently denounced the DA's Open Day as an "illegal act... 
tantamount to insurrection against the ANC City administration" (DA 2012c). The ANC was 
"dismayed" (ioL 2012c) by the DA's tactics, saying that the DA "had taken it too far now" 
(ibid.), and was wasting customers' time (ibid.). The DA also accused the COJ of being 
"politically spiteful" (Truluck 2012a), on 22 August, when it refused to accept delivery of the 
queries (ibid.); the COJ claimed that residents were essentially "jumping the queue" (DA 
2012a), although the DA refuted this as many of the complaints were longstanding (DA 2012a). 
On 10 September, the DA started handing these complaints to the Auditor General (iTWeb 
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2012b), planning to also send them to the Public Protector and the National Consumer 
Commission, but only as a "last resort" (EWN 2012a).  
Premier Mokonyane announced that progress in the resolution of the billing matter had been 
made, also on 10 September, claiming that the COJ had resolved 95 percent of the complaints 
received (albeit almost two years after they had been initially reported) (EWN 2012d). 
Meanwhile, the COJ started an audit, already delayed by 3 months, of 400 000 meters on 10 
September as reportedly 23 percent of electricity meter readings seemed improbable, leading 
to billing queries (The Star 2012d).  
'Better Customer Centricity' 
The COJ tried a more 'human' touch with the press reporting on 15 January 2013 that the 
group head of the Revenue Shared Services Centre, Lungelwa Sonquishe, would be stationed 
for a month in Region B's Randburg's Customer Service Centre to try to resolve customers' 
problems and ensure "better customer centricity" (COJ 2013e, p. 61; The Star 2013a). 
However, the media also reported on 15 January 2013 that the COJ had allegedly incorrectly 
closed some residents' open tickets, thus exposing them to unlawful cut-offs (Schindlers 
2013b).  
The COJ was notified of its third qualified audit, for 2011-12 financial year, on 31 January 2013 
(BDlive 2013f). The COJ's alleged over-reliance on estimated, and disregard for actual, readings 
meant that the Auditor-General was not able to verify R867.3m of water and electricity-related 
revenue (iTWeb 2013c). A further R695.8m for refuse removal could not be verified due to 
alleged discrepancies between source data and billing data (iTWeb 2013c). Despite this 
unfortunate result, the DA Councillor John Mendelsohn conceded that there seemed to be 
fewer billing queries in 2013 than in 2012 (iTWeb 2013a). By 19 February, the COJ had 
presented a 115-page action plan as part of its Annual Report dealing with the adverse audit 
outcome, with less than 10 percent of the items related to improvements in billing operations 
and revenue management of City Power, Pikitup and Joburg Water (COJ 2013c).  
At last, by March 2013, the COJ's efforts seemed to be effective, albeit not entirely. Mayor Tau, 
at his State of the City Address for 2013, on 9 March 2013, said that the 'roadmap' had resulted 
in improvements in the billing system (COJ 2013j). For instance, there was a reduction of 
unresolved billing complaints, an improved collection rate of 91 percent, and a reduction in 
call centre waiting times from 164 to 24 seconds with abandoned calls dropping from 27 to 6 
percent (ibid., p. 3).  
According to the results of the Quality of Life Surveys for 2011 and 2013 by the Gauteng City-
Region Observatory (2015b), there was a marked drop in the level of dissatisfaction with the 
COJ's billing services, from 31 percent who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied in 2011, to 
22.9 percent in 2013 (ibid.). Although there were negative perceptions about the COJ's billing 
in 2011, communities did not perceive it as the worst performing municipality and it ranked 
seventh of the ten Gauteng municipalities surveyed (ibid.).  
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Two years later, by July 2013, however, the COJ had so dramatically improved its ranking that 
it was placed as the best performing municipality of the ten municipalities for billing services 
(ibid.), indicating finally a tangible success in its convoluted path to improved billing services. 
But, then, in a rather embarrassing blunder, the COJ issued a cut-off notice to the former 
President Mandela on 1 August 2013; although the notice was intended for another customer 
and should have been delivered elsewhere (EWN 2013). Citing the same Quality of Life surveys 
(Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2015a), the results reported by the COJ and the media 
showed that in 2011, 64 percent of white residents, presumably in middle-class suburbs, in 
comparison with only 47 percent of black residents, presumably in low-income areas, were 
satisfied with the quality of billing services (COJ 2012m; The Star 2012g). This arguably 
indicates the influence of the media coverage in driving positive change but also indicates a 
racial dimension in the billing saga that has not been studied.  
On 31 January 2014, the COJ finally heard that it had achieved a clean audit, for 2012-13 
(BDlive 2014; COJ 2014c). For the first time since 2002, no mention was made of billing in the 
Mayor's State of the City Address for 2014 (COJ 2014h). The COJ's Programme Phakama, its 
Revenue Step Change Programme and numerous other efforts had finally yielded some 
measure of irrefutable progress. 
8 In Closing 
This convoluted tale of the middle-class malcontents and their backlash against the city 
administration's purportedly poor implementation of billing service delivery from the mid-
1990s to 2014 (see synthesis, Table 1.1 on page 230), reveals arguably five threads of insight in 
relation to agonism, interwoven with the eight main iterations of the billing crisis (Table 8.3 on 
page 214). 
Firstly, the historical context leaves a shadow over the present. Contemporary relationships 
and interactions do not happen in a temporal vacuum. They are shaped to a considerable 
extent by the legacy of past interactions. In the case of the mainly white middle class in 
Johannesburg, before the 'billing crisis' emerged, the Sandton rates boycott had already 
compromised the relationship between the ANC-led city administration and the middle-class 
malcontents, driving an antagonistic wedge between them and marking their relationship with 
mistrust and acrimony post-1994. 
Secondly, this tangled story highlights that in the investigation of the city administration's 
agonistic or antagonistic interactions with citizens, the real issue at stake that should not be 
overlooked is whether the processes of conflict yield constructive outcomes for the benefit of 
citizens, irrespective of the extent of agonism in practice. Clearly, the city administration 
employed a range of diverse stances, along the antagonistic-agonistic spectrum, towards 
processes of city strife in the matter of the billing crisis in inconsistent ways. The approaches of 
the city administration, as the billings crisis peaked eight times, included antagonism; denial 
with frequent statements that there was 'no crisis'; denigration when the ANC dismissed the
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Table 8.4: Synthesis of Conflict Management per Period in 'Middle-Class Malcontents' 
# Question 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-to date 
1 State's qualification of 
the conflict 
A necessary tax; unsympathetic; felt in the 
right 
No crisis; teething problems; cost recovery 
all-important; 'chaotic practices' (national) 
Nightmare; unacceptable; reputation-
damaging; a problem; no billing crisis but 
customer service crisis 
Internationally embarrassing; demoralising; 
tense; war; battle; not a crisis; no crisis; 
embarrassed by media coverage 
2 State's portrayal of 
protestors 
Rebels; wealthy; insulting; 'racist'; 
hysterical; powerful, not victims; 
boycotters; ratepayers; customers; account 
numbers; the enemy 
Non-payers; rich; debtors; customers; 
complainers; insulting; big business; in an 
uproar; lifeblood; never wrong 
Complainers; customers illegal; insurrection; guilty of treason; 
saboteurs; secret agents; victims; customer 
is King; angry; hostile 
3 State's 
response to 
protestors' 
claim 
To protest 
event 
Antagonistic; defensive; cuts off services 
for non-payment; unsympathetic; hostile; 
dismissive; undermining 
Repressive; threatens cut-offs and legal 
action; denial of crisis; placates; explains 
Placates; denial; antagonistic;  Acknowledges; denigrates; dismissive; 
placates; do mass arrears recovery and cut-
offs; denial; reactive; many contradictions 
To effects 
of issue 
under 
contention 
Did not increase rates; interest write-offs 
although executed poorly 
Defensive; reactive; internal 
acknowledgment of crisis 
Grudging acknowledgement of mistakes; 
asks for sympathy and understanding 
Responsive; reactive; explains; empathises; 
apologises; denial; plea for sympathy; also 
has 'victims'; placates; defensive; state not 
'heartless'; has 'open door'; meets with but 
disparages JAG; acknowledges publicly 
protest reminds COJ to be customer-
centric 
To root 
cause of 
issue 
Centralise finance function; consolidate 
billing databases 
Appoints consultants; changes 
management team; announces Phakama; 
sets up call centre; suspends and changes 
staff; Project Consolidate; performance 
management 
Escalate politically; concedes issue and 
changes internal systems, more on 
Phakama 
Escalate politically; discipline officials; 
reassign staff; one-way hotline; 60-person 
dedicated team; Revenue Step Change and 
roadmap; suspend cut-offs; discount 
scheme; new head; another moratorium 
on cut-offs; Customer Service Charter; 
more training; more changes to operations 
4 State's response to 
power dynamics 
Locks out protestors from discussion; 
divisive; solidifies mistrust 
Peoples' Centres, petitions management 
and oversight system, call centre; IDP and 
Mayoral Road Show as channels 
Favours structured channels; media 
briefings 
Favours structured channels; intimidated 
by protestors' power in the media; Open 
Days; forced to interact with Property 
Owners and Managers Association 
5 Form of agreement 
reached (or outcome if 
none) 
Court judgments reinforces city 
administration's decisions 
None, implicit in response to root cause of 
issue 
None, implicit in response to root cause of 
issue 
Property Owners and Managers 
Association interaction results in court-
endorsed rules for disputes and cut-offs 
6 How could the state 
have responded more 
agonistically and why did 
it not? 
1997 financial crisis; push for rates fuels 
antagonism; local government tries to 
avoid collapse 
Constrained by sour relationship due to 
Sandton rates boycott; need to integrate 
business systems; drive to collect 
payments; technical difficulties; staff 
issues; felt it was doing its job thus no need 
to interact 
Constrained by overt politicking for 2006 
and 2011 local elections when technical 
not political solutions are needed; 
contractual problems; staff issues 
Could have done more but ANC-DA politics 
are tricky to navigate 
Source: Own formulation 
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middle class's activism as not a crisis as the protest was not taking place in the streets; 
vexation; and defensiveness. However, moving towards the agonistic end of the spectrum, the 
city administration also recognised the protestors, as evidenced by its many apologies; 
responsiveness; and openness to criticism and change embodied in its acknowledgement 
(eventually) that it had 'heard' customers.  
Continuing with this trend, importantly, over time the city administration's processes also 
reflected many constructive attempts to resolve the problems, although the effectiveness of 
outcomes was variable due to technical and other difficulties and many did not necessarily 
draw on agonistic practices. Efforts included implementing Programme Phakama as a major 
attempt to address the consequences of frequent institutional restructurings and the 
consolidation of different billing systems even though Phakama itself created numerous 
technical and managerial issues requiring other interventions to resolve them in turn. An 
instance of a positive outcome for citizens is the set of court-endorsed rules for cut-offs 
resulting from the, seemingly, partly agonistic interaction with the Property Owners and 
Managers Association at the end of 2011. Being responsive to protestors' concerns included 
making operational and structural changes to the institution and to billing and revenue policy; 
establishing the one-way hotline and extended opening hours at the call centre in February 
2011; holding various Open Days; and installing smart meters to address inaccuracies with 
electricity billing. Further efforts were the discounting of debt settlements, by offering 
repayment plans and interest reversals on accounts paid in full; prioritising the billing matter 
politically and managerially; intensifying Programme Phakama; and thanking the media and 
customers for compelling the city administration to act with more 'customer-centricity'.  
Thirdly, any interactions, agonistic or not, by the ANC-led city administration with protestors, 
were mediated through party politics with the opposition party. The ANC faced significant 
political embarrassment as the opposition party, the DA, which represented all wards in the 
selected middle-class area during the height of the billing crisis repeatedly accused the ANC of 
underplaying the billing problems and exploiting the situation in its electioneering. The ANC 
met with party-political ridicule when it alleged, in February 2011, the sabotage of the city 
administration's billing system. The ANC's political leadership had to intervene in the billing 
matter to mitigate negative political sentiment about the party and the city administration. 
Should the ANC have disregarded the DA, it may not have affected the outcome of an ANC-led 
city administration at the polls, certainly not in 2006 and 2011 (although it may have partly 
accounted for the ANC's loss of the political control of Johannesburg after the local 
government elections in 2016). However, it did mean the city administration had to mediate 
the billing crisis through the filter of these party politics, until the 2011 local government 
elections and beyond, to avoid the near collapse of the system as experienced in the Sandton 
rates boycott of the late 1990s. Likewise, the DA had to concede that the billing system had 
improved. In this story, party politics creates an added dimension that perhaps limited 
agonistic interactions. 
Fourthly, this story of strife highlights difficult issues in the relationship between the city 
administration and citizens, especially this engagement with this specific middle-class 
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community. The city administration was ambivalent towards protests from the middle class 
but is dependent on the middle class, which has a disproportionate power relative to its low-
income counterparts due to its significant contribution to the city's rates base and access to 
resources and business networks. Then, although this community may be largely white, the 
grievances are shared by the new and growing black elite. Unlike low-income communities, 
usually black, the black middle class increasingly shares (white) middle-class concerns about 
aspects of service delivery that are important to it. Further, racial undercurrents are also 
evident in this story, observed initially in the Sandton rates boycott; simplistically, the 'white' 
was the symbol of the past struggles of the black against apartheid. Now the black, ANC-led 
city administration had to 'struggle', again, against white middle-class opposition to its 
initiatives, the same citizens who voted for the ANC's chief opposition party in Johannesburg. 
Lastly, the local government's notions of the citizen as 'customer' in line with New Public 
Management principles complicates an already complex billing relationship between the city 
administration and citizens, and is at odds with the agonistic practice seeing interaction as an 
opportunity to strengthen the state-society relationship and empower citizens, even if no 
resolution is reached. 
Fifthly, what is noteworthy is that dissensus is clearly not merely a factor of poverty-driven 
dissensus and relative deprivation, but is also anger and a sense of injustice regardless of class, 
or income. What the data in this story shows is that dissensus is endemic to any population, 
and has a variety of origins.  
In closing, the notion of agonism is seductive in its promise of brokering constructive conflict. 
However, the possible range of agonistic practices in this convoluted story is decidedly 
minimal, although there seems to have been some degree of responsiveness to the criticism 
evident. Amidst the city administration's repeated denials of the billing crisis, it did try to be 
deliberately constructive, if not agonistic, with its measures to address billing problems. 
Ultimately, it seemed successful in responding to the billing backlash of the middle-class 
malcontents, reflected in survey results showing improvements in customer satisfaction; 
namely, customer dissatisfaction levels about billing decreased significantly, from 31 percent in 
2011 to 22.9 percent in 2013. Further, Johannesburg ranked as the best performer out of ten 
municipalities in Gauteng by 2013. For the first time in over a decade since the 2002 State of 
the City Address (COJ 2002h), the Mayor of Johannesburg did not have to resort to talking 
about the billing crisis in his State of the City Address in 2014.  
The next and concluding chapter considers these and the other findings of the case study, in 
wrapping up and answering the research questions. 
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Chapter 9 | In Conclusion: Agonism's Possibilities 
1 Research Questions Recapped 
Protest globally is on the rise, with the state-society relationship seeming at an all-time (Roefs 
& Atkinson 2010; Marinova 2011; Byrne, J. 2012; Harvey, D. 2012; della Porta & Mattoni 2014). 
In South Africa too, open conflict – commonly called 'service delivery protest' – has become a 
near norm of engagement between the state and low-income citizens (Ballard et al. 2006; 
Alexander 2010; Heller & Evans 2011), but also to a lesser extent between the state and 
middle-class communities. State authorities in South Africa tend to view such conflict, which is 
beyond the framework of formal democratic processes, as being a threat to democracy or at 
least as something negative and harmful (Keane 2004; Moser 2006; Everatt 2010; von Holdt et 
al. 2011; Duncan 2014b; McMichael 2015). For some international observers, such conflict 
arguably even represents the 'failure' of democratic governance (Scott, J. 1998; Atkinson 2007; 
Misra-Dexter & February 2010).  
Conflict can be located on an 'antagonism-agonism' spectrum; both ends representing states 
of opposition. At the one end, 'antagonism' is the openly hostile fight between enemies, with 
or without physical violence, who disagree with each other's views; it is typically seen as 
destructive. At the other end, 'agonism' is the conflict between two adversaries who mutually 
and respectfully recognise the legitimacy of each other's view. The notion of agonism, or 
agonistic conflict, is seen as a positive force for change and capable of producing constructive 
outcomes. 
This positive and generative potential of conflict seems absent in state-society interaction in 
the case of service delivery protests in South Africa, largely prompting this research. Although 
governance practices of the state need to take into account the increasing levels of dissensus, 
they tend to follow the precepts of participatory and deliberative democracy with an emphasis 
on the attainment of agreement, and the placation of conflict. By going to the heart of the 
notion of agonism, that 'dissensus' underpins democracy rather than the more familiar 
'consensus', agonism offers an alternative way for the state to consider the meaning of 
protest. 
To recap, the overarching question of the research asks what the practical possibilities are of 
applying concepts of agonism to the state's governance practices in future state-society strife, 
drawing from cases of open conflict, in considering the perspective of those working within the 
state. Given the huge scope and complexity of state-society relationships, this research limited 
the exploration to the consideration of the perspective of state actors at the mainly local level 
only. 
Briefly, discussions on agonism – most distinctively by the political theorist, Chantal Mouffe 
(2000b) – provide a compelling argument on how the translation of antagonism to agonism 
within contexts of democratic rule could steer conflict towards more productive outcomes. 
However, although there is a growing and lively literature on agonism discussed in Chapter 2, it 
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is at a mostly at the conceptual or theoretical level. What is largely missing is an exploration of 
situated agonism, or an understanding of the extent to which agonism is currently practiced 
and what actually-existing instances of agonism may say about its possibilities for more fruitful 
state-society strife in further contexts – whether the agonistic practices are knowingly or 
unknowingly, deliberately or accidentally, intentionally or unintentionally, undertaken by the 
state. In other words, agonism has been well developed in the literature as a theoretical-
conceptual construct but has been rarely used in practice. 
The literature on agonism says that the state-society relationship may be framed differently to 
use conflict creatively and constructively to produce better democratic outcomes for citizens. 
This is a hopeful and positive claim, but how can the state realistically conduct agonistic 
practices in a messy and complex world? Even if two parties are genuinely committed to the 
ideals of agonism, they are but two of many interacting agents that must operate within 
rapidly changing contexts and configurations of power and political interest. The research 
draws on a specific narrative from the context of the post-apartheid city administration of 
Johannesburg to disclose this complexity. The research does not propose agonism as an 
attainable ideal, but rather explores the actual possibility for an (invariably imperfect) agonism 
within the details of situated practice. 
The case narrative suggests that in the context of post-apartheid Johannesburg, agonism was 
not the norm of engagement. Indeed, the city administration's stance towards strife was 
mostly inconsistent, varying greatly along the 'antagonistic-agonistic' spectrum of possible 
responses. Any unknowing or unintentional deployment of agonistic practices was constrained 
by multiple factors including adverse shaping contexts; the extreme difficulty in practising 
agonism in multi-actor configurations; and an unwillingness to move beyond the traditional 
modes of engagement in processes of conflict (which had to do with political interest or simply 
with a lack of knowledge). However, whilst evidence shows that agonistic practices were 
disappointingly infrequent, there were clearly some agonistic processes – although parallel to 
and often in contradiction with other modes of engagement – and so the narrative from 
Johannesburg does provide insights into the possibilities for agonism for fruitful strife. 
To answer the central question of this thesis, this chapter concludes the research process by 
first answering two lines of questioning to address the main question, as recapped in Figure 
9.1 on page 236. 
Firstly, the theoretical-conceptual question about agonism asks what the literature says about 
dissensus in democracy and governance, what agonism's appeal is and how it features in the 
discourse on dissensus; how writers have translated agonism into practice at the institutional 
level, and how they have applied agonism as a research tool.  
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Figure 9.1: Research Questions Recapped 
OVERARCHING QUESTION 
What are the practical possibilities of applying concepts of agonism to the state's governance practices in future state-society 
strife, drawing from cases of open conflict, in considering the perspective of those working within the state? 
 
             theoretical-conceptual                                                                                                                                                               descriptive-analytical 
 ❶ 
What does the literature say about dissensus in 
democracy and governance, and what is 
agonism's appeal and how does it feature in the 
discourse on dissensus; how have writers 
translated the notion of agonism into practice at 
the institutional level; and how have they applied 
agonism as a research tool? 
  ❷ 
In considering the case of local government, what 
types of protests characterised post-apartheid 
Johannesburg; how did the service delivery strife 
unfold over time; and how did the city 
administration respond to the protests? 
 
 ❸ 
To what extent were the city administration's 
practices agonistic; did these practices result in 
outcomes beneficial for citizens; and what were 
the constraints to agonistic practices of 
governance? 
 
 
Source: Own formulation 
Secondly, the two-part descriptive-analytical question is posed. Namely, in the case of local 
government, what types of protests characterised post-apartheid Johannesburg; how service 
delivery strife unfolded over time; and how the city administration responded to these protests. 
Then, the research considers to what extent the city administration's practices were agonistic; 
whether these practices resulted in outcomes beneficial for citizens; and what the constraints 
were to agonistic practices of governance.  
The next sections in this chapter synthesise the responses to these sub-questions in turn. 
Finally, the loop is closed by returning to the overarching research question, which speculates 
about the practical possibilities of applying concepts of agonism to state-society strife. 
2 Agonism as Ideal and Research Tool 
The first line of inquiry, essentially about the theoretical aspects of agonism, queries what the 
literature says about dissensus in democracy and governance, and what the appeal of agonism 
is and how it features in the discourse on dissensus; how agonism is translated from the 
theoretical-conceptual level into institutional practices; and how it is applied as a research tool. 
In response, the academic contributions to agonism to date focus mainly on its theoretical-
conceptual aspects. However, importantly for this research, the translation of agonism from 
theory into practice is under-explored. Broadly, the state could apply agonistic principles at an 
institutional level, especially that of the adoption of the ethos of agonism, to improve its 
approach to the management of strife. Further, at a detailed level, principles drawn from the 
available literature offer many insights into their possible practical application in agonistic 
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practices (refer to page 34, Chapter 2). However, these principles cannot be used as a tick list, 
but rather as a sensitising concept for practitioners, tending to open up more questions than it 
answers. Both the broad and the detailed translations of agonism into practice are theoretical, 
conceptual, ambiguous and insufficiently tested empirically, although the same could be 
argued about the deliberative and participatory democratic approaches to governance.  
The use of agonism as an analytical tool with the notion of agonism applied to research in a 
descriptive-analytical fashion, was used only infrequently in the literature. For this study, 
although other tools for the analysis of processes of conflict could have been applied, the use 
of agonism as a prism seemed particularly appropriate given the topic. According to the 
literature, the agonistic framework has been. In this research, the tenets of agonism were 
incorporated into the research design framework as a sensitising and thematic filter to analyse 
the data. 
3 Types of Protests, Unfolding Strife and Responses 
The second line of inquiry, essentially about the nature of aspects of service-delivery related 
strife, queries in a descriptive-analytical way what types of protest characterised post-
apartheid Johannesburg; how the service delivery strife unfolded over time; and how the city 
administration handled protest. Broadly, in responding to this question as detailed next, the 
research shows that many types of protest are evident; service delivery strife unfolded in 
contradictory and irregular ways over time; and the city administration responded in varied 
ways to the protest. The synthesis of the city administration's qualification of the conflict; 
portrayal of the protestors; responses to their claims; power dynamics; agreements reached; 
and outcomes contains such diverse and complex information, making responses to this line of 
inquiry a significant challenge. However, some broad inferences have been provided, albeit 
with less than desired specificity or details (refer to Table 9.1 on page 238; see detailed 
breakdown in Table 6.6, Table 7.1 and Table 8.4 on pages 164, 197 and 230). 
Many Types of Protest 
Lack of Common Definitions Masks Variety and Complexity of Service Delivery Protests 
Contextualising service delivery protests in Johannesburg within the broader global and 
national trends of relatively similar protest shows that most of these protests globally since the 
1990s share a common appeal to the authorities to do things differently. In South Africa 
though, one of the difficulties in this analysis is the fuzziness of the terms used in the literature 
to describe relations between state and citizens, including the nature of this sort of conflict. 
Glib use is made of terms such as 'service delivery', 'developmental government' and the 
'citizen' – even within the state – each of which in reality are complex and multidimensional 
concept, each influencing protest differently.  
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Table 9.1: Synthesis of Conflict Management in Case Study Areas, 1996-To Date 
# Question Dissent in the Deep South Struggle Streets Middle-Class Malcontents 
1 State's qualification of 
the conflict 
Ambivalent about conflict but largely negative, sees it as a 
business risk and wants to eliminate it; however does 
acknowledge humanitarian aspects of the conflict; feels 
justified in implementation initiatives to save water, 
recover costs and provide free water 
Initially recognises right to trade; seemingly progressively 
negative views of anything to do with informal trade, 
especially violent protest; sees trade as nuisance, chaos 
and anarchy 
Not a crisis; unsympathetic; need to recover costs; 
teething problems deepening to customer care crisis; 
embarrassing; demoralising  
2 State's portrayal of 
protestors 
Mainly as customers and clients, and net spenders, less as 
permanent citizens; ranges between seeing them as a 
liability, temporary and not part of city, to treating with 
respect 
Survivalists; guilty of acting illegally; manipulative; strong 
but also vulnerable; seen as bullying, looting and 
progressively more lawless and beyond enforcement  
Wealthy; hysterical; hostile; enemy; secret agents; 
insurrectionary; but also non-paying customers; debtors; 
and 'customer is king'; lifeblood 
3 State's 
response 
to 
protestors' 
claim 
To protest 
event 
Denial; antagonism; placation; unresponsive; forceful 
repression when violent; defensive 
Antagonistic and forceful suppression of protest especially 
if xenophobic and violent; denial; repression in Operation 
Clean Sweep 
Defensive; unsympathetic; threatening; placating; 
explaining; acknowledgement less common but there are 
instances 
To effects 
of issue 
under 
contention 
Increasingly aware of need to invest; installs prepaid 
meters despite unpopularity but acknowledges poverty 
and provides concessions, like debt write-offs and more 
empowerment measures; changes operations and water 
policies in 2005 and 2008 
Willing to engage, including agonistically; increasingly less 
so over time, eventually becoming aggressive and 
repressive with its enforcement actions, overshadowing 
more positive training provision, markets creation and 
participation 
Defensive; acknowledging internally; increasingly makes 
concessions; grudging acceptance; intensifying respons-
iveness; customer-centric; empathy; but also disparaging 
To root 
cause of 
issue 
Prioritises Orange Farm and other informal settlements; 
progressively greater budgets and plans and provision of 
infrastructure; increases free water and other free 
services 
Empowerment initiatives; concessions on rent and 
enforcement; consultation for initiatives; provides skills 
training; increasingly less experimental and deepens old 
ways of working  
Structural changes to improve billing; invests prog-
ressively more resources; escalates politically; more 
information to public 
4 State's response to 
power dynamics 
Implements placatory measures; provides structured 
participation spaces 
Creates structures for engagement about policy and 
projects; seen increasingly as dividing traders, later only 
courts allows traders to have a voice  
Minimal engagement with protestors; sets up structured 
channels; makes more public announcements; Open Days 
for some clients; forced to interact with Property Owners 
and Managers Association 
5 Form of agreement 
reached (or outcome if 
none) 
Implicit agreement with protestors' cause in that actions 
are increasingly responsive to issues underlying 
contention; few agonistic engagements or agreements 
Initially able to co-create project and policy agreements; 
responsive but indirectly to underlying issues; later forum 
but seen as ineffective  
No agreement generally, although response shows 
underlying issue taken on board; Property Owners and 
Managers Association interaction results in jointly agreed 
rules 
6 How could the state 
have responded more 
agonistically and why 
did it not? 
Minimal agonistic engagements; constrained by lack of 
knowledge and resources, New Public Management and 
capitalist ideologies; enmity of protestors especially 
violent ones; antagonism yielded success for protestors so 
role of agonism not clear; need to protect water as scarce 
resource; no obvious alternative way to provide free 
water 
Early agonistic approach reflects post-apartheid goodwill; 
constraints hamper later efforts especially need for 
management and regeneration of Inner City; protection of 
rates base; internal tensions; mistrust solidified around 
Operation Clean Sweep 
Agonism unlikely given constraints; financial crisis; need 
for income; hostility from Sandton rates boycott; 
increasing focus on technical and contractual difficulties 
and responsibilities; exacerbated by tricky ANC-DA 
politicking  
Note: refer to Table 6.6, Table 7.1 and Table 8.4 on pages 164, 197 and 230 respectively for breakdown of details per period 
Source: Own formulation 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 239 
The frequent use of the terms 'protest' and 'service delivery protest' typically masks the range 
of conflict categories that the state handles on a daily basis, with highly visible street protests 
being but one form of conflict. Indeed, although protests in the streets by low-income 
communities were at the forefront of most respondents’ minds at the time of the interviews in 
2012 and 2013, a few did raise other kinds of more 'quiet' protests in state boardrooms or 
made by those in middle-class suburbs, which also contribute to institutional change and thus 
were included in this study.  
Range of Service Delivery Protest Types with Overlapping Dimensions 
At first glance, the story of Johannesburg may seem to be of widespread and undifferentiated 
'service delivery' protest by increasingly frustrated and demanding communities and of an 
obdurate or ineffective state. Closer examination of the descriptive-analytical case of the 
chronology of strife in Johannesburg, contained in Chapters 4 to 8 (pages 68-229), and the city 
administration's handling of protest, offers the perspective of those working within the state 
on the governance practices of the city administration and reveals, however, a considerable 
diversity in relation to conflict – in terms of space, protagonists, form, cause, consequences, 
and more. The research identified 453 instances of publicised service delivery-related conflict 
between 1994 and 2013 alone (Chapter 4), of which 96 percent took place in low-income areas 
in the city. Of these protests, a little over 60 percent were about basic services, housing and 
land, or informal trading, with the remainder about less clearly-defined, multi-issued or locally-
specific matters, including billing systems.  
Together with the expanded definition of 'service delivery' and a wider understanding of 
service delivery protests, the provision of a more appropriate and universal classification of the 
different types was possible. Pointing to the extraordinary differences but also similarities 
between the protests, there are four discrete but overlapping types of protests, with distinct 
sets of state respondents. These are 'periodic service delivery protests', 'protracted service 
delivery protests', 'recurrent informal trading protests' and 'intermittent ad hoc service 
delivery protests'. The overlapping dimensions categorising any protest includes its size; the 
income group of the protestors; its physical intensity; the mechanism used; its duration; the 
type of service that is the subject of the dissensus; and the clarity of the role-players in the 
protest, inter alia.  
Irregular and Contradictory Processes of Strife 
Within the case study, the research narrowed its focus to three thematic- and spatially-focused 
stories of strife between the different parts of the city administration of Johannesburg and 
unique communities, namely about water service delivery in Orange Farm, informal trading in 
the Inner City, and billing in selected middle-class suburbs (in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 starting on 
page 135). The case study helps to determine how the different parts of the city administration 
(and the state) responded to protests and whether any of these responses incorporated 
aspects of Mouffe's (2000b) agonism, within the situated context of Johannesburg but 
providing insights for elsewhere. Every story of strife was constructed from multiple sources 
including scholarly publications; official reports; the media; and extensive interviews, but there 
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are gaps in these convoluted and multifaceted tales, partly due to the lack of appropriate data 
and partly due to the nature of the research method (refer Chapter 3, page 35). The diversity 
and particularity even within one part of one city, and one part of the state, shows how 
difficult it is to propose any consistent response by the state to conflict, not to mention a 
consistently agonistic one. 
Proponents of agonism argue that agonistic democracy is an improvement on current practices 
of democracy as it tries to 'empower' and not merely 'govern' society (Pløger 2004), and has 
the constructive ability to shock the state institution out of political complacency (Schaap 
2006, p. 256). The case study shows, though, that the city administration's practices generally 
attempted to take citizens' needs into account but that these practices, whilst sometimes 
constructive or well-intended, might not necessarily have been intentionally or deliberately 
'agonistic' ones. Indeed, even with the array of principles of detailed agonistic practices 
identified (see Chapter 2, page 34), it was challenging to exactly pinpoint features of agonistic 
governance practice in the case study, partly as information is imperfect but also as the 
understanding of agonism-in-practice is incomplete. 
In trying to understand how 'agonistic' practices fit into the unfolding of city strife over time, 
the case study shows that all governance practices in processes of strife are not at all linear, 
contiguous or consistent but are marked by a high degree of irregular and contradictory 
aspects. Within this context, any practices that might be categorised as deliberately 'agonistic' 
seem largely but not exclusively accidental, pointing to the lack of a definitive understanding of 
what makes a practice 'agonistic'. 'Agonistic' practices might appropriately be classified as 
'agonistic' possibly only if the state deliberately, knowingly and intentionally undertakes them 
as such, all the time or at least most of the time, or they unequivocally contain one or more 
easily recognisable principles of agonistic practice (like those outlined in Chapter 2, page 34), 
even if the state might not have termed it as such. Given this understanding of 'agonistic' 
practice, little progression in advancing the use of agonistic practices by the city administration 
over time seems evident in the case study. Sometimes the unknowingly agonistic practice gives 
way to one of antagonism such as in the tale of informal trading after the early 2000s, while at 
other times, displays of antagonistic and agonistic practices, by the different parts of the city 
administration, unfold in tandem. Examples include the city administration's delay in 
implementing street trading by-law enforcement but quashing violent and potentially violent 
street protests in the Inner City, or issuing termination orders for electricity services to middle-
class defaulters whilst also offering incentives to settle their debts. Overall, the city 
administration's approach to the management of conflict over time did not display a linear 
progression towards agonistic practice, but rather an irregular series of moves towards and 
away from it. However, that does not mean that the city administration did not set out to 
deliberately manage conflict or that it was unresponsive.  
Varied Responses to Protest 
As these different protest actions unfolded over time in Johannesburg as seen in the case 
study (see Part B, pages 68-234), the city administration's responses were also reviewed to 
assess its varied responses to protest. 
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Generally, responses to protest tend to range along an 'antagonistic-agonistic' spectrum of 
strife. The nature of state-society strife varies between 'highly hostile' and 'low-intensity 
hostile' relationships between the city administration and citizens at the antagonistic end of 
the spectrum, to 'highly cooperative' ones at the agonistic end of the spectrum. Likewise, the 
city administration's responses to conflict were varied, vacillating inconsistently along a 
'repression-transformation' spectrum. At the 'repression' end responses typically included 
'criminalisation' and 'suppression' of protest, whilst at the 'transformation' end they included 
'significant or incremental changes', 'concessions' and 'negotiation', with a range of responses 
such as 'placation' and 'denial' in-between. Further, in these contradictory, irregular and 
unpredictable processes of strife, the types of protest were not necessarily predictors of the 
types of responses by the city administration. 
The city administration, with its largely consensus-seeking democratic basis, means that its 
responses tend to reflect the state's view of protest as negative, despite protest being regarded 
as a democratic right in South Africa. The city administration generally aims to suppress, pacify 
or eradicate conflict (Dawson 2010b; Death 2010b). The prevailing view within the state 
appears to be that conflict was something to resolve as rapidly as possible. This is somewhat at 
odds with South Africa’s history of anti-apartheid protest and the celebration by the ruling 
party, the ANC, of the role of this protest in bringing about the change of the country, which is 
seemingly fertile ground for agonistic practices. Writers argue that a reluctance to engage with 
conflict is central to governance practices of municipal government, and that the state is more 
concerned with measures to address the lack of perceived order created by the frequency of 
service delivery protests, which impacts negatively on its legitimacy (Pierre 1999; Goldstone 
2008). 
The city administration of Johannesburg seemingly shares with many other municipalities in 
South Africa a desire to avoid or suppress conflict reflected in its use of a multiplicity of 
conflict-handling tactics. The findings of the case study reveal that its views of conflict range 
between antagonism, ambivalence, denial, and the less apparent acknowledgement and 
agonistic outlook. For instance, the city administration repudiates some of the service delivery 
protests in various low-income areas in ways that are frequently brusque and antagonistic. 
This was the case when Orange Farm protestors damaged municipal water meters, when 
violent anti-foreigner protests took place in the Inner City, and when permission was refused 
for a public gathering in Orange Farm during a period of frequent and 'violent' protests about 
water services and land in 2006. In another case the city administration adopted an approach 
of denial seen in its use of language allegedly denigrating electricity and water anti-pre-paid 
meter activists, and its insistence to middle-class protestors that there was no 'billing crisis' 
(COJ 2003e; COJ 2011x). 
Many of the city administration's tactics were reactive and in some cases even openly 
aggressive but one of the tactics was to concede to protestors and change its policies and 
behaviours. This is apparent in the case of Orange Farm, which received increasing attention 
and funds from the city administration over time, and the 'billing crisis' with multiple 
responses from the city administration including making elaborate and costly changes to 
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internal systems. The case of informal trading is less clear-cut but even in this instance the 
governance practices of the city administration were modified in response to protest although 
with frequent regressions to antagonism. 
However, the state's initial responses to protest events may not be the only ones and it may 
well alter its response over time to the effects and root causes of the issues under contention. 
The city administration's short-term responses to protests are often reactive, aggressive or 
denialist. However, such antagonistic responses are not necessarily the final stopping point for 
the city administration. Arguably, in the longer-term and somewhat indirectly, possibly in 
response to the cumulative weight of repeated protests rather than to any one specific 
episode of conflict or because the various conflicts had entered the consciousness of the city 
administration, it frequently did respond more positively to the benefit of citizens. Examples of 
such longer-term responses to the effects and root cause of the issue under contention include 
policy changes, such as the additional free water allocation in Johannesburg due in part to the 
Orange Farm water-related protests, and project initiations such as that of Programme 
Phakama due to the middle class's complaints about the billing system. By taking a longer-
term perspective on the relationship between state-society conflict and responses by the 
state, significantly higher levels of 'agonism' seem apparent than when one looks only at direct 
and immediate responses to specific conflicts. 
The city administration seems to express a preference for, and an ability to respond more 
readily to, protests made through formal channels. The study largely considers protest in terms 
of conflict that operate outside – although not necessarily in contradiction to – the formal 
spaces and channels for protest forming part of the city's framework of democratic practices. 
These formal structures for considering protest include participatory processes in planning, 
petitioning, one-on-one meetings with politicians and officials and the political channels 
provided by council committees. In some cases, the city administration also provides special-
purpose channels to 'routinise' a particular sort of conflict and this approach seems to have 
the potential to support agonistic practices. Informal channels, including most notably street 
protests but also others external to the city administration, put pressure on the city 
administration to respond. Examples include protestors' use of the media or appeals to 
another sphere of government or political representative to intervene on their behalf, with the 
city administration finding these forms of conflict uncomfortable, or embarrassing. In the 
short-term, the city administration seems to struggle to accept the validity of these protests, 
though over the longer term such processes may have a behaviour-changing effect on the city 
administration.  
The formal channels may facilitate agonistic responses to protest more readily than other 
informal approaches. The channels provide mechanisms that allow citizens to protest about 
issues through complaining and petitioning to the city administration, which can then engage 
accordingly with protestors. There may even be quite robust engagements within these 
processes. Are these engagements agonistic? Again, the answer depends on the specifics of 
each engagement. Clearly, in many instances, this form of channelled protest merely placates 
protestors, or creates the appearance of a responsive administration, or is used to co-opt 
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protestors and suppress real conflict. However, in other instances, protest does provoke a 
genuine response, especially where a lack of response might lead protestors to abandon the 
formal channels and to resort to street protests or media campaigns. Arguably, this fear leads 
the city administration to drive more agonistic, or at least consultative, interactions in formally 
channelled protests, although there is a degree of inequality in the access to these formal 
channels. Well-resourced protestors seem best placed to take advantage of the structured 
channels, such as petitioning, although less-capacitated objectors do also use them. However, 
protestors in low-income areas like Orange Farm, feeling excluded from decision-making 
processes of the city administration, tend to resort to street protest especially as for them it is 
a relatively low-cost protest tactic. One argument in favour of agonism linked to channelled 
conflict is that the state has more power and resources than the weaker adversary has, and so 
generally should take the lead in facilitating agonistic engagements, which is facilitated by 
formal channels (Gunder 2003, pp. 254, 310; Pløger 2004).  
Further, however, antagonistic protest outside formal channels can and does force state-
society interaction. The threat of court action in pressurising the city administration to engage 
with protestors can result in greater equality between antagonists, as it did in the court-
endorsed agreement with the Property Owners and Managers Association about processes to 
be followed in the event of billing disputes, and electricity and water disconnection processes. 
Forcing change in this way can be a tricky process, which does not always yield satisfactory 
outcomes for protestors. In some cases, the extra-municipal channel can rebound on 
protestors, as in the court actions about the Sandton rates boycott and the protest about the 
legality of pre-paid water meters.  
4 Extent, Outcomes and Constraints of Agonistic Practices 
Continuing with the second line of inquiry, still at the descriptive-analytical level, the research 
asks to what extent the city administration's practices were agonistic, whether these resulted in 
outcomes beneficial for citizens, and what the constraints were to agonistic practices of 
governance. Stereotyping city government as being entirely – or even mainly – unresponsive to 
protest or protestors is clearly unwarranted. What is less clear though is whether any of the 
city administration's responses should be considered as examples of agonistic governance 
practices. Agonism by definition requires a form of purposeful agonistic engagement between 
contending parties that leads to modified behaviour of adversaries. In the case of 
Johannesburg, there were many instances of behavioural changes in its institutional responses 
to protest. If agonistic practice means to embrace conflict as an opportunity to improve 
governance, rather than avoid conflict, then there were much fewer apparent cases of 
deliberately agonistic engagement between the city administration and the protestors. Four 
main points elaborate this difficulty next, namely the extent of agonism is difficult to gauge; 
the role of antagonism is also important in creating beneficial outcomes; agonistic practices of 
governance may not result in positive outcomes; and constraints to agonistic practices are 
many. 
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Extent of Agonism Difficult to Gauge 
The study established that agonism is indeed present to some degree in the interactions 
between the city administration and protestors. Gauging the extent of agonism is difficult, 
however, as the definitional issues are unclear. Even Mouffe (2013) acknowledges that 
agonism can consist of many diverse practices making for difficult definition and identification 
of agonistic practices. Does the broad use of agonistic principles qualify the governance 
practice as agonistic? Or are detailed aspects of agonism required in practices of governance, 
and if so, how many and in what mix and how often? Excluding entirely from the definition of 
'agonism' any processes of interaction about conflict that do not deliberately involve all 
possible agonistic practices may be very limiting, as some practices do display some 
components of agonism, albeit minimally and unknowingly, but which, nonetheless resulted in 
outcomes that might not have materialised if the conflictual interaction had not happened. 
Further, notwithstanding the minimal information on the conflictual interaction – if an 
agonistic practice means the internalisation of the issue under contention and the changing of 
behaviour and the 'being' of the institution, is that not then evidence of an agonistic practice, 
as suggested by Mouffe (2000b) herself (ibid., p. 10)? This aspect is not at all clear in the 
literature. However, in theoretical and practical terms, this detailed case study analysis lends 
one to speculate that some agonistic principles must enjoy more primacy than others must. 
Namely, the broad orientation towards agonism is all-important. Also, the state could focus on 
the processes of state-society strife, with any aspect thereof to reflect the broad orientation 
towards agonism, as well as the proactive (preferably) adoption of agonistic principles. 
Without that, the extent of agonism in practice can be but limited. 
Role of Antagonism is also Important in Creating Beneficial Outcomes 
There is also an unclear understanding of the relevance of 'agonism' and 'antagonism' in 
driving change in strife. Both involve states of tension, although one is said to involve a 
positive use of conflict and the other a negative one. In reality, negative and positive 
approaches to conflict are found to co-exist, or to unfold consecutively between the two ends 
of the antagonism-agonism spectrum. Attention should be paid to the role of antagonism in 
any processes of strife in potentially creating beneficial outcomes for citizens. For example, it is 
quite possible for a genuinely agonistic interaction to reach a stalemate and shift into 
antagonism. There is also a subjective element to understanding the nature of the conflict with 
some observers seeing antagonism and others seeing agonism, such as commentators who see 
conflict as a sign of democracy's 'failure' whilst others see conflict as a sign of its health. One 
cannot consider the extent of agonism without reference to the entire antagonism-agonism 
spectrum, with antagonism and agonism frequently intertwined, not separate, making it even 
more difficult to gauge the extent of agonism in any state-society interactions. The case study 
shows that there were no cases of 'pure' antagonism or 'pure 'agonism' evident in any of the 
conflicts but rather a range of responses in between. There is an implicit message in much of 
the literature that antagonism is a negative aspect of conflict. This study shows though that 
sometimes a positive change or outcome for the protestors was derived without recourse to 
any agonistic state-society strife. Rather the positive outcome was triggered by the 
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antagonistic nature of the strife between the city administration and citizens as the city 
administration tried to placate protestors, or avoid future protests, by proposing an outcome 
that responded to protestors' demands.  
Agonistic Practices Might or Might Not Result in Positive Outcomes 
Arguably, it is as important to consider the outcomes of any processes of conflict, as it is to 
consider the interactions themselves and any related agonistic practices. In the literature, 
there is a possibly misleading assumption that agonistic strife leads to positive outcomes, more 
beneficial than those achieved with processes that either are antagonistic or avoid conflict 
altogether. The accumulated case-based evidence points to the benefits of agonism but there 
is nothing definitive about it. Agonistic, or at least responsive, practices may even have 
contributed to poor outcomes and negative unintended consequences as in the city 
administration's response in the form of the problematic Programme Phakama to the middle 
class's numerous billing complaints with the programme's initially ineffective performance 
leading to other new and different billing problems, which triggered even more protests in 
turn. In another case, the city administration unintentionally became a slumlord of a 
dilapidated building in the Inner City when it tried to provide for temporary accommodation 
for residents evicted from another building targeted for redevelopment. 
Drawing a conclusive link between outcomes of protest and processes of strife is difficult – 
whether practices are agonistic or not – especially where the outcomes may be indirect or may 
evolve over the longer term. Quantifying the actual effect of conflictual processes on 
behaviour or policy, whether agonistic or not, is challenging when the city administration may 
make certain changes based on prompts other than those related to conflictual interactions. 
Further, differentiating between outcomes that reflect agonistic practices and those that 
reflect other kinds of democratic practices including electoral, participatory, consultative and 
deliberative engagements (which may be deemed as being part of agonistic interactions) may 
be as problematic (Wenman 2003; Knops 2007, p. 116; Vink 2007; Tambakaki 2009; Knops 
2012; Westphal 2014, p. 7). How one distinguishes agonistic democratic practices from these 
other 'ordinary' ones is not at all clear. Even if one were able to disentangle agonistic practices 
fully from the processes of strife, the difficulties in deciding the link between agonistic 
practices and outcomes would remain. Outcomes may, for example, be the consequence of 
agonistic interactions acting together with other processes. 
Where the city administration has acted seemingly with an ethos of agonism and responded 
proactively to protests, the outcomes invariably include both negative and positive aspects. 
Negative aspects included the increased mistrust of citizens of the city administration, costly 
litigation in the courts, and unintended outcomes that did not ultimately benefit citizens. 
However, agonistic practices seem to have also resulted in enough positive outcomes (as 
detailed in the next paragraph) to be cautiously optimistic about the prospects for agonistic 
conflict management.  
The positive impact of agonistic state-society strife manifests as changes to the city 
administration and its policies to the benefit of citizens. For instance, the city administration 
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made institutional modifications such as the appointment of former ActStop activists in the 
1990s in a conscious and deliberate attempt to build capacity to improve relations with 
potentially adversarial informal traders. The COJ set up the Petitions Unit to provide a formal 
space for citizens in support of an agonistic "active politicization of issues" (Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo 2010, p. 346). Also, at the peak of protests about water, and other services and 
housing, in Orange Farm in 2008, the COJ appointed an Orange Farm resident and political 
activist to manage the protest in the informal settlement. The city administration made 
changes to policy and programme implementation such as providing additional free water to 
citizens and revising the pricing structure of the water services tariff to be more pro-poor, 
responding to the water-related protest in Orange Farm. In terms of street trading in the Inner 
City, the city administration changed its policies, increased capital budgets to deal with the 
issues under contention and instigated special forums, like the Informal Trading Forum in 
2009, to debate challenges even if it did not always do so successfully. The city administration 
also undertook operational changes, such as the overt codification of project-based conflict 
management for the Bus Rapid Transit and the Rea Vaya service.  
The outcomes of agonistic interactions between the city administration and citizens in 
processes of conflict resulted in changes to the city administration in the form of typically 
incremental adjustments rather than sweeping changes. This is consistent with an argument in 
the literature that proposes incremental decision-making as the best outcome of agonistic 
conflict management (Gunder 2003, p. 308; Mäntysalo et al. 2011; Wingenbach 2011, p. xvi). 
The combined effect of these incremental changes over time could be significant. For instance, 
progressively larger allocations of capital budget for infrastructure investments in Orange Farm 
were made by the city administration since its incorporation into Johannesburg's boundaries in 
1995.  
Another of the difficulties for the state is that positive agonistic responses by the state might 
not be readily evident to the contending party. This was the case in the 'billing crisis' where the 
city administration's multiple attempts to address the matter were dismissed by the middle-
class protestors as insufficient, and in Orange Farm where the state's significantly up-scaled 
investments did not reduce the number of service delivery protests. This may be due to 
protestors' expectations shifting over time, meaning any responses would be deemed 
incomplete. However, the idea that the state can ever completely satisfy citizens through 
pacification, concessions, sincere or manipulative engagement, or in other ways that follow 
agonistic democratic principles is ultimately unrealistic as it is the agonistic state's 
responsibility to eternally keep the space 'open' for conflict. 
Constraints to Agonistic Practices of Governance are Many 
The research established that there are arguably seven constraints, challenges and 
complexities that make agonism difficult to draw on in practices in processes of conflict and 
that need to be addressed, or at least understood, if agonism is to be pursued, as discussed 
next. 
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Power of Context Shapes Interactions 
Interacting parties do not engage in isolation from broader networks of relationships and 
power. The prevailing context shapes the intent, nature and consequences of interactions in 
ways that may be empowering or limiting in relation to agonism. There are many examples of 
this: in the late 1980s, there was an unusual willingness to interact more agonistically with 
informal traders even during the state repression of apartheid. This, however, had a lot to do 
with an ideological shift internationally seen in the emphasis on the 'economic freedoms' 
perpetuated by Reagan and Thatcher. In Orange Farm, the broader context was a constraining 
factor in relation to agonism. For instance, pressure from national government on 
municipalities to be financially self-sustaining through initiatives like the Masakhane campaign 
combined with the city administration's extreme cash shortage, the 1997 financial crisis, and 
the need to implement Gcin'Amanzi, compelled the city administration to adopt a tough 
stance towards citizens' protests about the payment for services. 
History Influences Current Conflict 
History itself is a form of context. Conflicts and interactions do not happen in a vacuum, but 
are influenced significantly by what has happened in the past. An excellent example of context 
shaping governance is the effect of the middle-class Sandton rates boycott of the late 1990s, 
exacerbating the financial crisis faced by the city administration and souring this relationship. 
The reluctance then in the 2000s of the city administration to engage agonistically with the 
middle class in the 'billing crisis' relates to this history to an extent. When the opposition party 
took advantage of the protest in its electioneering, the mass politics added another layer of 
party-political complexity that made it almost impossible for the city administration to resolve 
the conflict technically.  
The most weighty history in South Africa is that of the anti-apartheid struggle and then of the 
'agonistic' engagements that brought South Africa to its transition to democracy. This history 
suggests both the productive role of conflict and the power of agonistic interaction in creating 
positive change, and could surely support a more agonistic ethos in governance today. The city 
narrative though does not offer sufficient evidence to suggest that such an ethos is possible 
today; the levels of willingness to adopt an agonistic approach may in fact be less than might 
be expected given this transformative history of the country.  
Many Shifting and Unreachable Expectations  
The city administration constantly juggles the priorities of the many needs and demands of 
many protestors and makes trade-offs between them, thus limiting the capacity to undertake 
agonistic practices. Some officials overtly recognise conflict management as a vital mechanism 
to balance these competing priorities as in the case of the apparent inability of the city 
administration to balance resources and rights in the matter of social housing in the Inner City. 
The continuously shifting expectations of protestors and unclear demands mean that 
outcomes are frequently short-lived with the city administration required to continuously 
renegotiate the scope of its services as citizens lodge objections against formerly accepted 
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service standards. For instance, the Orange Farm protestors' demands for the provision of free 
water shifted to also including housing and other unspecified demands from 2006 onwards.  
Another strong driver of protest in the case of low-income communities, although social 
movement scholars might disagree, is possibly their sense of poverty and relative deprivation, 
as theorised by Gurr (1968b) and Davies (1962), which complicates any resolution of this 
dissensus,. Nonetheless, matching expectations is likely an unreachable goal, given that the 
extremes of inequality are likely to endure indefinitely. Certainly, it seems doubtful that the 
state can address the full extent of hardship caused by unemployment, lack of affordability for 
services, lower standards of services and lower levels of quality of life, compared to the rest of 
the city within the current policy regime. Further, this argument discounts other motivations 
for struggle, such as mobilising resources, the claiming of identities, and reshaping the 
democratic state according to the ideals of the protestors. 
Institutional Complexities Make Agonistic Practices Difficult 
The huge complexity of relationships within and between the institutions of the city 
administration makes agonistic practices hard to implement and sustain. In relation to the COJ, 
as Councillor Walters stressed, the city administration is far from being one cohesive 
organisation but is rather a multi-billion Rand organisation with over a hundred departments 
and thirty agencies each with its own driving force frequently at odds with others. The lack of 
internal harmonisation makes consistent and synchronised handling of activities, mediating 
between paradoxical goals, and responses related to conflict, a hugely complex task. One 
example is the emphasis of Joburg Water on earning revenue for the provision of water 
services to customers whilst other parts of the COJ emphasise the allocation of minimum free 
water to citizens. Another example is JMPD's non-enforcement of the street trading by-laws in 
the Inner City thus reportedly compromising the viability of the overall city administration's 
efforts at creating sustainable markets. As a side-line, what seems evident in the literature, 
which documents the perspective of communities generally, is an underlying worrying 
assumption that the state is always wrong, possibly fuelling continuing state-society 
polarisation. 
In addition to the multiple and diverse positions of the city administration making consistent 
and sustained agonistic practices difficult, there are also fluid institutional dynamics related to 
its restructurings post-1994. Challenges at various times have included weakened capacity, an 
inward focus, growing sensitivity to criticism and a loss of institutional memory. These factors 
undermine the potential for agonistic strife between the city administration and society. 
The complexity of governance does not only relate to the city administration itself but to the 
multi-sphere form of government in South Africa. For instance, one sphere of government may 
be interacting antagonistically with society while another is interacting agonistically. For 
instance, the informal trading associations appealed to the provincial government in the 1990s 
when they felt aggrieved at the actions of the city administration, resulting in more agonistic 
responses from the provincial government; the risk for the state is increased state-on-state 
friction. 
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Negative Attitudes to Conflict Affect Interactions 
Despite the role of conflict in producing positive outcomes in recent South African history, 
there is a fear of conflict and a strong desire to avoid or suppress it. This may have something 
to do with the influence of international public administration approaches such as New Public 
Management and its emphasis on the role of the citizen as a 'customer' rather than as a 
'citizen'. Caught up in the 'deliverology' of service provision, any possible acknowledgement by 
the state of conflicting interests is subordinated to service delivery's technical considerations. 
In terms of this mind-set, the state seems to be more familiar with the consensus-seeking, 
'logical-rational', participatory and deliberative democratic practices and tactics of avoidance, 
denial and placation of protestors, than with the 'passion' of agonistic democratic practices 
(Fung 2003, p. 345). 
Role of Individuals can Constrain or Amplify Agonistic Practices 
While context is important, individuals also matter in both constraining and amplifying 
agonistic practices. The negative reactions of some individuals to conflict limits the extent to 
which the city administration is able to adopt agonistic practices. However, some individuals' 
ability to tap into their "inner agonism" (McManus 2008, p. 509) and empathy (Gunder 2003, 
p. 271 citing Flyvbjerg 1998; Glover 2011; Morrell 2014) significantly widens the state's 
prospects to govern agonistically. 
In the case of Johannesburg, some individuals within the state used their institutional authority 
or persuasive powers to promote agonistic practices, such as Oupa Radebe who responded 
agonistically to protestors in Orange Farm, whilst at the same time the approach of the city 
administration largely constrained agonistic engagement. Views towards conflict amongst 
individuals diverged but, in general, negative views on conflict seem to dominate. Some 
individuals were fearful of 'violent' protests at a personal or professional level, or saw conflict 
as endangering effective urban governance. Few saw conflict as an inescapable part of 
governance and as a necessary force to drive productive change. Others were mindful that 
their personal and professional attitudes towards conflict may not necessarily align with those 
of the organisation, and sometimes they even consciously held contradictory views at the 
same time.  
The challenge of agonistic state practice is that it is not a mere administrative function but 
requires a particular and quite rare form of leadership to steer the processes of interaction 
with adversaries (Westphal 2014). In the context of reported high turnover rates of officials 
and politicians in the city administration, those individuals with the willingness, courage and 
experience to engage agonistically may be present for short periods only. 
Multiple Role-players Add to the Complexity 
The major constraint may simply be the enormous variety and complexity of agonism in 
practice. Mouffe (2000b) argues that friction is inevitable when 'politics', namely the collection 
of institutions and their practices to create order in society, intersects with 'the political', 
meaning the antagonism inherent in all citizens due to their different interests (ibid., p. 101). 
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Even under the most co-operative of circumstances, relationships between parties with 
divergent interests are tricky to manage. The element of conflict brings greater complexity and 
new risks to governance. With willingness and skill, agonistic engagements are possible, 
although often difficult to sustain if the broader environment is not supportive. An added 
challenge in many cases is that there are not necessarily only two parties in a conflict, but 
multiple parties that have some interest in the conflict as well, even if they are not directly 
related to the conflict. The need to attend to and balance multiple contending interests adds a 
huge complexity to the interaction. In the case of informal trading, for example, it is not just 
the city administration and the informal traders that clash but also the formal businesses, the 
property owners and the many users of the Inner City environment, which have an interest in 
maintaining property values or in walking freely on the pavements of the Inner City. In the case 
of billing, the interests of the middle class were often mediated by the motivations of the 
political opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, which has political objectives around 
gaining electoral power, added to a specific concern it may have in serving its constituents and 
the urban community more broadly.  
5 Agonism's Practical Possibilities 
Then, the two lines of inquiry, namely the theoretical-conceptual and the descriptive-
analytical, are brought back together to close the loop by speculating on the initial and 
overarching question of this thesis, namely: 
What are the practical possibilities of applying the concepts of agonism to the state-society 
relationship in cases of open conflict, to governance practices of the state, considering the view 
of those working within the state? 
The descriptive-analytical findings of this study, in exploring the prospects for the application 
of agonism to local governance in matters of conflict within the situated context of 
Johannesburg, reveal important insights into possibilities for future agonistic practices. The 
findings suggest several courses of action for the city administration, which certainly seem 
theoretically possibly in the post-apartheid democratic South Africa (it is hard to imagine 
agonistic principles working effectively in a non-democracy where deep divisions or anti-
democratic values are the norm). Although there are some signs of agonistic governance 
practices within the city administration and the state, there is also scope for improvement. 
Adopt Agonism as Ethos of Governance 
The single biggest value of the notion of agonism, despite its ambiguities, is related to its 
potential to inform an alternative ethos of governance by the state. Hence, agonism's 
foremost strength lies in raising awareness of the potential design of agonistic practices of the 
state as 'empowerment' of citizens and not simply their 'governance' (Pløger 2004, pp. 82, 
219). Agonistic practices are designed to treat citizens as 'citizens' by building state-society 
relationships and not only as 'customers' of the 'business' of the state as in the New Public 
Management approach. 
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The city administration could deliberately adopt an "ethos of agonism" (Wingenbach 2011, p. 
115), particularly valuable for difficult situations, or for when conventional approaches have 
failed (Tambakaki 2014). Namely, the state could acknowledge that an agonistic ethos may 
allow it to view state-society conflict with a different mind-set, open to conflict's generative 
ability to formulate constructive outcomes from state-society strife. The management of state-
society interactions in processes of conflict could be more purposefully and systematically 
agonistic. The city administration could aim for consistent messaging internally towards 
protest. It could define 'antagonistic' conflict better and understand the differences between 
'antagonistic' and 'agonistic' conflict. The state could carry out practices of 'empowerment' by 
supporting weaker adversaries and overtly clarifying, within the institution, common 
understandings of issues of power and distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. It could 
intentionally strive for an 'agonistic respect' for the 'other'. It could recognise a practice as 
agonistic when it is indeed agonistic and evaluate its usefulness (or not) for future interactions. 
Accept Centrality of Dissensus 
The city administration, at its highest levels, acknowledges the conflict, thereby ensuring that 
the acceptance of the centrality of dissensus is fostered according to Mouffe's practical 
suggestion (2013, pp. 91-94), as opposed to the conventional liberal democratic notion of the 
centrality of consensus. The state could see conflict as inevitable and it would be alert to the 
'democratic paradox', namely the tension between the twin aims of liberty and equality in 
democracy (Mouffe 2000b), thus better able to foresee and appreciate the nature of potential 
conflicts arising from its practices of governance. 
In this way, the city administration could build on and maintain its channels for protest 
knowing that there will be continual strife, but be open to the voiced desires of communities 
to influence state action, accommodate shifts in power relations, fight the inequities of 
capitalist democracy and raise awareness of the issues under contention (Mouffe 2013). 
Integral to that approach is the state's acknowledgement that agonistic principles could be an 
asset to state-society interaction, making for more positive and constructive relationships with 
low-income and middle-class communities, potentially resulting in outcomes that serve all its 
citizens better. This approach would be a major move away from the state's seeming 
preoccupation with the concern that conflict is detrimental and destructive and needs 
eradication. Further, the application of agonistic principles to governance practice could reveal 
alternative ways of managing conflict.  
Recognise Impossibility of Consensus  
The city administration could be more aware of the impossibility of consensus thus avoiding 
the pessimism of officials that agreements reached with adversaries appear to be short-lived 
only. Respondents from the city administration tended to believe that any agreement reached 
with adversaries is final, but the case study shows that almost all agreements need repeated 
brokerage over time as contexts and needs changed. Agonistic governance means being aware 
that partial, incremental and iterative agreements are typical of agonistic practices (Gunder 
2003, p. 308; Mäntysalo et al. 2011; Wingenbach 2011, p. xvi). The city administration could 
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build on the strength of its mechanisms already in place for the channelling of protest to 
incorporate this understanding. 
Widen Repertoire of Responses 
The city administration could widen its repertoire of responses to conflict by drawing on 
examples from elsewhere to be more agonistic in its interactions with adversaries, although 
more research is clearly needed to close the gap between theory and practice. To be practical, 
the state could consider combining agonistic practices with current public management and 
deliberative or participatory democratic governance approaches. The state could ensure that 
skills in change management, ethics and care are grown within the city administration (as 
suggested by Gunder 2003; Healey 2009, pp. 452-454; Murtagh & Ellis 2011; and Sager 2013, 
p. 240), for agonistic management. 
Guard against 'Fetishisation' of Conflict 
The downside of the model of agonism lies in the possible 'fetishisation' or overemphasis of 
the agonistic interaction in processes of conflict at the expense of reaching consensus (Morrell 
2009). Further, the underlying assumption of the Mouffeian tenets of agonism is that the 
conversion of antagonism to agonism is always desirable and always possible. The model of 
agonism is also silent about immutable antagonism; it is hard to imagine a constructive 
agonistic engagement in such a situation without some intervening step to calm the 
antagonism. The notion of agonism is silent about the prospects of antagonism to also result in 
productive change as it seems have in the case of the protracted war for water in Orange 
Farm.  
Understand Limitations of Agonism 
The most important limitation of agonism lies in how any institution can measure up to the 
ideals of agonism, either broadly or at the level of detailed practices of governance, as 
identified within the academic literature in Chapter 2 (page 14 onwards), as the literature 
remains largely at the conceptual level. Mouffe's (2000b) notion of agonism has been 
developed with no practical applications in mind, and the few case studies available show that 
the translation of the theoretical aspects of agonism into practice is difficult to realise (Hillier 
2002a, p. 130; Nonhoff 2012).  
The Johannesburg case study too, shows that the relationship between processes and 
outcomes is not straightforward, so developing standard 'rules' for agonistic practices for the 
state to follow in the hope of improving its outcomes might not necessarily materialise in 
better outcomes. Despite agonism's lack of practicality though, it may have value if the state 
can apply it to conflictual interactions, although bearing in mind that "good processes do not 
guarantee good outcomes, but then good outcomes neither happen nor endure by 
themselves" (Forester 2011, p. 326).  
Because of its limitations, academics generally agree that agonism cannot exist on its own and 
must coexist with other democratic practices to facilitate decision-making (Wenman 2003; 
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Walzer 2004; Knops 2007, p. 116; Vink 2007; Beaumont & Loopmans 2008; Gürsözlü 2009, p. 
357; Tambakaki 2009; Knops 2012; Westphal 2014, p. 7). However, what proportions of the 
mix of approaches might be ideal remains unclear.  
6 Final Words 
The research asked the overarching question of what the practical possibilities are of applying 
the concepts of agonism to the state-society relationship in cases of open conflict, to 
governance practices of the state, in considering the perspective of those working within the 
state.  
Although the implications have been discussed for the city administration of Johannesburg, 
they provide insights for local governments elsewhere in South Africa and globally. These 
findings and insights are not presumed to be fully valid for other cities and states but they do 
serve, nonetheless, to raise general awareness of the extraordinary complexities of the state 
as it intersects with the unique intricacies of citizens' protest. 
Although the findings on the whole are negative due to the difficulty of operationalising 
agonism in this study, leading to some ambivalence about agonism's analytical and practical 
usefulness, there seems to be definite scope for the state to implement more agonistic 
practices of governance to improve democratic outcomes. Although the city administration 
has demonstrated, on occasion, that it can engage in processes of conflict in creative and 
constructive ways, the findings of the case of strife, between the city administration and 
citizens, suggest that for the state as a whole there are challenges in doing so.  
The most significant finding is that the state generally seems to lack the appetite and insight to 
place dissensus at the centre of democracy and governance rather than consensus, and to 
engage agonistically in strife, using conflict as a constructive force for change. The research 
also shows other important findings, such as cases where practices of agonistic governance are 
attempted but efforts are but nominal and inconsistent. Indeed, the outcomes of agonistic 
conflict management processes are also highly variable, sometimes having unintended 
consequences, sometimes succeeding, but sometimes not. 
Certainly, the reality of the myriad contextual factors, which can negatively influence the 
state's ability to engage in agonistic state-society strife thus limiting the potential for 
favourable outcomes, is not factored in by the theorists of agonism and has also been 
remarked on by some writers on the application of agonism in practice (such as Pløger 2004). 
Possible strategies and practical examples of how institutions have overcome these constraints 
are lacking, making the power of agonism-in-practice to address difficult conflicts uncertain 
and potentially as limited as any other conflict management approach. Nonetheless, this 
research shows that the state can draw on the ideals of agonism to perceive and manage 
conflict in ways that diverge from current practice. However, this would require the state's 
deliberate intention and attention to the improvement of its current conventional approaches 
for the conciliation of conflict.  
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Moreover, the notion of agonism itself has its limitations in the face of antagonistic conflict 
and of constraints within both the society and the state. Namely, two critical aspects are 
insufficiently considered in the notion of agonism. One, the state can facilitate positive and 
creative solutions to conflict without agonism, although such efforts may well contain traces of 
agonistic practices. Two, theorists of agonism seem to discount the role of antagonism in also 
driving positive change benefitting citizens in line with their expectations of the democratic 
state. 
Further, on a positive note, the analysis of strife in Johannesburg through the prism f agonism 
reveals that, from the perspective of those working within the state, there may be potentially 
significant benefits in incorporating an ethos of agonism in future practices of governance. The 
main value of the application of agonism lies in its potential for the state to perceive conflict in 
fresh ways and thus find alternative ways to address it in practice. Embracing conflict, in the 
context of intractable problems facing the state seems particularly important and promising, 
especially if it enables the appreciation of other dimensions of the issue under contention, and 
the possibility of building 'stakeholderness' and empowerment of citizens, rather than the 
avoidance, suppression or placation of dissensus.  
Some final words about agonistic practices pertinent to state-society strife: the absence or 
presence of agonistic practices does not account solely for successes or failures of governance. 
Agonistic interaction is simply not enough on its own to address deficiencies in state-society 
relationships in the face of antagonistic conflicts and the real limitations of both the society 
and the state. However, if the state acquires an appetite for agonistic engagement, drawing on 
principles of agonism in daily practice to the extent that it is appropriate, it can then increase 
its ability to interact agonistically to realise constructive change from conflict.  
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1 Glossary 
Note on race 
The categorisation of the ethnic groups of 'black’, 'coloured', 'Indian' and 'white' South Africans in this 
research is not meant to be seen as a validation of any physical and cultural differences between them but 
rather as a reflection of historic settlement patterns and differences of incomes; an upfront apology is given 
if the reader’s sensibilities are offended. 
 
Term Description 
administration (noun) In a public administration sense, the qualified staff of the state, excluding all 
political structures, responsible for the carrying out of policies as set by the 
government, and answerable to the politicians; also pertinent to the city administration 
or local municipal structures. 
adversary (noun) Describes Mouffeian 'adversaries' that engage in agonistic interaction with each 
other, namely amicable opponents who share a common belief with each other in 
democratic principles but disagrees with one about how to implement them. 
agonism (noun) A form of conflict between two opponents in the sense of Mouffeian (2000b) 
agonism, based on the theoretical notion that this conflict is a vital and necessary facet 
of democracy and is a positive force for change; the opponents recognise the 
legitimacy of each other's view; the state embraces conflict and keeps the space 
continuously open for expressions of dissensus, rather than seeking consensus. 
agonistic (adjective) Derived from 'agonism'; describes any attribute of democracy and the state 
and its institutions; its principles, ethos, practices, processes, behaviour, governance, 
conflict management and responses; and any state-society interactions or 
engagements, in line with the tenets of agonism. Likewise, the adverb form, 
'agonistically', is used to describe any of the above. 
agreement (noun) When two parties agree or have an understanding to follow a particular course 
of action; "1. the act of agreeing. 2. a settlement, esp. one that is legally enforceable. 3. 
A contract or document containing such a settlement. 4. the state of being of the same 
opinion. 5. the state of being similar or consistent…" (Collins Concise Dictionary of the 
English Language 1988). 
antagonism (noun) The fight between enemies; typically openly expressed opposition, may be 
mutual; may be destructive and ranges from hostility to violence to total non-
recognition of the state; the enemies deny the other's view and disagree; in the context 
of agonistic democracy, it is the enmity intrinsic to all humans. 
antagonist (noun) An enemy, in terms of Mouffeian agonism, to be destroyed. 
city administration (noun) Means the collective organisations and institutions of the local government, see 
also 'municipality'. 
city strife (noun) Strife directed at the local government of the city. See ‘strife’. 
complaint (noun) A generally formal and limited form of protest made by individuals and groups, 
usually through a prescribed system or channel (e.g. a petition) but also through 
informal channels, see 'protest'. 
conflict (noun) A state of strong disagreement between adversaries or ideas (see Aubert (1963, 
p. 63)). 
consensus (noun) In a consensus, individuals agree to support a decision made by the group – they 
give their consent – even if they do not all necessarily agree with it; consensus is the 
most likely process to ensure that everyone's view is respected and heard; some claim 
the notion of 'consensus' is critical for a stable democracy (Prothro & Grigg 1960; 
Bellamy & Hollis 1998), but others are more sceptical as 'consensus' is idealistic 
(Schmitter & Karl 1991; Dryzek & Niemeyer 2006; Rossi, E. 2013), and 'consensus' goes 
hand-in-hand with 'exclusion' (Connelly & Richardson 2004), and does not necessarily 
lead to stability (McClosky 1964); 'consensus' is an important principle underpinning 
democracy as it means effort is directed at obtaining 'agreement' (not necessarily 
unanimity) between parties about a particular decision; some have defined 'consensus' 
as the degree of 'co-orientation' or integration of a group, as in 'degree of consensus' 
(refer also Klapp 1957; Scheff 1967, p. 32). 
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Deep South (noun) So named by the city administration, the southernmost part of Johannesburg, 
containing the highest proportion of informal settlements in the city. 
deliverology (noun) ‘Deliverology’ is the implementation of projects and/or programmes in a highly 
technocratic and systematised manner as if it were a science. 
democracy (noun) A system of government by the people with power vested in the hands of 
representatives elected by the people, typically implicitly and/or explicitly founded on, 
and/or including principles of, in differing degrees, principles of aggregation, 
collaboration, consensus, compromise, co-operation, deliberation, equality, freedom, 
inclusivity, liberty, participation, pluralism, and representivity. 
descriptive-analytical  (adjective) Combination of systematically describing a phenomenon as it is and then 
deconstructing it according to selected themes. 
dissensus (noun) Conflicting opinion, disagreement or dissent. 
governance (noun) The administrative actions, systems, practices and manners of the exercise of 
authority for the implementation of policy and service delivery by any formal or 
informal governing body, for and behalf of society. 
government (noun) Selected representatives of the ruling party responsible for setting policy for the 
country, supported by the administration (excludes members of opposition parties). 
informal settlement (noun) The term 'informal settlement' is a controversial one (Huchzermeyer 2011, pp. 
5-9, 133). It is sometimes called a ‘slum’, ‘squatter camp’, ’shack farm’, ‘shack land’ or 
‘shanty town’. Here, the term describes an area that is poorly located, with a great 
number of informal residential dwellings, with minimal services and amenities, and 
high levels of poverty and unemployment. Despite significant formalisation of Orange 
Farm since its establishment, the city administration still labels it as an ‘informal 
settlement’ (COJ 2011f). 
local government (noun) Sphere of government at the local level, the municipality. 
municipality  (noun) See 'city administration'. 
politics (noun) According to Mouffe (2000b), 'politics' is the "ensemble of practices, discourses 
and institutions seeking to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in 
conditions that are always potentially conflictual as they are affected by the dimension 
of 'the political'", according to Mouffe (2000b, p. 101). According to the Collins Concise 
Dictionary of the English Language (1988), it is also "1. the art and science of directing 
and administering states and other political units; government. 2… the complex or 
aggregate of relationships of people in society, esp. those relationships involving 
authority and power…5… any activity concerned with the acquisition of power, etc." 
protest (noun) 'A protest' means any public expression of strong objection by any low-income 
or middle-class group against the state and its institutions about its issues related to 
governance-related matters undertaken by the state (other than anti-government 
protest, war, rebellion, or ethnic conflict) and can take any form, not just 'street 
protest' but also written demonstrations (Ratliff & Hall 2014); (verb) Similarly, 'to 
protest' means to express any objection to any issue. See 'street protest' and 
'complaint'. 
Red Ants (noun) controversial 'Red Ants', the COJ's outsourced private sector security company 
since 2000, with its distinctive use of red overalls as uniforms for its security guards. 
service delivery (noun) The institution of government, its resources, personnel and relevant processes 
that are involved in the provision of any essential or other service, as well as the service 
itself, to the public, such as the supply of water and electricity, refuse removal, street 
cleaning, public transport, infrastructure investment, health services, housing, parks, 
street trading stalls, social amenities, billing, parking, and the like. Taken in the broader 
context it has come to mean, in South Africa, as encompassing less tangible 
improvements to benefit citizens, and as part of the reshaping of the notion of 
democracy. 
service delivery protest (noun) Any form of protest by citizens against perceived shortcomings of services 
delivered by the state; the protest is typically in the public eye by means of media 
coverage or highly visible street protest; service delivery protest staged by low-income 
or middle-class citizens usually targets local government's unacceptable service 
delivery whether real or perceived. See ‘service delivery’ and ‘street protest’. 
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social movement (noun) A collective and typically organised protest or protests, where protestors act to 
persuade or disrupt an unjust social order by peaceful or by more coercive means (Opp 
2009; Mead 2010a, b); frequently regarded as struggles of the marginalised as 
classified by Louw and Bekker (1996, p. 84); with social movements of the middle class 
seen as different although it – like the low-income group – also seeks to change the 
level of participation in democratic governance (Fuentes & Frank 1989). 
state (noun) 'The state' is the organisation and entities of all spheres of government 
including all political and administrative aspects responsible for the operations of a 
country, under a single political organisation (see 'state-society link'). 
state-society link (noun) The relationship made up of the interaction between the spheres of the state 
and the society; the nature of the link is determined by the balance of power and 
functions between the state and the society, and the ability to drive change ranging 
from antagonism to agonism; the link can take a number of forms with some models 
more antagonistic than others, for instance in the case of the 'society-against-the-
state', wherein society tries to drive change by challenging the repressive effect of the 
capitalist democracy, furthering Mouffe's agonism and radical democratic aims; the 
state-society relationship is in constant flux with different models potentially operating 
concurrently (Chambers, Simone & Kopstein 2008). 
street protest (noun) Any protest, whether peaceful or violent, motivated by any cause, taking place 
in a street or public place where citizens gather to register an objection to any issue 
(noun).See also 'protest'. 
strife (noun) Any processes of conflictual interactions over issue under contention between 
the state and society (or city and citizen in the case study). 
the City (noun) 'The City' is a colloquialism for 'the city administration' of Johannesburg. 
the political (noun) 'The political' is the antagonism inherent in all citizens, namely the parties 
involved in conflictual debate, arising from human differences that informs the 
diversity of interests, ultimately leading to the formations of notions of 'them' and 'us' 
(Mouffe 2000b, p. 31). 
violence (noun) 1) Actual physical harm carried out against a person and property; violent 
actions can include property vandalism and destruction, arson, physical assault and 
murder, attacks on foreigners, vigilantism and looting; 2) the threat of harm to person 
and property; 'violent' actions are emotionally charged with tension and fear, and 
include verbal and physical challenges accompanying generally peaceful protests; both 
notions of violence are referred to in this thesis: 'violence' without inverted commas is 
used to describe protest actions, which were clearly documented instances of actual 
violence; and 'violence' with inverted commas describes instances where violence was 
threatened, or where the extent of actual violence was indeterminate, undocumented 
or alluded to in the data; (verb) as in 'violent' protest (more on page 24). 
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2 Extended Abbreviations for Appendices 
AEC Anti-Evictions Campaign 
AGM Annual General Meeting  
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
AMPROS  Anglo American Properties 
ANC African National Congress 
APF Anti-Privatisation Forum 
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism 
ARP Alexandra Renewal Programme 
AsgiSA  Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
ATC African Traders Committee 
AZAPO Azanian Peoples Organisation 
BLA Black Local Authority 
BRT Bus Rapid Transit 
CASE  Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
CAWP Coalition Against Water Privatisation 
CBD Central Business District 
CCF Concerned Citizens Forum (or Community Crisis Forum) 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CID  City Improvement District (also called Business Improvement District (BID)) 
CJP  Central Johannesburg Partnership 
COJ City of Johannesburg 
COJMM City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
COO Chief Operations Officer 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CRIN Community Research and Information Network 
CRUM Citizen Relationship and Urban Management 
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
CSU  Central Strategy Unit 
CSVR Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
CWCAC Concerned World Class African Citizens 
DA Democratic Alliance 
DED  Department of Economic Development 
DFA Development Facilitation Act 
DPLG  Department of Provincial and Local Government 
DPUM  Development Planning and Urban Management 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
ECD Early Childhood Development 
EDU  Economic Development Unit 
EMLC Eastern Metropolitan Local Council 
EMSS Eastern Metropolitan Sub Structure 
ESCOM Electricity Supply Commission 
ESP  Expanded Social Package, also known as Siyasizane 
ESSET  Ecumenical Service for Socio-Economic Transformation 
EWCC Evaton Water Crisis Committee 
EWN Eye Witness News 
GCRO Gauteng City-Region Observatory 
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
GISFOR Gauteng Informal Sector Forum 
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GJMC  Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 
GJTMC Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
GOLCOM Golden Highway Community (Golden Triangle Community Crisis Committee (GTCCC)) 
GPG Gauteng Provincial Government  
HHU Health, Housing and Urbanisation (Committee, or Department, of the JCC) 
HIV Human Immune-deficiency Virus 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
IBF  Informal Business Forum 
ICSTICC Inner City Street Trading Interim Crisis Committee 
ICUDIP  Inner City Urban Design Implementation Plan 
IDP Integrated Development Plan 
IEC Independent Electoral Commission 
IICSSP  Integrated Inner City Safety and Security Plan 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
ioL ioL News Online (Independent News Online) 
ISN Informal Settlement Network 
ITDP  Informal Trading Development Programme 
ITF Informal Trading Forum 
JAG Johannesburg Advocacy Group 
JCC Johannesburg City Council  
JDA Johannesburg Development Agency 
JHC Johannesburg Housing Company 
JICBC  Johannesburg Inner City Business Coalition 
JICDF Johannesburg Inner City Development Forum 
JITF  Johannesburg Informal Trading Forum 
JMPD Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
Joburg Johannesburg 
JOC Joint Operations Committee 
JOWEDET Johannesburg Well of Development and Training 
JPC  Johannesburg Property Company 
JRA Johannesburg Roads Agency 
JTA Johannesburg Traders Association 
JV  Joint Venture 
KUM Kagiso Urban Management 
LAMOSA Land Access Movement of South Africa 
LED  Local Economic Development 
LGTA Local Government Transition Act 
LPM Landless Peoples Movement 
M&G Mail & Guardian 
MEC Member of the Executive Council 
MLC Metropolitan Local Council 
MMC  Member of the Mayoral Committee 
MMS Municipal Management Services 
MSS Metropolitan Sub-Structure 
MTC  Metropolitan Trading Company 
NCC National Consumer Commission 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NMLC Northern Metropolitan Local Council 
NMSS Northern Metropolitan Sub Structure 
NPC National Planning Commission 
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NPM New Public Management 
OCS Operation Clean Sweep 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFWCC Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee 
OKM Operation Khanyisa Movement 
OVAHA One Voice of All Hawkers Association 
OVDB Orange Vaal Development Board 
PHP Peoples Housing Process 
PIE Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land (PIE) [Act] 
POMA Property Owners and Managers Association 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PPPC Petitions and Public Participation Committee 
PRABOA Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association 
PWV Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme 
RLDP Rapid Land Development Program 
RMD Rosebank Management District 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
RSC Regional Services Council 
RSDF Regional Spatial Development Framework 
RUMP Regional Urban Management Plan 
SA South Africa 
SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation 
SACN South African Cities Network 
SACP South African Communist Party 
SAFA South African Football Association 
SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations 
SAITF South African Informal Traders Forum 
SALGA South African Local Government Association 
SAMWU South African Municipal Workers Union 
SAMWU South African Municipal Workers Union 
SANCO South African National Civic Organisation 
SANFED Sandton Federation of Ratepayers’ Associations 
SANTRA South African National Traders and Retailers Association 
SAPS South African Police Services 
SARCC  South African Rail Commuter Corporation 
SATAPA South African Taxi Passengers Association 
SDF Spatial Development Framework 
SECC Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
SERI Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 
SMI Social Movements Indaba 
SMLC Southern Metropolitan Local Council 
SMS Short Message Service 
SMSS Southern Metropolitan Sub Structure 
SOCA State of the City Address  
TCC Traders Crisis Committee 
TMC Transitional Metropolitan Council 
TMSS Transitional Metropolitan Sub-Structure 
TPA Transvaal Provincial Administration 
TRS Township Regeneration Strategy 
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TUHF Trust for Urban Housing Finance 
TV Television  
UAC Utility, Agency or Company of the COJ 
UDF Urban Development Framework 
UDZ  Urban Development Zone 
UK United Kingdom 
UMSA  Unemployed Masses of South Africa 
WASP Workers and Socialist Party 
WMLC Western Metropolitan Local Council 
WMSS Western Metropolitan Sub Structure 
WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development 
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3 Draft Matrix of Possible Practices of the Agonistic Institution 
Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
1 TOPIC BASED THEME OF 'POWER': The agonistic institution acknowledges that state-society interactions are coloured by manifestations of power, arising from the struggle of different society groups in the expression of their 
needs, undertaking three proactive measures to moderate the potential negative effects of uneven power. 
a It adopts an 
"ethos of 
agonism" 
(Wingenbach 
2011, p. 115). 
It is open to conflict, even 
embracing it. 
It is 'open' to conflict (Wingenbach 2011, p. 131), even embracing it, and appreciates that agonism can "jolt" 
(Schaap 2006, p. 256) it out of political complacency (ibid.). Every institution has the ability to carry out 
agonistic practices, according to Wingenbach (ibid., p. 192). However, agonism can be "excessive", according 
to Gürsözlü (2009, p. 363), if it does not build agonistic respect, is too reactive and is never-ending (ibid.). It 
emphasises adversarial contestation (Koga 2016). 
It may pay insufficient attention to power at times of conflict, 
although planners do not necessarily ignore it at such times 
(Harrison 2001b, pp. 167-168). Responses to conflict can range 
between denial and acknowledgment (Dryzek 2005; Knops 
2007; Gürsözlü 2009). Although it may uncover hitherto unseen 
issues and opinions through agonistic governance (Vitus 2006), 
alternatively it could do so by considering deep data from many 
sources, understanding complexity and insight (Tannen 2002, p. 
1667), and not just from agonistic interactions, which may be 
too negatively based and wasteful (Tannen 2002, pp. 1661-
1665). 
 It uncovers systems of 
power. 
It uncovers systems of power (Wingenbach 2011, p. 115), to minimise exclusion and oppression (ibid., pp. 
xvii-xviii). It brings all issues to the fore as it recognises "all decision-making is political" (Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo 2010). 
It may perpetuate existing hegemonic practices (Bond, S. 2011, 
p. 163). It may overlook politicised issues as they may be 
"disguised as aiming for an abstract common good" (Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo 2010, p. 346). 
 It does not assume its 
interests are common to all 
It does not assume its interests are common to all interest groups (Pløger 2004), and is open to 
disagreement over the so-called 'common' principles (Wingenbach 2011, pp. xiii, 159). 
 
 It keeps the place of power 
'empty'. 
It keeps 'the place of power empty' (ibid., p. 131). However, the boundaries of the norms of the mass politics 
may constrain agonistic interactions (Spencer 2012, pp. 14-15), limiting its effectiveness to "the 
consequences of conflict, but rarely its causes" (ibid., p. 14). 
 
b It addresses 
power 
imbalances. 
It exposes uneven power 
relations. 
It proactively exposes uneven power relations (Wingenbach 2011, pp. 27-28), including the unwritten rules, 
knowing that power structures pervade values, norms and governance (Vitus 2006, p. 477). 
 
 It biases weaker 
adversaries. 
It, as the stronger player in the conflict, recognises some adversaries are weaker (Westphal 2014, pp. 16-17). 
However, it is cautious not to 'romanticise' adversaries or public participation (Sandercock 1998a, p. 101; 
Campbell & Marshall 2002, p. 102). 
It may appear to be acting impartiality; however, it may engage 
in interactions that favour the 'us' and the more articulate, 
prejudicing the most "needy" (Fung 2003, pp. 344-345). 
 It is responsive to demands. It is responsive to the demands of adversaries (Wingenbach 2011, pp. 114-115; Westphal 2014, pp. 16-17), 
even if unconvincing, in whole or in part (Westphal 2014, pp. 16-17). 
It may see the emphasis on the 'us' and 'them' as too negative 
(Tannen 2002; Roskamm 2014, p. 15). 
c It supports 
unequal 
adversaries. 
It defines the sphere of 
engagement. 
It is the job of the state to define the sphere of engagement allowing antagonism to play out (Mouffe 2005).  
 It separates the place of 
power from the institution. 
 
 
 
It ensures the separation of the place of power from the institution (Dryzek 2005, p. 229; Westphal 2014, p. 
20). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
 It provides opportunities for 
adversaries to express their 
views more. 
It designs and implements measures providing adversaries with more opportunities to express their views 
(Westphal 2014, pp. 16-17). 
It may provide no procedures other than promoting equal 
chances for all adversaries to express their views as all parties 
are deemed to be equal (Mäntysalo 2011). 
 It balances adversaries' 
negotiating position. 
It provides measures to balance adversaries' negotiating position to ensure a reasonable settlement, for 
instance, the power of veto (Westphal 2014, p. 20). 
 
 It recognises informal 
approaches support weaker 
adversaries. 
It recognises informal approaches like lobbying and negotiation support weaker adversaries (Hillier 2000, p. 
310). 
 
 It enables weaker 
adversaries to interact. 
It provides resources to enable excluded citizens to interact freely as adversaries, if necessary, according to 
Westphal (2014, p. 14), citing Smith (2012, p. 94). 
 
2 TOPIC-BASED THEME OF 'ADVERSARIES': The agonistic institution reflects an appreciation for the impact of antagonism potentially arising from the exercise of 'the political' by adversaries in displays of state-society 'politics', 
adopting five practices that facilitate agonistic governance. 
a It adopts 
agonistic 
principles in 
"the game of 
governance" 
(Tully 1999, p. 
172). 
It makes the 'rules of the 
game'. 
"The game of governance" as Tully calls it (ibid.1999, p. 172), centres on the notion of conflict as the struggle 
for freedom, and participation of society groups as "political freedom" (ibid., p. 162). The institution 
acknowledges the impossibility of the perfect democracy, and focuses on changes bringing society closer to 
the ideal (Wingenbach 2011, p. 32). Thus, in the 'ethos of agonism', it is open to disagreement about 
democratic principles (ibid., pp. xii, 159), and democratic action, focusing on shaping and 'changing the rules 
of the game' (Tully 1999; Mouffe 2000b, pp. 12, 72; Knops 2007; Wingenbach 2011, p. xvi), that uphold "the 
openness of political life" (Schaap 2006, p. 258). It adopts a flexible approach to governance (Acampora 
2003, p. 390) leaving the 'game' open-ended (Thiele 1990), to make it change-friendly. Thus, agonism seems 
to yield opportunities for application in praxis, especially in situations of conflict encountered in governance.  
However, the consensus-seeking democracy may 'play the 
game by the rules' (Pløger 2004, pp. 77, 81), seen as 
characteristic of governance and planning practice (Forester 
1987, 1989; Healey 1992; Warren 2009; 2011), although not 
always (Tully 1999). However, it may be aware that that it can 
shape the 'rules of the game', and is itself part of the system of 
rules it makes (North 1991, p. 3). At the other extreme, radical 
democrats want to 'play a completely different game' 
(Wingenbach 2011, p. xvi), although Little and Lloyd (2009) say 
radicalism is a model unsuited for implementation (ibid., p. 5). 
 It recognises its latent 
ability to govern 
agonistically, in theory.  
This is so, because governance is based on democratic principles, according to Westphal (2014, p. 7) citing 
Wingenbach (2011, p. 192). In practice though, context and timing impacts on its capacity to adopt agonistic 
principles (Pløger 2004; Pieterse 2006b). 
It may see agonistic governance, or integrated planning by the 
local state, as too 'radical' (Pløger 2004, p. 74; Pieterse 2006b). 
It adapts the agenda of 
engagement to the specific 
context of protest. 
Its agenda is also cognisant of the needs of adversaries (Pløger 2004, p. 81). It operates beyond "formal 
arrangements" to guard against asymmetry, critically aware of who is, or is not, involved and whose 
interests are being served, or not (Doğanay 2004; Bobbio 2010). 
It may set the agenda for engagement in line with an approach 
of "management-by-objectives" (Pløger 2004, p. 82). 
It undertakes agonistic 
practices, according to 
overarching developmental 
aims.  
 
It designs operations according to agonistic principles (Fung 2003, pp. 359-360), It displays openness in its 
interactions with adversaries (Pløger 2004, p. 87). Agonistic governance takes precedence over rules, and it 
changes rules and practices as needed, although such rules may need changing again (Friedmann 1987, p. 
406; Hillier & Healey 2008; Bond, S. 2011, p. 180; Westphal 2014, p. 2), in response to specific challenges 
from interest groups (Wingenbach 2011, pp. 55, 91). However, Hillier (2007, 2008) argues there can be no 
common rules as each issue is different, thus requiring difference approaches. 
It may prefer continuity and uniformity (Baxamusa 2008), 
operating within formal rules and structures, which may be 
long-standing. However, it may recognise these as only partly 
helpful in processes for dealing with conflict situations (Holston 
1998, p. 5; Stiftel & Watson 2005, p. 11), and rules may stifle 
future interactions and innovative responses (Harrison 2001b, 
p. 163). 
It tailors its responses according to each type of agonistic expression, suggests Pløger (2004), namely 
between the state and the society, between groups in society or individuals and groups in society, or 
intrastate between officials and politicians, although it is silent on official-on-official agonism (ibid., pp. 84, 
85). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
It views the attainment of a 
state of perfect order as a 
utopian vision. 
Namely, it views the attainment of order as an "unrealisable fantasy" (Gunder 2003, p. 235). It may emphasise certainty and order (Mäntysalo 2011), 
however it is aware too much order may inhibit "dynamic 
creativity", which exemplifies democracy in the view of 
Wingenbach (2011, p. 100). 
 It encourages changes that 
improve governance. 
It actively encourages "new ways of thinking and acting" (Hillier 2007, p. 99), is open to change as 
"democratic innovations" (Westphal 2014, p. 20). It is willing to experiment (ibid., p. 21), with novel ideas 
(Mäntysalo 2011). It may even adapt the institution itself, claims Collins (2010, p. 927). 
 
 It recognises protest can 
reshape notions of 'us' and 
'them'. 
It considers the issue under contention as "political mobilisations" (Tambakaki 2011, p. 579), and 
opportunities to positively reconceptualise the 'us' (ibid.). 
 
  It is process-oriented. Namely, the drive towards achieving the ideal of democracy (Pløger 2004, p. 82) underpins governance. 
However, the focus on process, rather than outcome, is agonism's downfall (Glover 2012). 
It may be goal-oriented (Pløger 2004, p. 82). 
b It adopts 
agonistic 
principles in its 
engagements 
with 
adversaries. 
It strives to maintain an 
agonistic 'tension' between 
the state's governance 
practices and protesting 
adversaries. 
Further, it pays attention to the inherent 'repressive' and 'transformative' potential of the state, and of 
protestors (Sandercock 1998a, p. 102).  
 
  It displays deep respect 
towards adversaries. 
Namely, any engagement with them (Pløger 2004, p. 84) is founded on respect. It shows an “agonistic 
respect – on a striving both against and yet with one’s enemy – for a notion of democracy as competitive or 
antagonistic (Chambers, Samuel & Carver 2008, p. 5, author emphasis in original text). 
It may range between showing compassion, and dispassion, to 
adversaries. It is more likely to be 'reasonable' (Schaap 2006, p. 
264) than 'respectful'(Pløger 2004, p. 87). 
 
  It views reciprocity as a 
precondition for agonistic 
engagements. 
Indeed, such mutual respect goes hand-in-hand with reciprocity, seen as a fundamental precondition for any 
agonistic engagements (Pløger 2004, pp. 84, 86; Schaap 2006, p. 268; Chambers, Samuel & Carver 2008, p. 
194; Agger & Löftgren 2010), as critically linked with equality and liberty (Bond, S. 2011, pp. 177, 179). 
 
   It sees "tolerance and agonism are kissing cousins, but they are not equivalent" (Connolly 1991, p. xxvii), 
with tolerance being more limiting than agonism (ibid., p. xxviii). 
 
  It relates to the adversaries' 
struggle for identity.  
Namely, "one’s identity only makes sense in relation to that which it opposes" (Chambers, Samuel & Carver 
2008, p. 5). 
 
  It recognises a multiplicity 
of struggles shift between 
agonism and antagonism. 
Further, these shifts occur at different times dependent on the context (Sandercock 1998a, p. 102).  
  It recognises that citizens 
can instigate solutions 
(Sandercock 1998a, p. 100). 
Moreover, citizens have views and local knowledge helpful to the issue under contention (Pieterse, p. 289; 
Mäntysalo 2011). 
It may see the state, not the citizen, as the initiator of solutions 
(Sandercock 1998a, p. 97). 
  It sees usefulness in the role 
of the collaborative body, if 
it is set up according to 
agonistic principles (Goi 
2005, pp. 72-73). 
For instance, the body creates its own agendas (Westphal 2014, p. 19), has its own decision-making power, 
or power to represent issues in political decision-making forums, with the state not usually in control of the 
body. 
It may see collaboration as helpful for improving the quality of 
decisions and for the relay of information to the public. 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
  It assumes adversaries, in 
instances of protest, to 
have some interests in 
common. 
It treats citizens as "friendly enemies" " (Mouffe 2000b, p. 13), rather than as "deadly enemies" (ibid., p. 
102), sharing the same goal but may not agree on the process to achieving it. 
It may treat citizens as clients, as competent negotiators, and as 
'rational' (Mäntysalo 2011). 
c It aligns its 
governance 
operations with 
agonistic 
principles. 
It designs its operations 
according to agonistic 
democratic principles. 
However, it may also use a mixed model of dissensus and liberal democratic actions (Dryzek 2005; Silver et 
al. 2010; Bond, S. 2011), ensuring that the expression of 'difference' is not undertaken at the expense of 
finding solutions (Dryzek 2005, pp. 221, 224). Another model has a foundation of "critique" and "reflexivity" 
(Bond, S. 2011, pp. 177, 179). However, Hillier (2002a) argues a standard model cannot be applied, and it 
must set protocols according to each unique circumstance (ibid., p. 130). Notwithstanding any particular 
approach, Wingenbach (2011) argues that even the democratic principles themselves should be contested 
(ibid., pp. xii, 159).  
 
  It aims to empower, as well 
as govern, through 
operations. 
Namely, its operations are tactics of "empowerment" of citizens (Pløger 2004, pp. 82, 219), as well as 
governance, as it makes deliberate efforts through participation to empower citizens to influence decisions 
(Pløger 2004; Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010), focusing on "trust and predictability" (Pløger 2004, p. 82). Such a 
notion is not new, however, as Arnstein (1969, p. 217) had identified varying degrees of power through 
participation, from the manipulation of citizens to citizens' control of power in the 1960s (ibid.). 
It may limit its operations to "governance" (Pløger 2004, p. 82), 
focusing on "accountability" to citizens (ibid.), rather than their 
"empowerment" (ibid., pp. 82, 219). 
  It considers planning 
processes as agonistic ones. 
Namely, a plan by its very nature is a "temporary compromise" (Allmendinger & Haughton 2010, p. 809), 
balancing swiftness with completeness, and entrepreneurialism with predictability, allowing for flexibility 
(ibid.). 
 
  It treats any plan, policy or 
strategy as a guide, not as a 
rule (Hillier 2007, 2008). 
It believes governance needs to respond to the issue driving the engagement (Pløger 2004, p. 87), and adjust 
its procedures accordingly, rather than to any pre-set plan (ibid.). 
It may see a plan as providing direction and as a control for 
planning, rather than as a blueprint (Mäntysalo 2011). 
  It guards against using 
careless and negative 
language. 
It is aware that such unthinking language can contain negative sentiment towards adversaries (Badger 2006), 
as it follows the agonistic spirit of spontaneity and responsiveness in interactions. 
 
  It actively seeks possible 
positive changes to 
ineffective governance. 
This approach can uncover unhelpful governance patterns rooted in historic power relations (Lowndes 
2005). 
 
  It deliberately uses the 
notion of 'vagueness' as a 
governance strategy. 
This strategy can support inclusivity as the vagueness blurs the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' (Decreus 
et al. 2014). However, "fuzzy boundaries" at the "edges of governance" (Allmendinger & Haughton 2009), 
can result in positive and negative effects related to informal decision-making processes (ibid.). Moreover, 
the creation of vague policy can proactively bypass conflict rather than confront it (Hytönen, Mäntysalo et al. 
2011). For example, the national government of Finland set specific planning goals for the regions, aware of 
the competing regional plans of the municipalities; in response the municipalities adopted "defensive 
routines" (ibid., p. 6), thereby entrenching the vagueness and unpredictability further and nullifying the 
prospects of intra-institutional agonistic interactions (ibid., pp. 21-22). 
It may prefer firmer limits to governance. 
  It finds the application of an 
agonistic "policy-politics" 
(Fortis 2014, pp. 222-223) 
style useful for 'wicked' 
problems. 
Further, the approach can help with conflict management, although it can result in deadlock and antagonism 
(Fortis 2014, pp. 222-223). 
It may be more familiar with a structured and technical 
approach, and may urge unrealistic technical solutions to a 
conflictual interaction where adversaries are not yet ready to 
resolve the issue under contention (Fortis 2014, pp. 222-223). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
  It generates policy at the 
local level. 
It undertakes bottom-up policy-making (Mäntysalo 2011), although it is not mutually exclusive from top-
down approaches, and can both happen at the same time, dependent on the phases of the policy cycle 
(Silver et al. 2010). 
It may undertake a top-down policy-making approach, although 
there is a shift towards bottom-up planning (Mäntysalo 2011). 
d It recognises the 
individual's 
contribution to 
effective 
agonistic 
governance 
It recognises his "inner 
agonism" can support 
agonistic governance. 
A process of iterative mimesis (McManus 2008, p. 518), between the institution and the individual's "inner 
agonism" (ibid., p. 509), urging him to action as the action itself is a "cathartic release" (ibid., p. 525), informs 
the extent of agonistic governance. 
 
 It recognises the 'soft' skill 
of empathy is critical for 
agonistic governance. 
However, notwithstanding its importance, 'empathy' is time-consuming to develop (Gunder 2003, p. 271), 
citing (Flyvbjerg 1998a). The process of empathising can help in understanding the adversary's view (Morrell 
2014), and is central not only to agonism but to liberal democracy (Morrell 2009, 2014). The qualities of 
sympathy and empathy share similarities with agonism, sustaining the level of attentiveness needed to drive 
change (Glover 2011). 
It may emphasise the 'hard' skills of technical expertise, rather 
than 'soft' skills, which are rare in praxis, according to case 
studies (Pieterse 2006b; Pløger 2006). 
 It recognises the exercise of 
due care is important for 
agonistic governance. 
Namely, the duty of 'care' is a critical one guiding governance (Gunder 2003; Sager 2013, p. 240), but ill-
defined in the face of multiple conflicting theories (Sager 2013, p. 240). 
 
 It recognises an 
understanding of the 
'other's' psychology is 
helpful in understanding 
'the political' (Hillier 2003, 
pp. 44-45). 
The psychological insight can "illuminate the ambiguity and uncertainty of planning decision-making arenas" 
(Hillier 2003, p. 45). 
 
  It recognises each individual 
has the capacity to carry out 
agonistic practices. 
Moreover, that capacity exists irrespective of one's personal politics (Glover 2011).  
  It recognises each individual 
as a "being-in-the-world" 
(Collins, M. 2010, p. 920), 
shapes the city's future, and 
vice versa, with antagonism 
potentially harmful to both 
city and individual. 
As a fleshly "being-in-the-world" (Collins, M. 2010, p. 920), one interacts with the city and all other beings 
populating it. Hence, one has the potential to shape the future of the city, and it in turn shape each human 
being, including one's self (Collins, M. 2010, pp. 927-928). Therefore, it is in one's interest to ensure that 
"difference and equivalence do not lead to violent antagonisms" (ibid., pp. 927-928), as the antagonism can 
potentially harm the city as well as any individual (ibid., pp. 927-928). 
 
  It recognises each of 'us' 
share some identity with 
each of 'them', thus 
providing common ground 
for agonistic interaction. 
Namely, overlapping identities between different groups in society, individually or collectively (Connolly 
1991), provide potential common ground for agonistic interaction. 
 
e It relies on the 
planner to have 
specific abilities 
to facilitate 
agonistic 
It relies on the planner to 
have an intuitive and 
practical wisdom. 
Gunder (2003) calls this ability 'phronesis', or the "knack of knowing" (ibid., p. 254). However, the value of 
'gut feel' to help improve the quality of governance is frequently discounted, and not clearly understood, in 
situations of interaction with potential adversaries (Bartels 2013; Raaphorst 2015, p. 6). The planner is 
hands-on, and knows how to act wisely (Gunder 2003). 
 
It may find value in the appropriate preparation, although 
intuition can be important too (Forester, Susskind et al. 2011). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
 governance.  It relies on the planner to 
display judgement, bravery, 
and ethics. 
The individual's skill in judgement, "political courage", and "ethical" nous are required in effective practice, 
and is likely to be more important than the plan itself (Healey 2009, pp. 452-454). 
 
 It relies on the planner to 
have the ability to take on 
different roles. 
For instance, the planner may present himself as an ally of the community (Sandercock 1998a, pp. 99-100), 
or as its "custodian" (Gunder, p. 308), rather than of the state or institution (Sandercock 1998a, pp. 99-100). 
However, Friedmann (1987) disagrees, arguing that the planner must be impartial, with an ability to tap into 
state resources as needed to achieve progress (ibid.). Lastly, the planner must be a facilitator of consensus 
(Gunder, p. 310).  
It may consider the planner to be a representative of the 
institution, a 'hero', or a skilled expert separate from the 
community he serves (Sandercock 1998a, p. 97). The planner 
may be a negotiator upholding the public interest, or a 
dispassionate professional (Mäntysalo 2011).  
 It relies on the planner to 
drive interest-based plans 
and processes. 
Pløger (2004) advocates that the agonistic planner focus on interests of society, rather than attempting to 
provide a pre-set integrated plan (ibid., p. 82). 
It may consider alternative planning approaches, such as 
communicative, incrementalist, or comprehensive-rationalist 
planning (Mäntysalo 2011). 
3 TOPIC-BASED THEME OF 'EXPECTATIONS': The agonistic institution appreciates that all citizens potentially fuel conflict, as they have conflicting expectations of democracy and delivery by the democratic state, driving five agonistic 
practices to closer match society's expectations. 
a It aligns agonistic governance goals with the 
striving for the democratic ideal. 
Further, it seeks to enhance democracy through the improvement of policies and procedures (Pløger 2004). It may consider democracy as an end state, rather than a state 
of being, considering policies and procedures as mostly 
constant. 
b It values protest as symbolic of a flourishing 
democracy. 
Further, it sees it as a way to advance the democratic ideal (Staeheli 2010). It recognises that "transgressive 
politics” (Pieterse 2006a, p. 288) are endemic to democracy and integrally linked with positive 
transformation (ibid.). 
 
 
 
It may see irresolvable protest as undemocratic (Pløger 2004, p. 
72; Wingenbach 2011, p. 54). 
c It shapes the future whilst it governs current 
needs. 
It governs current realities, generally. However, as Pieterse (2006a, 2008) argues, governance can also shape 
the future even as it addresses present-day realities. He calls on planners to extend their efforts to the 
creation of alternative city futures, by improving on the current situation, thus drawing closer to the ideals 
of democracy (ibid. 2006a, pp. 301-302; 2008, pp. 130-161).  
 
d It ensures no single view alone informs the 
make-up of the governance of the ideal 
democracy. 
Further, it guards against the consideration of 'rational' views only, and has an appetite for less coherent 
views (Westphal 2014, pp. 16-17). However, it must avoid a situation of paralysis if it fails to find the balance 
between the different views (Gunder 2003, p. 250). 
It may be uneasy with demands not based on rational 
argument. However, even agonistic interactions must play out 
within a "modicum of order" according to Wingenbach 
(Wingenbach 2011, p. xii). 
e It considers the impact of conflicts arising from 
competing expectations in different local and 
citywide spatial contexts on governance. 
Conflict has a spatial geography of 'localness', varying from area to area within the city (Pløger 2004, p. 77). 
Further, the scale of stakeholder groups can affect agonistic city governance, as a community group may not 
share the same interest as its citywide counterpart (Silver et al. 2010, p. 456). 
 
4 TOPIC-BASED THEME OF 'EXCLUSION':  The agonistic institution recognises there can be no consensus without exclusion, as every majority decision taken will inevitably exclude a minority group, and it exposes and overcomes 
exclusion through three agonistic governance measures. 
a It exposes and 
subjugates 
routines of 
exclusion. 
It acts deliberately to 
overcome subtle or 
structural routines of 
exclusion. 
Further, it recognises these routines can range from subtle (Vitus 2006), to structural, discursive, or 
deliberate ones (Agger & Larsen 2009), requiring the deliberate design of participation processes to ensure 
inclusivity. However, it may intentionally avoid existing hegemonic positions or procedures that prevent 
adversaries from voicing views or demands (Sager 2013). 
It may exclude adversaries if they are seen as not having 
enough authority or representivity, may be very pervasive in its 
value systems (Vitus 2006, p. 477), and governance, and needs 
deliberate action to overcome its strictures. 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
 It works against the 
potentially repressive 
effects of the state. 
It does so by recognising and overcoming of these effects, which can include locking out "voices from the 
borderlands" (Sandercock 1998b), as well as other opinions and ideas (McClymont 2011), seen to be helpful 
for agonistic interactions. 
It may limit exclusion through systematic, proportional 
representation of groups affected by the protest, ensures equal 
opportunities for participation, may adopt unsystematic 
selection techniques to ensure the inclusion of minorities, may 
disregard minority interests when making decisions (Sager 
2013). 
 It reflects on the impact of 
governance procedures on 
power relations. 
It may use "reflexivity" (Bond, S. 2011, pp. 177, 179), namely to make power relations transparent and 
understood (ibid.). 
 
 It considers dealing 
effectively with exclusion as 
a precondition for 
meaningful agonistic 
interaction (Silver et al. 
2010).  
However, it is aware that grassroots participation is not always as inclusive as it is purports to be (Silver et al. 
2010, p. 455). 
 
  It uses the agonistic 
interaction as an 
opportunity to deepen the 
sate-society relationship 
with excluded groups. 
If agonistic engagement is actively undertaken, it does not necessarily guarantee a stable interaction, but 
helps to build a new relationship (Simon-Kumar & Kingfisher 2011). In the cases of "divided societies", where 
the excluded challenge the democratic state as they encounter disappointment in not realising the material 
benefits of democracy, the agonistic interaction can be a useful strategy in addressing some of their 
concerns (Harvey, K. 2012). 
 
b It ensures fair 
treatment of 
adversaries to 
minimise 
exclusion.  
It considers what approach 
to adopt in its practices to 
be fair to all groups. 
It biases its practices towards less powerful adversaries. It does so as it understands the adoption of an 
unbiased view of adversaries may result in unfair disregard of their issue under contention, notwithstanding 
any potential self-interested motivation. Namely, it must be unfair to be fair to less powerful or weaker 
adversaries (Westphal 2014, pp. 18-19). 
It may prefer, in the name of fairness, to have an unbiased view 
of adversaries to ensure consideration of issue under 
contention results in outcome that is for the good of the public, 
rather than self-interest of specific adversaries only. 
 However, Sager (2013) contends less negotiation is less fair (ibid., p. 97), and that the yardstick of fairness 
measures whether the state or the society benefit from the negotiation (ibid., p. 237). 
 
 It deliberately identifies and includes participants, that may be weaker, in engagement to overcome 
exclusion (Agger & Larsen 2009; Westphal 2014, p. 18) based on the part they play in the protest, namely 
“conflict-oriented” selection (Westphal 2014, p. 18). It may provide additional measures that enhance the 
opportunities for participation by adversaries to provide their input. 
It may not acknowledge exclusion exists or make much effort to 
overcome it, as citizens are not the state's 'problem' leaving it 
to citizens to initiate interaction. 
c It creates and 
implements 
measures to 
overcome 
exclusion. 
It emphasises a 
collaborative approach. 
It prefers the collaborative approach to the participatory one of other democracies. However, even if 
ultimately no collaboration is possible, there is more value in participating than in not participating (Jones, 
M. 2014). Even consensus-seeking democratic collaboration has merit, although possibly more for the 
benefit of the institutions by strengthening it (Healey 1998). However, it tempers its approach with a healthy 
cynicism (Forester 2008), knowing there is no quick fix, and any interaction requires skills of all sorts (ibid., p. 
303). 
 
 It develops an institutional 
culture of autonomy and 
responsibility. 
 
It develops a "politically autonomous but responsible institutional design" (Pløger 2004, p. 87), that can 
govern agonistically in cases of conflict (ibid.). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
 It arranges for purpose-
made structures and 
systems to support weaker 
adversaries. 
For instance, issue-specific forums or ad hoc committees to debate an issue, can be small or large, or 
operate for a limited period. Further, it can enter into dialogue, provide an independent facilitator, or 
facilitate access to a mediator representing the formerly excluded adversaries (Westphal 2014, p. 15). 
It may establish and favour structured channels like petitions, 
outreaches, and dialogue. 
  It adopts measures to 
overcome continued 
patterns of exclusion.  
For instance, it guards against the “redevelopment at all costs” approach, which can entrench non-inclusivity 
(Jonas & McCarthy 2009). 
 
  It also emphasises structures and processes that are open-ended, and respectful (Pløger 2004, p. 87).  
  It clarifies how information is assessed and by who (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010).  
5 TOPIC-BASED THEME OF 'CHANNELS':  The main task of the democratic institution is to channel and transform antagonism to agonism, through processes of agonistic interaction supportive of ongoing positive recalibrations of the 
state-society relationship, in three main arenas. 
a It adopts 
principles of 
agonistic 
engagement. 
It finds areas of accord with 
adversaries. 
For instance, it starts the interaction with adversaries by agreeing to the unwanted results of engagement 
(Westphal 2014). 
It may allow for the exchange of views with adversaries, and 
mutual efforts to reach agreement. 
 It does not 'hide' from 
difference.  
Further, it goes beyond acknowledgement to of "matters of difference" to tackle them proactively 
(Sandercock 1998b, pp. 107, 126). 
 
 It explicitly vows to not 
change view of adversaries.  
Further, it develops rules of "civility" (Goi 2005, p. 60) jointly with adversaries that all pledge to follow, such 
as listening as well as speaking (ibid., p. 78), and ‘speaking in good faith rather than trying to manipulate’ the 
situation (ibid., p. 60), especially in cases of antagonism. It acknowledges the standpoint of adversaries and 
does not try to change it (Sandercock 1998a, p. 107?). However, Holden (2011) argues it is possible for 
adversaries to retain their separate views but they must reach consensus at some stage (ibid.). 
It may try to convince adversaries to accept its view, or it may 
try to co-opt them to its view. 
 
 
  It promotes reciprocity. Namely, reciprocity (see Tenet 2) forms part of its "ethos of engagement'" (Chambers, Samuel & Carver 
2008, pp. 231-254). 
 
  It is continuously willing to 
'do more'. 
Namely, its approach is that there is "always more that people can do than they realise" (Spencer 2012, p. 
14). 
 
  It favours 'hot' interactions 
over 'cold' ones. 
It favours Fung's (2003) "hot" interaction (ibid., p. 345), or Gunder's (2003) "passionate debate" (ibid., p. 
282), over "cold deliberation" (Fung 2003, p. 345), finding it to more productive (ibid.), in line with a 
Mouffeian "productive tension" (Simon-Kumar & Kingfisher 2011). Moreover, 'cold' interaction does not 
allow for the empowerment of, especially, weaker adversaries (Fung 2003, p. 346). 
It may underestimate the depth of passion expressed by 
adversaries (Murtagh 2004), and its oppressive effect. 
  It embraces and creates 
channels and spaces that 
give society groups 
opportunities to voice their 
issues. 
Further, it creates the space for the "active politicization of issues" (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010, p. 346), in 
various forms (Hillier 2002a, pp. 118-120; Metzger 2011), sometimes symbolically (Koga 2016). 
 
  It relies on the expertise of 
society in interaction.  
Namely, it sees little or no role for technical experts as the adversaries direct their attention to the issue 
under contention only, rather than on the more visible aspect of protest, developing an understanding of 
the underlying forces, and shaping the perception of the parties. Through the interaction, it adapts the state-
society relationship, with experts providing optional support, only if participants see them as helpful. If so, 
generally, each party has its own experts (Westphal 2014). 
 
 
It may rely on the input of technical experts to support the 
interaction. 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
  It accords agonistic 
interaction the highest 
priority 
For instance, it dedicates strategic-level capacity to lead the state-society agonistic interaction, such as 
politicians, departmental heads, or an independent arbitrator negotiator (ibid.), rather than managing it as 
an administrative function. 
An official with relevant expertise, or a politician, may lead the 
engagement. 
  It provides the skills to 
channel and transform 
conflict 
These skills relate to not only the driving of collaboration and analytical tools to map power, values, and 
socio-economic issues. They also include change management skills, like conflict resolution, mediation, risk 
identification and management, and crisis management techniques (Murtagh & Ellis 2011). 
 
b It fulfils more 
than one goal at 
a time by 
engaging 
agonistically 
with 
adversaries. 
It aims to convert conflict 
into positive 
transformation. 
Namely, it seeks not merely to manage collaboration, but to achieve real transformation through the 
agonistic transformation of conflict into a positive outcome (Silver et al. 2010).  
It may bargain with adversaries, or make compromises with 
them, or it may not (Mäntysalo 2011). 
 It desires to create a basis 
for future co-operation. 
Namely, it changes the nature of the state-society link, allowing for a mutual deferential dissent that had 
seemingly not been attainable before (Goi 2005, p. 73), by airing opposing views that point out policy or 
procedural changes for future interactions. 
It may focus on highlighting opposing views, discuss them, and 
aim to find solutions. It may seek consensus, even pushing 
conflictual debate aside to achieve it (Innes & Booher 2004). 
 It wants to manage, not 
necessarily resolve, conflict, 
and preserve the identities 
of adversaries.  
Namely, it directs deliberation at "conflict maintenance rather than conflict resolution… because it has the 
potential to tap into social identities. Identity is strengthened by difference; to know what you are, it is 
necessary to know what you are not, and attempts to bring different parties together can lead to a denial of 
their differences" (McClymont 2011, p. 253). 
The goal of the interaction is to attain consensus (Hillier 2002b). 
 It aspires to attain 
democratic ideals. 
For instance, it shares in the struggle of the adversary to overcome inequality in the pursuit of democratic 
ideals (Purcell 2009; Houwen 2010). 
 
 
c It has a deep 
understanding 
of how different 
channels for 
protest and 
agonistic 
engagement 
operate. 
It recognises informal 
channels to express 
objections are as legitimate 
as formal ones. 
Hence, dissensus expressed informally can influence planning outcomes (Hillier 2000). As Wingenbach 
(2011) puts it, there is power in informality (ibid., pp. xi-xxi). 
Weale (2007) asserts that the institution may not consider 
protests lodged informally at the time of "…important public 
decisions on questions of law or policy [that] depend, directly or 
indirectly, upon public opinion formally expressed by citizens of 
the community, the vast bulk of whom have equal political 
rights” (ibid., p. 18). 
 It acknowledges 
unconventional channels 
and ways of deliberation. 
Although these ways of deliberation may be different to what is customary to the institution (Tully 2002, p. 
223), they can be effective.  
It may conform to conventional, and formal, routines of 
dialogue only. This, says Tully (2002), in his testing of the 
legitimacy of democracy, is its downfall (ibid., p. 223). 
 It seeks to enhance the 
emancipatory aspect of 
participation.  
However, it is also alert to the potential disempowerment aspect of dialogue (Raco, Imrie et al. 2011).  
 It strives to reach a balance 
between too much and too 
little dialogue.  
Koczanowicz (2011) believes that too much dialogue "leads to "anarchy" (ibid., p. 553) or a mobocracy, and 
too little dialogue to "totalitarianism" (ibid.), or an autocracy. 
 
 It knows agonistic 
engagement can be a slow 
process. 
 
 
As the process relies on negotiation, it is seen as slow (Pløger 2004, p. 72). In contrast, however, decisions by 
exercising power can be quick (ibid.). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
 It facilitates a 'trading zone', 
a common language, 
between adversaries to 
exchange ideas. 
Mäntysalo et al. (2011), citing Galison (2010), advocate for a "trading zone" concept of engagement, namely 
a shared space for adversaries to consider complex problems, aided by a constantly-evolving, mutual 
language. "Agonistic planning and the generation of a local trading zone of planning both require long-
standing cooperation between different groups, in the effort to establish both the conditions of political 
tolerance and respect between the adversaries, and the practical-conceptual tools and rules for their mutual 
‘out-talk’ on planning issues. There has to be both political will (agonism) and practical capacity (trading 
zone) for coordinating the uneasy coexistence of groups in a locality – and achieving this takes time. In this 
context, politically respectful and conceptually comprehensible bargaining and compromising would not 
appear as qualitatively poor communication, but rather as an achievement of restless and creative dialogue, 
mutual sense-making and institutional capacity building… The exchange language of agonistic trading should 
be conceived as an organic, open-ended and continuously inclusive system of planning communication and 
interaction – and, moreover, as a system capable of developing self-reflexive boundary rules for judging 
mutually the legitimacy of the agreements and decisions made" (Mäntysalo et al. 2011, p. 268). Trading 
zones could be used as a way to bring consensual and conflictual approaches together (Saporito 2016).  
 
  It 'synthesises' the different 
facets of the conflictual 
interaction to enable 
decision-making. 
It is aware that the process of interaction can result in, not consensus, but an entirely new viewpoint shared 
by adversaries. Healey (2009) suggests that this 'synthesis' can be undertaken singly or in a group (ibid., pp. 
450, 452). Simon-Kumar and Kingfisher (2011) elaborate that the notion of 'synthesis' is referring "not to 
assimilation, but rather as negotiation leading to agreements arrived at not by way of compromise but by 
creating something new in the processes of conversing respectfully across difference" (ibid., pp. 275, 281-
282). 
 
  It sets the rules of 
engagement and decision-
making together with 
adversaries. 
For instance, whether the proceedings will be publicised widely, or not at all, is in accordance with the set 
rules. However, says Brownill (2009), these rules are likely to be affected by historic governance patterns 
(ibid.). 
It may set rules of engagement, and decision-making, without 
the input of adversaries. 
  Further, it sets the agenda for the interaction with unequal adversaries, giving them more time to make their 
inputs (Westphal 2014, p. 19). 
It may set the agenda, and its details, with or without the input 
of adversaries. 
  It empowers adversaries in 
the decision-making 
process, through 
appropriate special-purpose 
structures enabling 
agonistic engagement. 
Namely, it provides the means for adversaries to make decisions with, or without, recourse to the state in 
making recommendations (ibid., p. 21), or the decision itself (ibid.). Such structures in the past have 
included, for example, a depoliticised Planning Commission (Baxamusa 2008), panels (Agger & Löftgren 
2010), a "public inquiry" or "public debate" (McClymont 2011), and a Citizens’ Assembly (Westphal 2014, p. 
21). However, structures can be exclusionary, and not as participatory and democratic as they seem to be on 
the surface (Flyvbjerg 2003; Agger & Löftgren 2010). Empowered structures try to balance negotiating 
positions, and rely on reciprocity (iAgger & Löftgren 2010) (see Tenet 2), and decision-making power to 
effect change (Westphal 2014, p. 20). Further, they rely on a way for adversaries to reject any proposed 
agreement that does not sufficiently represent their interest (ibid.), or if their position is ignored (ibid., p. 
21), say, through veto rights (ibid.). 
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Practice 
Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
6 TOPIC-BASED THEME OF 'CONSENSUS': The agonistic institution understands that a full, and final, consensus is always unachievable, and that the agreement is fluid and impermanent, implementing five actions to support 
agonistic outcomes.  
a It recognises any 
agreement is a 
''conflictual 
consensus'' 
(Mouffe 2013, p. 
13). 
It recognises any agreement 
with adversaries is 
temporary. 
Namely, it sees 'consensus' as temporary (Gunder 2003), or as partial, interim, or as a compromise. It is a 
"conflictual consensus'' (Mouffe 2000b; 2013, p. 13), even at best (Hillier 2002a, p. 131). Any decision 
maintains an element of "undecideability" (Wingenbach 2011, p. 140). Spencer (2012) points out that, as the 
decision may deal with the consequences of the conflict, rather than the cause, the problem will continue to 
resurface making any agreement short-lived (ibid.). 
It may deem the negotiated compromise with adversaries to be 
a permanent agreement, as final (McClymont 2011), as 
conclusive, and as a "closure" of the issue, says Westphal (ibid., 
p. 4), citing Schaap (2006, p. 270). 
 It recognises the 
"impossibility of consensus" 
(Hillier 2007, p. 23). 
Agonistic engagement can result in a deadlock, where no answer is possible, for instance, in the case of 
"internal contradictions in the governance culture" between the orientation of the market and Danish social 
housing provision (Engberg 2009, pp. 21-22). It recognises some conflict is irresolvable, or undecidable, with 
consensus impossible (Mouffe 2000b; Pløger 2004; Hillier 2007, p. 23; Mouffe 2013, p. 13), for instance, the 
gap between institution and adversaries may be impossible to close (Mouffe 2000b; 2013, p. 13). It may 
resort to external legal and political decisions, if the conflict is not resolved by consensus (Pløger 2004). 
Despite its impossibility, conflict and consensus can co-exist (Silver et al. 2010). 
However, irresolvable conflict may also be an undemocratic 
result (Wingenbach 2011, p. 54). 
 It may facilitate a 
settlement, rather than a 
resolution, as it is easier.  
It finds that a settlement is typically easier to facilitate as the underlying attitudes of the state and society 
parties do not need to change (Hillier 2003, p. 54), than a resolution (ibid.). 
It may aim for a resolution, which is harder to attain than a 
settlement (Hillier 2003, p. 54). 
b It acknowledges 
that any 
transformation 
arising from 
consensus is 
likely to be 
incremental in 
nature. 
It limits negative outcomes 
on interest groups not 
considered in making the 
decision. 
Decisions arising from agonistic interactions are likely best limited to incremental improvements, 
recommends Gunder (2003, p. 308), Wingenbach (2011, p. xvi), and Mäntysalo et al. (2011). Gunder (2003) 
advocates that the institution must tread lightly to reduce the potential negative effects of decisions 
imposed on adversaries whose desires may not have been considered at the time the decision was made 
(ibid., p. 308). Moreover, small decisions are easier to agree on (Mäntysalo et al. 2011). 
It may make large policy or governance changes without 
sufficient regard to possible negative impact on adversaries, 
according to Wingenbach (2011, p. xvi). 
c It distinguishes 
between 
beneficial and 
negative 
outcomes 
arising from 
agreements 
made in 
processes of 
agonistic conflict 
management. 
It recognises any agreement 
may have a positive impact 
on the issue under 
contention.  
Conflict can result in beneficial outcomes (Silver et al. 2010).   
 The agreement can drive real change, such as the case of planning reform in Sydney (Cook 2011).  
 The agreement allows for the development of 'local' solutions, which are supposedly more sustainable, 
according to Pieterse (2006a, pp. 301-302; 2008, pp. 130-160). 
 
 It uses agonism as an important tool in coping with tricky problems, and complex governance (Hillier & 
Healey 2008). 
It may adopt traditional approaches of deliberation in planning, 
which do not address the complexities of issues (Mäntysalo et 
al. 2011). 
 It is aware any agreement 
may improve the state-
society relationship.  
Agonistic engagement focuses on building the state-society link (Michels & De Graaf 2010), and not just the 
issue under contention.  
 
 As agonistic conflict management focuses on collective decision-making (Wingenbach 2011, p. 157), the 
agreement can promote increased inclusivity (ibid., p. 136). 
 
  As the agreement does force the institutionalisation of the representation of the identities of adversaries, 
the adversaries see the agonistic engagement as a dynamic, non-aggregative process of becoming (ibid., pp. 
66-67, 140, 152). 
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Agonistic institution Other consensus-seeking democratic institution 
  The agreement fosters an “agonistic respect (Connolly 1993, p. 381) between the parties to the agonistic 
interaction.  
 
  However, the belief that participation serves social justice ends is possibly naïve (Silver et al. 2010, p. 456).  
   Nonetheless, although the agreement may not be final, even incomplete agonistic engagement efforts can 
yield positive results (Michels & De Graaf 2010). 
 
  Further, it is attentive to the 
possibility that any 
agreement may have a 
negative impact on the 
issue under contention.  
Forester (2011) reminds practitioners that "good processes do not guarantee good outcomes" (ibid., p. 325).  
  If a decision is made despite objections from adversaries, it is "not open to contestation and is shielded from 
democratic discussion", points out McClymont (2011, p. 252), citing Mouffe (2005, p. 56).  
However, if it focuses too much on consensus, apathy and disaffection may result (Mouffe 2000b, p. 194). 
Further, it may result in complacency (Silver et al. 2010). 
 
  It is concerned any 
agreement may be to the 
detriment of the state-
society relationship.  
Despite agonistic conflict management, a lack of consensus may lead to alienation, apathy, ignorance and 
antagonism (Hillier 2002b, p. 127), and possibly even revolution; however, the state must remain open to 
these states (ibid., p. 133). 
 
  Agonistic conflict management can deepen intergroup tension and cause harm (van Leeuwen 2015).   
  Hajer (2003) warns that decision-making through interaction with adversaries may create an institutional 
vacuum in the state, as no-one within it is responsible for assuring the quality and soundness of decisions 
made (Hajer 2003). 
 
   Moreover, the agonistic capacity of the state institution may not improve, as agonism is unlikely to exist 
outside the created channels (Beaumont & Loopmans 2008). 
 
   Further, agonistic conflict management may not always result in democratic outcomes at all (Silver et al. 
2010, p. 455). 
 
d It incorporates 
decisions arising 
from an 
agonistic conflict 
management 
process into its 
governance 
actions. 
It considers any decision as 
binding on it (Westphal 
2014, p. 21). 
Further, it includes it in other decision-making processes (Westphal 2014, p. 21). However, it must build 
accountable feedback measures into the rules of engagement (Agger & Löftgren 2010, pp. 13-14). Further, 
agonistic conflict management may be politicised, say, by reporting the outcome of engagement at public 
hearings (Westphal 2014, p. 21). 
It may consider the outcome of engagement as discretionary 
and for consultation and information purposes, make decisions 
without reference to adversaries or to outcome of engagement, 
or disregard their demands completely. 
e It considers such 
decisions as an 
important 
component of 
the democratic 
state (Mouffe 
2005, p. 56). 
It regards agonistic 
interactions as going hand-
in-hand with other, formal, 
politics. 
Indeed, although a formal political election may be held, winning or losing it is irrelevant, says Houwen 
(2010, p. 8). With agonism, adversaries now have "a new chance to win" (ibid., p. 9), by calling on 
democratic, and constitutional, norms in, say, a fight for human rights (ibid.). The agonistic institution 
advocates decision-making that goes beyond voting at elections (Pløger 2004, p. 87), as an important 
adjunct to democracy (Mouffe 2005, p. 56; McClymont 2011, p. 253). Further, the institution ensures the 
political group incorporates any decision made in its work, or broadens decision-making to a wider group by 
means of a referendum or similar (Westphal 2014, p. 21). In contrast, Metzger (2011) views such agonistic 
decisions as a 'displacement' (ibid., p. 193), of formal politics into "other spheres of society" (ibid.). 
 
 
It may view elections as the primary decision-making 
mechanism (Mäntysalo 2011). 
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7 TOPIC-BASED THEME OF 'DISSENSUS': The democratic institution deems various modes of dissensus as a critical and constant component of healthy democratic life with potentially positive outcomes, with six elements informing 
its perspective on protest. 
a Its stance 
towards conflict 
is 
acknowledgmen
t of its 
centrality, to 
democracy and 
to governance. 
It regards conflict as integral 
to democracy. 
Conflict is central to democracy (Mouffe 2000b; Schaap 2006; Swyngedouw 2015). However, most forms of consensus-seeking democracy are 
driven by the desire to maintain stability according to 
Wingenbach (2011, pp. 105-198). Likewise, it may see protest 
as a problem to be overcome, and push for consensus ((Schaap 
2006). 
 It regards conflict as core to 
governance. 
Conflict is central to policies and procedures (Mäntysalo 2011), to planning (ibid.), and to engagement 
(Pløger 2004, p. 87), rather than an obstacle (Metzger 2011, p. 195). Indeed, it knows that "when citizens 
feel that the decision-making apparatus of the state has already chosen to exclude their perspectives, their 
inclination is to retreat into the public sphere of insular communities or to resort to violence to balance the 
power they feel they lack before the institutions of the state" (Goi 2005, p. 59). 
It may see conflict as "anti-institutional" and finds it difficult to 
envisage how it can be institutionalised (Nonhoff 2012). It may 
be threatened by the potential ungovernabiity of protest (Honig 
1993). It may emphasise collaboration at the expense of 
confrontation, thus locking out different opinions and ideas 
(McClymont 2011, p. 253) (see Tenet 4 in this Table). It may 
view protest as possible to pre-empt through negotiation and 
planning, somewhat idealistically perhaps (Silver et al. 2010, p. 
456). 
b It holds that conflict is eternal. Conflict is never-ending (Pløger 2004, p. 24), and everlasting (Hillier 2007, p. 23).  
c It considers any protest as a legitimate form of 
objection (McClymont 2011) 
It recognises and acknowledges that there are multiple valid ways and channels for adversaries to express 
objections (McClymont 2011, p. 23).  
It may prefer structured, codified channels (Harrison 2001a). 
However, protestors may need to protest outside established 
channels to be heard (Innes & Booher 2004, p. 419). 
d It is open to conflict (Wingenbach 2011, p. 131). Moreover, it does not necessarily need to tame the protest (McClymont 2011). It may favour pacification of protestors, more so if protest is 
violent (Pierre 1999), or eradicate it (Forester 1999), as quickly 
as possible (Forester 1999; Pierre 1999). It may prefer calmer 
interaction due to its concern that acceptance of any type of 
protest may promote the use of physical force rather than 
taming it (Westphal 2014, pp. 19-20). 
e It views protest as an opportunity for positive 
change 
It sees conflict as an inspiration for the critical contemplation and dispute of existing policy and procedures 
(Pløger 2004, p. 24), in particular, the case of the struggle for the improvement of human rights (Parnell 
2007; Mottiar & Bond 2012). 
It may see conflict as an interruption of the status quo, or as a 
threat to the prevailing order. It may be conflict-averse 
generally. 
f It assumes it can 
convert 
antagonism to 
agonism. 
However, it may view 
antagonism and agonism as 
a matter of perspective. 
Pløger (2004) argues that conflict can be seen as agonistic, as it is only one's social and political perspective 
that turns it into antagonism (ibid.). He claims that as "public authorities only see antagonism" (ibid., p. 87), 
they translate conflict into impossible dilemmas and antagonism, rather than seeing it as allied to the spirit 
of agonism and deep democratic participation and a profound respect for the validity of diverse identities 
(ibid.).  
It may see any conflict as antagonistic (Pløger 2004). 
  It recognises elements of 
agonism and antagonism 
are subtle and indirect 
(Collins, M. 2010). 
 
 
Hence, it can be difficult to tell the difference between antagonism and agonism.  
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  In the conversion of 
antagonism to agonism, it 
needs institutional capacity 
for agonistic interaction, 
shared democratic 
principles, reasonableness 
and reciprocity, and 
willingness. 
It assumes that all antagonism can be converted into genuine respect, namely "agonistic respect" 
(Wingenbach 2011, p. 63). However, a stable democracy increases the prospects of the successful 
institutionalisation of agonism (ibid., p. 171). It assumes there are some democratic principles shared with 
adversaries (Mouffe 2000b, p. 102; Wingenbach 2011, pp. xii-xiii), and that the conflict Is not so antagonistic 
that it 'destroys' democracy (Wingenbach 2011, p. 173). It assumes that sufficient "reasonableness" (Schaap 
2006, p. 264), and "reciprocity" (ibid., p. 256) (see Tenet 2) are available to shift antagonism to agonism 
(ibid., p. 268). It assumes the institution and adversary are willing to transform antagonism to agonism 
(Houwen 2010). However, "not all conflicts are democratic and not all contestation is agonistic" 
(Wingenbach 2011, p. 99). Moreover, theoretically there are no limits to antagonism (Schaap 2006, p. 269). 
Agonism's helpfulness in cases of antagonism is questionable. Breen (2009) says that the notion of agonism 
is silent on antagonism's potential to decline "into cycles of limitless violence and atrocity" (ibid., p. 134), 
and agonism is too idealistic, and unaware of the issues of power (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Where writers have explicitly or implicitly compared the practices of dissensus-based practices with other consensus-seeking democratic institutions, these have been included in the right hand column above, and serve only to highlight the prospects of agonism by 
exaggerating the difference between the two approaches and are not intended as a critique of either approach.
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4 Questions for One-on-One Interviews 
For each story of city strife, respondents were identified from different phases to reveal the processes of strife over 
time. A maximum of twenty semi-structured questions in line with the tenets of agonism and the identified main 
topic-based themes were asked. 
Theme No Question 
Conflict 1 How did the story of city strife unfold over time?  
(Prompts: so what happened then? Who was involved? What did they do? What happened then? When did what 
happen?) 
2 What form/forms did the protest take?  
(Prompts: Was that the only time they protested? What were the other times? What did they do?) 
3 If the protest was violent, what was the city response to aggression and antagonism? At 
what point did the city start /could the city have started engaging in discussions (if it did) 
with the protestors?  
(Prompts: How was the violence managed by the city? What did it do? Who was responsible for the 
response/action? Why then (at that point), and not earlier in the process of the strife?) 
4 What approach should the city have to city strife generally? 
(Prompts: Should there be a policy? What should the policy say? Should there be an individual department? What 
would be their function?) 
Adversaries 5 Who was protesting? 
(Prompts: What were the groups participating in the protest? Who were they representing? What 
were their expectations? How did they come to have those expectations? What made them feel that 
protest was their way to engage with the city?) 
6 Who in the city was involved and what was their role in the process of strife in this story? 
(Prompts: Which departments or individuals were involved? Why? What were they doing? What were they 
supposed to be doing? What was your role? How did you feel about the protest? Did the city have a uniform 
approach to the strife? If not, how did it vary from person to person/ department to department? Where does that 
stance come from? Did the city prepare strategies together before engaging with the protestors? If not, why not? If 
so, in what ways did they prepare? Did the internal arrangements in the city have any material impact on the 
unfolding of the story? How? What do you mean?) 
7 What was the nature of the relationship between the city and the protestors?  
(Prompts: Why do you think that particular individual/department responded to the protestors / acted in that 
particular way? If you had to think of just one word that categorises the citizen in terms of how the state interacts 
with him/her, what would that word be? Why (elaborate), what do you mean? What city policies and strategies 
helped or hindered the relationship? In what way? Did everyone feel that way? What should it have been? Is the 
protestor the enemy of the state? If yes, why? If not, why not?) 
8 Did the protestors change over time? 
(Prompts: Within the city? Within the protesting groups? In what way? How did that change the nature of the 
strife?) 
Power 9 Who appeared to be the main interest groups in this story? And did it change over time? 
(Prompts: Which other groups or people were important in this story? What were their roles?) 
10 Who was the most powerful in the story? How was the power manifested? 
(Prompts: Who do you think had the power in this particular story and did it shift over time? How was that power 
manifested, at meetings, other engagements, etc..? Assuming it did change over time, how did it change?) 
Expectations 11 Why were the protestors protesting?  
(Prompts: What did they say they were protesting about? What did you think they were protesting about?) 
12 Where did they get their expectations from? What were the expectations? 
(Prompts: Assuming you refer to state policy or strategies, can you elaborate?) 
13 What actions has the state undertaken to meet these expectations? 
(Prompts: what do you mean? Explain? Were the actions successful? If yes, how so? If not, why not?) 
Channels 14 In this story, the protestors chose a particular protest action; why do you think they 
adopted this approach. What other approaches could they have followed? 
(Prompts: Why did they choose follow this avenue? What other channels / options did they have? Why did they not 
follow the other channels? Is there a protocol or policy for this protest? What are the main components of that 
policy? Would any of these have helped to resolve the conflict? How? In what way? Or if not, how not? Did they try 
that/those other avenues of protest? What was the outcome of this / of other forms of protest?) 
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Theme No Question 
Exclusion 15 Do you think the protestors felt excluded in some way by the city which led to the 
protest? 
(Prompts: How do you think they were excluded? Why were they excluded? In what way were they excluded? What 
could the city have done to minimise the sense of exclusion?) 
Consensus 16 What was the outcome of the protest; was their some sort of agreement?  
(Prompts: What sort of agreement was it? What alternatives did the city debate? What was the common ground, 
or starting point for the resolution or settlement of the issue? What informed the joint decision? From the city’s 
aspect? From the protestors view? What did the state give up? What did the protestors compromise on? Who were 
the winner and the loser? In what way? Learning from this engagement, what would the city / you need in future to 
be able to manage strife of this sort?) 
17 Do you think the outcome fundamentally changed the city approach to the issue under 
contention? 
(Prompts: Did the protest impact on city policy? How? In what way? What demands could not be resolved? And 
how long did the resolution last for, as it seems the story keeps repeating itself? What were the consequences of 
the decision? Did the protest impact on the way the city did its business? In what ways? In an ideal situation, what 
do you think should have happened? What do you think was positive? What was negative about the strife?) 
18 If you had a crystal ball, what do you think will happen next in this story? 
(Prompts: Do you think the strife will continue about this issue? Why? What will happen next?) 
Other 18 Who else can I speak to about this story? 
19 What would be good documents to read? Where can I find them? 
20 Do you have any questions you would like to ask? Or any other matters you feel you need 
to say? 
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5 Ethics Clearance Certificate 
See Appendix 23 for full submission. 
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6 Coverage of Interviews per Topic 
Theme Period Sample size 
Coverage of topic in period 
(number of respondent 
years) 
Number of respondent years 
worked in city administration 
City backdrop and 
protests generally 
1991-1995 10 
64 
29 
228 
1996-2000 11 46 
2001-2005 13 56 
2006-2010 16 71 
2010-to date 14 26 
Inner City informal 
trading protests 
1991-1995 3 
29 
5 
83 
1996-2000 9 26 
2001-2005 8 31 
2006-2010 6 15 
2010-to date 3 6 
Orange Farm basic 
service delivery protests 
1991-1995 4 
32 
17 
111 
1996-2000 3 11 
2001-2005 5 21 
2006-2010 11 45 
2010-to date 9 17 
Middle-class protest 1991-1995 1 
20 
1 
59 
1996-2000 2 10 
2001-2005 6 12 
2006-2010 5 25 
2010-to date 6 11 
   145  481 
 
 Highlighted areas indicate less-than-planned coverage of topic or period 
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7 Response to Invitation for Interview 
Respondent by 
race 
Respondent by 
gender 
Total invited Responsive Unresponsive or 
cancelled 
Black Africans  Female 6 3 3 
Male 14 6 8 
Coloured 
  
Female 1 1 
 
Male 4 3 1 
Indian 
  
Female 3 3 
 
Male 5 5 
 
White 
  
Female 13 7 6 
Male 18 14 4 
   64 42 22 
  
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 330 
8 List of Interview Respondents 
Name Position Date 
Abrahamse, Uriel First co-ordinator of street trading by-law enforcement in 
the GJMC in the mid-to-late 1990s, after a stint as Head of 
Security and Mayoral Programme coordinator for the 
Eastern MLC. 
9 November 2012  
Adler, Josie Black Sash activist in the in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
working with residents of informal settlements, and 
familiar with the origins of Orange Farm and other 
settlements. 
9 November 2012 
Ahmad, Peter Strategic planner with ten years of experience at local 
government level as the Assistant Director of Growth 
Management and Planning in the COJ's Development 
Planning department responsible for citywide planning 
initiatives; prior to that worked for about five years for the 
Gauteng Provincial Government between 1996 and 2002.  
12 December 2012 
Atkins, Keith Former CEO of the COJ's Metropolitan Trading Company 
between mid-2001 and early 2005. 
1 September 2012 
Bethlehem, Lael Formerly head of the Economic Development Unit's Joburg 
2030 team from 2002 to 2005, then the CEO of the COJ's 
Johannesburg Development Agency from 2006 to 2010. 
8 January 2013 
Bobat, Sabera Former Policy Specialist and then Deputy Director of 
Economic Development within the JCC's Urbanisation 
Department between 1993 and 1997 working on local 
economic development and urbanisation matters. 
3 December 2012 
Cachalia, Nazira Manager of the City Safety Programme in the Office of the 
Chief of Police, in the COJ's JMPD since 2006, prior to that 
worked for five years before that for the COJ's Economic 
Development department in a similar role (interviewed 
with Edna Mamonyane). 
12 October 2012 
Cohen, Douglas South African Local Government Association's Specialist for 
Economic Development (ICT) and Informal Trade for four 
years from 2009, with a number of years of experience 
working in the COJ albeit in a different role. 
17 October 2012 
Cowan, Sol Chairperson of the area-based Inner City Portfolio 
Committee (Section 80) and the Inner City Advisory 
Committee (Section 79) between 2000 and 2005, prior to 
that a councillor and MMC since 1995. 
7 November 2012 
Cox, Anna Senior journalist for The Star newspaper and the founder 
and lead of MetroWatch, a local government watchdog 
feature; has written very many stories on Johannesburg 
and service delivery failures in the Johannesburg area 
especially in middle-class suburbs. 
21 June 2012 
Daniels, Greg Director of Regulatory Compliance and Support to MMC 
Greeff since 2012, previously seconded by then Head of 
Planning in the late 2000s to coordinate urban 
management issues; prior to that worked as Regional 
Director of Diepsloot-Midrand Regions (1 and 2) from 
about 2006-2007, Executive Director of Corporate Services 
in the SMLC, SAMWU chairperson merging 3 unions into 
SAMWU for 23 000 employees, IEC deputy municipal 
electoral officer for Johannesburg in 1994 and Housing 
department official from the mid-1970s.  
 
 
16 October 2012 
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Name Position Date 
Dinat, Sean Former head of the COJ's Informal Trading Development 
Programme within the Economic Development Unit for 
about three years until 2006, worked in the city 
administration since the late 1990s in various roles.  
16 November 2012 
Fihla, Kenny Erstwhile Deputy Chairperson of Johannesburg's first post-
1994 municipal Council, and the lead of the Committee of 
Ten (later Committee of Fifteen) from 1997 to 2000, and 
the MMC responsible for Finance and Economic 
Development portfolio from 2000 to 2003. 
21 November 2012 
George, Xolile Former Regional Director of Region 11 of the COJ between 
2003 and 2006, which includes Orange Farm, prior to that 
served as Executive Director of Economic Development of 
the COJ in 2006 and 2007 and then as CEO of South African 
Local Government Association. 
17 October 2012 
Gerneke, Gerrie Director within the COJ's JMPD, who has worked on 
metropolitan policing, traffic and by-law enforcement 
matters for over thirty-five years in Johannesburg in the 
city administration. 
29 November 2012  
Goldsmith, Adam Former information officer of the GJMC's Inner City Office 
in the late 1990s communicating informal trading matters, 
inter alia, now Company Secretary for the COJ's 
Johannesburg Development Agency since 2001. 
12 October 2012 
Gotz, Graeme Specialist of Strategy and Policy in the COJ's Central 
Strategy Unit in the Office of the Executive Mayor (2006-
2009, Mayor Masondo's second term of office), prior to 
that worked as consultant and academic for about ten 
years focussing on local government, governance and 
urban development issues affecting South African cities. 
22 November 2012 
Harrison, Philip Former Executive Director of the COJ's department of 
Development Planning and Urban Management for three 
and a half years starting in 2006, now focused on 
development planning issues as academic and NRF Chair 
for Spatial Analysis and City Planning, School of 
Architecture and Planning, University of Witwatersrand. 
1 December 2012  
Hendler, Paul Former planning activist with PlanAct in pre-liberation 
South Africa, now a development consultant and academic 
addressing questions of housing and informal settlements. 
24 November 2012  
Khabakazi, Fundi Former ANC activist and trade unionist with leadership 
roles in politics since the late 1990s. 
12 November 2012 
Koseff, Jaq Director of Social Assistance within the COJ's department 
of Community Development since 2007. 
8 November 2012  
Kute, Peter Assistant Director of the Petitions Unit in the COJ since 
2008. 
21 June 2012 
Letsoalo-Ngcobo, Simon Senior COJ official responsible for matters relating to 
public transportation who has worked in the city 
administration for a few years. 
15 November 2012 
Masondo, Amos Former Executive Mayor of the COJ between 2000 and 
2010. 
15 November 2012 
Moodley, Syd Former director of SMME Development within the 
Economic Development department of the Urban 
Development Directorate of the SMLC, worked briefly in 
the informal trading sector in the early 2000s, now 
working in the Social Assistance Directorate of Community 
Development within the COJ. 
 
7 November 2012 
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Name Position Date 
Muthialu, Nomi Specialist project manager and public participation expert 
consulting to the JCC's Urbanisation department on the 
implementation of informal trading projects for about six 
years from 1993. 
4 December 2012 
Narsoo, Monty Consultant specialising in development of housing and 
informal settlement upgrading policy in the country 
through various roles over the last thirty years, from the 
Deputy-Director General of Housing in the national 
government, to specialist and researcher, now Governance 
Advisor to National Upgrading Support Programme. 
5 December 2012 
Peacock, Keith Acting Head of Communications between 1996 and 1999 
in the Eastern MLC, with responsibilities for customer-
relations management in various positions in the COJ 
thereafter until 2011. 
12 November 2012 
Phakathi, Dumisane Senior legal advisor to the COJ. 26 October 2012 
Phumzile, Njabulo Senior ANC politician with a number of roles in city politics 
of Johannesburg since 1995. 
1 October 2012 
Radebe, Thamsanqa Regional Manager for Urban Management and Service 
Delivery in Region G of the COJ since 2008, previously a 
councillor living in Orange Farm; interviewed with Lesego 
Legwale and Bafana Khumalo. 
17 October 2012 
Seedat, Rashid Responsible for long-term planning for the COJ since 1999, 
initially seconded to COJ's reform team from the Western 
MLC where he was working the head of the Community 
Development department; then as director of the COJ's 
Central Strategy Unit in the COJ from 2001; now Gauteng 
Planning Commissioner since late 2011. 
14 December 2012 
Sibaya, Nokuthula Development Manager for the Orange Farm Stretford 
Station Precinct project for the COJ's Johannesburg 
Development Agency. 
18 October 2012 
Strijdom, Liana Senior planner in the COJ's department of Development 
Planning and Urban Management responsible for strategic 
planning in the southern regions of the metropolis as well 
as Sandton (Regions D, E and G). 
18 October 2012 
Talwar, Hakesh Senior manager of a private sector parking management 
company. 
19 October 2012 
Truluck, Tim DA councillor for Ward 117, Parkhurst, with a close 
interest on the paid-parking matter and other city 
administration issues for his ward. 
16 October 2012 
Walters, Christine Councillor for the African National Congress and MMC 
managing a variety of COJ political portfolios in the city 
administration in Johannesburg since 1994. 
31 August 
Zack, Tanya Former Acting Executive Manager of Strategic Planning for 
the Johannesburg Development Agency in 2009; now an 
independent consultant working on the Inner City as well 
as other City initiatives. 
26 November 2012 
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9 Sample of Completed Data Summary of Interview 007 Greg Daniels (GD)
1
Interview Data Summary Sheet 007
Interview details
University Witwatersrand (NRF SARChI) Research supervisor Philip Harrison
PhD name Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery
Interview date and time 2012.10.16 at 10h00 Interview ref. no. 007
Duration +2 
hours
Recorded 
time
00:01:00 to 02:06:30, i.e. 2.13 decimal 
hours for transcript
Place 10th Floor, Metro Centre,
Braamfontein
Interviewer Li Pernegger Participant Greg Daniels (GD)
Interview number (real) 007
Interview number (anonymised) -
Name for thesis (real) Greg Daniels
Name for thesis (anonymised) -
Initials for thesis (real) GD
Initials for thesis (anonymised) -
Description of role for 
thesis (real)
The former Regional Director of the City responsible for the Midrand region until he was 
seconded by the then Head of Planning in the latter part of the 2000s to coordinate urban 
management issues, and subsequently the Director of Regulatory Compliance and Support in 
the Office of the Executive Director for Development Planning
Description of role for thesis (anonymised) -
Gender (real) M
Gender (anonymous) -
Participant approves being included in the list of interview 
participants
Yes
Participant allows details in aggregate form only N/a
Participant allows direct quotes to be attributed by name Yes
Participant allows direct quotes to be used Yes
Participant wants to check direct quotes if used No concern noted
Participant wants to check quotes No
Data capture date 2014.03.03 Date sheet finalised 2014.03.03
Recording method Livescribe SmartPen pencast (audio and handwritten notes)
Transcript available Yes. Transcript checked 2013.03.14
Audio available Yes, saved as Pencast Reference Journal 5: Pp. 38-46
Questionnaire Yes, standard semi-structured
questionnaire used.
Questionnaire
followed
Generally Attached On file
Consent in place Yes Interviewer Li Pernegger (LP)
Informal consent captured on audio recording N/a Consent attached Yes, on file.
Interviewee details
Name or pseudonym Greg Daniels (GD) Organisation COJ
Job role  Year?-2012 Director of Regulatory Compliance and Support to Roslyn Greef (Director in the
Office of the Executive Director: Development Planning).
 2007-Year? Seconded by the then Head of Planning, Phil Harrison to coordinate issues around 
urban management.  
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2
Interview Data Summary Sheet 007
 2006-2007 Regional Director of Region 1&2 (Diepsloot and Midrand) (A & B).
 2004-2005 (check date – more likely 1996-2000) Executive Director for Corporate Services in
SMLC.
 2009? IEC's deputy municipal electoral officer for Johannesburg.
 Date? SAMWU chairperson responsibke for merging the 3 unions into SAMWU for 23 000 
emplotyees. He participates in disciplinary hearings frequently.
 1975-Pre-1994 (?): Housing department official.
Qualification Not known.
Gender Male Age Possibly early fifties
Multicultural differences from interviewer AG is a coloured male, somewhat older than LP.
Address City of Johannesburg, 10th floor, Metro Centre, Braamfontein            gregdan@joburg.org.za
Olga Mbele: PA to Greg Daniels             olgamb@joburg.org.za
Cellular 082 467 9403 Work 011 407 6620
011 407-6151
Fax 011 339 3647
Behaviour and 
body language of 
participant/
Tone and delivery
of dialogue
Relaxed, engaged, involved, earnest. Possibly some anger 
and frustration with senior management decisions post-
2004.
Implications 
for research
None that seem 
obvious.
Interviewer
feelings and
behaviour
Interested. Curious. Implications 
for research
As above.
Any personal 
information 
obtained
26-year old son was with them on holiday to Victoria falls, Zimbabwe.
Interview rationale To get an overview about the City from 1994 to 2012
Interview summary
A brief introduction had been made by LP prior to the interview when the meeting was set up. Consent was obtained from 
the participants to record the interview, and the interview commenced with a brief overview given by LP.
The City institution and urban management
 The 4 MLC s competed with each other, the move to the unicity made it more efficient.
 It seems it is possible that the COJ restructuring of DPUM is as result of service delivery protests.
 In 2007, the head of Planning had 15 direct reports (7 RDs and other planning directors.
 LP recalled she had done a presentation to Planning about Urban Management in 2006-2007 as part of EDU.
 People Centres, Social Services, Revenue, complaints, Health and Housing initially reported to RDs but after RDs were 
incorporated into planning these functions then reported to centralised EDs.
 GD thought the move was to strip RDs of “all authority, power, staff’ – the matrix approach with functions reporting to
EDs as well as to RDs did not happen.
 GD says urban management was a concept not a function.
 The system of RDs had worked well and he centralisation process was contested.
 Urban management had 4 main functions 1) Programme and Strategy 2) Service Delivery 3) Communications and 4) ?
 RDs were dependent on their relationships with MOEs.
 Urban Inspectors would log service breakdowns into the system and then the MOEs would not respond as they were 
not held accountable for their SLAs.
 In 2010 a JOC was created i.t.o. getting ready for the World Cup. It used to “embarrass’ MOEs via a matrix approach 
and worked very well – ‘the city has never been this clean’.
 Today SLAs contain sanctions on individuals’ performance bonuses, if they do not comply with their stated turnaround 
times and scorecards are ‘interdependent’.
 Some departments were historically weak such as Housing so i.t.o. the informal settlements regularisation initiative the 
function was managed by Planning, not Housing. It was supported by a regular Steering Committee that stopped when 
Phil Harrison left and the function was given to Housing.
 The Urban Management function now sits in the City Manager’s Office.
 Visible Service Delivery acknowledged (?).
Fixed-term contracts
 GD outlines that such contracts can start at R500 000 and end up at a R1m in 5 years.
 Hence the City was motivated to reduce this high cost.
 About 1071 directors and deputy directors were potentially affected.
 Staff were ‘bulldozed’ and not consulted. A state of limbo for 10 months occurred during which a number of people left  
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3
Interview Data Summary Sheet 007
due to the uncertainty of their jobs destabilising the City and compromising institutional memory. Morale was also 
affected.
 Note that all colleagues had agreed to take a cut in salary if necessary.
 The City overlooked a key court ruling initiated by IMATU. And was forced to ultimately transfer contract staff into 
permanent positions without a reduction in salaries, and thus did not achieve their objective to save money.
 how the City
Protests
 Although protests had occurred earlier they seemed only to have drawn attention post-2004 (why ten?).
 They originate(d) mostly from informal settlements.
 A serious protest happened in Diepsloot/Midrand in 2004 with looting, burning and damage to City property. This was 
despite the R140m investment in a 2-year period from the City and GPG.
 If protests are peaceful then there is no response to protestors’ demands but if all ‘hell breaks loose’, it gets attention 
and is featured on CNN and it ‘forces negotiation’.
 There is no systematic response within the City other than Phil Harrison’s policy on responding to protests.
 A successful municipality attracts more people who then get stuck on the periphery, and get frustrated, prompting 
protests.
 Authority to march must be obtained from the JMPD and the march leader must undertake to make good any 
damages.
 Protestors may, if they get violent, get arrested charged, put in prison, appear in court have bail set to refused.
However, this aspect hardly ever appears in media stories and it would be helpful if it did so as to demonstrate that
‘every action has a consequence’. It is not a newsmaker – p. 36.
 Protests also happen when illegal connection s are cut, note Eskom is likely to be the service provider not he COJ, so 
the Councillor has ‘no influence over that’ but in people’s minds, ‘the councillor represents government’.
 The protest management policy (Phil’s) classifies protests into different Statuses (1, 2, etc.) with appropriate responses 
per level.
 GD also notes that protest responses need to link and refer to a plan for that area in negotiations.

Channels
 Ward Councillor: their status changes when they are elected. It sends a signal ‘to the rest of those that this is what you 
must become’. A typical protest strategy is to burn down the ward councillor’s house even though he does not get to
decide what capital investment is made.
 CLO: Community Liaison Officer appointed by the City to help contractors source local labour, others want that benefit.
Informal settlements
 Informal settlements have grown in number over time – is that true? See p. 14.
 Themb'elihle is on dolomite which is dangerous (like Marathon and Makautse which are undermined). The community 
resisted moving to Lehae as it does not have the same economic opportunities as Lenasia. The community did not
believe the City about the dangers.
 Kya Sands: affected by NIMBYism i.t.o. trying to redevelop it.
 Orange Farm: It as more protests than other regions, there is one every month which is ‘no exaggeration’ with a couple 
of hundred people at a time. The DFA allowed for poor quality developments that were not in alignment with building
regulations. It has poor quality sewerage infrastructure compounded by poor maintenance. Soweto has community 
pride, unlike Orange Farm where as soon as a street light is installed, it is being cut down and the wire stripped – a 
phenomenon one does not see in Diepsloot and Ivory Park.
 Mogase View: has no storm water drainage.
Enforcement
 The City is bad on enforcement compared to Zimbabwe.
 GD tell the story of the dirty JMPD cop extorting money from a taxi driver for a cool drink.
 He also tells the story of a female police officer who shot her boyfriend dead.
OUTsurance
 Concept has become so popular that it has spread to Tshwane and Cape Town but there is a procurement issue as 
there is a ‘serious benefit’ to OUTsurance without having competed with other suppliers.
 JDA and JMPD are the custodians of the roads and traffic lights, and traffic management, respectively.
Informal trading
The MTC is flailing. Alfred Sam got killed in a car accident.
Definition of service delivery
 GD found it difficult to provide a definition.  
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Interview Data Summary Sheet 007
 It includes elements of capital investment.
City response to protest as stated or implied by participant

 Regularisation policy
 Visible Service Delivery acknowledged.
High points discussed per theme
Power  See interview Matrix for details
Stakeholders  “
Expectations  “
Exclusion  “
Channels  “
Consensus  “
Conflict  “
Other  “
Any omissions? “
Any new themes or subthemes “
Most valuable inputs and why “
Other
Reference to 
other valuable 
sources of 
information 
including 
people, 
documents, etc.
Documents:
 Minutes of Service Delivery JOCs (?).
 Press coverage on Diepsloot unrest about 8 years ago due to rumour they were being moved to
Brits (also SABC talk show).
 Protest policy done by Phil Harrison (undated version received by LP from Olga on 2012.10.19).
 Reports on every incident of service delivery protests from RD to City Manager (Lemmy may have 
copies of these).
 Informal settlements regularisation policy
Other people to speak to possibly:
 Imran Zhardat – Corporate HR (?) re numbers of senior management staff
 JIKE: Harvey Phalatse, 16th Floor Metro Centre
 Khetso Ghordan
 Lemmy Belot: RD for Region G
 Nathi Mthethwa : RD for Region F, for views on Inner City informal trading and as former RD, now
Group head of Urban Management generally
 Phil Harrison re protest policy
 Thamsanqa Radebe: Region G service delivery manager
 Xolile George
 Yakoob Makda
Organisations to speak to:
 N/a.
Items received 
from 
participant
 Nil
Leads to follow 
up
 Nil
Follow up 
actions
E-mail thank you sent.
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10 Guideline for Capturing Data from News Articles 
Do Don’t 
Focus on the response first 
Describe the response 
Assess the response, protest and events 
Discuss any agonistic attributes, their shape 
and form 
Focus on categories of response 
Look for patterns  
Focus on the protest first 
Describe the protest 
Describe protest and events  
Say nothing about the response or agonistic 
attributes 
Focus on every protest 
Look at data one-by-one 
What was the state's response to protest? Why did it respond that way? 
Was it agonistic or antagonistic? Why? How? 
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11 List of Protests Studied, 1994-2013 
Available digitally, see Appendix 23, data can be filtered any category. 
Date Name Area Protest theme Income group Refer-
ence 
1994      
January Informal trade protest threat Inner City Street trading Low-income 451 
December Buyelekhaya ('Go Back Home') campaign Alexandra Anti-foreigner Low-income 018 
1995      
January Street trading project-based protests Inner City Street trading Low-income 172 
1996      
- March to Mayor & disrobe to protest 
cut-offs 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 115 
April Informal trade anti-by-law protest Inner City Street trading Low-income 452 
August Trashing of MEC's Sexwale's Houghton 
home 
Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 173 
November Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 088 
1997      
- Hostel upgrade sit-in in Nancefield-
Lifateng 
Soweto Anti-state plans Low-income 080 
- AMPROS objection to unmanaged 
Informal Trading  
Inner City Street trading Low-income 174 
February Anti-rates and service charge increases 
campaign 
Eldorado Park Anti-tariff or rental increases Low-income 024 
February Anti-rates and service charge increases 
campaign 
Noordgesig Anti-tariff or rental increases Low-income 026 
February Anti-rates and service charge increases 
campaign 
Westbury Anti-tariff or rental increases Low-income 027 
May Far East Bank anti-relocations protest Alexandra Anti-relocation Low-income 175 
July Inner City march and memorandum Inner City Street trading Low-income 453 
August Anti-foreigner and anti-enforcement 
violent protests by informal traders 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 467 
October Anti-enforcement and anti-foreigner 
informal traders protests 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 442 
1998      
July Sandton rates boycott Middle-class suburbs Rates boycott Middle-class 085 
September Anti-foreigner informal trader protest Inner City Street trading Low-income 346 
1999      
- Anti-privatisation Golden Highway 
blockade 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 218 
September Braamfontein anti-eviction protest Inner City Street trading Low-income 455 
2000      
- Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 050 
July Anti-iGoli campaign All Anti-privatisation Low-income 020 
October Anti-foreigner protest Zandspruit Anti-foreigner Low-income 019 
November Anti-iGoli campaign All Anti-privatisation Low-income 021 
2001      
March Park Station anti-eviction protest (and in 
May) 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 176 
May Worldwide May Day protests (South 
Africa) 
All Service delivery Low-income 160 
2002      
- Anti-prepaid meters mass meeting Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 265 
January Park Station anti-eviction protest Inner City Street trading Low-income 456 
February Big Brother billboards objection Middle-class suburbs Anti-state plans Middle-class 038 
April Kensington 87 Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 025 
August Anti-World Summit protest Alexandra Alexandra Anti-globalisation Low-income 033 
August Anti-World Summit protest (all areas) All Anti-globalisation Low-income 034 
August Anti-World Summit protest Inner City Inner City Anti-globalisation Low-income 035 
August Anti-World Summit protest (Sandton) All Anti-globalisation Low-income 036 
September Yeoville market rental boycott Inner City Street trading Low-income 161 
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Date Name Area Protest theme Income group Refer-
ence 
August Landless Peoples Movement campaign Inner City Anti-eviction Low-income 074 
September IBF traders anti-market management 
protest march 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 070 
2003      
January Landless Peoples Movement resistance Eikenhof Anti-relocation Low-income 322 
March Service delivery protest Orange Farm Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 089 
March Landless Peoples Movement campaign 
Themb'elihle 
Themb'elihle Anti-relocation Low-income 076 
March Landless Peoples Movement campaign Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Anti-eviction Low-income 075 
March Three Mass Activities (Orange Farm, 
Germiston, Bophelong) 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 259 
May May Day Rally All Anti-privatisation Low-income 267 
May Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 058 
May Electricity and water protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 449 
May Electricity and water protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 450 
June June 16 Commemoration Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 444 
July Electricity and water protest Inner City Area championship Low-income 047 
July Landless Peoples Movement - Protea 
Seven 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 167 
September Newtown street naming petition Inner City Anti-state plans Low-income 081 
September Electricity and water protests resistance 
of arrest 
All Anti-globalisation Low-income 060 
September Electricity and water protests, City's 
court interdict and resisting arrest 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 264 
September Resistance to evictions and high rentals Inner City Anti-eviction Low-income 168 
- Billing crisis Middle-class suburbs Billing Middle-class 039 
September Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 051 
October Shooting of Alice Ngubane Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 260 
November IBF litigation threat and court action Inner City Street trading Low-income 457 
2004      
January March to Eskom Offices Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 261 
- Kopanong Precinct planning opposition Middle-class suburbs Anti-state plans Middle-class 073 
March Electricity and water protest Inner City Anti-privatisation Low-income 048 
March APF 52 Anti-privatisation protest  Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Anti-privatisation Low-income 022 
March Electricity and water protest Soweto Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 252 
April Landless Peoples Movement campaign 
'No Land, No Vote' 
Themb'elihle Anti-election Low-income 169 
April Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations (election day) 
Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Anti-privatisation Low-income 279 
May-June Metro Mall taxi lock-out protest Inner City Street trading Low-income 177 
June Right to housing protest Zevenfontein Service delivery Low-income 166 
June Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 251 
June Anti-prepaid electricity meters research Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 266 
July Media Campaign about Fire Tragedy 
caused by services cut-offs 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 262 
July Diepsloot-LPM service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 044 
August Property owners’ opposition to EDU’s 
trading stalls implementation 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 181 
August Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 316 
September Violent anti-market management march Inner City Street trading Low-income 458 
September Nothing for Mahala ('Nothing for Free') 
protest 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 263 
October Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 250 
October Gcin'Amanzi resistance Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 268 
October Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations 
 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 269 
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Date Name Area Protest theme Income group Refer-
ence 
November Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations march 
Eldorado Park Anti-privatisation Low-income 281 
November Kliptown Concerned Residents blockade Soweto Anti-eviction Low-income 284 
November Wynberg Concerned Residents 
Resistance 
Wynberg Anti-eviction Low-income 286 
November Marlboro Old Warehouses residents 
resistance 
Marlboro Anti-eviction Low-income 287 
November Alex World Summit Anniversary Alexandra Anti-eviction Low-income 288 
November Electricity and water protest court case Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 052 
November Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 240 
November Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations march 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 285 
November JTA violent protest march Inner City Street trading Low-income 459 
December Wynberg Concerned Residents 
Resistance 
Wynberg Anti-eviction Low-income 282 
December Service delivery hunger strike Grasmere Anti-state plans Low-income 087 
2005      
Unspecified Service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 280 
February Local Government Summit protest leaflet All Anti-privatisation Low-income 289 
March Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 053 
 
April Landless Peoples Movement campaign Soweto Anti-eviction Low-income 077 
May Electricity and water protest  Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 249 
May Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 290 
June Kliptown Concerned Residents campaign Soweto Anti-eviction Low-income 283 
August Anti-eviction protest  Marlboro Anti-eviction Low-income 003 
September Service delivery protest Other areas in city Service delivery Low-income 090 
2006      
- Dogs and Cats By-Laws objections Middle-class suburbs Service delivery Middle-class 178 
- Orange Farm Stretford Station informal 
trading protest 
Orange Farm Street trading Low-income 179 
- Anti-World Bank prepaid water meter 
protest 
All Anti-privatisation Low-income 278 
- Service delivery Yellow Humvee protest Orange Farm Anti-local politics Low-income 317 
February Service delivery protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 091 
May May Day rally and service delivery 
Protest 
Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 314 
June 16 June Commemoration - 30 years of 
struggle 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 270 
June Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 271 
July Electricity and water protest and launch 
of court case 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 054 
August Women's rights workshop with APF and 
service delivery protest 
Orange Farm Rights Low-income 293 
August Wynberg Concerned Residents protest Wynberg Anti-eviction Low-income 294 
August Marlboro Concerned Residents protest Marlboro Anti-eviction Low-income 295 
August Asinamali ('We Have No Money') march 
of the Vaal Region 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 272 
August Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 324 
September Housing protest Freedom Park Anti-eviction Low-income 291 
September Housing protest Soweto Anti-eviction Low-income 292 
September Housing protest All Anti-eviction Low-income 301 
September Protesting councillor's announcement 
about ESKOM services 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 276 
September Housing and service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 092 
September Housing and service delivery protest Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 445 
September APF and LPM march All Housing Low-income 273 
September APF and LPM march Orange Farm Anti-eviction Low-income 446 
September Landless Peoples Movement campaign  Inner City Service delivery Low-income 078 
September APF and LPM march  All Housing Low-income 274 
September APF and LPM march  Orange Farm Housing Low-income 447 
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Date Name Area Protest theme Income group Refer-
ence 
October Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 180 
October Founding affidavit for prepaid water 
meter court case 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 275 
October Founding affidavit for prepaid water 
meter court case 
Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 448 
October Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations in Meadowlands 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 298 
November Resistance to prepaid water meter 
installations in Phiri 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 277 
November Housing protest Ennerdale Anti-eviction Low-income 296 
December Nationwide SMI protests South Africa Rights Low-income 302 
2007      
January Cyclists' protest - Anti-bad driving Middle-class 170 
March Service delivery protest in Freedom Park Soweto Service delivery Low-income 099 
April Service delivery protest in Freedom Park Soweto Service delivery Low-income 255 
March Nationwide Human Rights day service 
delivery protests 
South Africa Anti-privatisation Low-income 023 
April Service delivery protest Marlboro Service delivery Low-income 004 
May Anti-evictions protest in solidarity with 
Zimbabweans 
All Anti-eviction Low-income 299 
June Housing delivery protest informal 
settlements 
Other areas in city Housing Low-income 061 
June Housing march to Shilowa's office Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Service delivery Low-income 313 
June Housing Protest by GOLCOM All Service delivery Low-income 311 
July Service delivery protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 093 
July Service delivery protest Denver Service delivery Low-income 094 
July Service delivery protest Vlakfontein Service delivery Low-income 098 
July Sol Plaatjie (Mandelaville) housing 
protest 
Mandelaville Service delivery Low-income 304 
July Service delivery protest in Phiri Soweto Service delivery Low-income 305 
July Soweto Community Radio station 
Struggle  
All Media freedom Low-income 310 
July Service delivery protest Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 303 
July Service delivery protest Soweto hostel Soweto Service delivery Low-income 096 
July Housing protest Soweto in Kliptown (18 
July) 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 306 
July Housing protest in Kliptown (23-25 July) Soweto Service delivery Low-income 097 
August Informal settlements housing protest 
campaign for September protests 
All Service delivery Low-income 308 
August Service delivery protest in Protea South Soweto Service delivery Low-income 182 
August Service delivery protest in Kliptown Soweto Service delivery Low-income 307 
August Right to Gather protest All Rights Low-income 300 
September Service delivery protest Soweto Service delivery Low-income 101 
September Service delivery protest in Kliptown Soweto Service delivery Low-income 102 
September Right to Gather protest Soweto Rights Low-income 309 
September Service delivery protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 100 
September Service delivery protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 103 
September Service delivery protest in Protea South Soweto Service delivery Low-income 183 
September Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 315 
September Resistance to prepaid water meters Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 297 
November Dursots-APF Rights Protest Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 312 
December Kliptown Concerned Residents campaign  Soweto Service delivery Low-income 072 
2008      
March Housing delivery protest Alexandra Housing Low-income 065 
April Service delivery protest in Kliptown Soweto Service delivery Low-income 104 
April Service delivery protest Hospital Hill Service delivery Low-income 107 
April Housing delivery protest Alexandra Housing Low-income 184 
April Electricity and water protest  Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 055 
May Anti-foreigner attacks  Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 009 
May Service delivery protest Finetown Service delivery Low-income 106 
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May Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 015 
May Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 110 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Other areas in city Anti-foreigner Low-income 006 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Alexandra Anti-foreigner Low-income 007 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Cleveland Anti-foreigner Low-income 008 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Inner City Anti-foreigner Low-income 010 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Ivory Park Anti-foreigner Low-income 011 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Kya Sands Anti-foreigner Low-income 012 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Malvern Anti-foreigner Low-income 013 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Mayfair Anti-foreigner Low-income 014 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Soweto Anti-foreigner Low-income 016 
May Anti-foreigner attacks Zandspruit Anti-foreigner Low-income 017 
May Service delivery protest (12 May) Orange Farm Anti-privatisation Low-income 320 
May Electricity and water protest (14-16 May) Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 248 
May Anti-xenophobia peace drive march All Anti-foreigner Low-income 037 
June Protea-South 2004-2009 anti-relocation 
protest 
Soweto Anti-relocation Low-income 187 
July Service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 105 
July Service delivery protest Alexandra Housing Low-income 062 
July Service delivery protest Denver Housing Low-income 063 
July Housing delivery protest in Soweto 
hostels 
Soweto Housing Low-income 064 
July Service delivery protest in Kliptown Soweto Service delivery Low-income 108 
July Service delivery protest Vlakfontein Service delivery Low-income 114 
September Service delivery protest Marlboro Housing Low-income 068 
September Vaal Uprising commemoration rally Soweto Service delivery Low-income 190 
September Anti-relocation protest  Soweto Anti-relocation Low-income 030 
September Housing delivery protest Alexandra Housing Low-income 067 
September Week-long service delivery protest  Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 319 
September Service delivery protest Princess Service delivery Low-income 186 
October Service delivery protest Orange Farm Anti-poverty Low-income 325 
October Service delivery protest (5 October) Marlboro Service delivery Low-income 109 
October Service delivery protest Soweto Service delivery Low-income 113 
October Service delivery protest (8 October) Marlboro Housing Low-income 066 
October Service delivery protest in 'northern 
suburbs' 
Middle-class suburbs Service delivery Middle-class 111 
- Rosebank Anti-BRT Alignment protest  Middle-class suburbs Anti-state plans Middle-class 188 
November Anti-eviction protest Diepsloot Anti-eviction Low-income 005 
2009      
August Chestnut Hill legal objection Inner City Service delivery Low-income 193 
January Service delivery protest AZAPO march 
and memorandum to GPG and COJ 
Inner City Service delivery Low-income 116 
January AZAPO housing delivery protest Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Service delivery Low-income 191 
February Electricity and water protest Inner City Anti-globalisation Low-income 049 
March Service delivery protest in Motsoaledi Soweto Service delivery Low-income 117 
April Service delivery protest Hospital Hill Service delivery Low-income 199 
April Rea Vaya and BRT Rea Vaya route Anti-Rea Vaya Low-income 198 
- Blairgowrie Smart Meters protest Middle-class suburbs Service delivery Middle-class 192 
May Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 443 
June Mob riot  Diepsloot Anti-crime Low-income 042 
July Service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 045 
July Service delivery housing protest Diepsloot Housing Low-income 194 
July Service delivery protest Ivory Park Housing Low-income 200 
- Fordsburg CID initiative march - Area championship Middle-class 059 
July Service delivery protest in Kliptown Soweto Housing Low-income 201 
August SAITF anti-enforcement mass action Inner City Street trading Low-income 171 
August Anti-Rea Vaya protest  Soweto Anti-Rea Vaya Low-income 028 
September Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 123 
September Housing delivery protest  Alexandra Housing Low-income 196 
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October Service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 119 
October Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 121 
October Service delivery protest Riverlea Service delivery Low-income 122 
October Housing service delivery protest Eldorado Park Service delivery Low-income 120 
October Rea Vaya and BRT Rea Vaya route Anti-Rea Vaya Low-income 197 
October Electricity and water protest Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 247 
October Helen Joseph Women Hostel protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 195 
November Service delivery protest Riverlea Service delivery Low-income 118 
December OVAHA-led protest march and 
memorandum 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 460 
December Service delivery protest Slovo Park Service delivery Low-income 254 
2010      
January Service delivery protest Joe Slovo Service delivery Low-income 211 
January Service delivery protest in Motsoaledi 
(mid-January) 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 221 
January Service delivery protest in Motsoaledi 
(end-January) 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 132 
February Service delivery protest and March  Poortje Service delivery Low-income 127 
February Pothole protest Middle-class suburbs Service delivery Middle-class 084 
February Week-long service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 441 
February Service delivery protest (February-
March) 
Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 253 
March Orange Farm RSDF Outreach protest Orange Farm Anti-state plans Low-income 185 
March Service delivery protest Weilers Farm Service delivery Low-income 189 
March Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 126 
March Balfour solidarity march (Orange Farm, 
Diepsloot, Alexandra and Soweto) 
Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 321 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Soweto Service delivery Low-income 129 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 130 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Finetown Service delivery Low-income 212 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Majasana Service delivery Low-income 213 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Mereting Service delivery Low-income 214 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Sweetwaters Service delivery Low-income 215 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Thula Mtwana Service delivery Low-income 216 
March Service delivery protest (11 March) Weilers Farm Service delivery Low-income 217 
March Service delivery protest (14 March) Finetown Service delivery Low-income 125 
March Service delivery protest (15-16 March) Rabie Ridge Service delivery Low-income 128 
March Service delivery protest (16-18 March) Ennerdale Service delivery Low-income 124 
March Service delivery protest (16-18 March) Poortje Service delivery Low-income 219 
March Disability Alliance protest Soweto Rights Low-income 204 
March Service delivery protest (26 March) Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 134 
March Eviction-related protest Diepsloot Anti-eviction Low-income 203 
May Service delivery and housing protest in 
Doornkop 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 135 
May Service delivery protest Joe Slovo Housing Low-income 220 
May Housing delivery protest in Dobsonville 
Snake Park 
Soweto Housing Low-income 207 
May Precinct traders march to SAFA Inner City Street trading Low-income 461 
May World Cup march to Mayor Masondo Inner City Street trading Low-income 462 
May Electricity and water protest in Protea 
South 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 056 
May Service delivery protest Finetown Service delivery Low-income 131 
June Electricity and water protest in Protea 
South 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 246 
June Service delivery protest Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 257 
June APF Housing delivery protest march Other areas in city Housing Low-income 202 
August Protest in Protea Glen Soweto Housing Low-income 210 
September Service delivery protest Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 258 
October Service delivery protest Lion Park Service delivery Low-income 133 
October Anti-crime rally Lenasia Anti-crime Low-income 079 
November Housing protest Eldorado Park Housing Low-income 208 
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ence 
November OVAHA anti-enforcement march and 
memorandum with 29 demands 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 463 
November Service delivery protest Kya Sands Housing Low-income 209 
November Service delivery protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 205 
November Service delivery protest Marlboro Housing Low-income 206 
2011      
- Orange Farm Stretford Station Project 
protest  
Orange Farm Anti-state plans Low-income 148 
December Blue Moonlight legal action Inner City Service delivery Low-income 223 
- Orange Farm Shopping Centre protest  Orange Farm Anti-private sector plans Low-income 225 
January Mob riot  Diepsloot Anti-crime Low-income 043 
March Unrest (March-April) Zandspruit Service delivery Low-income 165 
April Service delivery protest Rietfontein Service delivery Low-income 227 
April Hawkers anti-marginalisation march and 
memorandum 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 464 
April Service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 138 
April Service delivery protest Zandspruit Service delivery Low-income 162 
May Anti-unemployment protest Other areas in city Anti-poverty Low-income 032 
May Electricity and water protest Soweto Service delivery Low-income 057 
May Property owners in Joubert Street 
protest 
Inner City Street trading Middle-class 465 
June Brixton anti-redlining-and-slumming 
campaign 
Middle-class suburbs Area championship Middle-class 041 
June Service delivery protest Eldorado Park Service delivery Low-income 141 
June Service delivery protest Newclare Service delivery Low-income 142 
June Service delivery protest Noordgesig Service delivery Low-income 143 
June Service delivery protest Riverlea Service delivery Low-income 144 
June Service delivery protest Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 146 
June Service delivery protest Westbury Service delivery Low-income 147 
June Service delivery protest Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 136 
June Service delivery protest Finetown Service delivery Low-income 139 
June Service delivery protest in Chiawelo Soweto Anti-tariff or rental increases Low-income 145 
June Service delivery protest in Dube Soweto Service delivery Low-income 152 
June Service delivery protest Zandspruit Service delivery Low-income 163 
July Unrest Zandspruit Service delivery Low-income 164 
July Unrest Nooitgedacht Service delivery Low-income 224 
July Service delivery protest in Chiawelo Soweto Service delivery Low-income 151 
August Relocation memorandum and protest Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 158 
August Service delivery and workers protest Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 137 
September Service delivery protest (early-to-mid 
September) 
Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 159 
September Service delivery protest (end September) Themb'elihle Service delivery Low-income 150 
September Service delivery protest in Freedom 
Square 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 153 
September Anti-Rea Vaya protest Rea Vaya route Anti-Rea Vaya Low-income 029 
October Service delivery protest Ivory Park Service delivery Low-income 140 
October Alexandra Bonafides movement Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 001 
- OUTsurance Pointsmen protest Middle-class suburbs Service delivery Middle-class 226 
November Rental dispute protest in Pennyville Soweto Anti-eviction Low-income 082 
December Service delivery protest Finetown Anti-local politics Low-income 328 
December Service delivery protest Lawley Service delivery Low-income 329 
2012      
January 72-year old pensioner's protest Other areas in city Service delivery Low-income 228 
January Service delivery protest in Pennyville Soweto Service delivery Low-income 330 
January Paid-parking protest Middle-class suburbs Anti-state plans Middle-class 238 
February Anti-eviction protest in Pennyville Soweto Anti-eviction Low-income 239 
February Anti-Parkhurst library closure complaint Middle-class suburbs Service delivery Middle-class 229 
February Service delivery protests Sol Plaatjie 
(Mandelaville) 
Mandelaville Housing Low-income 331 
February Anti-taxi protest in Meadowlands Soweto Anti-bad driving Low-income 235 
February Blanford Road clean-up campaign Middle-class suburbs Area championship Middle-class 040 
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March Service delivery protest in Protea Glen Soweto Service delivery Low-income 332 
March Poverty, unemployment and service 
delivery protest 
All Anti-poverty Low-income 333 
March Service delivery protest Hospital Hill Service delivery Low-income 156 
March Service delivery protests in 
Meadowlands 
Soweto Anti-local politics Low-income 334 
March Service delivery protest Kya Sands Service delivery Low-income 155 
March Service delivery protest Kya Sands Service delivery Low-income 086 
March Housing protest Kya Sands Housing Low-income 222 
March Informal trading protest against foreign-
owned shops 
Soweto Anti-foreigner Low-income 335 
March Housing delivery protest Inner City Housing Low-income 336 
March Protest about development concerns Hospital Hill Housing Low-income 337 
April Anti-crime protest in Orlando West Soweto Anti-crime Low-income 338 
April Anti-eviction protest Kanana Anti-eviction Low-income 339 
April Service delivery protest in Palestine area Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 340 
April Service delivery protest Alexandra Anti-poverty Low-income 341 
April Water contamination crisis  Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 046 
April Water contamination protest  Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 241 
April Service delivery protest Diepsloot Service delivery Low-income 154 
May Concerned Hawkers Group 
memorandum 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 232 
May Refugee mistreatment protest Inner City Anti-poverty Low-income 343 
May Anti-eviction protest Other areas in city Anti-eviction Low-income 344 
May Anti-Rea Vaya protest by SATAPA Soweto Anti-Rea Vaya Low-income 345 
May Soweto Hostels protest  Soweto Service delivery Low-income 149 
June Service delivery protest Langlaagte Service delivery Low-income 347 
June Service delivery protest  Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 327 
June Paid-parking protest Middle-class suburbs Anti-Pay-for-Parking Middle-class 083 
June Youth issues protest  Soweto Service delivery Low-income 348 
July Service delivery protest Themb'elihle Anti-relocation Low-income 349 
July Service delivery protest Thula Mtwana Service delivery Low-income 350 
July Service delivery protest memorandum in 
Orange Farm Palestine 
Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 351 
July Service delivery protest by SECC in 
Diepkloof 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 352 
August Service delivery protest in Naledi Soweto Housing Low-income 353 
August Anti-eviction protest in Jeppe Inner City Anti-eviction Low-income 354 
August Land invasion action 2012 August Marlboro Service delivery Low-income 234 
August Housing delivery protest in Zamimpilo Riverlea Housing Low-income 355 
August Ad hoc service delivery protest by 
Forgotten Poor Black citizens of SA 
Other areas in city Service delivery Low-income 356 
August Service delivery protest Cosmo City Service delivery Low-income 357 
September Ad hoc service delivery protest Other areas in city Service delivery Low-income 358 
September Anti-eviction protest by ISN and informal 
settlements 
Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Anti-eviction Low-income 359 
September Service delivery protest - Helen Joseph 
Hostel 
Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 230 
September Anti-crime and drugs protest Riverlea Anti-crime Low-income 360 
October Housing delivery protest Eikenhof Anti-relocation Low-income 361 
October Service delivery protest by Forgotten 
Poor Black citizens of SA 
Other areas in city Housing Low-income 362 
October Anti-corruption protest in Klipspruit Soweto Anti-corruption Low-income 363 
October Service delivery protest in Ward 5 Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 237 
October Housing delivery protest Eikenhof Anti-relocation Low-income 364 
October Electricity cut-off protest Riverlea Anti-service cut-offs Low-income 095 
October Ad hoc housing delivery protest Other areas in city Housing Low-income 365 
October Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 236 
October Service delivery protest (also Newclare) Westbury Service delivery Low-income 366 
October OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning police harassment 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 367 
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October Anti-contractor protest by Diepkloof 
Business Forum 
Soweto Anti-private sector plans Low-income 368 
October Service delivery protest in Ward 107 Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 369 
November Lenasia Ext 13 protest about illegal 
houses 
Lenasia Service delivery Low-income 233 
November Housing service delivery at Metro Centre Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Service delivery Low-income 231 
November Service delivery protest in Stretford 2 Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 370 
November Memorandum Marlboro Housing Low-income 371 
November Electricity and housing delivery protest 
by Gauteng Concerned Residents 
Other areas in city Anti-privatisation Low-income 372 
November Rights protest by Florida Action Branch - Rights Middle-class 373 
November OVAHA informal trading march and 
memorandum concerning trading spaces  
Inner City Street trading Low-income 374 
November Housing delivery protest Vlakfontein Housing Low-income 069 
November Service delivery protest in Protea South Soweto Service delivery Low-income 157 
November Service delivery protest - Inner City 
hostels 
Inner City Service delivery Low-income 375 
November Service delivery protests in 
Meadowlands 
Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 376 
November OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning grievances about rights 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 377 
November Service delivery protest in Ward 107 Alexandra Anti-local politics Low-income 378 
December Housing delivery protest Kanana Housing Low-income 380 
December Housing delivery protest Soweto Service delivery Low-income 382 
December Housing delivery protest by Homeless 
and Landless Forum 
Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Housing Low-income 383 
2013      
January Service delivery protest by SANCO Alex Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 385 
January Service delivery protest in Mzimhlope Soweto Service delivery Low-income 386 
January Prepaid meter protest in Pimville Soweto Anti-privatisation Low-income 387 
January Anti-Eskom tariffs picket Other areas in city Anti-tariff or rental increases Low-income 388 
February Service delivery protest  Braamfischerville Service delivery Low-income 389 
February Service delivery protest in Kliptown Soweto Service delivery Low-income 390 
February Service delivery protest Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 318 
February Service delivery protest Sweetwaters Anti-corruption Low-income 391 
March Protest for speed humps in Linbro Park Middle-class suburbs Anti-bad driving Low-income 392 
March Service delivery protest Thabo Mbeki Village Service delivery Low-income 393 
March Service delivery protest in Pimville Soweto Service delivery Low-income 394 
March Anti-crime protest Cleveland Anti-crime Low-income 395 
March Service delivery protest  Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 326 
March Anti-crime protest  Eldorado Park Anti-crime Low-income 396 
March Picket and sit-in protest in Stretford 2 Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 397 
April Anti-crime protest Eldorado Park Anti-crime Low-income 398 
April Service delivery protest in Mzimhlope Soweto Service delivery Low-income 399 
May Service delivery protest Slovo Park Service delivery Low-income 400 
May Anti-ward councillor protest Fordsburg Anti-local politics Low-income 401 
May Anti-ward councillor protest  Newclare Anti-local politics Low-income 403 
May Anti-eviction, and housing and service 
delivery protest in Orlando 
Soweto Housing Low-income 404 
May Anti-foreigner protest Orange Farm Anti-foreigner Low-income 323 
May Service delivery protest Braamfischerville Service delivery Low-income 406 
May Anti-eviction protest by Abahlali Base 
Mzansi 
Other areas in city Anti-eviction Low-income 407 
June Service delivery protest by Riverpark 
Residents Association 
Alexandra Anti-privatisation Low-income 408 
June Service delivery protest in Tladi Soweto Service delivery Low-income 411 
June Street trading protest Cosmo City Street trading Low-income 413 
June OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning grievances about rights 
 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 414 
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June Housing delivery protest by Soweto 
Concerned Residents 
Soweto Housing Low-income 415 
July OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning right to trading space (10 
July) 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 417 
July OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning Inner City corruption (12 July) 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 418 
July OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning right to trading space (17 
July) 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 419 
July Housing delivery protest Durban Deep Housing Low-income 420 
July Service delivery protest in Diepkloof Soweto Housing Low-income 421 
July Anti-eviction protest by SACP Other areas in city Anti-eviction Low-income 422 
August Service delivery protest by Residents 
Committee 
Soweto Service delivery Low-income 423 
August Social justice picket Other areas in city Anti-crime Low-income 424 
August OVAHA informal trading memorandum 
concerning the right to trading space 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 425 
August Service delivery protest in Ward 91 Alexandra Service delivery Low-income 426 
August Anti-crime protest by ANC Women's 
League 
Mathole Anti-crime Low-income 427 
August Anti-eviction picket at JHC by SACP (23 
August) 
Other areas in city Anti-eviction Low-income 428 
August Anti-eviction picket at JHC by SACP (30 
August) 
Other areas in city Anti-eviction Low-income 429 
August Service delivery protest Orange Grove Anti-local politics Low-income 430 
September Anti-corruption protest in Majasane Orange Farm Anti-corruption Low-income 431 
September Service delivery protest Marlboro Housing Low-income 432 
September Anti-eviction protest at JHC by SACP Other areas in city Anti-eviction Low-income 433 
September Anti-crime protest in Doornkop  Soweto Anti-crime Low-income 434 
September Service delivery protest in Ward 3 by 
SANCO 
Orange Farm Service delivery Low-income 436 
September Service delivery protest and anti-crime Alexandra Anti-crime Low-income 437 
September Anti-crime protest in Zondi Ward 64 Soweto Anti-crime Low-income 438 
September Housing and service delivery protest Other informal 
settlements and 
townships 
Housing Low-income 439 
September Anti-corruption protest Ivory Park Anti-corruption Low-income 440 
October Anti-Operation Clean Sweep: WASP, 
SAITF and ATC march to COJ 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 466 
October Anti-Operation Clean Sweep: March and 
memorandum with 29 demands 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 031 
November Anti-Operation Clean Sweep: Anti-JMPD 
protest march 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 468 
November Anti-Operation Clean Sweep: Violent 
protests in Kerk Street market and Bree 
Street Mall 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 454 
December Anti-Operation Clean Sweep: JMPD-
trader clash 
Inner City Street trading Low-income 071 
Note: The use of the word 'violent' or ('violence') may include actual or threatened violence and is dependent on the interpretation of the data on each protest, see definition 
on page 23. 
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12 Institutional Features from Mining Camp to Municipality to Metropolis 
Mining Days Pre-liberation Negotiation Transition Consolidation Maturation Current 
1887 Pre-1991 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 Post-2010 
1991-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-2000 
First town council JCC + Others CWMC + JCC + Others GJTMC + 7 MSSs GJTMC + 4MSSs GJMC + 4MLCs COJ with 11 regions COJ with 7 Regions COJ with 7 Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First town council 
replaced former 
Sanitary Board run by 
mining magnates 
encompassing the 
heartland of mining 
activity surrounded by 
current day inner city 
suburbs. 
 
Former Johannesburg 
City Council 
boundaries included 
the white suburban 
areas. Thirteen 
racially-based 
Councils and 
Management 
Committees 
separately governed 
what is called 
Johannesburg today. 
The Soweto Accord of 
1990 between civic 
movements and the 
state and 
Central 
Witwatersrand 
Metropolitan 
Chamber facilitated 
the restructuring 
process. 
Greater Johannesburg 
Local Negotiating 
Forum, replacing the 
Central 
Witwatersrand 
Metropolitan 
Chamber in 1993, 
recommended 7 MSSs 
in September 1994 to 
make up the new 
Johannesburg. The 
provisional GJTMC 
and 7 TMSSs, based 
on civic associations' 
functional areas, were 
promulgated in 
December 1994 by 
the Province of PWV 
(map dated December 
1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
The provisional 
GJTMC, in readiness 
for first democratic 
local government 
elections in 
November 1995, was 
created in line with 
Proclamation 24 
(Provincial Gazette 
No. 5059, 3 December 
1994) and finalised 
i.t.o. Proclamation 42 
(1 September 1995). 
Its four MSSs (NMSS, 
SMSS, EMSS and 
WMSS) were 
independent from the 
GJTMC (maps dated 
May, September and 
November 1995). 
After the first local 
government elections 
in 1995, the GJMC 
and its four 
Metropolitan Local 
Councils, the NMLC, 
SMLC, EMLC and 
WMLC were 
autonomous 
municipalities. The 
1997 financial crisis 
prompted more 
restructuring led by 
the Transformation 
Lekgotla's Committee 
of Ten (later Fifteen) 
in line with the iGoli 
2002 plan (map dated 
December 1995). 
In preparation for the 
local government 
election of 5 
December 2000, the 
GJMC and 4 MLCs 
were integrated into 
one metropolitan 
municipality, the COJ. 
Parts of former 
Modderfontein and 
Midrand municipal 
areas in the north 
were added to the 
city footprint. The 
finance function was 
recentralised (map 
dated October 2000). 
The Regions of the 
metropolitan 
municipality of COJ 
were streamlined into 
7 regions subordinate 
to the centre. Some 
functional changes 
were introduced, such 
as the consolidation 
of the Offices of the 
Regions with 
Development 
Planning making a 
new DPUM. 
 
Small shifts were 
made, such as the 
relocation of the 
Urban Management 
part of 
DPUM to the City 
Manager’s Office as 
CRUM. 
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Mining Days Pre-liberation Negotiation Transition Consolidation Maturation Current 
1887 Pre-1991 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 Post-2010 
1991-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-2000 
First town council JCC + Others CWMC + JCC + Others GJTMC + 7 MSSs GJTMC + 4MSSs GJMC + 4MLCs COJ with 11 regions COJ with 7 Regions COJ with 7 Regions 
The area governed is 
approximately that of 
today's Inner City. 
The areas 
corresponded roughly 
to mainly the 
Johannesburg, 
Soweto, Roodepoort 
and Randburg 
magisterial districts 
including: 
1 Johannesburg, 2 
Roodepoort, 3 
Randburg, 4 Sandton 
5 Alexandra, 6 
Davidson-Fleurhof, 7 
Dobsonville, 8 
Diepmeadow, 9 
Soweto, 10 Lenasia, 
other areas not 
indicated on map 
such as Ennerdale, 
Lenasia South East, 
South-Western, and 
portions of 
Modderfontein and 
Midrand councils. 
The thick boundary 
correlated with the 
CWMC's planning 
area. 
The area was made 
up of 8 Councils 
(Johannesburg, 
Roodepoort, Soweto, 
Diepmeadow, 
Dobsonville, 
Alexandra, Randburg 
and Sandton) and 5 
Management 
Committees 
(Ennerdale, Lenasia 
South East, Lenasia, 
South-Western and 
Davidson-Fleurhof). 
Orange Farm was not 
included. The seven 
MSSs were Randburg, 
Sandton-Alexandra, 
CBD, South East, 
South West, Soweto 
and Dobsonville-
Roodepoort. 
The area consisted of 
the former 
Johannesburg 
administration, 
Alexandra, Sandton, 
Randburg, 
Roodepoort, 
Johannesburg, 
Soweto, Diepkloof, 
Dobsonville, 
Ennerdale, Lenasia, 
Lenasia-South, 
Orange Farm area, 
and dispersed 
informal settlements. 
Specialised entities 
were also set up, like 
MTC and JMPD in 
1999. 
The 11 Regions were: 
1 Diepsloot, 
2 Midrand, Ivory Park, 
3 Rosebank, Sandton, 
4 Northcliff, 
5 Roodepoort, 
6 Doornkop, Soweto, 
7 Alexandra, 
8 Central Region, 
9 Johannesburg 
South, 
10 Diepkloof, 
Meadowlands and 
11 Ennerdale, Orange 
Farm. 
The 7 Regions are: 
A Diepsloot, Kya Sand, 
B Randburg, Rosebank, Emmarentia, Greenside, 
Melville, Northcliff, Rosebank, Parktown, 
Parktown North, 
C Roodepoort, Constantia Kloof, Northgate, 
D Doornkop, Soweto, Dobsonville, Protea Glen, 
E Alexandra, Wynberg, Sandton, 
F Inner City, and 
G Orange Farm, Ennerdale, Lenasia. 
Mayor Various, one per year, ceremonial role 
 
Mayor for each MSS and GJMC, one year 
ceremonial role 
Mayor Isaac Mogase, 
first black mayor, one 
year ceremonial role 
Executive Mayor Amos Masondo, five-year 
executive role 
Executive Mayor 
Five-year term, Parks 
Tau, executive role 
Mining Commissioner 
 
Town Clerk 
 
CEOs Various CEOs for each MSS and 
GJTMC/GJMC 
City Manager Khetso 
Gordhan, 1998-2001 
and CEO for each MLC 
City Manager Pascal 
Moloi 
 
City Manager Mavela 
Dlamini 
 
City Manager Trevor 
Fowler 
Head of State 
Various Governor-Generals, Prime Ministers, Ceremonial State Presidents, 
Executive State President Pieter Willem Botha (formerly Prime Minister) 
from 1978, Executive State President Frederik Willem De Klerk from 1989 
Head of State 
President Nelson Mandela from May 1994 
Head of State 
President Thabo Mbeki from June 1999 
Head of State 
President Kgalema 
Motlanthe from 
September 2008 
Head of State 
President Jacob Zuma 
from May 2009 
(incumbent) 
Map sources: Formulation by author according to sources shown, note maps are approximations (Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber 1993, p. 3; Province of PWV 1994, p. 28; Province of Gauteng 1995a; GJMC 1996; Beavon 1997; Tomlinson 1999, p. 12; Province of 
Gauteng 2000; COJ 2001a, p. 144; Beall et al. 2002, p. 69; Mabin 2007, p. 41; COJ 2011}, p. 32; Urban Inc. 2011, p. 68) and Rubin (2004) citing Appelgryn (1984) 
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13 Changes in City Governance and Main Protests in Johannesburg between 1991 and 2011 
Governance changes  Notable protests and trends 
Pre-1991: Pre-liberation  
Pre-1991 During apartheid, 13 racially segregated separate local councils or management committees administered Johannesburg, each with 
own legal, financial and planning systems, different resources and non-uniform standards for services. 
1990 September The Soweto Accord is signed to resolve rent and services boycotts in the township areas, inter alia. 
1980s Soweto rates and tariff 
boycotts target Black Local 
Authorities 
1985 Objections about service 
delivery shortages in Black areas 
1991-1995: Negotiation  
1991-1993 The Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber was formed out of the Soweto Accord and played a strategic role in negotiating 
the new post-apartheid democratic city administration. 
1994 February The Greater Johannesburg Local Negotiation Forum, restructured from the Metropolitan Chamber in line with the Local 
Government Transition Act (LGTA) (Act 203 of 1993) was mandated to negotiate the 'pre-interim' stage of the city administration's formation, 
bring a new and strong emphasis to local governance in addressing pervasive service delivery and housing problems in black areas. 
1994 August The Forum decided on a Transitional Metropolitan Council (TMC) with defined outer boundaries; functions were to be then 
transferred to Transitional Metropolitan Sub-Structures (MSS) but agreement on internal boundaries could not be reached, so the matter was 
referred to arbitration.  
1994 September The arbitrators supported a seven-MSS model with the TMC. 
1994 November The Forum recommended the seven-MSS model. 
1994 December The GJTMC and 7 MSSs were proclaimed by Proclamation 24 (Provincial Gazette No. 5059, 3 December 1994) thus formalising 
the seven-MSS model. The newly-created GJTMC was seen as main driver of a 'strong' city administration to drive the transition and 
transformation processes, to prepare an overall policy framework, to manage the RDP, to approve a budget, to set minimum service levels and 
delegate certain powers and functions to MSSs. Ultimately the seven sets of business plans were never used. MSS boundary disputes meant a 
new agreement was needed, and ultimately proclaimed. This part of the city administration's evolution was called the 'pre-interim' phase 
starting in December 1994 and ending in November 1995. The Joint Negotiating Forum of the TMC and MSSs political structures, especially 
active in 1995, set out and negotiated new powers and functions between the councils. 
1995 April-June The boundary dispute arose again with the ANC promoting a three-MSS model to the Gauteng Demarcation Board, which 
agreed to the change but an indecisive provincial cabinet eventually decided on a four-MSS model in June 1995. The decision was then disputed 
by the Provincial Legislative Committee on Local Government, which objected to the Special Electoral Court. 
1995 August The Court upheld Gauteng's four-MSS model based on 'racial balance'. Proclamation 35 (Provincial Gazette No. 59 of 4 August 
1995) listed the 24 functions for the TMC only, with any other functions to be done by the MSSs; this lack of clarity persisted into 1996. 
1995 September Proclamation 42 (Provincial Gazette No. 66 of 1 September 1995) formalised the four-MSS model and was criticised for 
'weakening' the GJTMC. Some in the city administration resented the Province's 'interference', highlighting that the roles between the three-
sphere government-model were as unclear as the city administration although there are many successful intergovernmental forums.  
1994 Other than an anti-foreigner 
protest in 1994, very few service 
delivery protests were staged in this 
period.  
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Governance changes  Notable protests and trends 
1995 November The first democratic local government elections were held for the GJTMC and MSSs on 1 November 1995. Proclamation 42 was 
implemented with the creation of five councils (4 MSSs and TMC), in effect 'decentralising' the city administration.  
1996-2000: Transition  
1996 September The GJMC and MLCs approved an agreement of the Joint Negotiating Committee on the split of powers and functions 
between them on matters of electricity, planning, water, health and housing, but which were not proclaimed by the provincial government.  
1995 November The LGTA Second Amendment (Act No. 97 of 1996) formalised the agreement of the split of powers and functions but 
'weakened' the GJMC by giving the MLCs autonomous powers and functions to set their own service standards and implement RDP initiatives 
which relied on redistribution. Each of the five councils had its own advisory and decision-making political committees, Executive Committee 
and full Councils, with inconsistencies within the councils and between them, making development of a common vision for Johannesburg's 
future and uniform service delivery virtually impossible. This so-called 'interim' phase lasted until October 1997.  
1997 July The GJMC could not integrate or control cash flow management for the councils, as the finance function had also been decentralised, 
so it was unable to pay Eskom's demanded a R300 million payment for bulk electricity. Other serious financial and structural concerns also 
contributed to the financial crisis, ultimately needing the province's intervention. 
1997 October The financial crisis, and difficulties with the implementation of a developmental agenda and management, generally prompted 
the move to centralisation of some functions and powers under GJMC strengthening its role as recommended by the Organisational Review. 
The centralisation was generally accepted by the councils as necessary, although the intention to have strong local representation through 
MLCs and ward committees was also promoted, possibly motivating the creation of the Offices of the Regions later. The crisis effectively 
marked the end of the 'interim phase' since November 1995. 
1997 October 10 The 'October Notice', the proclaimed provincial notice (General Notice No. 401, Gauteng Provincial Gazette Extraordinary, 10 
October 1997) allowed for the establishment of the Committee of Ten. The Committee of Ten was a centralised political management group 
supported by a three-person technical team to rapidly resolve the crisis. Many of the issues had been previously raised in management but now 
the Committee of Ten had the authority to make the changes, but also giving rise to concerns that the process was a top-down, exclusionary 
and not transparent one. Also, contradictorily, the MSSs' functions had not been revoked sometimes causing a political and legal impasse. For 
the 1997-1998 financial year, the Committee of Ten had to revise the budgets of the 5 councils to provide a working capital reserve; radically 
reduce the capital budgets; drive the immediate collection of outstanding debts; restructure the councils' debt; find ways to fund the year's 
activities; standardise the information systems, and introduce cost-reflective tariffs.  
1998 March The White Paper on Local Government reinforced the importance of getting the city administration right for service delivery and 
clarified definitions, options and roles of the state.  
1998 April The 'April Notice' built on the earlier 'October Notice' by expanding the Committee of Ten into a Committee of Fifteen and included 
senior managers into the technical team. The Notice widened the scope of tasks to include planning and urbanisation, information technology, 
PPPs, restructuring, improving emergency services and the preparation of a balanced operating budget for year plus five-year capital and 
operating budget with budget decisions to be made by a two-thirds majority of the five councils. 
1998 Inclusion of certain areas within Johannesburg's boundaries were still being debated, for instance Edenvale and Orange Farm. There is 
concern that political decisions are not aligned with the institutional design of the city administration.  
A recorded 21 protests took place in 
this period. 
The first post-apartheid 'service 
delivery' protests emerged in 1996. 
The Sandton Rates Boycott starting in 
mid-1996 was significantly linked 
with the changes in the city 
administration. 
Informal trading protests combined 
with violent anti-foreigner protest 
took place in 1997 and 1998. 
The emergence of anti-globalisation 
resistance, especially to prepaid 
water and electricity meters and to 
the payment for services, was seen in 
this period in the form of a few 
sporadic protests. 
Anti-eviction sentiment in the Inner 
City from 1997 onwards was 
observed. 
The Anti-Privatisation Forum and 
Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
were established in 1999, and staged 
many protests against the city 
administration in the years to come. 
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Governance changes  Notable protests and trends 
1999 The Inner City Office, and the Metropolitan Trading Company (one of various municipal entities with specialised functions) were 
established for the regeneration of the Inner City, and the management and development of informal street traders. The JMPD was also 
formed. 
2000 In preparation for the local government election of 5 December 2000, the GJMC and the MLCs were integrated into one metropolitan 
municipality, the COJ, in October 2000. Parts of former Modderfontein and Midrand municipal areas in the north were added to the city 
footprint. The finance function was recentralised. 
2001-2005: Consolidation  
2001 Joburg Water, an independent entity for water services of the city administration, was created. 
2001 onwards This period saw the continued consolidation of the institutions of Johannesburg's city administration into the new COJ – the so-
called 'final phase' from 2001 onwards. The COJ included 11 Regions subordinate to the centre to carry out localised functions and manage the 
state-citizen relationship in local areas of Johannesburg. Each Region was responsible in its area for libraries, sports and recreation, housing, 
health and social services, People’s Centres, provision of support to ward councillors, and accommodation of some central staff especially for 
payment and customer contact services.  
The number of protests in this 
period more than trebled relative to 
the previous period.  
Strong anti-globalisation sentiment 
was expressed at the WSSD in 2002, 
fuelling the establishment of the 
Orange Farm Water Crisis 
Committee in 2002 and the anti-
privatisation protests against 
prepaid meters with the war for 
water escalating in Orange Farm 
during this period. 
The billing crisis emerged, with the 
middle-class areas mainly objecting 
to the COJ's billing system's 
problems. 
Increasing use of petitions channel 
by both low-income and middle-
class residents was evident, 
although generally not as an 
alternative to street and other forms 
of protest. 
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Governance changes  Notable protests and trends 
2006-2010: Maturation  
The COJ introduced a 'new governance and administrative model', namely the artificial separation of 
legislative and executive powers mirroring the national and provincial political systems to distinguish 
between legislative and oversight roles from executive roles to enhance service delivery. The Offices of the 
City Manager and the Mayor were amalgamated to enhance accountability for service provision.  
The COJ reduced the number of Regions to seven for improved efficiency and focused more explicitly on 
urban management and community interaction. The Regions were subordinate to the centre, and their 
coordination was incorporated into the expanded Development Planning and Urban Management 
Directorate.  
The number of protests in this period more than doubled relative to the 
previous period. 
The war for water against prepaid meters declined post mid-2006. 
The Landless Peoples Movement, formed in 2001, is the most active in the 
informal settlements of Johannesburg in the mid-2000s. 
The middle-class areas of Rosebank and Saxonwold resist the alignment of 
the Rea Vaya in 2008.  
Violent anti-foreigner protests took place countrywide and in 
Johannesburg in 2008. 
From especially 2009, anti-eviction protests became increasingly fought as 
housing rights-based battles in the courts, such as Chestnut Hill. 
From mid-2009, after the global economic downturn, service delivery 
protests became more 'violent'. 
2011-to date: Current  
Although no major changes were made to the city administration, the COJ adopted a four-cluster approach 
to improve service delivery, namely Sustainable Services, Economic Growth, Human and Social Development 
and Good Governance.  
To strengthen and support the Regions in their coordination, integration and monitoring of local service 
delivery and management of local stakeholders, the COJ provided strategic leadership and political oversight 
to the Regions. The regions were split from Development Planning and centralised in the City Manager’s 
Office as a new Citizen Relationship and Urban Management (CRUM) Unit.  
2012 November The MTC was absorbed into the JPC. 
Informal trading protests escalated in this period, with a Constitutional 
Court battle fought against the COJ's Operation Clean Sweep. 
The Parkhurst middle-class suburb protested against the COJ's paid-
parking protests. 
Own formulation; based on consolidation of various sources and own data, namely Tomlinson (1999, pp. 2-3, Table 1), the COJ (2001a, pp. 44-45) and Emdon (1998) for the period before 2000; the COJ (2011}) for 2001 to 2011; and the COJ (2014f) for the post-2011 period 
 
 
  
  
Li P
ern
egger   |   Sto
ries o
f C
ity Strife in
 Jo
h
a
n
n
esb
u
rg
: A
g
o
n
ism
 in
 Lo
ca
l D
em
o
cra
cy a
n
d
 Service D
elivery   |   P
age 3
5
4
 
14 Summary of Municipal Informal Trading Management and Development per Period 
Main Protest Themes Notable Aspects Responsibility 
Pre-1991: Pre-liberation   
Municipal management phase 
Prohibition, restriction, 
deregulation 
Number of protests noted 
Legal challenges by black 
traders 
Protest themes Anti-apartheid 
legislation at national level, 
restrictive city trading policy 
and by-laws 
State-trader link Antagonistic 
Key shift In late 1980s, from white to black traders, from restriction to deregulation 
View of street trade As a nuisance 
Role of city administration As owner of city 
Management features Restricted city centre with prohibited streets, limited licences available, blitzes, about 
250 licensed stands; AMPROS and other property owners leased adjacent sidewalks since 1992 
By 1980 200-250 'illegal' black traders 
1986 City centre declared free trade area 
1988 Significant rapid growth of informal trading especially around transportation hubs 
Political Emphasis on early transition of apartheid state to 
democratic state 
Policy and strategy Generally restrictive, limiting numbers 
of legal trading sites but turning blind eye to expansion of 
black informal traders 
Market development Nil 
Trader development Nil 
Trading management Markets Department, then to JCC 
Urbanisation Markets Unit 
Urban management Nil 
Enforcement JCC Urbanisation Markets Unit, Hawker 
Unit/Squad, police and traffic officers, Licensing, Health 
Other players Johannesburg CBD Association 
1991-1995: Negotiation   
Municipal management phase 
Consultation, collaboration, 
experimentation 
Number of protests noted 
About 3 
Protest themes Anti-project 
(and anti-policy) 
State-trader link Agonistic, with elements of antagonism 
Key shift Acknowledgment that trader-property-owner-pedestrian-vehicle tension needed attention; 
emergence of informal trade development as component of LED; developmental policy created; market 
establishment starts  
View of street trade As economic development opportunity 
Role of city administration As custodian of city; as project manager of markets 
Management features Only those in markets were managed; CIDs established by property owners 
1991 Businesses Act deregulation  
1992 CJP established 
1993 Policy and strategy approved  
1994 Authority to set up enforcement team 
1995 Drafting process for new by-laws 
1995 Informal trading census by CASE 
 
 
Political JCC Management Committee, Health, Housing 
and Urbanisation Committee 
Policy and strategy JCC Urbanisation, CBD TMSS briefly 
Market development JCC Planning (Architecture) 
Trader development Developmental policies created in 
1993 
Trading management Minimal, limited to markets and 
complaints, Markets Department handed over to JCC’s 
HHU department in 1993 
Urban management Nil 
Enforcement Hiatus pending approval and set up of team 
Other players CJP, Waste Management, AMPROS, RDP 
office (John Singh), Environmental Health 
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Main Protest Themes Notable Aspects Responsibility 
1996-2000: Transition   
Municipal management phase 
Negotiation, implementation, 
legislation 
Number of protests noted 
About 7 
Protest themes Anti-foreigner 
Anti-policy; anti-management 
 
State-trader link Seemingly agonistic 
Key shift Project-based approach to development; later institutional changes to accommodate new function 
View of street trade As a crisis; in need of urgent management and development  
Role of city administration As developer and manager of markets, as partner 
Management features Market management and lease agreements and CIDs; multi-disciplinary enforcement 
and blitzes 
1997 First part of by-laws promulgated; financial crisis; ICSTICC established 
1998 By-laws promulgated; first enforcement team 
By 1999 Over 1 200 trading sites created in about 20 markets (excluding Mai Mai Bazaar) 
1999 Informal Trade Development Plan approved for Inner city ('From the Streets into Markets' by GJMC); 
Yeoville market opens; MTC and JMPD established 
Political GJMC & SMLC Executive Committees, Inner City 
Section 59 Committee (Bremner) 
Policy and strategy SMLC LED and GJTMC Inner City Office 
(from 1998), limited input from EMLC and NMLC 
Market development SMLC, Inner City Office, MTC 
Trader development SMLC LED, Environmental Health 
Trading management SMLC (EMLC & NMLC), Inner City 
Office 
Urban management - 
Enforcement Multi-disciplinary team, GJTMC Public Safety 
and Emergency Services cluster? SAPS 
Other players ICSTICC, GPG, CJP in BIDs, SAPS, SANDF 
2001-2005: Consolidation   
Municipal management phase 
Formalisation, administration, 
separation  
Number of protests noted 
About 14 
Protest themes Anti-
management, anti-market, 
anti-cages 
State-trader link Agonistic, with elements of antagonism 
Key shift Towards enforcement and away from development 
View of street trade As economic development opportunity but also as damaging the Inner City, which was a 
mayoral priority; as having distinct market traders and street traders somewhat synonymous with notion of 
'legal' and 'illegal' traders; as a management problem which could be tackled through a programmatic 
approach with the Inner City Informal Trade Management Programme 
Role of city administration As manager of city space; as developer of markets through JDA; as policy maker 
through EDU; as manager of markets through MTC 
Management features Through 'cages', formal markets like Metro Mall but smaller, lease agreements with 
traders, some JMPD by-law enforcement 
2001 Inner City becomes one of six mayoral priorities; JDA created 
2002 Metro Mall completed  
2003 KUM takes on CID management; five-pillar Inner City Regeneration Strategy ('sinkholes and ripple 
ponds') 
2004 By-laws revised and centralised; 'cages’ implemented; taxi lockout at Metro Mall 
Political COJ, Inner City Section 79 Committee (Cowan), 
Finance & Economic Development Committee 
Policy and strategy COJ EDU 
Market development JDA, EDU for 'cages' 
Trader development EDU 
Trading management MTC for market traders only 
Urban management Region 8’s Inner City Task Force 
Enforcement JMPD blitzes & above based on street 
trading by-laws, not multi-disciplinary 
Other players CJP-KUM in BIDs (CJP becomes KUM in 
2003), CJP-COJ JV, Blue IQ as funder 
2006-2010: Maturation   
Municipal management phase 
Registration, construction, 
operation 
State-trader link Largely antagonistic 
Key shift Trading seen as out of control 
View of street trade As urban management problem, as opportunities for survivalist economy 
Political COJ, Inner City Section 79 Committee, Finance 
and Economic Development Committee 
Policy and strategy COJ EDU 
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Main Protest Themes Notable Aspects Responsibility 
Number of protests noted 
About 14 
Protest themes Anti-
enforcement; anti-exclusion 
from World Cup 
Role of city administration As enforcer and manager of street trading; also as developer 
Management features MTC in markets; increased JMPD by-law enforcement and blitzes; Smart Cards; use of 
restricted areas 
2008 Linear markets strategy; by April 388 smart cards issued and by August 665 smart cards issued; about 
700 traders trained by Wits 
2009 By-laws revised (uncertain status); new policy approved 
2010 World Cup 
Market development CJP-COJ joint venture, JDA, MTC 
Trader development EDU, for business skills, food hygiene  
Trading management MTC for market traders only 
Urban management DPUM, Region F (after 2007) 
Enforcement JMPD 
Other players KUM-Urban Genesis in BIDs (KUM becomes 
Urban Genesis in 2010) other voluntary RIDs and BIDs, 
SALGA/SANIEF, Public Protector 
Post-2010: Current   
Municipal management phase 
Intimidation, conflagration, 
persecution  
Number of protests noted 
About 11 protests excluding 
OCS 
Protest themes Anti-
enforcement; for right to trade  
 
State-trader link Antagonistic, especially OCS 
View of street trade As a nuisance; as compromising the Inner City's sustainability 
Key shift Uncontrolled street trading seen as out of control and undesirable 
Role of city administration As enforcer  
Management features Smart cards; enforcement 
2012 Revised by-laws 
2013 Operation Clean Sweep 
Political COJ, Inner City Section 79 Committee, Finance 
and Economic Development Committee 
Policy and strategy EDU 
Market development EDU for traders in streets, MTC for 
traders in markets 
Trader development EDU 
Trading management MTC for market traders only, shifts 
to JPC 
Urban management Region F, RUMP 
Enforcement JMPD 
Other players Urban Genesis, Constitutional Court 
Source: Own formulation 
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15 Orange Farm Protests per Five-Year Period, 1996-2012 
Date Protest 
1996 to 2000  
1996 Anti-privatisation march against mandatory fitting of pre-paid water meters in 
Stretford Extension 4 and cut-offs to Mayor's office, women undress to show their 
contempt for the state [115] (Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al. 2004). 
1996 November Service delivery protest, memorandum accepted by CEO of the SMLC, no other details 
provided [88]. 
1999 Anti-privatisation Golden Highway peaceful blockade about water cut-off and 
compulsory fitting of pre-paid water meters in Stretford Extension 4, organised by 
women [218] (ibid.). 
2001 to 2005  
2002 Anti-privatisation mass meeting by OFWCC and APF protesting launch of mandatory 
fitting of pre-paid water meters, Stretford Extension 4, the 200 protestors turned 
violent (ibid.) [265]. 
2003 Anti-privatisation and service delivery protest march organised by OFWCC about water 
privatisation, and pre-paid meters in operation and cut-offs, OFWCC also represents 
Samancor Retrenched Workers Crisis Committee (the Samancor Chrome company 
mines and processes steel) in its struggle for compensation, Soweto residents also 
protested. COJ represented by Red Ants security force arrest resisting APF 
representative. Six protestors from Orange Farm, Soweto and elsewhere appear in 
court, likely part of Operation Vulamanzi in response to the COJ's Operation 
Gcin'Amanzi. Funding and support to protestors came from Polaris Institute and Public 
Citizen, and APF [89].  
2003 March Three mass activities organised as part of Human Rights day in Orange Farm, Germiston 
and Bophelong. Protest forms part of Stop Forced Removals and Evictions with 
representation from APF, LPM, AEC, CCF and LAMOSA. They demand that water, 
electricity, housing and education be treated as human rights – their slogan is 'basic 
needs for all! Human Rights are not Privileges!' Later APF also lends support to 
MetroBus and Pikitup strikers [259]. 
2003 May Orange Farm joins forces with Alexandra and Soweto in the 'water wars' protest action 
(Thompson 2003) [450]. 
2003 October Anti-prepaid water meter media campaign referring to the shooting of Alice Ngubane, 
activist and martyr for OFWCC cause. Her death was redolent of the alleged murder of 
another activist, Emily Lengolo, in February due to her affiliation to the OFWCC [260]. 
2004 January March to Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) offices against electricity cut-offs by 
ESCOM by means of ripping out meters, claiming electricity as a basic human right 
[261]. 
2004 July Media statement about fire tragedy caused by services cut-offs. Three family members 
killed when their house caught fire. They were using candles during a four-day services 
cut-off. There was no water to put the fire out [262]. 
2004 August Resistance rally about water privatisation and HIV/AIDS organised by Kganya Women's 
Consortium and OFWCC on Women's Day [316]. 
2004 September  'Nothing for Mahala' pre-paid water meter protest by both OFWCC and SECC 
supported by research (Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al. 2004) [263].  
2004 October Gcin'Amanzi resistance in Orange Farm Stretford Extension 4 and Soweto. Pamphlet by 
OFWCC, APF & CAWP restated resistance to pre-paid water meter installations. Use of 
slogan 'Destroy the Meter/Enjoy Free Water' [268]. 
2005 May Violent resistance to pre-paid water meter installations [290].  
2006-2010  
2006 Stretford Station violent informal trading protest. Dissatisfaction with lack of 
continuity, progress and scope of COJ-Intersite upgrade project [179]. 
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2006 Violent service delivery protest. Councillor who drove a yellow Humvee was attacked 
and almost killed. The community was angered by his expensive vehicle when they had 
no sanitation; it thought Councillor Sotshantsha, ward councillor, had stolen 
development money. This protest seemed to mark the turning point from monthly 
generally peaceful sporadic protests to more complex, political and intense protests, 
especially after a protest in Themb'elihle had turned aggressive in 2007. Thereafter, 
protests were frequently violent, particularly against ward councillors. Reportedly, 
protests in Orange Farm would often spread to Poortje, Weilers Farm, Finetown and 
Themb'elihle. This year also saw the birth of OKM, which worked with OFWCC, SECC, 
APF, LPM and others against privatisation of services. Ward committees were called on 
to 'quell' protests and to 'manage the misinformation' about initiatives and provide 
reassurance' to communities [317]. 
2006 May APF's May Day rally and service delivery protest and also about other standard of living 
issues [314].  
2006 June APF's 16th June Commemoration march to celebrate 30 years of struggle since the 
students uprising of 16 June 1976 [270]. 
2006 June 29 APF drove resistance to pre-paid water meter installations. OKM and OFWCC boycott 
2006 elections. OFWCC supported also Evaton's EWCC struggle against water 
privatisation and working class conditions. "Electricity as a campaign was largely 
overtaken by the water struggles". Installation of tamper-proof boxes is underway. 
Internal problems beset APF, its interactions with affiliates and engagement with local 
government. Ngwane reportedly left APF to go to SECC (however, note that Ngwane 
himself says he resigned from APF in 2005 (Ngwane 2011, p. 121)). The link between 
LPM and APF weakened [271]. 
2006 July Mazibuko of Phiri, Soweto, lodged case with the courts in July 2006, linking the 
separate anti-pre-paid water and electricity meter struggles of the OFWCC in Orange 
Farm with the SECC in Soweto [448]. 
2006 August 9 Women's rights workshop and mass meeting with APF and service delivery protest, 
organised by Kganya Women's Consortium with APF and OFWCC [293].  
2006 August 29 Asinamali campaign of the Vaal Region, incorporating Orange Farm, revived a 1980s 
campaign against exploitation of the poor. 'Asinamali' means 'we have no money' 
[272]. 
2006 August 31 Service delivery protest turned violent. Protestors clash with police and rubber bullets 
were fired [324]. 
2006 September 2 Protest about councillor's announcement about lack of electricity service provision. 
ESKOM was blamed. Protest broken up by SAPS. APF coined slogan of 'there will be no 
peace without development' [276]  
2006 September 6 Violent housing and service delivery protest. Two blockades of Golden Highway by 
'thousands' of OFWCC supporters and Orange Farm residents. 'No peace without 
development!' OFWCC had held many house meetings over the last year about their 
grievances. Invited ward councillors had not attended. Frustrated residents refused to 
present a memorandum of grievances. They demanded that Mayor Masondo and not 
the "useless councillors" address them on the lack of service delivery. 'Heavy-handed' 
police shot and injured 18 protestors and make arrests, released later. A councillor on a 
Casspir tried to disperse protesters and eventually agreed to multi-stakeholder meeting 
with community the following day. Meetings happened with various service providers, 
except Eskom. This protest was a repeat of one a month earlier where the highway was 
blockaded for 12 hours by OFWCC and Orange Farm residents demanding "immediate 
delivery of decent water, sanitation, electricity and housing in the area" [92]. 
2006 September 9-10 Two-day service delivery protest. Protestors were shot at and eight people were 
arrested [445]. 
2006 September 14 Orange Farm residents and others like GOLCOM-Freedom Park, Marlboro and Protea 
Glen march to local municipal offices over last few months, organised by Johannesburg 
Region of the APF Housing March [446]. 
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2006 September 20 APF and LPM housing march. Many communities including Orange Farm march to GPG, 
Shilowa's office about slow pace of housing delivery, struggle for land and the increase 
in evictions. This was in response to a previous march where the department did not 
respond to a memorandum. March originally planned for 14 September declared 
illegal. 3 000 marchers waited while APF secured a High Court interdict for freedom to 
gather (APF 2006b). 2 500 marched in support of communities in places like Orange 
Farm. The slogan was 'Struggle for land and housing continua' [447]. 
2006 October 2-3 Two-day service delivery protest organised by OFWCC and APF promising 'no peace 
without development'. Hundreds of protestors blocked the road with burning tyres, 
rubble and their own bodies for most of the two days. Frustrated by unmet promises 
made by the Johannesburg councillor at the September protest, they demanded the 
"resignation of councillors and the immediate delivery of free quality basic services" 
(APF 2006d). Police used Casspirs and broke up the barricade by shooting protestors 
with rubber bullets. They arrested four protestors and cleaned up the area. A week 
later, on 9 October, the APF issued an indignant and frustrated 'message from Orange 
Farm' at the brutal response of the state to the peaceful protest [180]. 
2007 September 6 Service delivery blockade with burning tyres. Protestors throw stones at the police. 
They are still frustrated with ESCOM's and COJ's inaction about grievances about the 
lack of electricity expressed twelve months before and with ineffectual ward 
councillors. They also wanted access to water, health, education and adequate housing. 
They criticised the media for not representing their views in their reports [315]. 
2007 November 11 Dursots 'Exploited Workers and Anti Privatisation Forum' picket against 'Gross Human 
Rights Violations: Mass Action Against the Monster'. Whilst not strictly speaking a 
service delivery protest, the APF allied itself to the cause of workers for Dursot (canned 
food, vegetable oils and detergents manufacturer) who live in Orange Farm, Majasane, 
Grasmere, Finetown and elsewhere. The picket demands right for better working 
conditions and expresses anti-privatisation sentiment [312].  
2008 May 8 Violent service delivery protest. About 400 residents obstructed the Golden Highway 
demanding basic services. Despite engagement with councillors, protestors stoned 
vehicles going by. SAPS fired rubber bullets to disperse the crowd and injured eight 
people [110]. 
2008 May 11 Service delivery protest. About 400 residents used sticks, rocks, and flaming tyres to 
block the Golden Highway at 04h30 in the morning. Police made use of rubber bullets 
and councillors' talk broke up the protest. Five people were injured [15]. 
2008 May 12 Service delivery blockade of 1 500 residents of Drie Ziek Extension 5 organised by 
OFWCC. They demanded basic services and were frustrated as they had not had a 
response from their councillor to their demand made the year before. Police shot 
about seven people with rubber bullets and arrested some people to break up the 
crowd [320].  
2008 May NOTABLY Orange Farm did not experience the anti-foreigner attacks that were 
happening at the same time in almost every community in Johannesburg and South 
Africa, although foreigners were clearly of concern to Orange Farm residents (Monson 
et al. 2012). 
2008 September 15 Week-long violent service delivery protest started on 15 September. Like May's protest, 
Municipal IQ saw Orange Farm as a protest 'hotspot' due to the state's inattention to 
the area and its poverty relative to other parts of Johannesburg (citation). Some 
protestors set fire to shacks in Extension 13 later in the week to reinforce the service 
delivery protests. After community leaders raised grievances with representatives of 
COJ and GPG about the lack of streetlights, sanitation, land tenure and roads, about 
2 000 residents organised by the OFWCC blockaded the Golden Highway. Police 
brought in additional resources to the area and used rubber bullets. 18 people were 
injured. Violent protest was possibly exacerbated by impatient residents under the 
impression that newer areas got more attention than Orange Farm even though they 
had been waiting since 1994 for services. Once the JMPD removed the Golden Highway 
blockade, it did not allow further blockading in the week but noted the situation was 
"'very tense'". Police arrested 63 protestors for public violence (319). 
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2008 October Service delivery/anti-poverty protest. Small, peaceful, showing political support for 
Zuma. New York Times notes that protestors were "unemployed, they had nothing else 
to do" (325). 
2009 May Service delivery protest action. Simultaneous protests occurred in Cape Town, 
Emalahleni, Ekurhuleni, Greater Taung, Greater Sekhukhune, Midvaal, and in 
Johannesburg's Elias Motsoaledi informal settlement (443).  
2009 September Service delivery blockade of thousands of people organised by OFWCC. Use of slogan 
'No Freedom without basic services' (123). 
2009 October Violent service delivery protest. Police resorted to firing rubber bullets, injuring 15 
people, to disperse the protestors in the Palm Ridge area of Orange Farm. Police 
arrested 61 people (121). 
2010 February Week-long violent service delivery protest. 1 500 protestors including children, 
protested against substandard service delivery and sanitation, corruption, and an 
incomplete sewerage project abandoned in 2009 by its unpaid contractor. They called 
for better services and flush toilets citing health hazards. Blockaded Golden Highway 
for two days and other major roads with burning tyres and rocks. Police and their 
vehicles stoned by protestors. Tyres burnt. Damaged police vehicles with stones and 
set them on fire. JMPD officers injured. Local vendors and foreigner-owned spaza shops 
(Somalis mentioned) looted by protestors. Some looters identified by police and 
shopkeepers. Areas in Orange Farm affected by protest included Orange Farm 
Extensions 7 and 8, Drie Ziek and Extensions 1, 4, 5 and 8. Nearby Sharpeville also 
experienced protests at the same time. Heavy SAPS presence in Orange Farm with 
police kitted out in riot gear. Manned checkpoints. Used Casspirs. Used stun grenades, 
fired rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse crowd. Door-to-door house searches. 
Searched people. Retrieved looted goods. Chased protestors and suspected looters. 
Dismantled barricades and cleared rubble. Patrolled on foot. Arrested over 30 people 
for public violence and malicious damage to property. After a two-day caucus, the ANC 
in Johannesburg stated that the protest was due to some of its members vying for 
positions in anticipation of the local government elections in 2011. ANC promised to 
get rid of dishonest and useless COJ representatives. It said that it upholds the right to 
protest but will not endorse unlawful acts such as property vandalism. The acting 
Mayor Ruby Mathang promised residents that a contractor would be on site to fix 
sewerage problems within one day. Significant media coverage (441). 
2010 March 2 Service delivery protest. Protesters said that the state only heard them when they 
"toyi-toyi". Residents were reportedly angry that Councillor Ruby Mathang did not keep 
his promise although contractors were working in some parts of the township. Lakeside 
residents protested about sewage, incomplete projects and gravel roads, and seeping 
ground water. The ANC Chief Whip, Mathole Motshekga, on a visit to Orange Farm, 
said that he thought the criticisms were reasonable ones (126). 
2010 March 4 Balfour solidarity march organised by Abahlali baseMjondolo and residents of Orange 
Farm, Diepsloot, Alexandra and Soweto. The Siyathemba township of Balfour was the 
site of violent protests in February that started as a strike and turned into a service 
delivery protest with anti-foreigner attacks, looting of shops and destruction of 
property. The police's alleged indiscriminate use of force was seen as a human rights 
violation (321). 
2010 March 26 Service delivery protest and memorandum by the ECD Forum about needing land for 
ECD Centres in Orange Farm. Sentiment expressed against by-laws that prejudiced the 
poor. Use of slogan 'Orange Farm is not equal to Sandton' (134). 
2010 March Orange Farm RSDF Outreach protest. Aggressive toyi-toying group armed with sticks 
barged into RSDF meeting. COJ forced to cancel the workshop. Community input into 
the compilation of the RSDF was impossible (185). 
Post-2010  
2011 Boycott of private sector shopping centre investment, which then spread to all other 
projects in Orange Farm (225). 
2011 Orange Farm Stretford Station Project protest Residents protested because they 
wanted to have a 'stake' in the project and to know the details. After the JDA official 
provided information, the peaceful protest broke up (148). 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 361 
Date Protest 
2012 April 12 Palestine service delivery protest. The community group, SANCO, Palestinian Branch 
handed a memorandum of unspecified demands. JMPD did not allow a march to take 
place (340). 
2012 June 4-6  Three-day service delivery protest. Hundreds of protestors, mainly women, took to the 
streets and demanded toilets, housing, electricity, social amenities and roads (327).  
2012 July 12 Memorandum from SANCO Palestine Branch about service delivery (351).  
2012 October 8-14 Week-long 'violent' service delivery protest Ward 5. People had invaded land illegally 
and built shacks. JMPD demolished these shacks, which was the cause of the protest 
(237). 
2012 October 17 Service delivery protested, possibly about poor quality sewerage infrastructure and lack 
of electricity due to cable theft (236).  
2012 November 6 Stretford 2 Residents handed over memo concerning low quality service delivery in 
Stretford Extension 2 (370). 
Note:  
The timeline of 56 protests between 1991 and 2011 in this Table cannot be an exhaustive list given under-reporting in the media and elsewhere and incomplete official 
records. Primary data are derived from miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, databases, journal articles, field notes from interviews, web pages, statements, articles 
and press releases from multiple sources such as the APF, Indy Media, COJ, Mail and Guardian, ioL News, News24, JMPD, CSVR, Municipal IQ, Polaris Institute and others, see 
own data. 
The use of square brackets in tables signifies the unique reference number for the protest in the primary data. 
The use of the word 'violent' or ('violence') may include actual or threatened violence and is dependent on the interpretation of the data on each protest, see definition on 
page 23. 
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16 City Centre Street Trading Counts, 1953-2013 
Year Number of 
traders 
Comment 
1953-1957 53 Negligible, very few 'illegal' traders; 5 white and 48 Black traders in fixed stalls (Beavon & Rogerson 
1982, p. 119). 
1957-1966 53 Negligible, very few 'illegal' traders; 5 white and 48 Black traders in fixed stalls (ibid.). 
1966-1980 64 Negligible, very few 'illegal' traders; 30 white and 34 Black traders in fixed stalls (ibid.). 
1973 Unknown 
 
Evident when scrutinising photographs in report that sidewalks are generally not occupied by 
traders as they are in the post-2010 period, but are contained within a few markets and designated 
sites (JCC 1976). 
1979-1980 200-250 Excluding newspaper vendors (Beavon & Rogerson 1987, p. 222). 
1981 Unknown 
 
Some itinerant black traders, others are concentrated in fixed stalls in a few areas only, namely 
Noord-Hoek Streets, Diagonal-West Street and Atwell Gardens (Tomaselli 1985). 
1980 200-250  Traders in the Inner City (Beavon & Rogerson 1982, p. 119). 
1987 year-end 1004 1004 licences issued by 1987 year-end and by mid-year of 1988, 7 000 licences had been issued 
(presumably throughout Johannesburg), and included 730 hotdog carts in the city centre and all 
business nodes in Joburg (Beavon 2004, p. 211). Unlicensed traders are not mentioned.  
1991 January 2 050 Street trader counts carried out before the survey by CASE (1995b, p. 4). 
1991 March 1 498 Street trader counts carried out before the survey by CASE (ibid.). 
1991 June 2 012 Street trader counts carried out before the survey by CASE (ibid.). 
1991 December 1 567 Street trader counts carried out before the survey by CASE (ibid.). 
1991 and 1992 1 500-2 500 According to 5 counts by Informal Market Trading Division, cited in CASE (1995a, p. 1). 
1992 May  2 467 (CASE 1995b, p. 4). 
1993 June 2 000-2 500 2 000-2 500 traders, up to 3 000 in summer (ibid.1995b). 
1993 October N/a 180 traders in Eloff Street alone (ibid.). 
1993  4 000-4 500 In city centre and Hillbrow and Braamfontein, research by CJP cited in CASE (1995a, p. 1) 
1993 15 000 In city centre according to Beavon (2004, p. 248) citing Rogerson (1996, p. 172). 
1994 Winter 2 000 2 000 in CBD, 457 in Hillbrow, according to street trader counts carried out before the survey by 
CASE (1995b, p. 4). 
1994 Summer 5 000 Up to 5 000 (estimate for the city centre and Hillbrow), street trader counts carried out before the 
survey by CASE (ibid.) 
1994 November 21-28 3 167 First 1994 survey by CASE (1995a, p. ii). 
1994 December 2-3 6 893 Second 1994 survey by CASE, large number possibly due to month-end and Christmas (ibid., p. i). 
1994 December 12-19 4 569 Third 1994 survey by CASE (ibid.), large number possibly due to Christmas, Although counts are 
unreliable given the fluctuating nature of street trade, it seems that the level of activity had doubled 
between 1991 and 1994. The variation between the three surveys is possibly because "some trading 
days are better than others, traders leave their stalls to collect goods to sell, and others do not 
operate on a daily basis" (Lund, Nicholson et al. 2000). 
1995 Mid-February 3 545 Periods covered are mid-February and early March (CASE 1995b, p. 5). 
2000 5 000 Maximum 5 000 in Inner City (Beavon 2004, p. 248). 
2002 1 068 Number of traders in CBD according to ITDP data (COJ 2004e, p. 45). 
2005 7 000-10 000 Estimate, in report covering the 2001-2005 period, of traders in the Inner City (COJ 2006h, p. 193). 
2007 4 000 Statement that "there are an estimated 4 000 traders in the city" by the COJ (2007i). 
2007 10 000 In the Inner City, cited in 'Inner City Summit: Overview of trends and dynamics' of 2007, by the COJ 
(2009i, p. 17). 
2008 3 402 Namely "within the area of the Inter-modal Transport and Retail node, covering Wolmarans, Noord, 
Plein, Claim Streets and the Johannesburg Station area, as well as Fordsburg Market, Commercial 
Street and Park Street". Further, note there are 6 815 traders in the Inner City, and 8 010 traders in 
the whole of Region F, according to the COJ (2008r, p. 3) citing the COJ's baseline study (COJ 2008v). 
This extent of trading is equivalent to the numbers of all traders in the rest of the city combined, 
namely at 7 800 traders in the other 6 Regions (COJ 2009b, p. v). 
2013 3 723 COJ estimated it managed 65 percent of the 3 723 traders in the city centre and the Central 
Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) the balance (COJ 2013h, p. 2). 
Note:   
1 Unless stated, figures pertain to city centre 
2 Clearly issues of definition are a problem as well as fluctuating figures 
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17 Formal Markets in Inner City, 1990s-2013 
Bank City Precinct 
Bounded by Jeppe, Harrison, Pritchard and Fraser Streets 
Description Private sector development incorporating informal trading, according to mid-1998 report 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer Private sector (?) 
Manager Private sector (?) 
Bree Street  
- 
Description Stalls were being built reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager Reportedly in 2004, to be managed by CJP and MTC 
Bree-Sauer 
Bree corner Sauer Streets 
Description Linear market. 
No. of traders 5 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Bree-West Mini Market 
Bree corner West Streets 
Description Operations recorded in 1998, and early 1999. 
No. of traders 5 
First operations 1990s 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Cages 
City centre mainly 
Description Steel and mesh shelved and roofed stalls, called 'cages' by traders as the sides folded up so they could be 
locked at nights. Initially 500 planned but 1 000 reportedly erected. However, by 2012, due to objections, 
many had been removed and those that remained were in an "appalling state" (Citichat 2012b).  
No. of traders 1 000 
First operations 2004 
Status Project shelved 
Developer EDU 
Manager MTC 
CID markets 
Throughout city centre, mostly in southern and western portions 
Description A number of CIDs, voluntary and legislated City Improvement Districts, had market stalls and/or 
demarcated spaces with some built by the city administration (especially the SMLC) and some by the CID, 
dependent on negotiated agreements. About 1 300 traders fall within CIDs and are managed by the CIDs. 
See Peyroux (2008) for more information.  
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
CID market: Braamfontein 
Inner City 
Description Part of CID, and first area declared a 'no-go' trading area, but with some traders' stalls near station. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
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CID market: Central Improvement District  
Bounded by Jeppe, Delvers, Pritchard, Von Wielligh, Main, Kruis, Fox, Von Brandis, President, Kruis, Pritchard and Smal Streets 
Description First CID created in Johannesburg, in 1993. Linear market built through public-private sector partnership. 
Roofed single structures with shelves and/or tables. Not clear if this market was subsequently rebuilt. 
Type C trading. The area abuts the Supreme Court and surrounds, which were proposed in mid-1998 to 
be prohibited for trading, as it is a public building. 
No. of traders 99 (or 97) 
First operations June 1997 
Status In operation in early 1999 and seemingly before and thereafter 
Developer SMLC and CJP joint venture 
Manager CJP, in 2004 reportedly, was being operated successfully by a private operator 
CID market: Retail Improvement District 
Bounded by Bree Street, east of Medical and African City and Kerk, Rissik, Jeppe and Joubert Streets 
Description Improvement District by the CJP incorporating managed informal trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Commissioner Street Market (1) 
Between Rissik and Delvers 
Streets 
Description Linear market as part of urban upgrade over 7 blocks, with architect-designed high-tech tensile tent-
roofed stalls, new paving, trees, irrigation, sleeving under road, street lighting, hand-carved wooden 
bollards, benches, and road surfacing. Project consultation was done with traders, shopkeepers, street 
block representatives, traders associations, landowners, and street committees, and the Commissioner 
Street Steering Committee. Stalls were designed with the help of the hawkers themselves with 
prototypes to choose and debate. Likewise the Code of Conduct and lease agreement – the main 
management tool – were done jointly. A local labour intensive approach was used for implementation. 
The project included 23 triple-bay roofed structures with tables, shelves and benches, more and new 
bins, and an African themed 30 meter wide circular zebra crossing with paving design based on a zebra 
skin. Trees used in the street landscaping were indigenous Acacias used for the first time in the city 
centre. Artists created the 60 artist-created wooden (ex-railroad sleepers) and purpose-designed 
galvanised metal bollards inspired by street life revealed in the taxis, shows, fish and animal skins, and 
were cheaper than conventional bollards and were later used in Newtown as well. Pedestrian and 
trading areas on the sidewalk were separated by half-moon shaped paving areas. The stalls were 
dismantled in about 2001 possibly due to high-sided vehicles damaging the tent-roofs due to the 
extreme road camber problem. 
No. of traders 69 
First operations 1995 
Status Still in operation in early 1999, stalls were removed in about 2001 by JRA allegedly due to damage 
caused by parking and passing vehicles 
Developer JCC Urbanisation 
Manager - 
Diagonal Street linear market 
- 
Description One of three popular trading sites for black traders already in the 1980s. In 2004 reportedly, was being 
successfully managed by a private operator. A linear market under roofed structure(s) to shelter traders. 
Cost of R 18 million. Type C trading. 
No. of traders 58 
First operations Completed in 2009 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager Private operator 
Doornfontein 
- 
Description Approved trading spaces. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager MTC 
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Ellis Park 
- 
Description As sports stadium with informal trading occurring on events days only, proposed in mid-1998 report to 
restrict trading to demarcated stands or areas/ or to specific hours. Provided initially with round stalls 
with umbrella shaped roofs (not to be confused with the 253 unmanaged sites at the former FNB 
stadium, now Soccer City). 
No. of traders 20 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager In 2004, it was reportedly unmanaged and needing management, even though it is a small market, by 
MTC especially during sports events 
Eloff Street Market 
10 blocks between De Villiers and Plein Streets 
Description Market proposed and approved for 76 traders on street over 10 blocks on main bus transport route. The 
plan was to cater for 166 traders of the existing surveyed 120 to 480 traders on site in consultation with 
the traders, shopkeepers and landlords. Although new trees, pruning, 3 benches, paving repair, the first 
7 canopied structures and 20 bins were (partly?) provided at a cost of R230 000 (?) to match the Transit 
Way design, the project, part of the wider Transit Ways initiative, ultimately did not proceed.  
No. of traders 7 of 166 had stalls 
First operations 1997-9 
Status - 
Developer JCC (?), SMLC 
Manager - 
Ernest Oppenheimer Park restoration and relocation of informal storage facility 
Bounded by Joubert Street Mall, Market Street, Rissik Street Post Office and President Streets (falls within Gauteng Precinct area) 
Description Originally a park, named after SA's wealthiest mining family, with 'leaping springbok' statue and water 
feature located next to the former City Hall, it was run by an 'entrepreneur' who charged R6.00 per week 
for each trader's trolley stored there overnight. He slept on site to guard the trolleys. The proposed 
project was the relocation of the illegal storage for 400 to 450 traders to an alternative facility including 
the empowerment of traders and the restoration of park. In mid-1998, tit was planned to prohibit 
trading here completely as although Parks By-Laws prohibit trading in parks, the pre-existing situation 
could not be managed without the additional legal support. 
No. of traders - 
First operations Consultants appointed in 1997 
Status - 
Developer SMLC 
Manager - 
Faraday Street (1) Muti Market 
Faraday corner Stott Streets, under M2 highway 
Description One of two markets in the Inner City trading in traditional herbs, sometimes controversial commodities 
(Williams, V. & Whiting 2015). Squatters had to be relocated as part of the project. The market was 
planned for 350 traders but only the first phase of the double-bay trading-stall-combination-storage-
lockers (65 of) for about 80 traders, four consulting rooms for sangomas ('traditional healers') designed 
and built by artists including one made from an overturned yacht, and ablutions were built. When the 
new Faraday Street Taxi Rank and Trading Market were built, this site became a (informal?) taxi holding 
area with a limited number of traders. 
No. of traders 75 (or 69) 
First operations Consultants appointed in 1997, community participation/construction underway in mid-1998 
Status No longer exists 
Developer SMLC 
Manager Did not seem to have been managed 
Faraday Street (2) Taxi Rank and Trading Market 
North of M2 highway in southern part of city centre, near Faraday station 
Description Off-street market inside a building as part of a mixed-use development. Streets and sidewalks were 
revamped. About 350 subsidised housing units were included. Taxi ranking and holding areas for 1 200 
taxis, 60 traders, 500m2 formal retail, bus ranks, are designed for 30 000 commuters at a cost of R50 
million (Sowetan 2003). Type A trading and taxis.  
No. of traders 200 
First operations Completed by end 2003 (2005?) 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager MTC 
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Fashion District 
- 
Description Stalls, type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations Reportedly in 2004 stalls were being built 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager Reportedly in 2004, by MTC and CJP 
Fashion District (lower Pritchard Street) 
- 
Description Not clear if this forms part of the main Fashion District market. Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 
2004 and was earmarked for Type B stalls.  
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Fashion Kapitol Saturday Fashion Market 
- 
Description R25 million project. 
No. of traders 20 
First operations 2008 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
Fordsburg Market 
- 
Description A market under roofed structure(s) to shelter traders. 
No. of traders 40 
First operations Completed in 2007 
Status - 
Developer MTC 
Manager - 
Gauteng Precinct (Phase 1) Pilot Project Street Market 
15 blocks bounded by Rissik, Commissioner, Sauer and Pritchard Streets 
Description Trading sites demarcated for Gauteng Precinct Street Market, implemented overnight by enforcement 
team and LED. 
No. of traders 200 (?) 
First operations 1996, 1997 (?) 
Status - 
Developer SMLC 
Manager - 
Gauteng Precinct (Phase 2) 
27-28 city blocks bounded by Pritchard, Von Brandis, Fox and Sauer Streets 
Description A grant-funded project (through the GPG's Vusani Amadalobha fund) extending and building on the 
earlier phase. Project go-ahead received, but delays experienced due to trader-on-trader violence and 
foreigner issue. [Four wooden structures erected in a 'civic' design for comment from traders]? Rentals 
for sites and stalls in 28 blocks were agreed. Construction started in 1997 with 200 of the existing 428 
traders to be accommodated in the project. 40 of the structures were under construction in mid-1997. 
No. of traders 350 
First operations Consultants appointed in 1997 (?),under development with community participation/ construction 
underway in mid-1998 
Status Unclear if implementation was completed 
Developer SMLC 
Manager  
Hillbrow (1) Market 
Kotze Street, Hillbrow, Inner City, outside Shoprite (?) 
Description Linear street markets for 10 traders. In 2004 reportedly needed upgrading. Type C trading. 
No. of traders 10 (or 25?) 
First operations 1993 (but could have been as late as 1997) 
Status Still in operation as of early 1999 
Developer JCC Urbanisation 
Manager In 2004 reportedly was unmanaged and needed management by MTC 
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Hillbrow (2) Market and Taxi Rank 
Quartz Street, between Pretoria and Bruce Streets, Hillbrow, Inner City 
Description Also known as Quartz Street Market. Linear market in pedestrianised street. Type B trading provided at 
R8 million cost, in street pedestrianised for purposes of building the linear market, under roofed 
structure(s) to shelter traders, which blocked access to entrance to adjacent underground parking 
garages needing expensive market rebuilding. 
No. of traders - 
First operations 2001? (built by 2004) 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager MTC 
Hillbrow (3?) Phase II 
Uncertain, Inner City 
Description In 2004, managed by MTC with upgrading due to take place. Type C trading. 
No. of traders 240 
First operations Completed in 2006 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
Hillbrow Windybrow market 
Hillbrow, Inner City 
Description Was under construction in 2004. Type A trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Hillbrow-Berea Pretorius Street Market 
Pretorius Street, Berea-Hillbrow, Inner City 
Description Linear street market. 
No. of traders 10 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Jeppe Street Market (1) 
Between Joubert and Von Wielligh Streets 
Description Urban upgrade over 5 blocks which were densely traded. It incorporated a street market, new paving, 
trees, irrigation, sleeving under road, new storm-water pipes, street lighting, bollards, benches, and road 
surfacing. There were ten triple-bayed roofed stalls with tables and/or shelves and 101 unroofed units in 
combination of one to eight bays with tables and/or shelves and retractable blinds on sides to protect 
stock against rainy weather, with shopfront cantilevered roofs over sidewalks serving as additional 
protection. Planting was provided along the length where possible to create a green 'node' at Smal 
Street, a pedestrianised cross street linking the Carlton Centre with the city centre to its north. Planting 
was limited due to underground services. The project was challenging, as the sidewalks were too narrow 
to accommodate traders and pedestrians so part of the sidewalks were expanded at street intersections 
and patterned paving was used to demarcate trading and pedestrian zones. Green hawkers' structures, 
post-top lighting, lamp lighting, and bollards were provided. Management was through lease 
agreements. 
No. of traders 131 (or 117) 
First operations 1995 
Status Still in operation in early 1999, stalls were removed allegedly in about 2001 by JRA 
Developer JCC Urbanisation 
Manager - 
Jeppe Street Market (2) 
- 
Description In 2004 reportedly, stands were being (re?)built. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager MTC, reportedly in 2004 to be managed by MTC and CJP 
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Joubert Street 
Between President and Jeppe Streets 
Description Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders 74 
First operations 2010 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Joubert Street (1) 
Pedestrianised portion 
Description Management plan and leases for traders' own structures. 
No. of traders - 
First operations c. 1996-9? 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Joubert Street (2) Market 
Between Plein and Bree Streets 
Description Pedestrianised street that links Gautrain terminus with Ghandi transport hub. Joubert Street is a legal 
taxi rank. Upgrade of street as a formal linear market, and removal of on-street parking and trade. 
No. of traders - 
First operations 2011 (?) 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
Kerk Street Mall Market (1) 
Between Von Brandis and Harrison Streets 
Description Mall market in pedestrianised street planned in about 1997 as a partnership between local and 
provincial governments (through Vusani Amadalobha fund) and the private sector. Implementation was 
delayed as funding from private sector could not be secured timeously, so SMLC's contribution was lost 
at end of June 1998. 72 of 200 existing traders were catered for in the market. The project was CJP-
driven with others such as Broll Properties as part of the Retail Improvement District. Bollards, bins and 
trading structures erected and paving was upgraded. However, reportedly in 2004, the market needed to 
be surveyed and was earmarked for Type B trading. 
No. of traders 72 (or 70) 
First operations 1999 (?), urban management scheme incorporating informal trading being implemented in mid-1998 
Status - 
Developer SMLC, Planning, CJP in partnership 
Manager In 2004, it was managed by retail companies as a stop-gap measure, by 2004 it was in need of an 
upgrade and management by MTC 
Kerk Street Mall Market (2) 
- 
Description In 2013 reportedly, R26 million had been spent on upgrading and new structures by JDA. Considered "as 
international leading practice, and involves both a spatial and urban management intervention" (COJ 
2013g). 
No. of traders 74 
First operations 2009 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
King George Street (1) Joubert Gauteng Market 
Between Wolmarans and Koch Streets 
Description Linear market made up of single-bay open-sided units with shelves and/or tables for 39 traders, 
ablutions and two storage areas. Type C trading. 
No. of traders 39 
First operations 1994 
Status Still in operation in early 1999 
Developer - 
Manager In 2004 reportedly managed unsuccessfully by private operator and needed management by MTC 
King George Street (2) market 
Uncertain 
Description Linear market (?). Not clear if this was an extension or a refurbishment of the existing market. 
No. of traders 30 
First operations 2012 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
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Loveday Street 
Between Pritchard and Jeppe Streets 
Description Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Mai Mai Bazaar (1) 
Albert corner Berea Streets, near Anderson Street off-ramp from the M2 highway 
Description Kwa Mai Mai is the oldest market in Johannesburg although not originally planned as a market. Type A 
trading. It is one of two markets in the Inner City trading in traditional herbs. Mai Mai was former stables 
converted to a market in the 1920s (?). It offers traditional dress, wedding chests, drums, sticks for sale, 
some made on site. Coffin and furniture manufacturer. A project was implemented, conceptualised as a 
socio-economic development initiative with a tourism development focus, and establishment of 
community Section 21 facilitated. Off-street market. Initially redeveloped as a socio-economic and 
tourism project with 250 trading and manufacturing spaces and over 600 illegal residents including 
upgrade and construction of new infrastructure, establishment of new institutional structures, extensive 
community facilitation and development, and business planning, largely through provincial grant funding 
for about R3 million. The project included marketing Mai Mai as tourism attraction, upgrading of shops, 5 
carpenters workshops, 5 panel-beaters workshops, Community hall and a crèche. It has a covered 
amphitheatre for traditional dancing, Admin offices and a former Beer Hall building. 
No. of traders 202 
First operations 1997 
Status - 
Developer SMLC, tripartite agreement between SMLC, Gauteng Department of Transport and Public Works and the 
Mai Mai Bazaar residents 
Manager MTC 
Mai Mai Bazaar (2) 
- 
Description - 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Market Street 
Between Rissik and Von Wielligh Streets 
Description Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Metro Mall 
Northwest city centre, covers 2 city blocks, Simmonds, Sauer, West and Pimm streets 
Description Flagship facility of the MTC…2003 – By Mid-2002 Metro Mall near completion, opened in January 2003 
(JDA 2012). The building is three storeys and includes the Bree Street taxi rank. "The facility contains 1 
617 taxi bays, designed to service about 3 000 taxis. A further 22 berths have been reserved for buses. 
Hawkers will have 510 stalls to sell their goods from. An area of 1 922 m2 has been put aside for retailers 
and another 910m2 reserved for wholesalers. For tenants, 59 parking bays have been established." The 
R139.8 million Blue IQ-funded building includes "formal retail shops along Bree Street… An estimated 
150 000 daily taxi and bus commuters go through Metro Mall… 3 000m² of formal retail space as well as 
six hundred units of mixed income housing" (COJ 2002e). Market traders are located inside the building 
and not in open-air stalls. Type A trading and taxis. 
No. of traders 491 
First operations Opened In January 2003 
Status - 
Developer  JDA 
Manager MTC 
Newtown Cultural Precinct 
Bounded by railway reserve, Bree, West President and Goch Streets, Newtown, Inner City 
Description Flea Market in the area, catering for middle-class consumers. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status Defunct 
Developer - 
Manager - 
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Noord-Hoek Street markets  
Multiple markets: Hoek Street and Noord street span four blocks between them and have been popular trading sites for African 
traders since at least the 1970s (JCC 1976) as they link between Park Station and the rest of the city centre. 
Hoek Street 
Name and site not specified 
Description The location of this market is not clear, possible duplication of data which could not be 
verified (?). Cost of R3 million. Type C trading. 
No. of traders 40 
First operations Was being upgraded in 2004 by MTC, but completed reportedly in 2009 (?) 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Hoek Street Market North (1) 
In Hoek Street (running north-south) between De Villiers and Plein Streets, near Park Station 
Description Two multi-bayed roofed and open-sided sheds for 18 traders and enclosed kiosks for 8 traders 
in a linear market arrangement with storage and ablution facilities. This cluster and linear 
market was developed in conjunction initially with InterSite, as part of area was owned by the 
SARCC. 
No. of traders 26 
First operations 1994 
Status Still in operation in early 1999 
Developer JCC Urbanisation & Intersite 
Manager - 
Hoek Street Market South (2) 
In Hoek Street (running north-south) between Plein and Bree (renamed Lilian Ngoyi) Streets, near Park Station 
Description Two multi-bayed roofed and open-sided sheds for 10 traders. A cluster and linear market done 
in conjunction initially with InterSite, as part of area was owned by SARCC. 
No. of traders 10 
First operations 1994 
Status Still in operation in early 1999 
Developer JCC Urbanisation & Intersite 
Manager - 
Hoek Street Market South (2) 
In Hoek Street (running north-south) between Plein and Bree (renamed Lilian Ngoyi) Streets, near Park Station 
Description Former market development seems to have been rebuilt or upgraded. Market stalls, ablutions, 
water and electricity, lighting, CCTV and guards were provided by the COJ, Apex High 
Properties and the Affordable Housing Company. The market is located next to a new three-
storey development with small shops for traders. 
No. of traders  45 (?) 
First operations 2010 (or 2009?) 
Status - 
Developer COJ and property developers 
Manager  
Noord Street (2) market 
Location uncertain 
Description Unclear if this is a market that was rebuilt or an upgrade of one or more of the earlier markets. 
A two-phase project catering for 150 traders in both phases. 
No. of traders 150  
First operations 2013 and 2014 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
Noord-Hoek Street Mall A 
In Hoek Street (running north-south) between Noord and De Villiers Streets 
Description Linked single-bayed roofed units with tables and lighting for 20 traders, use made of local steel 
manufacturers. Recorded that 25 of 50 structures had been built by 1999 by SMLC for both A 
and B (see below). 
No. of traders 20 
First operations 1997, under development with some stalls completed in mid-1998 
Status - 
Developer JCC (?) 
Manager - 
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Noord-Hoek Street Mall B 
In Noord Street (running east-west) between Wanderers and Hoek Streets 
Description Linked single-bayed roofed units with tables and lighting for 30 traders, near Park Station, use 
made of local steel manufacturers. 
No. of traders 30 
First operations 1997, community participation/construction underway in mid-1998 
Status - 
Developer JCC (?) 
Manager - 
Wanderers Street corner Noord Street 
Park Station area, Wanderers Street 
Description Linear market. 
No. of traders 5 
First operations By 1999 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Park Central Tax Rank (Jack Mincer) and market facilities (including Noord street trading 
- 
Description In 2004, reportedly an upgrade of taxi and trading facilities was underway. Taxi rank and 2 sets of Type C 
trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager In 2004 reportedly, taxi rank leased to taxi association and has been closed by MEC due to unspecified 
major problems.  
Park City Kazerne traders 
- 
Description In 2004 reportedly upgrading underway. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager In 2004, reportedly needed management by MTC 
Park City Long Distance 
- 
Description Not yet developed by 2004. Taxi and Type B trading 
No. of traders - 
First operations 2004 or later (?) 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager In 2004, due to be managed by MTC 
President Street  
Between Joubert and Von Wielligh Streets  
Description Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Pritchard Street 
Between Eloff to Sauer Streets 
Description Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Rissik Street 
Between President and Jeppe Streets 
Description Needed to be surveyed, reportedly in 2004. Type C trading. 
No. of traders  
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
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Scottish Memorial Market 
King George corner Klein Streets, opposite art gallery and at south end of King George Street market 
Description Cluster market with wash-up, ablutions and storage areas for 36 traders, and the relocation of the 
historic Scottish memorial statue to a site in Parktown. The market includes three multi-bayed roofed 
open-sided sheds for 6 traders, single-bay roofed open-sided units for 22 traders, closed kiosks for 44 
traders, one storage facility and ablutions. It was also proposed in mid-1998 to declare the entrance to 
the art gallery (off King George Street between Bok and Koch Streets, Joubert Park) as a prohibited 
trading area. 
No. of traders 72 
First operations 1994 
Status Still in operation in early 1999 
Developer JCC Urbanisation 
Manager - 
Sidewalk Lease Markets 
City centre mainly 
Description About 10 linear markets (sites only or with structures) erected by private sector in terms of sidewalk 
leases with the council and in accordance with council requirements. A number of these leases were 
entered into, and by 1998 included: 
1. Devonshire House: Jorissen Street corner Melle Street, Braamfontein (Consolidated Erf F 4556, 
Johannesburg). 
2. Edura House: bounded by West, Commissioner, Fox and Ferreira Streets (Erf 303, Ferreirasdorp). 
3. Samancor House: bounded by Anderson, Simmonds, Marshall and Harrison Streets (Erven 171 to 
178, Marshalltown). 
4. 56 Von Wielligh Street: Von Wielligh corner Market Streets (Erf 5196, Johannesburg). 
5. Southern Life Building: 17 Harrison Street between Main and Marshall Streets (Erf 1146, 
Marshalltown). 
6. West Street Parkade: West corner Bree Streets (Erven 258 to 259, Newtown). 
7. 30 Simmonds Street: between Commissioner and Fox Streets (Erven 1098, 140 and 144, 
Marshallstown). 
8. 32 Diagonal Street: bounded by Sauer, Kerk, Diagonal and Jeppe Streets (Erven 1186, Re/1187, 
1188 and 4842, Marshallstown). 
9. Standard Bank: Edgars Building (boundaries of area to be confirmed) (application pending). 
10. Edgars: Standard Bank Building (boundaries of area to be confirmed) (application pending but 
structures already erected). 
No. of traders - 
First operations Early-to-mid-1990s 
Status - 
Developer Individual private sector property owners 
Manager Private sector property owner usually 
St Mary’s Cathedral Precinct 
Bounded by De Villiers, Wanderers and Plein Streets and Hoek Street Mall 
Description Prohibited and/or trading restricted to demarcated stands or areas proposed in mid-1998 as it is a public 
building/church with informal trading market adjacent to area 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Temporary Taxi Facility on Transnet property 
- 
Description Temporary Taxi Facility on Transnet property. 
No. of traders 30 
First operations 2012 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
Twist Street Market 
- 
Description - 
No. of traders - 
First operations - 
Status - 
Developer - 
Manager - 
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Western Joubert Pilot Project Precinct 
Bounded by Smit, Twist, Plein, Klein and Noord Streets, the railway reserve (including Park Station and Wanderers Street) and 
Hoek Street 
Description Development precinct incorporating managed informal trading. 
No. of traders - 
First operations Underway in mid-1998 
Status Status unknown 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Westgate (1) 
At Westgate Taxi Terminus/Rank 
Description Cluster market at Westgate Taxi Terminus. 
No. of traders 18, or for 9 traders? 
First operations Established in the 1980s or 1990s, by 1999, retail development incorporating managed informal trading 
proposed in mid-1998 
Status Still in operation in early 1999 
Developer - 
Manager - 
Westgate (2) 
Westgate taxi and bus facility  
Description - 
No. of traders 60 
First operations 2013 
Status - 
Developer JDA 
Manager - 
Yeoville Market (1) 
Outside former OK Bazaars super market, Raleigh Street, Inner City 
Description Linear market, stalls with stepped shelves and roof. 
No. of traders 23 (or 24) 
First operations 1993 (but could be as late as 1997) 
Status Still in operation as of early 1999 
Developer JCC Urbanisation 
Manager - 
Yeoville Market (2) and Taxi Rank 
Raleigh corner Cavendish Streets, Inner City 
Description Yeoville Market was the pilot project of MTC. A new small on-street taxi rank and existing block of flats 
were also incorporated in the scheme. Yeoville Traders Associations were consulted at the planning 
stage. The market is an interior market and regarded as too small by the traders. Type A trading and taxi 
rank. 
No. of traders 216 
First operations 1999 
Status - 
Developer Inner City Office/MTC 
Manager MTC 
Note: 
a  Unless otherwise stated, markets are in the city centre and cater for low-income consumers. 
b  Table is incomplete as not all data was available at time of formulation. 
c  List may be incomplete with some markets missing. 
d  Markets may be unnamed, named differently or not be described, with possibly some duplication in the table as a consequence. 
e  Multiple sources of data, including the researcher's personal archive and her memory from working on informal trading work in the 1990s as an Architect for the 
JCC, then as the Manager of Economic Empowerment and Business Support for the SMLC; accuracy of data was not verified by the researcher. 
f  Types of trading stalls are in terms of the ITDP (COJ 2002a): with Type A the most formalised in terms of location, permanence of structure; the provision of 
electricity, storage, refuse removal, and cleaning; and access to a development programme, and Type D with no amenities and only refuse removal provided; with 
Types B and C ranging between the two types. 
g  Sources include Atkins (Interview, 2012) and various documents although this list is not complete (Tomaselli 1985; JCC 1994a, b, e; Street LEVEL 1996b, a; City Vision 
1997a, b; Die Beeld 1997a, b; JICDF 1997; Le Roux 1997; Lentswe La Gauteng 1997; M&G 1997b; Nisda News 1997; North-Eastern Tribune 1997; SMLC 1997a, b, f; 
The Star 1997d, a; Unsworth 1997; Die Beeld 1998; GPG 1998; Muwanga 1998; Pernegger 1998; SMLC 1998a, b, d, e, g; Spartan 1998; GJMC 1999f; Pernegger 2001, 
p. 71; COJ 2002a; COJ 2003d; COJ 2004f; 2010p; Citichat 2012a, b; Fraser 2012; COJ 2013g; b; Zack 2014; JCC c. 1994; Parks and Grounds c. 1994; Denny-Dimitriou c. 
1997; Geyser c. 1998; The South c. 1998; Untitled pamphlet c. 1998). 
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18 Informal Trader Representative and Advocacy Groups 
Group  
ADF African Diaspora Forum 
AHA African Hawkers Association 
CALS Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CUBES Centre for Urbanism and Built Environment Studies (CUBES), University of Witwatersrand 
ESSET Ecumenical Service for Socio-Economic Transformation 
FMF Free Market Foundation 
Human Rights Watch - 
ILO  International Labour Organization, agency of United Nations 
Khanya-aicdd Khanya-African Institute of Community Driven Development 
Law Review Project - 
LRC Legal Resources Centre  
NAFCOC National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
NHA National Hawkers Association 
SACCAWU South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 
SALGA South African Local Government Association 
SAMWU South African Municipal Workers Union 
SAWEN South African Women Entrepreneurs Network  
SERI Socio-Economic Research Institute 
StreetNet International - 
UMSA Unemployed Masses of South Africa 
WIEGO Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing 
Note: 
Data has been derived from all sources used in Chapter 7 and Databank Workbook 
  
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 375 
19 Informal Trader Associations 
Association  Associated individuals 
2010 Stadiums Task Team - 
ACHIB African Chamber of Hawkers and Informal Businesses (or 'African 
Cooperative (or Council) for Hawkers and Informal Business') established 
1986 
Lawrence Mavundla (president, founder), 
Livingston Mantanga (General Secretary), 
Mthuthulezi Madalani, Sunnyboy Ntsukwini, 
Rumbidzai Kangara (Gauteng General Secretary), 
Victor Mabaso, S'bu Mavundla 
ADIBA African Development of Informal Business Association Elizabeth Ngwenya 
AFITO African Federation of Informal Traders Organisations Sam Khasibe 
ATC African Traders Committee Zacharia (Zakes) Ramutulwana (president, 
organisation leader) 
ATO African Traders Organisation, established 2010 Matron Mhlanga (General Secretary) 
BAMBANANI - 
Block committees - 
Block Leaders Justice Mashele 
Bree Street Traders - 
Bertrams Traders Organisation - 
CHATA Concerned Hawkers and Traders Association  Mischka Cassiem (deputy chairperson) 
CHG Concerned Hawkers Group  
Edith Cavell Traders Joyce Mametja  
Ethiopian Traders Association (or Union) Moges Girma 
FABCOS Foundation of African Business and Consumer Services - 
FAITH Federated Association of Informal Traders and Hawkers - 
Faraday Market Committee Christinah Kedikiloe (leader) 
Fashion District Traders - 
GASEWA - 
GBH(H)A Gauteng Braiders and Hairdressers Association Zacharia Ramatula (founder) 
GGBF Greater Gauteng Business Forum Makhosana Mhlanga 
GHA Gauteng Hawkers Association (or Organisation), initially GJHPC between 
1992 and 1997, see 'GJHPC' 
Mannetjies Solomon, Edmund Elias, Nkomo 
(General Secretary) 
GIDA Gauteng Informal Development Alliance, established 2011 Sam Taraka (chairperson) 
GISFOR Gauteng Informal Sector Forum - 
GJHA Greater Johannesburg Hawkers Association  - 
GJHPC Greater Johannesburg Hawkers Planning (or Plannery (sic)) Committee Mannetjies Solomon (chairperson), Moffat 
Sebulalo (spokesperson) 
GTA Gauteng Traders Association - 
Hillbrow (Street) Traders Association Anton Rakhava, Edmund Elias 
Hillbrow Berea Hawkers Association - 
Hillbrow Hawkers  - 
IBF COJ-initiated Informal Business Forum Mannetjies Solomon, Churchill Mrasi, Edmund 
Elias, Leon Louw (a coalition of informal traders 
formations in Gauteng) 
IFAG Illegal Foreigners Action Group - 
Inner Johannesburg Hawkers Committee Mannetjies Solomon 
Isihlano Organisation Gabisile Mpangase 
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Association  Associated individuals 
ITA Informal Traders Association John Makondo (president) 
ITO Informal Traders Organisation - 
Jonedede Trader Organisation Tselane Mosholi 
JOWEDET Johannesburg Well (of) Development and Training - 
JTA Johannesburg Traders Alliance Edmund Elias 
JTCC Johannesburg Traders Crisis Committee (JTCC) (see TCC) Leaders are Livingston Mantanga, Edmund Elias, 
Nkomo 
MBAC Micro Businesses Against Crime - 
MBC Micro Business Chamber  Represents five organisations 
MMC Metro Mall Committee - 
NAFEDA - 
NIBDA - 
NISDA National Informal Steel Developers Association - 
NUT Nigerian Union of Traders (Nigerian Traders Union), established 2005 Hyging Chukwu (General Secretary) 
OFHA Orange Farm Hawkers Association  Mxolisi Sibeko 
OVAHA One Voice of All Hawkers Association (or 'One Voice for all Hawkers', 
or 'One Voice Trader Organisation' or 'One Voice'), established 2007  
Zacharia Ramutula (founder, president, 
chairperson), Frans Seema (spokesman, 
secretary), Dan Kakae (executive committee 
member), John Ratau, J. Thlopane 
PIBA Pretoria Informal Business Association (Pretoria only) - 
PPOA  - 
SABHIBA South African Black Hawkers and Informal Business Association - 
SACHIB South African Council of Hawkers and Informal Business - 
SAITF South African Informal Traders Forum, established 2006 Brian Phaaloh (General Secretary), Sam Khasibe 
(chairperson), Sam Ndlovu 
SANTRA South African National Traders and Retailers Association (or 
Alliance) (or South African National Retail Alliance, or South African National 
Traders Association), established 2005 
Livingston Mantanga (chairperson), Edmund 
Elias, Geoffrey Nemakonde 
SARHA South Africa Railway Hawkers Association  Represents traders on trains, Sam Khasibe 
(chairperson) 
SEWU Self Employed Women's Union - 
Street committees - 
TCC Trader Crisis Committee, see 'JTCC' Livingston Mantanga (spokesman) 
WASP Workers and Socialist Party Mametlwe Sebei (spokesperson) 
WCCA WCCA Trader Organisation  C. D. Selepe 
Yeoville Street Traders Association (or Yeoville Traders Hawkers Association) - 
Yeoville Traders Hawkers Association - 
Note: 
Data has been derived from all sources used in Chapter 7, Databank Workbook, COJ (2008r, p. 5) and Bénit-Gbaffou (2014, 2016). 
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20 Inner City Informal Trading Protests per Five-Year Period, 1993-2013 
Date  Protest 
1991-1995  
1993 AMPROS protest and others: Delays with enforcement prompted large corporate 
property owners and managers to protest about the deteriorating urban environment 
related to trading activities. Since property owners' first protest in 1993, the city 
administration had permitted some, on application, to manage sidewalk traders 
adjacent to their properties through limited lease agreements with the city 
administration (JCC 1993b; Skinner 1999). Fundi Khabakazi (Interview, Khabakazi, 
2012), a former ANC activist and trade unionist with leadership roles in politics since 
the late 1990s, said that she thought that formal businesses had been remarkably 
patient about the GJMC's lack of informal trading management in the Inner City (ibid.). 
Further, the lack of an appropriate response from the GJMC had led to a 'downward 
spiral' of high vacancy rates, slumming and devaluation of properties. In a typical case, 
Gerald Leissner of AMPROS protested about the rapid decline of the area around the 
Carlton Centre and the five-star hotel due to unmanaged trading and taxis in the face 
of looming building closures as property values plummeted (Murray 2011, pp. 89-90). 
Property owners' management of the sidewalk traders through lease agreements had 
but a small impact. As a result, several corporate owners mothballed some landmark 
buildings in the city centre including the Carlton Hotel in 1997 (COJ 2004a) (Interview, 
Khabakazi, 2012) [174]. 
1994 January 
 
A joint policy committee of traders, businesses and the city administration set up by 
CJP in response to traders' grievances and the threat of large-scale march on 9 
February about recently prohibited areas around Supreme Court, St Mary's and three 
blocks in Kerk Street [451]. 
1995 Street trading project-based protests: Muthialu (Interview, Muthialu, 2012) recalled 
that in the earliest interactions, before mass street marches, one group was 
"demanding entry to council, and actually requesting meetings… So it was a different 
kind of action… [I]t was a mobilised group, a small group, of informal traders." But the 
balance of power had shifted. She observed that: 
"[T]he informal traders were forming themselves… [T]hey were beginning to 
challenge council… [T]hey were demanding a due consultation, an involvement in 
terms of the by-laws; informal trade agreements, so they wanted to be in that 
space… [T]hey recognised they needed to do that through some kind of structure, 
and that they couldn't do it as a mass of traders. And so they started to use that 
platform, and leverage themselves off that. So I think that balance of power started 
to shift. And we all started to sit up and take notice… [T]hings were changing and 
shifting … [T]here were protest actions… [T]hey started to use this channel in terms 
of mass action… [A]t the start of any project, you would then only go to the 
association, as your gateway, because they really held the key to that… group of 
informal traders in that particular area. So you would do your homework and 
understand who the players were and you would meet with them" (Interview, 
Muthialu, 2012, pp. 13-19). 
Note the date of protest is approximate and may also have extended to 1996. See 
Interview and notes for more detail [172]. 
1996-2000  
1996 April 18 Informal trade anti-by-law protest: On 18 April 1996, Lawrence Mavundla of the 
informal trading association of ACHIB led a large march to the Gauteng Provincial 
Government (GPG). The traders were protesting the announcement in the press by the 
GJTMC's Mayor, Isaac Mogase, to clean up informal trading, starting on 10 June. They 
also protested against Johannesburg's street trading by-laws even though the city 
administration had formulated the by-laws in consultation with all affected parties 
including traders before their submission in January 1996 to the GPG for the Premier's 
approval. However, ACHIB denied that participation with the traders had taken place. 
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 The GPG's Department of Economic Affairs, Jabu Moleketi, convened a meeting with 
the GJMC and trader associations on 19 April whereat it was clear that there were 
internal disputes amongst the traders, but also within the state. Bobat (Interview, 
Bobat, 2012) recalled that an official of the GPG openly rebuked the GJMC at the 
meeting, although the GJMC was an independent sphere of government and the 
trading association admitted at the meeting that it had, in fact, been consulted. Bobat 
said that the GPG adopted a populist stance, effectively undermining the city 
administration's by-law process as well as future implementation efforts and the 
sustainability of the GJMC's informal trade policy, which was readopted on 15 October 
1996 (GJMC 1998b). She said: 
"[They] were "rapping us, as local government, over our knuckles… 'You are the 
naughty child'… So, my point that I want to make is, that at a political level, if you 
have these kind of games being played, informal traders are going to take advantage 
of this. And if they take advantage of this, you're undermining that whole process 
that you want to implement. You know, so the whole thing about 'pay for your 
structures' is not gonna happen" (Interview, Bobat, 2012). 
The GPG approved, then, only the first part of the GJMC's by-laws, omitting the second 
part that dealt with the creation of restricted and prohibited areas, which the GJMC 
had to resubmit to the GPG only after more consultation, which the GJMC had 
completed by August 1997 (GJMC 1997b). The GPG then proclaimed the first phase of 
the GJMC's by-laws on 8 January 1997 (ibid.). Further, indicative of the complexities of 
the five-MSS model municipality, the GJMC then had to consolidate, between 1996 and 
1997, the four different sets of by-laws of the MLCs into one consolidated version to 
ensure consistency across the city of Johannesburg of implementation and penalties 
for any contraventions (GJMC1998b, p. 4.2). Refer also to Interview with Bobat, 2012, 
and other sources (Business Day 1996a, b; Saturday Star 1996; The Citizen 1996; The 
Star 1996a, b, c, d) [452]. 
1997 July 9 Inner City march and memorandum: The GJHPC traders marched to the offices of the 
city administration in Braamfontein and issued a memorandum. They demanded the 
"suspension of the construction of stalls until their problems were addressed" including 
the issue of foreigners. The SMLC said it would respond within two weeks (The Star 
1997b; Peberdy & Crush 1998, p. 6). [453] but refer also to [467], [442] and [346]. 
1997 August 14-15 and 
18 
City centre anti-foreigner and anti-enforcement violent protests by informal traders: 
South African traders attacked foreign traders, initially, over two days on 14 and 15 
August. Police arrested a hundred traders on charges of looting formal and informal 
retailers, assault and illegal marching. The chairperson of an informal trading 
association told a reporter that traders were "prepared to push them [foreigners] out 
of the city… [m]y group is not prepared to let our government inherit a garbage city 
because of these leeches" (HRW 1998, p. 66).  
The Human Rights Watch (1998) and the Centre for Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (2008) reported that the xenophobia and related violence, especially in 
the informal trading sector, had its roots in rising anti-foreigner sentiment since 1994. 
Refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa from elsewhere in Africa were generally 
unable to get jobs in South Africa due to the high unemployment rate and their 
temporary status; they frequently resorted to trading on the streets, bringing them in 
direct competition with South Africans. Foreign traders were resented by South African 
traders because the foreigners were perceived to be more profitable than the South 
African traders. Informal trading associations, such as ACHIB, militated against 
foreigners, handed them to the police and organised protest marches which became 
physically violent.  
The then Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Lindiwe Sisulu, hinted that foreign traders 
were trading illegally as, in terms of immigration policy, no immigrant should get 
employment at the expense of a South African. Further, the then Gauteng MEC for 
Safety and Security, Jesse Duarte, and ACHIB members agreed to set up a joint forum 
with regular interaction.  
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It seemed also that the GPG was in support of ACHIB's use of block committees to 
identify possibly illegal migrants and hand them over to the police. The lack of policy 
guidance at the national level created significant inconsistences within government 
departments, at all levels. Some officials of the city administration were reported to 
have refused to issue application forms for market registration to foreign traders.  
A few days later, on 18 August, another episode of violent anti-foreigner protest takes 
place. Thirty local traders attack Senegalese traders in Kerk Street. MEC Duarte 
condemned the violence. There was some police response in support of foreigners, 
albeit considered ineffective. There were some measures of intervention by the city 
administration, and police arrested 120 informal traders. Protests continued for a week 
in the case of Yeoville. Refer to Pernegger's personal archive material, Interviews 
(Cowan 2012, Gerneke 2012, Goldsmith 2012) and also various sources (M&G 1997b; 
Peberdy & Talibe 1997; The Citizen 1997; HRW 1998; Peberdy & Crush 1998, pp. 5, 6; 
Business Report 2000; CSVR 2008). [467] but refer also to [453], [442] and [346]. 
1997 October 23 City centre anti-foreigner and anti-enforcement informal trader protests: Two months 
later, the situation of foreign traders was just as dangerous. According to the Human 
Rights Watch (1998), 500 traders marched in the Inner City on 23 October. Again, 
foreigners were denigrated. Again, an informal trading association reiterated the 
hostility directed at foreigners at the rally after the march and told the protestors that 
the foreigners "are not welcome. No country would allow the mess Johannesburg has 
come to. We must clean up the streets of Johannesburg of foreign informal traders. 
The pavements of Johannesburg are for South African citizens and not for foreigners" 
(HRW 1998, p. 67 of 157). A month later, in November, an informal trading association 
called for sanctions on goods traded by foreigners. It was not only the city centre that 
experienced the xenophobic attacks against traders, but also Yeoville, Kempton Park, 
Germiston and Cape Town at various times in 1996 and 1997 (HRW 1998; CSVR 2008). 
[442] but refer also to [467], [453] and [346]. 
1998 September Anti-foreigner informal trader protest: Linked to the 1997 anti-foreigner protests, 
emotions were still running high in the city centre a year later. Aggressive UMSA 
supporters returning to Johannesburg from a protest in Pretoria throw three foreigners 
on the train to their death (Business Report 2000; Misago et al. 2009, p. 23). UMSA did 
not explicitly support the attacks but did not stop it; they said that unemployment and 
poverty in South Africa was mostly caused by foreigners. Three human rights 
organisations joined forces to carry out the 'Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign' in 
December (CSVR 2008). The links are drawn between unemployment, protest and 
xenophobia (see Interviews (Cowan 2012, Gerneke 2012, Goldsmith 2012) and various 
sources (HRW 1998; Business Report 2000; CSVR 2008)). [346] but refer also to [442] 
and [453]. 
1999 September Braamfontein anti-eviction protest: In September 1999, the GJMC evicted 500 street 
traders from Braamfontein, with clashes between police and informal traders taking 
place. In response, the GHA organised a mass rally against the by-laws that restricted 
the informal traders from trading in Braamfontein. In its memorandum, GHA asked the 
GJMC to recognize the permanence of street trading on all Johannesburg streets. They 
also called for all material confiscated by the police since mid-1998 to be returned. The 
protest action prompted a joint fact-finding mission by GJMC officials and the GHA 
representatives. "The mission began a process of negotiations on the rights and 
responsibilities of street traders and city officials" (Motala 2002, p. 27). [455].  
1999 December Anti-Yeoville market: The Yeoville Market opened in December 1999 to a barrage of 
opposition in the media from both traders in the markets and 'illegal' traders in the 
surrounding streets, forcing the MTC to declare a moratorium on market rents for at 
least the first three months (Gotz & Simone 2001, pp. 8-10). 
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2001-2005  
2001 March 28, May 24 Park Station traders' anti-eviction protests: Informal traders were attracted to trade in 
Park Station by the high pedestrian footfall. The consequent volume of trading 
evidently posed a significant challenge for Metrorail, as it did at other stations in 
Gauteng. The station management had obtained a court order in 1999 allowing it to 
evict about 200 informal traders from its properties based on the danger caused to 
train passengers and the shortfall of ablutions. On 28 March 2001, traders were 
removed from station platforms at Park Station by a security company, on behalf of its 
management. These traders were operating from and living in makeshift structures 
inside the station. Metrorail had repeatedly warned the traders to leave in terms of the 
court interdict. After their removal, traders were defiant and said that they would 
return the following day.  
The GHA then orchestrated a protest march on May 24, first to the police demanding 
that overnight detentions of traders caught trading at the stations be stopped, then to 
Metrorail demanding that it ceased labelling traders as criminals and collaborates to 
create a workable solution for traders. Later that day, traders stoned security guards, 
who then used rubber bullets to disperse the traders. Metrorail called off the eviction 
planned for 17 June. It ultimately agreed with the GHA that registered traders with 
identity cards and uniformed traders could continue to trade on Metrorail property. 
Intersite also completed a Cookhouse project for 30 traders in 2000, and an ex-
prisoner-managed communal shower and laundry facility, earning Metrorail a Silver 
Impumelelo award for innovation (Impumelelo Social Innovations Centre 2001).  
A consultant working for the SMLC in the vicinity of Park Station and acquainted with 
its trader-related challenges recalled the friction between informal traders selling 
within the station and Intersite, the property management arm of SARCC. She 
remembered that traders had held Intersite staff hostage at the Park Station for a 
number of hours. On another occasion, traders would not let people out of a meeting 
(see Interviews (Muthialu 2012, Goldsmith 2012) and various sources (Business Day 
1999; City Press 1999; news24 2001a, b, d; Motala 2002, pp. 27, 45; South African Rail 
Commuter Corporation 2002; ILO 2003)). [176]. 
2001 July GHA anti-enforcement march: 2 000 traders marched under the banner of the GHA 
demanding the cessation of impoundment of stock and a management plan (Saekano 
2001) [No reference number in Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2002 January Park Station traders' violent anti-eviction protest: three coaches are set alight at Park 
Station after COJ officials removed traders from station platforms (refer also '2001 
March 28, May 24' herein). [456]. 
2002 February and 
March 
GHA Court challenge to by-law enforcement: The JMPD undertook focused street 
trading by-law enforcement in the Inner City for a number of weeks starting in early 
January 2002. Towards the end of January, Mayor Masondo announced that the COJ 
would "clampdown on hawkers not trading in designated zones" meaning markets in 
Hillbrow, Yeoville and Eloff Street (news24 2002a). The JMPD confiscated stock of 
about 400 street traders trading in contravention of the by-laws. On 3 February, the 
GHA held a crisis meeting for traders about the enforcement and also about MTC's 
management of markets (eProp Commercial Property News 2002). The GHA alleged 
that the JMPD had "looted" 30 tons of stock from traders (City Press 2002b). 
On 4 February, the JMPD baton-charged a group of angry traders that were demanding 
the return of their goods (news24 2002a). On 5 February, the GHA tried to hold a mass 
meeting, which the JMPD disbanded (City Press 2002b). On 7 February, the GHA 
announced it had lodged an application for an urgent interdict against the COJ in the 
High Court to be heard the next day (news24 2002a).  
 
 
 
 Li Pernegger   |   Stories of City Strife in Johannesburg: Agonism in Local Democracy and Service Delivery   |   Page 381 
Date  Protest 
On 8 February, the High Court ordered the JMPD to return confiscated goods 
immediately to traders without charging storage fees and to stop enforcement in the 
city centre. The JMPD was allowed to continue to enforce by-laws in other parts of the 
Inner City providing the COJ warned traders 48 hours in advance of any action and such 
actions were in strict accordance with the law. The JMPD continued to enforce the by-
laws in line with the court order, which was effective until the COJ had presented its 
case to the Court on 19 February. That day, the Court was also to consider the GHA's 
application to overrule by-laws that allowed the JMPD to remove traders from the 
streets (COJ 2002c; City Press 2002b, c). 
On 10 February, the City Manager, Pascal Moloi' was compelled to comment to the 
press in February 2002 that the COJ was "dealing with anarchy" despite the 
developmental measures it had taken so far (Sunday Independent 2002). On 20 
February, the High Court granted an interim order allowing the JMPD's seizure of goods 
from traders that were in contravention of the by-laws, as long as 48 hours' notice was 
given and receipts were issued. A number of traders laid charges of theft, harassment 
and bribery against certain JMPD officers (AllAfrica.com 2002). On 24 February the GHA 
invited its members to lay criminal charges with the police against the JMPD for the 
alleged confiscation of goods without the provision of receipts. The GHA said that the 
Legal Resources Centre wold support legal action by the traders (PanaPress 2002). On 3 
March, the JMPD said that its officers were "just doing their job" (City Press 2002c, d). 
On 5 March, there was a follow-up hearing in the High Court "on the constitutionality 
of the police action and bylaws" (City Press 2002c; PanaPress 2002). The GHA 
challenged the by-law dealing with "removal and impoundment of goods, articles, 
receptacles, vehicles or structures belonging to informal traders operating in 
contravention of the by-laws" (COJ 2002c). The outcome of the court action could not 
be determined at the time of the research; nonetheless, it seems to have impacted on 
future JMPD actions as these were accompanied by advance notices thereafter. [No 
reference number in Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2002 August 2002 August WSSD Freedom to Trade Protest: Impacting on the disposition of Inner 
City traders, the COJ remove traders from WSSD-related sites in Soweto and Sandton 
on 21 August 2002 by force (Misbach 2002). A week later on 28 August 2002, the GHA, 
the IBF, which was a coalition of informal traders formations in Gauteng, and other 
street trading and farming organisations march in protest to Sandton, the location of 
the WSSD conference. They demand the right to trade, including at the conference 
venues whereat organisers had barred informal trading. The protestors issue 
memoranda to Mosiuoa Lekota, the Minister of Defence. They award a 'bullshit trophy' 
to Greenpeace and other NGOs for purportedly perpetuating poverty in Africa (Liberty 
Institute 2002a, b, c; Misbach 2002). [No reference number in Databank Analysis 
Workbook]. 
2002 August 2002 Yeoville Market rental boycott: The traders boycott rental payments at the 
Yeoville Market (Business Day 2002). They protest about rental affordability, poor 
marketing, maintenance, and lack of access to MTC. They vow to continue the boycott 
until the MTC agrees to meet them. The MTC refutes the traders' claims as being not 
truthful. Many traders go back to trading on the street instead. Note that the rents are 
very low and that the MTC provides a wide range of facilities. Ultimately, the MTC was 
to lock traders out of the Yeoville Market for non-payment of rentals. Note there is 
reference made in COJ documentation that rentals had been halved although the date 
of that is uncertain (but likely in January 2002) (COJ 2002g). Gotz and Simone (2001) 
said the many protests by traders was predictable (ibid., pp. 10-11), and partly reflects 
the "street protection business" of the GHA and other traders (ibid., p. 10). 
Presumably, the MTC's action led partly to the September 2002 protest. Refer to 
Interviews (Atkins 2012, Goldsmith 2012). [161].  
2002 September-
October 
IBF traders anti-market protests: On 12 September 2002, traders were already 
inflamed by the Yeoville Market rental boycott in August 2002 (Business Day 2002) 
against alleged poor market management by the MTC and high rentals.  
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The MTC then cancelled a planned meeting with StreetNet, the IBF and traders to 
discuss the problems of Yeoville and Metro Mall markets (ioL News Online 2002e). On 
15 September 2002, the JMPD issued warnings to a hundred traders that they would 
be removed from Metro Mall sidewalks as they were blocking entrances to the taxi 
rank (News24 2002b). Traders were trading illegally as the area around Metro Mall, 
which had been declared a prohibited trading area, to support the viability of the 
market and those traders who were paying rentals in the market. 
On 18 September, the IBF announced it had decided to march on 25 September to the 
GPG and the COJ, to ask Mayor Masondo for an urgent meeting, to lobby Sydney 
Mufamadi, the national Minister of Provincial and Local Government, in person on 1 
October, and to ask the High Court to grant an interdict to stop the eviction of traders 
(news24 2002c).  
Two hundred traders protested on 20 September after JMPD removed them from the 
sidewalks. The JMPD had warned them that a removal would happen on 18 September; 
the date was subsequently extended to 20 September (News24 2002b).  
On 25 September 2002, the IBF marched in protest about market management by the 
MTC (ioL 2002e). The IBF, the GHA and traders marched from the Library Gardens to 
the Gauteng Legislature intending to deliver a memorandum outlining their grievances 
to the MEC of the GPG for Finance and Economic Development, Jabu Moleketi, in 
person. However, the head of the department received the memorandum instead. The 
marchers then wanted Mayor Masondo to receive the memorandum but he was also 
not available. Traders then marched to the MTC to express their grievances about high 
rents, police raids, being hounded off the streets, their exclusion from deciding 
development plans, the lack of water and electricity, the MTC's market management, 
the so-called waste of R170 million that had been earmarked for developing markets, 
no promotion of the market and the loss of customers. According to the IBF's 
memorandum, it demanded the immediate resignation of the CEO of the MTC because 
he was 'a symbol of past repression' and he had failed to address the concerns raised 
by the Hillbrow and Yeoville Market traders.  
During the protest, traders waved posters proclaiming "Freedom to trade", "Away with 
Atkins" and "It's war, Masondo." Some of the traders were dressed in the distinctive 
black T-shirts and red overalls of the GHA (Pernegger 2014a, p. 64). The IBF threatened 
more marches, picketing, and sit-ins. The leaders of the march urged protestors to 
disperse in a dignified manner and to not assault traders who did not march. The SAPS 
and JMPD maintained high visibility, as traders were belligerent and clamorous. The 
leaders of the COJ, the MTC and the GPG had allegedly refused to meet the traders, 
according to the traders, treated them like criminals, and tested out the JMPD on 
traders that were not in markets. The COJ refutes this saying consultations had been 
held and that, in terms of objections to high rentals, these were very low (Interview, 
Atkins, 2012). 
Mayor Masondo's spokesperson, Khotso Chikane, promised that the Mayor would 
meet with traders within a week or two. The outcome of the meeting, if there was one, 
is unknown. Traders continue to refuse to pay rent for the next two months.  
On 2 October 2002, the MTC used the Red Ants, a private security company contracted 
by the COJ for evictions, to forcibly evict and lock out traders from the Yeoville Market 
for non-payment of the previous two months' rent (Business Day 2002). (Refer to 
Interview, Atkins, 2012). [070]. 
2002 October IBF court action about Yeoville leases: In brief, shortly after the IBF traders' anti-market 
management protests of September-October 2002, the IBF again protested against the 
MTC, this time to its proposal to amend lease agreements for stalls in the Yeoville 
Market and took the MTC to court. The traders won their case but the victory was a 
pyrrhic one as the judgement was in accordance with the MTC's aspirations (Interview, 
Atkins, 2012). 
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According to Atkins, Edmund Elias of the IBF lodged a case in the Magistrate's Court on 
behalf of the Yeoville Market traders, rather than approaching the MTC for a discussion 
about their grievance. The MTC had been charging rentals for stalls with storage in the 
Yeoville Market. The MTC wanted to separate the rentals for the stalls from the rentals 
for storage and rent them out separately as storage was at a premium and not all stall 
traders used it. At the time, the MTC had a pre-existing 'licence agreement' with each 
trader for the stall combined with storage. It proposed to cancel the agreement and 
replace it with two new ones on the same terms as before, giving affected traders a 
period of notice of 30 days. The MTC consulted with traders about its plan. Their 
association, possibly flexing its muscle, or relying on poor legal advice, took the matter 
to court.  
The IBF's court application said the IBF wanted the MTC to consult with traders about 
any action to be undertaken by the MTC, but following such consultation, any decision 
arising therefrom was to be binding on the parties. The judge asked the association if it 
was sure that it wanted the decision of the court to echo their court application. The 
association said it was exactly what they wanted. The judge then granted them their 
order. Although the traders may have 'won', their victory was a pyrrhic one. They seem 
not to have recognised, as the judge had, that consultation between the parties did not 
imply that any decision taken by the MTC had to be a mutually agreed one after such 
consultation had taken place. In effect, the MTC's process had been validated as a 
sound one by the court (refer to Interview, Atkins, 2012; note that the date is 
approximate and could not be confirmed at the time of the research). [457]. 
2003 November 25 IBF litigation threat and court action: Edmund Elias of the IBF, representing allegedly 14 
associations and 8 000 traders, threatened to file a court action that week against the 
COJ and JMPD to force the city administration to prosecute 'illegal' traders (i.e. those 
trading in restricted areas for free and in completion with market traders who had to 
pay rent). The IBF also wanted the restricted areas reviewed, frequently the best places 
for informal trading. The JMPD spokesperson said that a review of restricted areas was 
possible, providing other citizens benefitted also. The COJ had completed Metro Mall 
and the Hillbrow and Yeoville Markets, with another nine planned, for traders (The 
Citizen 2003a, b). [457]. 
2004 May 14-June 11 Metro Mall taxi lock-out protest: The taxis using Metro Mall were supposed to make 
monthly payments to the MTC who managed the facility. The MTC charged each taxi R2 
per day, a nominal rental that did not cover operating costs, to use the rank. The taxi 
associations administered the collections of the fees, in line with an agreement with 
the MTC, from the taxis but paid them only sporadically to the MTC. Matters had come 
to a head already, in April 2003, mere months after the opening of the Metro Mall. The 
MTC had had to resort to the threat of eviction of the taxis to try and recover 
payments. Then, the taxi associations paid up, in cash. A year later, on 14 May 2004, 
again the MTC said that it would lock the taxis out of the Metro Mall taxi rank if taxi 
associations had not paid their rental arrears for the previous year within three days. 
The taxi associations still refused to pay, as they believed that the COJ should provide 
the ranks for free and on the same basis as all other public transport service providers 
in South Africa. The MTC then locked them out of the rank for non-payment. Taxis 
operated informally from an open piece of land adjacent to Metro Mall whilst 
commuters were inconvenienced for three weeks. Market traders soon followed suit, 
said Atkins: 
"… you have great sympathy with the informal traders if the taxis, 
who could afford to pay, weren't paying, why should the informal 
traders who were, if you like, hand-to-mouth subsistence traders, 
have to pay? When the big boys weren't paying, why should the 
little minnows have to pay?" (Interview, Atkins, 2012). 
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The Mayor convened a meeting on 7 June between the COJ representatives and taxi 
associations to resolve the impasse. Whilst they did not resolve the clash that day, the 
Mayor instructed the MTC to re-open the rank immediately, which it did, after the MTC 
board resolved to support the Mayor's decision. It seemed, according to Atkins, that 
the Mayor: 
"… wanted it to all just go away. Everything had to be smooth and 
serene with no difficulties. It came to a head with the taxis. I think 
prior to that he wasn't particularly bothered … I honestly don't know 
what his priority was … he was heading up a Council who up until 
that moment, the principle of the user pays applied. Suddenly it 
didn't anymore, it no longer applied. Literally in one meeting that 
whole concept of the user pays just disappeared, ironic because the 
user is still paying. It's just not handing the money over to the city 
council. I don't have an answer why. I know what the … taxis' 
argument was, which was every other form of public transport is 
subsidized, we should be subsidized and the Council must pay, but 
that's a different agenda. I wasn't privy to those meetings; I just 
know that from that one meeting on, the whole concept of the user 
pays went out the window, and consequently the financial model 
that went back to 1996, '7, '8, for the roll-out of markets no longer 
applied. It had gone, because any sense of credulity [sic] that the 
council had, had gone. Up until that point you used spaces, you were 
a trader, you paid. From that moment on, no chance (Interview, 
Atkins, 2012). 
In effect, the political decision largely nullified the policy of the 'user pays' that had 
been painstakingly negotiated with many interest groups over many years. Although 
further meetings were held between the COJ and the taxi associations to discuss the 
issue of payment and taxi rank management starting on 11 June, chaired by Mayor 
Masondo, with other numerous and protracted sessions chaired by Councillor Tau 
thereafter, and later Councillor Cowan, no sustainable agreement was reached. Taxi 
drivers and traders increasingly withheld rentals from the MTC, even in other taxi ranks 
and markets such as Hillbrow and Yeoville.  
According to Atkins (Interview, Atkins, 2012), the credibility of the MTC had thus been 
irreparably damaged, and it ceased to be a viable initiative. The inconsistent 
development and management approaches, and the little-foreseen consequences of 
decisions made, by officials and politicians, within the COJ and its agencies, with each 
group driven by common but also competing aims and priorities, meant that little 
agonistic energy was applied to the wider, and tense, state-society tension in the 
informal trading sector. The ongoing governance uncertainty of the MTC meant that it 
limped along, heavily subsidised, until its closure in 2012 and the transfer of its 
functions to the Johannesburg Property Company. Refer to Interview, Atkins, 2012 and 
various sources (The Citizen 2003a; COJ 2004i; 2004k; Atkins 2014). [177]. 
2004 August Property owners' and informal traders' anti-'cages' protest: In brief: The EDU began 
implementing the 'cages' initiative in August 2004. The 'cages' were metal and mesh 
stalls, called 'cages' as the sides could fold up and be locked up at night to keep stock 
secure. The 'cages' provided a fast-tracked complement to the other, but slower, 
market developments of the COJ's ITDP (COJ 2004f). The approach seemed to have 
potential to deal with what Lael Bethlehem, the head of the EDU's Joburg 2030 team 
from 2002 to 2005 and later the CEO of the JDA between 2006 and 2010, dubbed as 
the "insoluble problem" of uncontrolled street trading (Interview, Bethlehem, 2013). 
However, according to Dinat, almost as soon as the COJ started installing the cages, 
starting in the Joubert Park precinct and other congested areas (COJ 2006h, p. 197), 
formal businesses lodged forceful legal challenges against the COJ. They maintained 
the 'cages' did little to alleviate the 'anarchic' state of the sidewalks as some were 
poorly located; there were project and management shortfalls; and some businesses 
wanted trading banned completely from the streets.  
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Ultimately, however, the COJ had to address some of the businesses' demands and 
repositioned or removed many 'cages' from the streets, and the project was stopped 
before it could be fully completed (Interview, Dinat, 2012). 
The EDU of the COJ was the driver of the Informal Trading Development Programme 
(ITDP) (COJ 2004f), one of the measures to address the decline of the Inner City. Lael 
Bethlehem, the former head of the EDU's Joburg 2030 team, thought that street 
trading was an "insoluble problem" (Interview, Bethlehem, 2013) but not in the same 
league as the more significant management challenge of slummed buildings, forcing 
the COJ in one instance to became an accidental slumlord (Pernegger forthcoming). 
Even though property owners in the Inner City saw trading as "anarchic", it would have 
been "morally repugnant… and impossible… under conditions of democracy" 
(Interview, Bethlehem, 2013) to clear the streets of informal trading, as one of the 
major Inner City property owners had demanded. She said that if the COJ had adopted 
a purely urban management and property investment perspective, then it would not 
have protected street traders' rights, as it had done in the face of opposition from 
some property owners, but would have changed its policy and removed traders with 
the support of the army.  
Sean Dinat said that large formal businesses such as City Prop, Old Mutual, 
GrowthPoint and iProp complained about uncontrolled street trading on the sidewalks 
outside their buildings. Dinat said street trading was perceived as synonymous with 
hundreds of years of infrastructure that was "permanently disrupted, blocked, rat-
ridden… just getting rotten with informal trading's cardboards, goods, fruit, veg and 
plastics. The streets were unmanageable, un-walkable, and grime and crime-ridden' 
(Interview, Dinat, 2012). Bethlehem said that in terms of the COJ's policy, formal 
markets were to serve as the instrument to balance the rights of traders, property 
owners, shops, and pedestrians (Interview, Bethlehem, 2012), but these were slow and 
costly to implement. So, in 2004, the EDU proposed a speedier and more affordable 
complement to formal markets.  
The COJ began to install the first planned 500 to 1 000 standard steel-and-mesh stalls, 
colloquially known as 'cages', in August 2004. The EDU had originally planned 800 stalls 
in the Inner City in 2002 (COJ 2006h). Dinat recognised that the EDU had to bully 
departments internally and bend every rule to implement the initiative. It became 
clear, however, that that the location of a number of the 'cages' on the sidewalks was 
problematic. Some were positioned in contravention of the by-laws, or crowded too 
close together, obstructed views of shop fronts visually and physically, were too large. 
Dinat said that, further, the COJ hardly managed the leases, maintained the stalls 
properly, failed to consult adequately with affected parties on the initiative, prevent 
subletting of stalls or exploitation of traders by associations that 'sold' space, or deal 
with corruption in the implementation and management process (Interview, Dinat, 
2012). He said that formal businesses then lodged forceful legal challenges against the 
COJ. Informal traders and their associations also objected saying that they had not 
been consulted.  
In hindsight, Bethlehem (Interview, Bethlehem, 2013) and other officials (Interviews, 
Cachalia, Mamonyane and Dinat, all 2012) believed that the 'cages' had been a failure 
on the COJ's part, unable to bring order to the streets. Subsequently, many stalls were 
repositioned or removed from the streets, and the project was stopped before it could 
be completed  
Refer to Interviews (Cachalia and Mamonyane 2012; Dinat 2012; Bethlehem, 2013) and 
other sources (COJ 2004f; Citichat 2012b; Atkins 2015). [181]. 
2004 September 1 Violent anti-market management march: In a violent protest march, about 3 000 
traders marched to the Gauteng Legislature and to Mayor Masondo and delivered a 
memorandum. Traders demanded a proper management plan; the suspension of 
enforcement and JMPD's cessation of 'looting' of their stock; objected to the high 
market rentals of R50 per month; and demanded ownership of their stalls in markets 
and the dismissal of the CEO of MTC due to 'ongoing friction'.  
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They complained of being 'forced into markets that are not viable,' that spaces in 
demarcated areas had not been allocated as per the October 2002 policy although 
funds had been approved three months earlier, and that shares had been given to the 
CEO of the MTC. Mayor Masondo met the TCC and announced that the CEO was to be 
replaced (without discussing this with the CEO first) – the then CEO had offered to stay 
on after his contract expiry in June until a successor had been appointed but no later 
than 31 December 2004 (Interview, Atkins, 2012). Mayor Masondo agreed to a joint 
policy workshop in October – the planned June session had been postponed. Two 
attempts by Mayor Masondo to invite the ILO to serve as a neutral facilitator of the 
session as the traders had requested went unanswered. Mayor Masondo noted that 
enforcement would continue (M&G 2004b; Saturday Star 2004; Sunday Independent 
2004). [458]. 
2004 November JTA violent protest march: The bullying, looting and destruction of traders unwilling to 
join the JTA violent protest march to Mayor Masondo the week before was condemned 
by Councillor Cowan, MMC of the Inner City Committee, in an open letter in the press 
on 17 November. Cowan noted another protest earlier in the year where the same 
tactics were used (no reference to the protest was found at the time of this research, 
and the date is assumed to be around the 10 November). Traders aimed to raise 
awareness of JMPD corruption and purported human rights abuses, but undermined 
their own cause with their actions according to Cowan. Cowan stated that the JTA must 
be responsible for the unruly behaviour of its members and must respect the individual 
trader's right not to protest (Cowan 2004). [459]. 
2004 November-
December 
Commissioner Street anti-illegal trading protest: In brief, the illegal traders objected to 
the JMPD's seizure of their goods, and shopkeepers complained about the additional 
stalls that had been erected to replace damaged ones (Interview, Atkins, 2012). 
In detail, just before Christmas, the MTC reorganized trading sites in the Commissioner 
Street market, starting at the Carlton Centre end of the market. Between the few 
original tented structures that remained, many street traders had set up informal stalls. 
The MTC demarcated sites with metal studs, and provided some additional structures, 
the 'cages', where possible. Traders were allocated sites and those that could not be 
accommodated were removed. Soon however they returned to the market and began 
trading illegally. The MTC's CEO, Keith Atkins, believed that although there was some 
COJ-trader friction, it took a back seat to the COJ's internal friction with the JMPD and 
its seeming reluctance to enforce the by-laws. He described how the MTC and the 
JMPD came to loggerheads early on in the re-development of the Commissioner Street 
market. Atkins recalled the fury of the market traders when the JMPD did not keep 
their former trading areas clear of informal trading, in line with the declaration of the 
restricted trading area. Atkins said: 
"[H]aving moved the traders out, charged them rent for both stalls and storage, 
they would then see that the spaces that they had occupied previously free of 
charge with guaranteed footfall were then taken over by other traders who 
shouldn't have been there. So you then have the conflict between existing traders, 
the conflict between the council, for not having done its job in ensuring that the 
bylaws were carried out … directed at Metro Trading as being the management arm 
of the City Council, but it was also directed at the Council … [and] … with the Metro 
Police by then having allowed the traders to become established once again out on 
the streets, started doing the raids and seizing their goods. So you then had the 
interesting dialogue of traders inside supporting Metro Police seizing the goods, 
whilst the traders' organisations … were complaining that the police were taking the 
goods away from traders that shouldn't have been trading in the first place" 
(Interview, Atkins, 2012). 
The different mode of management by the KUM (formerly the CJP until 2003 when it 
was renamed as part of a restructuring initiative) added to the confusion. The CJP had 
established a number of Business Improvement Districts on behalf of its property-
owner members, which encompassed some informal trading markets. Atkins pointed 
out the difference between the CJP and the MTC, and that the CJP could do: 
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"a very, very good job … because … they had their own enforcement officers, unlike 
having to rely upon JMPD because of the by-law situation. The MTC could not have 
enforcement officers. It wasn't in its mandate, in its memorandum and articles of 
association. They could manage markets, but they couldn't manage markets areas 
outside the markets, informal traders, street traders. Hence the need to designate 
areas and established markets, be they stalls or be they designated spaces" 
(Interview, Atkins, 2012). 
Note that the November-December date is approximate according to Atkin's 
recollection (Interview, Atkins, 2012). [No reference number in Databank Analysis 
Workbook]. 
2006-2010  
2006 February TCC's Anti-lock-out protest: Traders had been locked out of Metro Mall for not paying 
rents despite the MTC's write-off of previous outstanding debt in exchange for timeous 
rental payment thereafter. The TCC disputed this saying that they were going to court 
and that the real reason, inter alia, for the protest was that traders refused to sign 
lease agreements, as they did not understand them (eProp Commercial Property News 
2006). [No reference number in Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2006 September SANTRA Anti-enforcement media lobby (ioL News Online 2006; The Star 2006a, b). [No 
reference number in Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2007 June SANTRA Anti-enforcement media lobby(M&G 2007). [No reference number in 
Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2007 July SANTRA Anti-enforcement media lobby (The Star 2007). [No reference number in 
Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2008 April 17 AFITO and others anti-enforcement media lobby (The Citizen 2008). [No reference 
number in Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2008 April 24 Anti-enforcement march and memorandum: Tissington (2009) said:  
"One Voice of All Hawkers Association (OVOAHA) is a registered Section 21 [not for 
profit] company that claims to represent the interests of over 1 000 traders in 
Johannesburg. The organisation emerged most notably in April 2008 when it 
marched on, and presented a memorandum of demands to, the COJ's Executive 
Mayor, Amos Masondo and the MTC, using what The Star termed "emotional 
blackmail" to express their grievances, stating that "whether you are a minister, 
premier, mayor, manager or councillor, the truth is that some of you became 
educated because of your mothers braving the cold weather to sell in the streets" 
[citing The Star (2008)]. The memorandum demanded that demarcation must be 
accelerated by the MTC and informal traders must be included in the process; that 
hawkers must be allowed to sell in the interim; that the EDU of the COJ must reduce 
areas of restriction and allocate more stalls to traders; that the by-laws be reviewed; 
and that the Metro police stop harassing traders and confiscating their goods [citing 
OVAHA (2008)].  
"Its plight was supported by the social movement, the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
(APF), who stated in a press release that 'The Gauteng Hawkers Association was a 
part of the early beginnings of the APF when it was participating in the Anti-iGoli 
Forum [citing commentary earlier on iGoli on page]. The renewed voice of hawkers 
in the shape of the OVAHA is welcomed by the APF. The Forum supports the 
hawkers' struggle for a space in the city, and more broadly for a space for the poor 
in the city Joburg is becoming' [citing APF (2008b)]" (Tissington 2009, pp. 45-46).  
See also The Star (2008). [No reference number in Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
2008 May 2008 May Anti-foreigner protests throughout South Africa. 
2008 November 23 OVAHA anti-enforcement media lobby (City Press 2008). [No reference number in 
Databank Analysis Workbook]. 
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2009 August 5 
 
SAITF anti-enforcement mass action: SAITF planned to march in the city centre against 
"alleged rights violations" including the impoundment of goods and harassment, high 
market rents, lack of consultation about the by-laws revision, and alleged corruption in 
the JMPD and MTC. SAITF's demands are to be handed to the Premier of the GPG and 
Mayor Masondo. It is not clear if the march took place (The Citizen 2009). [171]. 
2009 December 1 OVAHA-led protest march and memorandum: The memorandum handed to the COJ 
demands for the dissolution of the MTC, an investigation into JMPD bribery, the right 
to more trading spaces in the city centre and access to World Cup trading opportunities 
(Sowetan 2009a) [460]. 
2010 May 12 Precinct traders march to SAFA: Long-standing Soccer City stadium precinct traders 
marched to SAFA house after they were evicted from the stadium area (Saturday Star 
2010). [461]. 
2010 May 15 World Cup march to Mayor Masondo: A few days later, hundreds of traders led by 
OVAHA, claiming membership of over 1 000 traders, marched to Mayor Masondo's 
office demanding accreditation to trade at World Cup events. The COJ maintained it 
had been engaging with informal traders and 'has intensified its interaction with 
traders'. The 200 established events traders would be situated in designated areas and 
another 800 traders would be accommodated at parallel events (Saturday Star 2010) 
[462]. 
2010 November 10 OVAHA anti-enforcement march and memorandum: OVAHA led a march of 100 to 300 
Braamfontein traders from Newtown to Metro Centre on Tuesday to issue a 
memorandum to the COJ with 29 demands, mainly to do with enforcement by JMPD. 
Peter Kute of the COJ said that the Executive Committee of the COJ said the traders 
would be met the next day (M&G 2010; Press 2010) [463]. 
Post-2010  
2011 April 13 Informal traders' anti-marginalisation march and memorandum: The traders and 
OVAHA marched to the Department of Economic Development in the GPG in 
Braamfontein (sic: suspect the writer meant the DED of the COJ as Xolani Nxumalo 
received the memorandum and he worked for the DED). Traders demanded more 
trading spaces and demarcations; that the officials be bound to the COJ's policy; 
enforcement be stopped; the removal of Nigerian traders from De Villiers Street, inter 
alia. The COJ noted it was "disappointed" that OVAHA chose to march and felt the 
action was "opportunistic" as the issues were already under discussion at sessions of 
the COJ's Informal Trade Forum (ITF). The ITF met "regularly to discuss informal trade 
issues and is a formal Council approved structure that allows for interaction to resolve 
issues, promote trade, facilitate education and training and address traders' concerns" 
(COJ 2011y). The COJ said it would respond within seven days (COJ 2011y; Daily Sun 
2011; The Citizen 2011). [464]. 
2011 May 27 Joubert Street property owners protest: The property owners objected to the trashing 
of Joubert Street. The JDA had recently upgraded the street as a formal market. In 
terms of the project, on-street parking had been removed. However, traders had taken 
over the street in contravention of the by-laws. The enforcement manager of Region F 
agreed to coordinate a meeting of JMPD, MTC and JDA by the end of the month, having 
unsuccessfully tried to do this in January already (The Star 2011b) [465]. 
2012 May 23 Concerned Hawkers Group memorandum: The Concerned Hawkers Group wanted 
permission to gather to present a memorandum of grievance concerning trading 
spaces and informal traders' rights. According to the JMPD data, it was not clear if this 
protest went ahead (Duncan 2014a). Refer also to Interview (Cowan 2012) and Elias 
(2012). [232]. 
2012 October 24 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning police harassment. According to the 
JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (Duncan 2014a) but it is not clear if the 
memorandum was handed over to the COJ [367]. 
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2012 November 15 OVAHA informal trading march and memorandum concerning trading spaces in 
Johannesburg. According to the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (ibid.) 
but it is not clear if the memorandum was handed over to the COJ [374]. 
2012 November 21 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning grievances about informal traders' 
rights: according to the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (ibid.) but it is not 
clear if the memorandum was handed over to the COJ [377]. 
2013 June 26 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning grievances about informal traders' 
rights. According to the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (Duncan 2014a) 
but it is not clear if the memorandum was handed over to the COJ [414]. 
2013 July 10 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning the right to trading space. According 
to the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (ibid.) but it is not clear of the 
memorandum was handed over to the COJ [417]. 
2013 July 12 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning Inner City corruption. According to 
the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (ibid.) but it is not clear if the 
memorandum was handed over to the COJ [418].  
2013 July 17 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning the right to trading space. According 
to the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (ibid.) but it is not clear of the 
memorandum was handed over to the COJ [419]. 
2013 August 7 OVAHA informal trading memorandum concerning the right to trading space. According 
to the JMPD data, permission to gather was granted (ibid.) but it is not clear if the 
memorandum was handed over to the COJ [425]. 
2013 October-December Anti-Operation Clean Sweep and Constitutional Court challenge (see next Appendix) 
about the right to trade legal challenge. 
Note: 
The timeline of 49 protests between 1991 and 2013 in this Table excludes events related to Operation Clean Sweep cannot be an exhaustive list given under-reporting in the 
media and elsewhere and incomplete official records. Primary data are derived from multiple sources such as miscellaneous reports and minutes of meetings of the GJMC, 
COJ, HRW and CSVR; databases; journal articles; field notes from interviews; web pages; media articles and press releases from mainly Business Day, Citichat, City Press, COJ, 
ioL, M&G, News24 and Saturday Star; and others.  
The use of square brackets in tables signifies the unique reference number for the protest in the primary data. 
The use of the word 'violent' or ('violence') may include actual or threatened violence and is dependent on the interpretation of the data on each protest, see definition on 
page 23. 
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Date Protest 
2013 September 26  COJ invites 
traders to OCS 
meeting 
Trader associations were invited by SMS to a meeting about OCS by the 
DED (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, pp. 12, 19). 
2013 September 30 COJ reminds 
ITF of planned 
operation 
The COJ reminded ITF members of the upcoming operation at a meeting. 
and were briefed by the COJ (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, pp. 10, 29). 
Plans for the operation had been discussed a year before (M&G 2013c). 
2013 October 1   OCS starts In summary, the purpose of the operation was to tackle crime and grime 
issues, not just 'chaotic' informal trading, in the Inner City using a highly 
coordinated, multi-disciplinary approach, to address complaints made by 
users of the Inner City and businesses (The Star 2013b, c). Thousands of 
traders, both legal and illegal, were evicted from their trading sites. If 
traders' permits were verified by the COJ, a reportedly chaotic process 
(M&G 2013d), they were to be allowed to return to trading sites, 
although not necessarily their former sites, and only after some weeks. 
The operation met with resistance from the traders, trader association, 
and advocacy groups. Attempts by traders and the COJ to find a mutually 
beneficial solution were unsuccessful. Ultimately, the traders sought 
relief from the High Court, but their application for an urgent interdict 
was postponed. Upon appeal to the Constitutional Court, the traders 
were allowed to return to their trading spots in the interim without 
interference from the JMPD. The Court's final ruling followed a few 
months later, ratifying its earlier interim ruling. It declared the COJ's 
actions as procedurally and legislatively flawed as it infringed on the 
traders' legal right to trade. (Business Day 2013b; M&G 2013d; The 
Citizen 2013a; The New Age 2013a, b; The Star 2013c, h; Urban Joburg 
2013a; SERI 2015b). Traders said they didn’t know OCS was going to 
happen with reallocation of stalls and removal of illegal stalls, although 
COJ said traders had been advised ad it had minutes of ITF meetings to 
that effect (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 11). 
2013 October 9 Mayor goes on 
walkabout 
Mayor Tau inspected the work of the team on a walkabout, with invited 
media, and said the team would continue every day until 'order' is 
restored (CityBuzz 2013; SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 30; The Star 
2013f). 
2013 October 14 Some traders 
cannot return 
to former sites 
Around mid-October, the COJ stated it would not provide traders with a 
guarantee that they would be able to return to their former trading sites, 
as some of the sites were in prohibited trading areas. 
2013 October 16 Use of undue 
force 
witnessed 
The use of unduly forceful actions by JMPD and other enforcement 
agencies was witnessed (Urban Joburg 2013b). 
2013 October 22 SANTRA holds 
crisis meeting 
SANTRA held a crisis meeting' for traders in the city centre. It seemed 
that SANTRA knew the operation was to be undertaken but that it was 
not supposed to target traders that had been paying or had permission 
to trade. Goods were confiscated allegedly without notice and taken to 
the storage facility at the end of Joubert and De Villiers Street. SANTRA 
planned a march for Friday, 25 October, although it seems to have been 
overtaken by the SAITF march on 24 October. The COJ reiterated its 
stance that it could not accept 'dirtiness and anarchy'. The COJ was also 
investigating how some traders received permits improperly and 
fraudulently (The Star 2013h).  
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2013 October 24 WASP, SAITF 
and ATC march 
to COJ 
WASP, SAITF and ATC marched in protest to Mayor Tau's office. Two 
thousand traders protested the JMPD's heavy-handed confiscation of 
goods and harassment of traders in terms of OCS. They demanded the 
right to sell on the street and to return to their former trading sites. The 
COJ acknowledged the contribution of informal traders to the economy 
and stated it would meet with the leadership of traders to address their 
concerns. (Business Day 2013c; M&G 2013b; SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 
2013b, p. 13; The Star 2013b). [466]. 
2013 October 25 COJ-trader 
talks start 
SANTRA and other representatives, including COSATU, started talks with 
the MMC for Economic Development, Councillor Ruby Mathang (it 
seems there was also a separate (?) meeting chaired by Councillor 
Roslynn Greeff, the MMC for Development Planning (SAITF et al. vs. COJ 
et al. 2013b, Annexure, p. 53 onwards). The traders accuse the COJ of a 
"hidden agenda" (Business Day 2013a; StreetNet International 2013). 
Matshidiso Mfikoe, the MMC for Environment and Infrastructure, 
reported that the traders and the COJ had agreed to weekly meetings 'to 
discuss matters such as alternative trading space for hawkers', but she 
was adamant that traders would not go back to the streets. The traders 
themselves acknowledged there was 'chaos' on the streets. Talks ended 
in deadlock.  
2013 October 28 COJ-trader 
talks resume 
COJ-trader talks resumed in a bid to break the deadlock. Informal trading 
associations, namely SANTRA, GIDA, JOWEDET, the Nigerian Traders 
Union, the Ethiopian Traders Union and block leaders, with ESSET, 
COSATU, SAMWU and the APF, attended the meeting, which lasted for 
more than four hours. The COJ is represented by MMC Greeff, MMC 
Mathang and Anthony Selepe from the Mayor's Office. The COJ said 
traders could not return for 6 weeks. The next meeting is planned for 1 
November. Traders demanded: 
1. "Return of all legal traders: those with smart cards and those in 
demarcated areas should be given permission to go back to trade 
within 24 hours. 
2. Confiscated goods by the JMPD should be given back to hawkers 
and compensation should be given in respect of missing goods and 
loss of income. 
3. Alternative trading areas should be allocated whilst the operation is 
continuing. 
4. JMPD should stop violence toward street traders when executing 
their operation. 
5. The city should open up unrestricted and prohibited areas, should 
provide demarcated areas and build stalls. 
6. The MMC shall chair the Informal Traders Forum (not the current 
DED official). 
7. The city should negotiate all issues concerning street traders in the 
Forum in order to address outstanding issues e.g. issuing smart 
cards. 
8. The city should provide an office for the Forum at the city's 
expense. 
9. The city should train committees on by laws enforcement informal 
by law booklet. 
10. The city should review special [sic? spatial?] development including 
then city accord and role of hawkers including Jabulani. 
11. Regions ABCD must have its own forum including in other areas 
such as Soweto." 
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COSATU made an emotional plea to the public for the COJ not to return 
to the days of 'forced removals' (Business Day 2013a). A plan was made 
to start a new verification process on Monday (SA Breaking News 2013). 
OCS continued in Wolmarans, Rissik, Klein and Jeppe Streets (Business 
Day 2013b; City Press 2013c; The Citizen 2013a; The New Age 2013a; The 
Star 2013h). SAITF said it had participated in meetings with the city 
administration at which it was decided that a verification process be 
done at the beginning of November, with the relocation and return of 
traders from November 11 onwards (ioL 2013a), seemingly in 
contradiction with undertakings made for the 2 November, but that did 
not take place and no alternative process had been put in place (not 
verified). 
2013 November 1 COJ-Trader 
meeting sets 
rules of 
engagement 
The COJ-trader meeting was chaired by MMC Greeff. Its purpose was to 
set the ground rules of engagement, and report back on the traders' 
memorandum. The COJ said it agreed to 13 items. Numerous trader 
concerns were set out, and although traders objected to the manner of 
operations, they do not oppose the operation per se (SAITF et al. vs. COJ 
et al. 2013b, Annexure: COJ and Minutes of Informal Traders Meeting on 
1 November 2013, p. 48 onwards). 
2013 November 1 MTC absorbed 
into JPC 
The former MTC was absorbed into the JPC on 1 November 2012 (COJ 
2011n; 2011s; COJ 2012c, pp. 8, 15, 2012a), which institutional shift 
presumably complicated OCS. 
2013 November 2  COJ-Trader 
meeting agrees 
trader 
verifications 
and stall 
relocations  
COJ and the traders agreed to the verification of traders and stall 
relocations (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 10). Traders alleged that 
the COJ said they could return by 4 November to their sites (SAITF et al. 
vs. COJ et al. 2013b). 
2013 November 3 Agreement 
allowing 
displaced 
traders to 
return soon 
COJ and traders struck a deal to identify appropriate trading spaces and 
verify traders for implementation, starting immediately, that would 
allow traders to get back to business from 5 November onwards. (Urban 
Joburg 2013a). 
2013 November 4 COJ-traders 
special meeting 
Representatives from SANTRA, SAITF, COSATU, JOWEDET, and OVAHA 
met with CRUM, the MMC's Office, the COO, the Managing Director of 
JPC, the DED, and the Department of Legal and Compliance. They 
discussed the verification process (reportedly 'chaos'), the criteria for 
trade, team allocation (including block leaders to lead the group, 
progress of verification, inter alia (see 2 November). The COJ registered 
traders, starting in Noord Street from this day over the course of the 
week (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b).Traders alleged that the COJ had 
promised that legitimate traders would be able to return to trading by 
the end of the week, 8 November (date not verified). Further, the 
verification process was to pick up again in Hoek, King Georg, Albertina 
Sisulu (Market Street) and President Streets. (M&G 2013d; SAITF et al. 
vs. COJ et al. 2013b, Annexure: COJ and Minutes of Informal Traders 
Meeting on 4 November 2013, p. 56 onwards; The New Age 2013a). 
2013 November 5 COJ-traders 
special meeting 
Representatives from the associations and the COJ continued talks 
chaired by Gerald Dumas, the then COO (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, 
Annexure: COJ and Minutes of Informal Traders Meeting on 5 November 
2013, p. 58 onwards). 
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2013 November 6 COJ-traders 
special meeting 
The associations and the COJ met to discuss solutions for displaced 
traders. About 1 456 traders had been verified, of which 1 318 were 
eligible for trading. Home Affairs was also verifying documents of 
foreigners. Traders were asked to bring allegations of corruption to the 
appropriate authorities. (Business Day 2013b; City Press 2013c; M&G 
2013d; SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, Annexure: COJ and Minutes of 
Informal Traders Meeting on 5 November 2013, p. 58 onwards; The 
Citizen 2013a; The New Age 2013a, b; The Star 2013h; Urban Joburg 
2013a; SERI 2015a). 
2013 November 7 COJ-traders 
special meeting 
Delegates met again to find solutions for affected traders. The 
associations alleged minutes of previous meeting were incomplete and 
inaccurate, and noted they should be rejected. Evidently the interaction 
was highly tense. There was an argument about the roles of the parties – 
especially Block Leaders (were they observers, gatekeepers, working 
alone, or part of the team?). 
2013 November 8 COJ-traders 
special meeting 
The COJ announced that only 800 of 2 500 permits presented by traders 
so far were valid (M&G 2013c; SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 16). 
MMC Greeff said verification had been undertaken in terms of the new 
revised trading process. Talks continued in a bid to break the deadlock, 
and OCS continued in Wolmarans, Rissik, Klein and Jeppe Streets. The 
traders' legal representatives sent a letter to the COJ demanding it stop 
the demolition of stalls by Monday and provide details on the plan for 
the relocation of the traders. However, in contradiction, SERI stated 
elsewhere that demolitions had stopped by the end of October (SERI 
2015a, p. 14)). (see also Business Day 2013b; City Press 2013c; Harrison 
et al. 2013; SERI 2013a; The Citizen 2013a, b; The New Age 2013a; The 
Star 2013h). 
2013 November 11 COJ extends 
registration 
process from 7 
to 17 streets 
COJ extended the registration process from 7 to 17 streets starting with 
Hoek, De Villiers, King George, and Wanderers Street. Verification was 
being done at the Metro Centre and usually included site visits whereat 
stalls were found to not be aligned to the COJ's database and some had 
been let illegally. (Business Day 2013b; COJ 2013g; City Press 2013c; 
Moneyweb 2013; The Citizen 2013a; The New Age 2013a; The Star 
2013h; SERI 2015a). 
2013 November 12 COJ task team 
meets and 
plans to 
relocate and 
reduce traders 
The Inner City Informal Trading Task Team members (Planning, 
Transport, JPC, DED, JMPD, MTC, Legal, JDA and JRA) met to check on 
progress. It found there were 1 300 traders in 34 JPC-managed streets 
and 15 CID-managed streets.. 2 535 traders had been verified. A plan of 
relocation and reduction of traders, shifting them into linear markets, 
buildings and 'short streets' was tabled. The outcome of the meeting was 
not recorded (COJ 2013h). 
2013 November 13 COJ accused of 
not acting in 
'good faith' 
Traders alleged that this is the first time that the COJ advised them that 
traders would be moved to alternative spaces, and that they had not 
been consulted. The COJ maintained that they knew for a long time 
through the ITF meetings chaired by an official of the DED (SAITF et al. 
vs. COJ et al. 2013b). The traders contended that the purpose of the 
operation was to remove traders permanently from the streets. SAITF 
had accused the COJ of not acting in 'good faith' at meetings after its 
protest march on 24 October and had appointed SERI as its attorney 
(ibid.). 
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2013 November 14 SAITF and 
1 500 informal 
traders send 
written 
ultimatum to 
COJ 
SAITF and 1 500 informal traders from the 24 blocks targeted by the 
operation sent a written ultimatum to COJ and JMPD. They demanded 
that by Monday, 18 November, they could return to trading, the re-
erection of their stands in the same spots as before and that no further 
removals would be done, failing which the informal traders would apply 
urgently to the High Court for relief JMPD (IoL News Online 2013a; SERI 
2013b). COSATU accused the COJ and the MTC's own systems for 
debacle, and of acting against their own policies and not engaging with 
trader leaders despite monthly meetings. (ioL 2013a; SERI 2013a; SAITF 
et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013a; 2013c; The Citizen 2013b). 
2013 November 15  SANTRA lodges 
court 
application 
SANTRA lodged its application with the courts to stop OCS (SAITF et al. 
vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 13). 
2013 November 16  Open objection 
letter by 
university 
academics 
Architecture and Planning academics of the University of Witwatersrand 
sent an open letter of objection to TUHF's defence of the COJ's operation 
and the 'world class city' approach. The objection was made based on 
order being pursued at the expense of development imperatives; the 
lack of a 'coherent plan' and enforcement that was indiscriminate; and 
being counter-productive, although it also acknowledged a need for 
better enforcement (Harrison et al. 2013). 
2013 November 17 SAITF 
announces it is 
seeking an 
interdict 
against the COJ 
SAITF then announced it would also lodge an application for an interdict 
against the COJ on behalf of its members, WASP, OVAHA and the ATC 
through SERI. SAITF says that it was agreed that a verification process 
starting at the beginning of November was to have been followed by a 
relocation of traders from November 11 at the COJ-traders meetings.  
2013 November 18 Anti-JMPD 
protest march 
An anti-JMPD protest march to Mayor Tau's office was held following on 
from the ultimatum served on the COJ (ioL 2013a). The COJ stated it 
wanted trading to be "organised and orderly" (COJ 2013f). Allegations of 
bribery by the JMPD were made (ioL 2013a). [468]. 
2013 November 19 SAITF applies 
for interdict 
against COJ 
SAITF appeared in the South Gauteng High Court to apply for an interdict 
against the COJ on behalf of a thousand traders that would allow them 
to return to their former trading spaces as per Sections 9 and 10 of the 
by-laws (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 13). The COJ notified that it 
intended to oppose the application and the case was deferred to 26 
November. COSATU and hundreds of street traders protested outside 
the court against the heavy-handedness of the removals. Also that day, 
the COJ convened a progress meeting (ibid., p. 17) with traders and 
discussed criteria for the relocation of traders with valid permits but that 
were in irregular trading sites. The 4 100 available trading spaces 
included 600 stalls, 1 500 temporary sites in 10 'short streets', and 2 000 
possible spaces that were to be identified in the 'long streets' (and could 
be done in a week). Spaces would only be available to those with valid 
permits, and who had paid up. It seems the plan was to put remaining 
traders in 'short streets' after trader verification and clearance had been 
completed. By then the COJ had undertaken verification and physical 
checks of 23 streets, which had highlighted 3 issues: there was a 
discrepancy between actual and logged stalls; there were instances of 
over-demarcation; and cases of illegal leasing. Allegedly, 600 traders 
were not given a hearing before their stalls were demolished and they 
were not given alternative spaces or notices (see also Interview, Zack, 
2012). (Business Day 2013h; M&G 2013c; SA Breaking News 2013; The 
Star 2013j). 
2013 November 20 COJ accused of 
human rights 
violation 
The media alleged that the operation was a violation of human rights 
and was not about 'sweeping clean' as the COJ maintained (Business Day 
2013h). 
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2013 November 22 Third of traders 
do not have 
smart cards, 
half are in 
arrears 
About 35%, or 158 traders, were found not to have smart cards and 
about half of the traders were in arrears with rental payments, as per 
the finalised list of 449 traders in Bree, Joubert, Diagonal, Kerk, Eloff, 
Noord and Hoek Streets (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 17). 
2013 November 23 COJ files 
objection 
COJ filed court papers to get the case removed from the urgent roll 
(SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b). 
2013 November 25 COJ-informal 
trader talks 
collapse 
COJ-informal trader talks, to find solutions notwithstanding imminent 
court action, collapsed when trader associations heard that 'fresh 
prohibition of trade on 20 streets, including Jeppe and De Villiers Streets 
was non-negotiable.' The COJ was also talking allegedly to COSATU 
rather than to the 'legal representatives.' The COJ would allegedly allow 
only a few hundred traders back, in linear markets. The COJ reportedly 
planned to start a new verification process this day but SANTRA said the 
process was a 'bluff'. MMC Mfikoe said that 919 traders would be able to 
return, mainly in linear markets, and smart cards would be issued to 
legitimate traders (Business Day 2013e; SA Breaking News 2013; SAITF et 
al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b). JOWEDET and OVAHA, and the COJ, agreed to a 
JOC to oversee the reallocation process deal with objections and find 
'short streets' suitable for trading (COJ 2013k). 
2013 November 26 South Gauteng 
High Court 
hears case 
 
The South Gauteng High Court heard SANTRA and SAITF applications 
over two days starting this day. The applications asked that the COJ, the 
JMPD, the Mayor and the City Manager allow about 2 000 legal and 
verified traders to return to trading in their original spots. The COJ 
wanted SAITF and SANTRA to be heard jointly by the Court as SAITF was 
represented by SERI, with SANTRA represented by Routledge Modise 
Attorneys, but were applying for a ruling on the same matter. The COJ 
argued that traders had had a month already in which to state their 
concerns to the court but they had not done so, thus the case could not 
be considered as urgent. The case of hardship being suffered by traders 
was 'self-created', the COJ maintained. The COJ wanted the case to be 
postponed, likely until March 2014, as it was not urgent in their view, 
whereat the substantive issues detailing the COJ actions going back to 
2008 could be heard. The traders' representatives censured the COJ for 
undertaking the operation under 'false pretences', intending all along to 
evict both legal and illegal traders from the streets and only informing 
legal traders afterwards that they would not be able to return to former 
trading sites. The traders' lawyers did not argue about the principle of 
the relocation of traders but rather about whether the process to do so 
was lawful. SAITF, other than in the court, also publicly condemned the 
COJ for 'dirty tricks' by creating divisions within the street trading sector, 
thus inciting infighting, by reaching an agreement the day before for a 
JOC with some associations (OVAHA and JOWEDET) (COJ 2013k). Also 
this day, the JOC started allocating stalls in linear markets of Kerk, 
Joubert and Diagonal Streets. An outcome of the COJ-traders meetings 
was that the COJ agreed to extend verification until 29 November. Of the 
2 535 traders that had come forward for verification, only 43% or 1 100 
traders, were on the COJ's database, and Home Affairs did not approve 
13% or 340 traders (Business Day 2013g; City Press 2013a, b; SAITF et al. 
vs. COJ et al. 2013a; 2013c; The Star 2013i). 
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2013 November 27 Court dismisses 
the traders' 
application, 
violent protests 
ensue in Kerk 
Street Market 
and Bree Street 
Mall, SERI 
lodges appeal 
with High and 
Constitutional 
Courts  
The High Court this day dismissed the traders' application as not urgent 
and postponed the action until 2014, and ordered the separate actions 
of SAITF and SANTRA on behalf of 1 217 respondents to be merged into 
one and each party to pay their own costs (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 
2013e). SAITF and SANTRA assisted by SERI, immediately lodged an 
appeal to the High Court and the Constitutional Court on behalf of 2 168 
traders. When traders, after chanting anti-ANC slogans in protest outside 
the court, returned to their trading stalls in Kerk Street and Bree Street 
Metro Mall, they found that other traders had moved in while they were 
away and had demolished their stalls. Violence then occured. Stalls and 
also shopkeepers in Kerk Street were forced by traders to shut their 
doors or risk being stoned by protestors (City Press 2013b). Five people 
were arrested after looting, with informal traders' bodies in 
condemnation of the looting. SANTRA and SAITF blamed each other for 
the 'sporadic' violence. The COJ blamed SANTRA which maintained that 
there was 'only one solution … return all legal traders to all legal trading 
spaces from which they were illegally removed by force' (but that did not 
address the so-called 'illegal' traders). (Business Day 2013d, g; Business 
Report 2013; City Press 2013a, b; SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013a; 2013e; 
Sowetan 2013; Sunday Independent 2013; The Star 2013e, i). [454]. 
2013 November 28 Verification 
process 
extended 
Traders and the COJ had agreed to extend the verification process for 
one more day (until 29 November). 
2013 December 3 COJ notifies of 
intention to 
object; 
advertises for 
road closures 
to create 
markets 
COJ notified that it intended to object to the Constitutional Court on the 
basis that the High Court had not yet ruled on the matter and thus it 
would be procedurally incorrect for the Constitutional Court to hear the 
traders' appeal on the substantive issues. The COJ noted that any 
disadvantage traders are experiencing would be short-lived as 1 500 
trading spots were to be allocated on or about 9 December COJ (SAITF et 
al. vs. COJ et al. 2013b, p. 14). The COJ expressed frustration at the lack 
of success with by-law enforcement over years despite JMPD efforts to 
enforce by-laws, and that OCS had been discussed with traders and that 
it was not possible hat it came as a surprise to them (ibid., pp. 35-36). 
The COJ also advertised this day for the road closures for ten streets for 
the creation of markets: 
1. Quartz Street (Plein and Noord Streets) 
2. Noord Street (Entrance of Park Station) 
3. Hancock Street (Twist and Nugget Streets) 
4. Eloff Street (De Villiers and Plein Streets) 
5. Kock Street (King George and Wanderers Streets) 
6. King George Street (Wolmarans and Bok Streets, opposite Park 
Station) 
7. Joubert Street (Bree and Plein Streets) 
8. Von Brandis Street (Jeppe and Bree Streets) 
9. Diagonal Street (Jeppe and Kerk Streets) 
10. Fraser Street (Bree and Jeppe Streets) (The Star 2013g). 
2013 December 5 Constitutional 
Court grants an 
interim 
interdict 
against the 
COJ, JMPD-
trader clash 
and arrest of 
SERI lawyer 
The Constitutional Court granted an interim interdict against the COJ. 
Traders were allowed to return to trading immediately, pending the 
courts' full review of the issues later (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2013d). 
After the court ruling, a clash between JMPD and traders also included 
the arrest of SERI's lawyer. The police subsequently released her without 
charge. The COJ said it respected the court's decision but that it would 
also continue to enforce by-laws in terms of illegal trading (City Press 
2013d; The Citizen 2013c; The Star 2013d, 2014c). [71]. 
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2014 April 4 Constitutional 
Court issues 
final 
judgement 
 
The Constitutional Court found the COJ had not upheld the by-laws and 
had acted improperly – the COJ had stated it was 'convenient' to evict 
legal traders, along with the illegal ones. The court said that "[i]t is open 
to COJ to use all lawful means to combat illegal trading and other 
criminal conduct" (SAITF et al. vs. COJ et al. 2014, pp. 18, Para. 33, my 
emphasis). The Constitutional Court censured the COJ in its judgement 
for the manner in which the enforcement was undertaken and for 
indiscriminately removing legal, as well as illegal, traders. Despite the 
COJ's argument that the matter was not urgent and should not have 
bypassed the High Court, the Constitutional Court ruled that the appeal 
was indeed urgent, as traders' rights to earn a living had been infringed 
causing financial hardship. Although the COJ was allowed to lawful 
means to combat illegal activities, the court found that that the COJ had 
been procedurally and legally incorrect in the eviction of legal traders as 
it had not observed the requirements of the by-laws. (SAITF et. al vs. COJ 
et al. 2014; The Star 2014a). 
2014 July 23 Talks start Talks to find a solution to the issues commenced (The Citizen 2014a). 
2014 August 21 Discussions 
with interest 
groups show 
that original 
concerns still 
need 
addressing 
Although the COJ did not stop by-law enforcement, it had re-instigated 
discussions with interest groups for a 'lasting' solution to the ongoing 
challenges posed by the street trading sector.  
MMC Mathang reported that at the first phase of COJ-initiated 
negotiations over the previous two weeks, all interest groups raised 
concerns about congestion, safety, health, grime and enforcement. 
Traders objected most to corruption, illegal traders, permits and 
facilities. The formal property and business sector acknowledge informal 
traders but had doubts about the impact on investment. Residents 
demanded better enforcement and no trading outside residential 
buildings due to the associated littering and loitering. Taxi drivers were 
also concerned about trading on the sidewalks. Foreign traders were 
concerned about xenophobia and the ability to access trading sites. 
NGOs wanted better management and the development of markets. 
More detailed discussions between COJ and traders followed. By-law 
enforcement was still continuing. Talks took place over a number of 
weeks, but despite goodwill amongst the parties, the matter was 
reportedly unresolved and the GPG's Department of Economic 
Development planned to broker a session between municipalities and 37 
informal trading associations on 21 September 2014. (CityBuzz 2014; The 
Citizen 2014a, b; The Star 2014b). 
Note: 
This timeline is derived from multiple sources as indicated, namely the COJ; court documents made available by SERI; media articles and press releases from mainly Business 
Day, M&G, The Citizen, and The Star; and others.  
Further information is available in the Databank Workbook Analysis and Databanks. 
The use of the word 'violent' or ('violence') may include actual or threatened violence and is dependent on the interpretation of the data on each protest, see definition on 
page 23 
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1996-2000 
Sandton Rates Boycott 
1996 January The new MLCs committed to significant expenditure assuming – incorrectly – that funds 
were available. 
1996 June A 'one city one tax base' approach to creating uniform property taxes across city was 
adopted, with rates (property taxes) in Sandton going up by 120-250 percent, creating a 
'distrust' of the GJMC. About 10 000 ratepayers out of possible 118 000 ratepayers of the 
EMLC, represented by SANFED, an umbrella body of ratepayer associations, began a partial 
boycott. This boycott was seen as an ironic echo of the apartheid-inspired boycotts of the 
1980s in the black townships. The success of the city administration's redistribution 
approach was reliant on income from the EMLC, especially for development in the WMLC 
and SMLC areas. The city administration also had new areas to govern, which had not 
experienced local government before 1994 and which had had no rates base. The GJMC was 
seen as largely 'unsympathetic' to the Sandton boycotters. 
1996 July The boycott was almost subsumed by the restructuring of local government. 
1996 October The boycott featured in international press. 
1996 November The CEO of the GJMC spoke about the restructuring challenge and of the shift to a model of 
developmental local government, which was needed to drive processes of transformation in 
Johannesburg. 
1996 December The GJMC had no sense of the 'accuracy of budgets' even in the immediate period prior to 
the imminent financial crisis. More than half of Sandton ratepayers refuse to pay as the 
steep increases were too 'big' and 'arbitrary'. Meetings between the city administration and 
ratepayers "ended in name calling". Officials threatened to cut services to ratepayers and 
were seen as largely antagonistic. The negotiator of the government team struggled to 
comprehend the Sandton ratepayers' claims of 'hardship'. Payment levels in Sandton drop to 
half of the previous 90 percent level. Fedsure and nine other corporations collectively lodged 
a case in the High Court maintaining that the rates increase was unlawful and not procedural 
(Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 1998a). The GPG tried unsuccessfully to resolve the impasse. 
1997 January By January, ratepayers were withholding R18 million per month. The boycott helped to 'tip' 
the city administration into its financial crisis (Lipietz 2008, p. 145). Meetings were 
reportedly antagonistic and ended in a stalemate when SANFED said the chairperson was not 
objective; the chairperson said then he would talk to individual associations; prompting 
SANFED to accuse him of 'divide and rule' tactics.  
1997 February The SMLC drove the collection of the arrears of R623 million to stave off the financial 
collapse, and promised projects to wards that paid at least 50 percent of arrears by 1 July. 
The EMLC and NMLC called for inputs into their three-year plans, demonstrating their 
willingness to show 'accountability'. However, the emphasis on debt collection and the 
resistance thereto made agonistic engagements difficult. 
1997 April The case by Fedsure went to trial and was dismissed by the Court. The GJMC felt 'vindicated'. 
SANFED said, nonetheless, that it would continue the boycott. The stalemate continued with 
minimal prospects for agonistic engagement. Fedsure decided to appeal the ruling. 
1997 May The EMLC struggled to budget due to the uncertainty of revenue, beginning to issue 
summons for payment and said it would not work with those that were not paid up. Tension 
increased but SANFED and the MEC's task team managed to have 'more constructive' 
discussions. The city administration offered concessions to ratepayers, waiving interest and 
giving extra time for repayment. SANFED rejected this offer, insisting on paying a flat rate as 
those in the townships did, a scheme which the city administration wanted to stop. The 
Auditor-General deemed the city administration's municipal financial management 
ineffective. 
1997 June Fedsure was given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
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1997 July The city administration decided not to raise rates this year. In an antagonistic turn, the then 
MEC Sicelo Shiceka (now deceased) of the GPG denied SANFED's participation in the task 
teams to find solutions to the budget problems as it was acting in 'bad faith' allegedly. The 
GJMC said SANFED's 'hysteria' had impacted on its ability to raise revenue. By July, too, the 
responsibility for billing had been transferred to MLCs, thus impacting negatively on the city 
administration's prospects for integrated cash management. 
1997 August The GJMC used short-term loans to fund operations. SANFED accused the GJMC of the 
intimidation of ratepayers with threats of cut-offs of services, deepening antagonism 
between the parties. 
1997 October The withheld rates accelerated the city administration's financial collapse, which became 
readily apparent this month. The Auditor-General and the GPG exerted pressure on the 
GJMC to recover arrears. The GJMC offered more concessions reducing the payment of 
interest. The GPG felt compelled to intervene in the affairs of the GJMC and MLCs due to 
their negative cash flow of R130 million monthly. Legislation was passed, allowing for the 
centralisation of financial and administrative functions. The Committee of Ten, chaired by 
Councillor Kenny Fihla, was created and tasked with corrective measures including the 
collection of debt. The resultant financial crisis provided the impetus to recentralise the 
administrative functions of the city administration, especially the billing system. 
1998 January By 1998, the EMLC was owed R197 million by 12 201 ratepayers, and the GJMC's 
organisational review made a strong case for the change and the standardisation of the 
accounting and financial controls of the city administration.  
1998 March The Supreme Court reserved judgement on the Fedsure matter. The GJMC said it was ready 
to reopen negotiations with rates boycotters (Camay & Gordon 2004, pp. 25-26). The 
Fedsure case was referred to the Constitutional Court. The GJMC again said it was open to 
discussion. The level of payments had increased from 85 percent in October 1997 to 92 
percent in March 1998. 
1998 April Revised legislation allowed for an extended Committee of Fifteen and stronger centralised 
decision-making to continue with solutions to resolve the financial crisis. 
1998 June Tensions were high within the city administration too as 'councillors felt undermined by 
officials not coming up with the money'. 
1998 October The imminent consolidation of the five councils into a single metropolitan municipality 
overshadowed the boycott and attracted criticism. The Constitutional Court upheld the 
earlier High Court ruling and the city administration's policy in October 1998 that the action 
of the city administration was lawful but the judges were split about cross-subsidisation 
being in accordance with the LGTA although it operated in accordance with the spirit of the 
Constitution (Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 1998c). The GJMC said that arrears were payable 
immediately but that it would not be 'vindictive'. SANFED and Fedsure effectively ended 
their boycott.  
1998 November Councillor Fihla reported that payment levels had increased to 94 percent through the 
GJMC's debt collection and cut-off measures. Councillor Fihla met SANFED to discuss relief 
on payments for those who cannot pay.  
1999 Beginning GJMC launched iGoli 2002, including the centralisation of administration and corporatisation 
of certain services. 
1999 January By 1999, 6 900 of the 12 000 defaulters had paid in full and 3 000 had made plans to pay off 
the debt. 
1999 February Camay and Gordon (2004) claimed that the city administration had learnt many governance 
lessons. Lessons included 'more clarified functions and resources of the spheres of 
government'; 'more transparency and accountability'; 'local government structure 
modifications for more effective delivery'; and 'understanding of the need to select qualified 
people in political roles'. These lessons potentially enhanced the city administration's 
abilities for future agonistic engagements. 
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2001-2005 
Pointsmen Partnership 
2004 October In 2004, Colleen Bekker, a media expert, presented an unsolicited bid to JMPD about her 
partnership-based concept to ease traffic congestion. Faulty traffic lights in Johannesburg 
had become a significant cause for complaint amongst the middle class in the northern 
suburbs, coupled with concerns about traffic congestion. These issues warranted attention in 
the planning documents of the city administration (namely the IDP of 2003-2004, and later in 
the 2005-2006 IDP (p. 24)). Underscoring the importance of such issues, writers have argued 
that rage caused by congestion, potholes and lack of parking (the causes of three of the 
middle-class protests showcased in this table) increased driving risk and caused accidents 
(Underwood, Chapman et al. 1999; Deffenbacher, Petrilli et al. 2003; Stephens & Groeger 
2012).  
August 2005 The OUTsurance pointsmen partnership was launched, and the first pointsmen started work 
this month. Partners included the JMPD, OUTsurance (an insurance company, as the main 
sponsor), Talk Radio 702 (as the media partner) and the Kit Group. Traffic Freeflow, owned 
by Colleen Bekker, was the implementing agent. The pointsmen work at intersections mainly 
nominated by the public. Mobile pointsmen move to trouble spots as and when needed. The 
benefit was 'free' marketing for OUTsurance and sponsors and thus providing additional 
resources to the JMPD. 
2006-2010 
Fighting for Dogs and Cats 
2006 April  About 6 000 objections were received by the COJ including a petition to the City Manager A 
peaceful demonstration was staged with placards at the Civic Centre entrance about aspects 
of the draft By-laws relating to Dogs and Cats in the lead up to their promulgation in April 
2006. This proposed by-law prompted the most objections ever received by the COJ. One 
objection was in resistance to the compulsory sterilisation, of strays especially, in case they 
were breeding animals as it would be detrimental to the owner's business, although the 
COJ's intention was to eradicate puppy mills and define animal hoarding (more than four 
pets), inter alia. A dedicated committee was established of officials and animal-loving 
community representatives, such as the SPCA. The committee successfully negotiated 
changes leading to the proclaimed by-laws (Province of Gauteng 2006). The promulgation of 
the by-laws was done in two phases in response to dog-owners' concerns (Interview, 
Phakathi, 2012). Agonistic engagements with objectors seemed possible as the protests 
channel was structured and the objections could be categorised straightforwardly. 
Post-2010 
'Clucking Potholes' 
2010 January Every year since 2007, seasonal rains in Johannesburg at each year end had resulted in the 
formation of thousands of new potholes. However, the summer rainfall this year was 
'unprecedented' and started a multi-year protest against potholes by the middle class (CSIR 
2010). 
2010 January-
March 
Significant coverage about the problem with the resultant potholes was provided by the 
media, in technical publications, ward newsletters, by Residents Associations, radio stations, 
and investigative journalists of Carte Blanche. The DA, the main opposition party seemed to 
have taken the lead in this protest in the northern, middle-class, suburbs of Johannesburg. 
2010 February 3 According to municipal analysts, the JRA chairperson reportedly told the COJ at the JRA's 
AGM that the lack of funds for road resurfacing and pothole repair accounted for the great 
many potholes (Municipal IQ 2010j), although Mayor Masondo later denied this claim. The 
National Treasury reported in its Medium-Term Revenue and Expenditure Framework for the 
previous year that the COJ's expenditure on repairs was allegedly "sorely lacking" (ibid.) and 
was far lower than in other metropolitan municipalities. Further, potholes were more than a 
middle-class "annoyance" (ibid.) but acted to "erode confidence in municipalities' 
management" (ibid.). 
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2010 March 3 Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) donated R200 000 to JRA to fix potholes after the recent 
unduly heavy rains (as it had done in Louisville, USA, in 2009) and gaining significant free 
media coverage in the process, as well as escalating the issue of potholes in the mind of the 
public 
2010 March 11 Potholes were mentioned in the SOCA of 2010 (COJ 2010a) (and also later in those of 2011, 
2013 and 2015 (COJ 2011a; COJ 2013j; COJ 2015d)). The COJ clearly under pressure as the 
Mayor said that main routes would be prioritised for pothole repair in the lead up to the 
2010 World Cup. The JRA responded by noting in its Annual Report for the 2009-10 financial 
year (ending June) notes that the issue of potholes "came under the spotlight" (JRA 2010) 
during the year and it had had "to double its efforts to deal with these challenges" (ibid.). 
The consequence was that the repair of potholes drew attention away from areas with 
gravel roads where communities "simply do not have the means to compete with their 
counterparts elsewhere in drawing attention to their problems" (ibid., p. 10). The JRA said 
that 91 percent potholes reported had been repaired within 3 days (JRA 2010), and training 
had been done (ibid.). 
2011 March After many complaints from motorists, more negative press, and heavy rains again at the 
end of 2010, the JRA was prompted to respond this month. The JRA launched its Khendla 
Ma-Pothole ('Fix the Pothole') initiative. It also (JRA 2011a) partnered with the Pothole 
Brigade funded by the public sector, in 2011 (EWN 2011c; JRA 2011a). 
2011 March The issue of portholes was now at the top of the list of city challenges in the state of City 
Address.  
2011 July JRA claimed to have successfully dealt with potholes on the 200 main roads in Johannesburg 
(JRA 2011b). 
Rea Vaya Rerouted 
2011 October 29 The Rosebank Management District had appointed consultants, TTT Africa, in 2009 to assess 
the full impact of the various design options for the proposed BRT and the Rea Vaya ('We are 
Going') public bus service planned for Oxford Road and in the Rosebank node and surrounds. 
The Rosebank and Saxonwold communities resisted this portion of the bus system and 
forced the COJ to delay the project until after the World Cup 2010. However, despite a series 
of meetings between the COJ and the public, the steering committee and property owners 
and residents about various design options, and three years of lobbying, the COJ was 
compelled to reroute the Rea Vaya elsewhere due to some groups remaining dissatisfied and 
threatening legal action against the project. The media reported that the Public 
Transportation Committee of the COJ had decided to reroute the Rea Vaya along Louis Botha 
Avenue to Alexandra and then to Sandton. Thus, residents in Saxonwold, Forest Town, 
Parkwood, Rosebank and Parktown residents were satisfied. The relocation decision meant, 
however, that implementation would be delayed as detailed project planning for the Louis 
Botha Avenue leg would still need to be done. According to a blog featured on Mobilitate, a 
private sector online platform linked with municipalities allowing citizens to record service 
delivery problems on Google maps, had "forced the City of Johannesburg to go back to the 
drawing board to look at different options" (Mobilitate 2011). A spokesperson for the 
Saxonwold Residents' Association said it supported public transportation development "but 
we've always expressed our irritation that this one wasn't done properly to minimise impact 
on the area" and the rerouting represented "a victory from a heritage, traffic and 
environmental point of view" (news24 2011a). However, the next day, residents and 
businesses along Louis Botha Avenue were reportedly shocked at the decision, as they had 
not been consulted about the change. Cox said that the COJ had retreated as the residents 
had the financial resources to engage the COJ in legal battles for years, and the COJ did not 
seem to have the appetite for the battle and needed to continue with Rea Vaya even if it 
meant shifting the route (Interview, Cox, 2012). 
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Out with OUTsurance Pointsmen? 
2011 October 31 An "outpouring of anger" (looklocal 2011b) erupted when Talk Radio 702 announced on air 
that OUTsurance had to suspend its services whilst its pointsmen were properly accredited in 
compliance with its contract with the JMPD, perpetuating the perception that the COJ was 
unable to deliver services effectively. This was a temporary measure only despite rumours of 
contractual difficulties potentially threatening the popular partnership. The COJ and the 
partnership overcome the problems within a few days and the pointsmen continued as 
before. Moreover, the media attention could only be limited, as Talk Radio 702 was part of 
the partnership (with the COJ and others) for the project, and nor could the DA – as it did in 
the paid-parking and billing protests – "capitalise on the issue as the issue was already 
owned by Radio 702" (Interview, Phakathi, 2012).  
2011 November 1 Pointsmen were removed from the roads for four days to undergo training as peace officers 
and vetting. 
Parking of Parkhurst's New Paid-Parking 
2011 December The JMPD's first effort at implementing a new paid-parking scheme in Parkhurst in December 
2011 was not successful. The scheme had started elsewhere already in early 2010 and by 
mid-2011, paid-parking was successfully in place in Braamfontein and parts of the city 
centre. Parkhurst, a long-established (in 1903), largely white, well-serviced, middle-class 
suburb (Rule 2002; Monare 2012; Monare et al. 2014), protested vehemently until 2014, led 
by the Parkhurst Residents and Business Association, and Ward Councillor Tim Truluck of the 
DA.  
2012 January 4 Motorists in Parkhurst received pamphlets on the new pre-paid parking system in Parkhurst 
this day. The scheme had already been rolled out to 2 910 bays within Braamfontein on 3 
December 2010 and was reportedly well-received by the public as security had been 
improved and the level of petty thefts from cars declined. The COJ then extended paid-
parking to parts of the city centre from 1 June 2011 onwards in accordance with the COJ's 
contract entered into with Ace Parking Services to manage kerbside parking in Johannesburg. 
Parkhurst, with its heavily congested high streets of Fourth Avenue, and its coffee shops and 
boutique stores, and Sixth Street, was the first residential suburb to be targeted for the 
implementation of the paid-parking scheme.  
2012 January 5 The paid-parking scheme started despite Councillor Truluck's query into the scheme when 
painted numbers had appeared kerbside earlier on 1 December 2011 (Interview, Truluck, 
2012). Marking the start of a prolonged media campaign, complaints were reportedly made 
to Talk Radio 702. Wayne Minaar, the JMPD spokesperson, suspended the Parkhurst paid-
parking scheme on air until further notice on the understanding that public participation had 
not been properly done. 
2012 January 10 JMPD reportedly argued that many businesses approved of the paid-parking scheme as it 
limited employees' parking in front of their shops, which made it difficult for their customers 
to drop in.  
2012 January 11 COJ officials met traders and residents who raised many concerns about the scheme, such as 
the absence of consultation, official signage, demarcated lines and maintenance of sidewalks 
and pedestrian crossings. The community also wanted the first 30 minutes of parking free to 
support convenience stores; the operation of the scheme during times of worst congestion 
rather than during the day alone; appropriate planning for residents living in paid-parking 
areas; bays for the disabled, motorbikes, and loading; clarity on whether the scheme was run 
by Ace Parking, or Servest (as indicated in initial pamphlets the COJ had circulated); a plan 
dealing with the potential exclusion of existing informal car guards from the initiative, and an 
assurance that paid-parking marshals were not underpaid and reliant on commissions. The 
Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association (PRABOA) reported that the 
paid-parking suspension would remain in place until the COJ had done consultation, inter 
alia. PRABOA maintained the new paid-parking scheme was of no benefit to the community. 
Ace Parking reported that it had had no complaints in the Inner City.  
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The Parkhurst public was dissatisfied that undue profits were potentially being made at the 
expense of the middle class – the media claimed that paid-parking could generate R1.3 
billion for 21 000 bays at 10 hours per day in 21 areas excluding escalation due to inflation. In 
any event, only a 25.1 percent share of the funds would go to the COJ. 
2012 January 17 The PRABOA and the Fourth Avenue traders submitted written proposals to the COJ 
objecting to the paid-parking scheme. 
The Library is Open 
2012 February 11 The Parkhurst library is a council-run local library popular with the residents of Parkhurst and 
surrounds. The PRABOA announced on its web site that the Parkhurst library had had a 
notice pasted on its door that day advising of its closure 'until further notice'. This sparked a 
rumour that the closure was a permanent one. 
2012 February 14 The Star (2012f) reported that Councillor Truluck launched a campaign to 'save the library 
from closure' and had written an open letter of complaint to the Carnegie Corporation, 
which had funded the restoration of the main library in the city centre. The vexed MMC for 
Community Development, MMC Vondo, responded in a press release that the closure was a 
"reckless falsehood" (COJ 2012k) with "major repercussions" (ibid.) with the COJ's 
international funders. He noted that the redeployment of staff from other libraries to the 
main library had been necessary to get the main library ready for its re-opening. It was not 
clear if the protest was warranted but it did seem to reveal a key driver of the protest in the 
study area. Namely, MMC Vondo hinted at an apparent political agenda and the underlying 
tension between DA-led wards and the COJ's ANC-linked administration, which "is 
exacerbating a crisis of local government in the city" (ibid.), with this incident an example of 
political opportunism at play. 
Pointsmen are Back on Point 
2012 February By February 2012, the OUTsurance Pointsmen were back in full swing, having returned to 
their duties on 11 January 2012 following their brief training session in November 2011 and 
their Christmas vacations. 
2012 February end By the end of February, the successful bid in response to the COJ's tender issued in early 
December 2011 was confirmed, resolving earlier controversy about the contract. Colleen 
Bekker said that the pointsmen scheme was the most successful public-private partnership in 
the country (Classic FM 2012), sponsored by OUTsurance and 33 other sponsors. Training of 
the pointsmen was done by Traffic Freeflow and the JMPD. Within 7 months, by 5 October, 
the pointsmen initiative had increased to 84 static pointsmen, 26 mobile pointsmen. Six 
project managers working on a 'micro-management' approach visiting each pointsman once 
per shift helped to make the scheme successful.  
Paid-parking Starts Again in Parkhurst 
2012 February 20 After its two false starts, the JMPD started the scheme again in February 2012. However, 
anger soon flared up at the COJ's distribution, again, of Ace Parking pamphlets on this day in 
Parkhurst and the installation of some new parking signs. Councillor Truluck alleged that the 
COJ had closed its doors to the community with its lack of response to the community's 
January submission and objection. The COJ rejected the community's proposal as it went 
against the terms of its contract with Ace Parking. Councillor Truluck (Interview, Truluck, 
2012) accused the COJ of merely placating the community and 'hoping the problem would go 
away. 
2012 February 28 The community members met and agreed to appoint a lawyer to assist them in their protest. 
2012 March 1  The paid-parking scheme recommenced in Parkhurst although signage was still inadequate. 
The Parkhurst residents met again and unanimously agreed to vote against the paid-parking 
scheme as the Concerned World Class African Citizens (CWCAC), for the COJ to stop the 
scheme and to approach the Public Protector and the Petitions Committee. 
2012 March 6 Attorney Mervyn Smith sent a letter of demand for information to the COJ on behalf of the 
CWCAC and PRABOA. The letter argued that the scheme was "unlawful, unconstitutional; 
and immoral" (Mervyn Smith Attorneys 2012, p. 3). 
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'The Door is not Closed' to the Parkhurst Community 
2012 May 2 Now taking the community's upset more seriously, the COJ briefed the press. The COJ's legal 
advisor, Pieter de Klerk admitted: "we thought it was sufficient but community wanted more 
engagement" (Daily Maverick 2012a). "The door is not closed", he added (ibid.). The DA was 
reportedly sceptical.  
2012 May 6 The PRABOA claimed that the matter received coverage in at least six newspapers, and on 
four radio shows and Carte Blanche, and that businesses had lost between 20 and 50 percent 
of their income because of the scheme thus far. 
2012 May 7 Shop owners and residents threatened court action. 
2012 May 9 In a media briefing and a press release, the COJ said it had met its legal obligations in terms 
of consultation with the public, and that specific areas had been selected due to the high 
incidence of illegal parking there. Nonetheless, the COJ undertook to significantly increase 
the extent of community participation and invited residents to help in making the system 
functional (COJ 2012i), and that the views of the public could still be incorporated where 
possible. 
2012 May 10 However, the next day the press covered Councillor Truluck's gate-crashing of the COJ's 
media briefing and his denial of the COJ's assertion that ward councillors had been made 
aware of the intended paid-parking scheme. The COJ was accused of 'passing the buck' to 
ward councillors. 
2012 May 16 Shopkeepers in Fourth Avenue staged a public protest in the street by taking over the 
parking bays, laying out tables and chairs, displaying goods and having barbecues. The COJ 
spokesperson reportedly said that it additional consultation with residents, the ward 
councillor and the Petitions Unit had started, and that public comments could be sent to the 
Speaker's Office. Further, the COJ said it had heard the public and it urged protestors to use 
the correct channels for objecting. Phakathi confirmed that the MMC responsible for the 
Safety Committee, Oupa Tolo, called regular meetings with the JMPD, Ace Parking and the 
JRA to determine how the system was progressing (Interview, Phakathi, 2012). MMC Tolo 
"had to go backwards; almost as if he’s starting all over again", according to MMC Tolo's 
colleague, Councillor Walters (Interview, Walters, 2012). 
2012 June 22  The COJ held a meeting with councillors only, chaired by the MMC for Safety and Security, 
and attended by departments of the city administration such as Petitions, Finance, JMPD, 
Legal, Communication's, four DA councillors and officials. The COJ again acknowledged the 
paucity of its consultation and communication and that it was initiating a process to address 
the issue. The COJ promised to give feedback on the rumour that Ace Parking was in breach 
of their contract in terms of subcontracting. The DA rejected the COJ's statement that 
"consultation could not go on indefinitely" (Truluck 2012b). Further, Councillor Walters 
reportedly said the petitions received proved that the Executive of the Council had not 
undertaken the public participation processes successfully and that there was a "chaotic 
situation in the city where people feel they can do what they want with impunity and that 
this had to be brought to an end" (ibid.). The COJ agreed to a further meeting. 
2012 June 30 The DA reportedly said of the meeting, "we listened to each other for a change" (Saxonwold 
and Parkwood Residents Association 2012). 
2012 August Ultimately the threats of legal action, public meetings, letters, complaints to the Public 
Protector, press and television coverage, and the street protest compelled the COJ to stop 
the roll-out of its paid-parking scheme to other middle-class suburbs this month. 
Disbanding the Pothole Brigade  
2012 May 4 Middle-class motorists were disappointed to hear the media announcement of the 
disbanding of the Pothole Brigade. The partnership was to close the Pothole Brigade 
effectively at the end of June 2012. Trafficare, the contractor for the initiative, said that 67 
400 potholes in and around Johannesburg had been fixed between August 2010 and June 
2012, at a cost of R1 million per month to DialDirect, an insurance company (Trafficare 
2012).  
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The brigade had had to cease operations in Johannesburg due to complaints of the COJ's 
contraventions of the MFMA, although it would continue to work on non-JRA roads in and 
near Johannesburg until end July 2012 (ioL Pretoria News 2012). The JRA continued to repair 
potholes on its own. 
2012 Jul beginning The COJ's changed its business planning and budgeting activities in response to the pothole 
issue. The JRA stated in its Business Plan for 2012-13 financial year that it had convinced the 
Budget Office "for the first time" to allocate an indicative R18 million for the repair of 
potholes; the JRA had estimated that 87 00 potholes would need repair. The JRA also needed 
a "transformation agenda" in the upcoming year in acknowledgement of the damage to its 
reputation caused by negative media coverage (JRA 2012). Not all officials were in 
agreement with the JRA's approach, especially as the city administration could have saved 
around R30 million a year by asking the public to bid for the work, as Gerneke pointed out 
(Interview, Gerneke, 2012). 
Petitioning Against Paid-Parking 
2013 March 5 Wayne Minaar reported that after councillors had said they were unhappy about the paid-
parking plan due to the lack of appropriate procedures in place, which put the plan at risk 
(on 11 February), a subcommittee had been set up to look at the inputs of interest groups to 
improve the plan. 
2013 March 6 The media reported that the paid-parking scheme was and that the income it potentially 
generated from the Parkhurst part of the scheme amounted to 3 percent of the total income 
of the scheme only. Protestors in Parkhurst petitioned this day for the termination of the 
scheme.  
2013 March 9 The JMPD said the scheme would continue. 
2013 March 18 The COJ called for comments on its draft precinct plan for Parkhurst. This plan emphasised 
the challenge of unmanaged parking, unlike earlier plans. 
2013 March 25 The audit of the areas earmarked for paid-parking had started. The COJ seemed, 
nonetheless, to continue to 'push' for paid-parking, with Spokesperson Minaar saying the 
scheme was working in the three areas it was already operating in.  
2013 March 26 Councillor Truluck said in his newsletter that 1 157 people had signed the petition for ending 
paid-parking in Parkhurst.  
2013 April 25 The petition led to a Council meeting this day on 'Public Hearings conducted on Roll-Out of 
Paid Parking System in Parkhurst'. According to the DA, at this meeting the "COJ agreed for 
the MMC for Public Safety to take the necessary steps to address the Parkhurst matter by 9 
May". 
2013 May 27 A planned parking meeting for Parkhurst, Melville and Rosebank was held to discuss the 
management of parking in small CBDs study to determine various technical aspects of paid-
parking. 
"Learnt a Lot of Lessons" with Paid-Parking protest 
2013 October 29 During a Mayoral visit to Parkhurst, the COJ made a presentation on CIDs, IDP and Streets 
Alive to contextualise policy for Parkhurst. The COJ said that it had learnt lessons on how to 
develop a more integrated approach to the issue of parking and other measures for the 
benefit of 'small nodes'. By this time, the COJ had audited about 25 areas, consulting in 12 
thus far. The outcome was that the COJ was to recommend a 'new approach' to paid-parking 
to the Mayoral Committee, better adapted to Parkhurst's current requirements, and to slow 
down the pace of the roll-out. The COJ seem to have found a contradiction between the 
current requirements for Parkhurst's streets and its past ones. The Citizen (2013d) reported 
that the COJ's head of Transportation, Lisa Seftel, had said the COJ had "learnt a lot of 
lessons" from the consultation and that Parkhurst had "not adapted to the change it was 
experiencing" (ibid.).  
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Possible solutions that would be proposed to the Mayoral Committee included changing the 
status of Parkhurst from a 'neighbourhood node' to an 'activity street'; providing for free 
day-time parking for a maximum of one hour with a fine applicable for periods longer than 
an hour, a tuk-tuk shuttle service or similar from a nearby parking area; providing for paid-
parking in the late afternoon to evening and weekends; and creating temporary road 
closures on Thursdays and Fridays and weekends. The approach by the COJ shows how its 
parking policy has changed from a focus on order, enforcement and earning of revenue, the 
provision of minimum parking, and control by the traffic police in the 1990s. Now the focus 
was on paid-parking and the provision of parking maximums (Falconer & Richardson 2010) as 
tools to aid transportation demand management and foster transport-oriented development 
by transportation departments.  
There seemed to be a growing awareness that the COJ's objectives were in conflict with each 
other and that each neighbourhood centre had context-specific issues, which shifted over 
time, as Marsden (2006) also found. Too, the 'high cost of free parking' that Shoup (2005) 
identified in other similar situations was also becoming apparent to many. Although the COJ 
was initially dismissive about concerns about paid-parking in Parkhurst, it seemed to have 
shifted its positon, acknowledging it had learnt lessons from the conflict, as evidenced in its 
changed approach from considering paid-parking as a by-law enforcement and revenue 
creation activity to a congestion and public transport management one. Further, Phakathi 
said the protest did prompt the COJ to suspend further implementation of the scheme and 
that pamphlets and press releases were not sufficient consultation and that it would consult 
more appropriately with the councillor and the community (Interview, Phakathi, 2012). 
'Find and Fix' Potholes 
2014 February-
March 
The JRA again reported heavy rains in its Integrated Annual Report for the 2013-14 financial 
year as being responsible for causing about R60 million damages to roads in Johannesburg, 
including potholes. The JRA again reported heavy rains in its Integrated Annual Report for 
2013-14 financial year (JRA 2014a) causing about R60 million damages to roads in 
Johannesburg including potholes. In terms of its Customer Services Charter (JRA 2007), 72 
percent or 8 665 of the reported 12 028 potholes had been fixed within 3 days against its 
target of a higher 90 percent. Further, the JRA said it had repaired 144 432 potholes rather 
than the 88 000 targeted repairs under its activities in support of the implementation of the 
IDP at a cost of R26.5 million to its operating budget (JRA 2014a, pp. 85, 100). 
2014 April 24 The JRA released a statement that it was "serious about service delivery" (JRA 2014b) and 
released its "Find and Fix" application for testing, the "first of its kind in the Southern 
hemisphere" (JRA 2014b), with mapping and photographing functionality. It also offered 
Twitter, Facebook and e-mail options as well (iTWeb 2013b, 2014a, b; JRA 2014b; 2015) 
2014 May 14 The JRA officially launched "Find and Fix" after having taken the public's comments into 
account. In response to criticism that the public was doing the JRA's job, the JRA said it would 
continue to do its own "pre-emptive inspections" (iTWeb 2014b). Ultimately, the potholes 
protest resulted in budget reprioritised from road surfacing to pothole repair, establishment 
of (short-lived) partnerships, more clarity about tricky problems and the creation of 
innovative solutions, such as Find and Fix. 
"New approach" to Paid-Parking in Parkhurst 
2014 July 3 Executive Director of Transportation, Lisa Seftel, announced in her press release (COJ 2014d) 
that after the Mayoral Committee had approved the 'new approach', it had had a number of 
further consultations. It then agreed to install bollards to protect sidewalk space and 
wheelchair ramps within 2 months; investigate park and ride and shuttle services within the 
area to "alleviate parking problems" (ibid.); and end the "regulation of day time parking" 
(ibid.) in Parkhurst along Fourth Avenue, and that the partnership with the community was 
set to continue (Saxonwold and Parkwood Residents Association 2012; ioL 2014b). 
2014 July 7 Protestors in Parkhurst announced that the outcome was a "victory" (ioL 2014b), paid-
parking was being phased out by the end of the month, and that it was "thrilled the city 
listened to our concerns" (ibid.). 
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Note the following references used, in addition to those stated: 
All middle-class protests The Workbook Databank Analysis and individual Databanks contain details and sources for each protest. 
Dogs and cats by-laws Interviews and Data Summaries (Talwar 2012, Phakathi 2012) and various sources (Province of Gauteng 2006; Showdogs 2006; COJ 2010m; 
Hope for Homeless Animals Foundation 2010; COJ 2014b). 
Paid-parking scheme Interviews and Data Summaries (Letsoalo-Ngcobo 2012, Phakathi, 2012, Truluck 2012) and various sources (SACN 2007; COJ 2011}; Mervyn 
Smith Attorneys 2012; iol News Online 2014b). 
Parkhurst Library Interview and Data Summary (Truluck 2012). 
Pointsmen partnership Interviews and Data Summaries (Phakathi 2012, Talwar 2012) and various sources (iTWeb 2011h; OUTsurance 2011; BizCommunity 2012; 
Classic FM 2012; Traffic Freeflow 2014) 
Pothole protest Interviews and Data Summaries (Letsoalo-Ngcobo 2012, Phakathi 2012) and various sources (New York Times 2009b; Advertising Age 2010; 
COJ 2010a; Daily Maverick 2010a, b; Harmony Central 2010; Municipal IQ 2010j; COJ 2011a; COJ 2011t; EWN 2011c; Rail Road Association 
of South Africa 2011; Sowetan 2011a; City Press 2012; COJ 2013j; Financial Mail 2014; COJ 2015d) 
Rea Vaya Interview and Data Summary (Cox 2012) and various sources (COJ 2008a; Rea Vaya 2008; COJ 2009e; Rosebank Management District 2009, 
2010; COJ 2011z; ioL Motoring Industry News 2011; Mobilitate 2011; news24 2011a; Rosebank Management District 2011a, b, c; Pernegger 
2014a; South African Jewish Report 2014). 
Sandton Rates Boycott Interviews and Data Summaries (Khabakazi 2012, Peacock 2012) and various main sources (Fedsure et al. vs. GJTMC et al. 1998a; 1998b, c; 
Tomlinson 1999; Camay & Gordon 2004; COJ 2006h; Hunter & Phakathi 2010; Clarno 2013). Refer also to various other sources (Knight 
1986; Beavon 1997; Lawrie 1997; The Globe and Mail 1997; Emdon 1998; GJMC 1999e; Beall et al. 2000b; Business Day 2001; COJ 2001a; 
Visser 2001; ioL 2002b; 2003g, h; iTWeb 2003; Reddy 2003; Camay & Gordon 2004; Cameron 2006; van den Berg et al. 2006; Van Ryneveld 
2006; iTWeb 2007; Lipietz 2008; iTWeb 2009a; Faull & Rawoot 2011; Powell 2012; Peu Group 2015). 
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23 Additional Digital Annexures 
URLs provided on request, located in DropBox folders. 
No Name Description 
0 Thesis Main thesis document and its parts in digital format, MS Word and PDF formats, about 515 
pages, 30mB 
1 Research Milestones  Detailed milestones of the research process, MS Word format, 2 pages, 0.1mB 
2 Summary of Six Research 
Outputs Online 
This Table with URLS to each output, MS Word format, 1 page 
3 Academic Library About 1 600 references including documents where possible and notes, which were used in 
this thesis in compressed EndNote library, .enlx file, file format  
4 Databanks 49 themed collections of primary data in 1253 files in 22 folders, 34 750 pages, 4.2gB 
5 Databank Analysis 
Workbook  
MS Excel workbook of data mined from Databanks, about 60 worksheets, 580 pages, 11mB 
6 Protest Timeline 
Workbook 
MS Excel workbook of analysis of protest data, about 69 worksheets, 230 pages, 4mB 
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